shapiro-stiglitz Flashcards

1
Q

Assumptions

A

I –> workers

N–> firms

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2
Q

effort level

A

ê (e bar) or 0

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3
Q

probability of job destruction at time t0

A

P(t)=e<span>-b(t-to)</span>

<span>b>0</span>

=P(t+tau)/P(t)

=e-b(tau)

(probability of being employed at time t is independent of t+tau)

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4
Q

job breakups occur with probability

A

b

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5
Q

detection of shirking follows a ______ process

A

poisson

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6
Q

detection of shirking occurs with probability __ per unit time

A

q

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7
Q

VE

A

value of being employed and exherting effort

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8
Q

unemployed workers find employment at rate __ per unit time

A

a

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9
Q

Vu

A

value of being unemployed

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10
Q

worker discount rate is__

A

p (rho)

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11
Q

wage

A

w

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12
Q

no shirking condition

A

pVs=w-(b+q)(Vs-Vu)

pVu= 0+a(VE-VU)

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13
Q

given effort cant exceed ebar, no incentive to pay any excess so

A

VE=VS

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14
Q

VE-Vu=

A

ebar/q

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15
Q

wage needed to induce effort

w=

A

ebar + (a+b+p)(ebar/q)

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16
Q

wage is decreasing in:

A

probability that shirkers are detected q

17
Q

in steady state

A

movements in and out of employment balance

18
Q

Number of workers becoming unemployed per unit time=

A

Nhb

19
Q

Lbar=

A

total # of available workers

20
Q

L=

A

workers exherting effort hired per firm

21
Q

product of labor

A

F

22
Q

Marginal product of labor=

A

F

23
Q

firms hire up to the point where the marginal product of labor equals the ____

A

wage

24
Q

is there a wage at full employment that can deter shirking?

A

no

25
Q

the firms problem is to _________________

A

set wage high enough to prevent shirking, then choose L

26
Q

if there were perfect monitoring of shirking, there would be_____

A

full employment

27
Q

equilibrium occurs where the__________________

A

the aggregate demand for labor intersects the no shirking condition

28
Q

if wage goes up

A

fewer workers are demanded L down

29
Q

eq for number of of workers becoming unemployed per unit time:

A

NLb

30
Q

eq for number of unemployed workers finding jobs:

A

(Lbar-NL)a