Session 9 Flashcards Preview

Corporate Governance > Session 9 > Flashcards

Flashcards in Session 9 Deck (17):
1

What is the definition of a family firm?

a firm, of any size, is a family business, if:
1.) the majority of decision-making rights is in the possession of the natural person(s) who established the firm, or in the possession of the natural person(s) who has/have acquired the share capital of the firm, or in the possession of their spouses, parents, child or children's direct heirs
2.) the majority of decision-making rights are indirect or direct
3.) at least one representative of the family or kin is formally involved in the governance of the firm

2

How does the F-PEC Scale divide?

- F-PEC Power Subscale
- F-PEC Experience Subscale
- F-PEC Culture Subscale

3

How does the F-PEC Power Subscale divide?

- ownership (direct and indirect)
- governance (family and nonfamily (external) board members)
- management (family and nonfamily (external) board members)

4

How does the F-PEC Experience Subscale divide?

- generation of ownership
- generation active in management
- generation active on the governance board
- number of contributing family members

5

How does the F-PEC Culture Subscale divide?

- overlap between family values and business values
- family business commitment

6

Was sagt Klein in seinem Paper: "Family Businesses in Germany: Significance and Structure"?

- Bedeutung von Familienunternehmen für deutsche Wirtschaft und ihre Struktur auf Eigentum, Regierungsgewalt und Management
- Eigentum ist der Schlüssel zur Differenzierung von Familien- und Nichtfamilienunternehmen
- da Regierungsgewalt und Management komplementär zueinander, suchen Familien Einfluss durch Familienmitglieder im Aufsichtsrat oder im Vorstand

7

Was sagen Becht/Röell in ihrem Text: "Blockholdings in Europe: An international comparison"?

- hoher Grad von Konzentration der Stimmrechte der Anteilseigner in Bezug auf die USA und UK
- Beziehung zwischen großen und schwachen Mehrheitsaktionären ist wichtig
- genau wie Schnittstelle zwischen Management und verstreuten Aktionären

8

What is the characteristic of the agency conflict I (owner-manager conflict)?

familiy controlled firms are an example of a corporation where the classic owner-manager conflict is mitigated..
- due to the large shareholder's greater incentives to monitor the manager
- due to family members also working as managers

9

What is the characteristic of the agency conflict II (expropriation of (minority) non-family shareholders)?

families as large shareholders may use its controlling position in the firm to extract private benefits at the expense of the small shareholders

10

What are the advantages of family firms and performance?

- long term orientation
- few hierarchy levels
- flexibility, quick decision-making
- strong and stable owners
- regional embeddedness
- owner = manager

11

What are the disadvantages of family firms and performance?

- succession problems?
- nepotism?
- family conflicts
- resource limitations
- exploitation of minority shareholders
- family goals ≠ firm goals

12

Was sagt Andres in seinem Text: "Large shareholders and firm performance - An empirical examination of founding-family ownership"?

- Beziehung zwischen Familenunternehmen und Unternehmensperformance
- Familienbetriebe sind profitabler als weit verbreitete Unternehmen und als Unternehmen mit anderen Typen von Blockholdern
-Performance von Familienunternehmen ist nur besser in Unternehmen, wo die Gründungsfamilie noch aktiv ist entweder in der Geschäftsleitung oder im Aufsichtsrat
- Unternehmenserfolg nur unter bestimmten Bedingungen
- wenn Familien nur Großaktionäre ohne Vorstandsvertretung sind, ist die Leistung ihrer Unternehmen nicht unterscheidbar von anderen Firmen
- andere Aktionäre beeinflussen entweder Unternehmensperformance negativ oder haben keinen Einfluss

13

What is the definition of socio-emotional wealth (SEW)?

Non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family's affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty

14

Why do firm owners give their company into a foundation?

- returning money to society
- no children
- safeguarded revenue of the children
- protection from M&A's
- avoiding family conflicts

15

What are the goals of a firm?

- high profits
- high level of long-run competitiveness
- high wages and employment security

16

What are the goals of the foundation?

- high dividends -->
- spending money for social purposes
- realizing the intention of the founder

17

What are the private benefits of control?

1. self-dealing
2. dilution
3. amenities
4. reputation