Test 2

Question 1

Winner only election

Answer 1

Only the highest 3 of first place votes wins.

Question 2

Ranked

Answer 2

Each place is listed in order by number of votes.

Question 3

Single choice ballot

Answer 3

Voters select only their preferred candidate.

Question 4

preference ballot

Answer 4

voters order their candidates from first choice to last choice. not necessary in a plurality method.

Question 5

Truncated preference ballot

Answer 5

Voters order their top candidates and ignore the rest.

Question 6

Ties

Answer 6

Sometimes they are allowed such as MVP or academy awards. not allowed in politics because who would have power? Should be decided on how to break a tie before the vote begins. Constitution determines what would happen for president if there were a tie. Could be a run off election, draw from a deck of cards or coin toss.

Question 7

Winner only election in plurality

Answer 7

Candidates with most 1st place votes wins

Question 8

Borda Count

Answer 8

A voting method that assigns points to positions on the ballot and ranks candidates according to the number of points.

Question 9

weighted voting system

Answer 9

a formal voting arrangement where the voters are not necessarily equal in terms of the number of votes they control.

Question 10

motion

Answer 10

a vote between two options (yes and no)

Question 11

Player

Answer 11

a voter in a weighted voting system

Question 12

dictator

Answer 12

a player whose weight is bigger or equal to the quota.

Question 13

coalition

Answer 13

a set of players that join forces and agree to vote together

Question 14

critical player

Answer 14

in a winning coalition, a player without whom the coalition would be a losing coalition. The one that tips the vote to win.

Question 15

critical count

Answer 15

for each player, the number of winning coalitions in which the player is a critical player.

Question 16

Banzhaf power index

Answer 16

for each player, the ratio of the times that a player is critical divided by the total number of times any player is critical

Question 17

Banzhaf power distribution

Answer 17

A list consisting of the Banzhaf power indexes of all the players.

Question 18

sequential coalition

Answer 18

an ordered listing of all the players

Question 19

pivotal player

Answer 19

in a sequential coalition, as the votes are tallied from left to right, the first player whose votes make the total equal to or higher than the quota

Question 20

pivotal count

Answer 20

for each player, the number of sequential coalitions in which the player is a pivotal player.

Question 21

Shapley-Shubik power index

Answer 21

for each player, the ratio SS/N!, where SS is the players’ pivotal count and N is the number of players.

Question 22

Shapley-Shubik power distribution

Answer 22

A listing consisting of the Shapley-Shubrik power indexes of all the players

Question 23

plurality method

Answer 23

a voting method that ranks candidates based on the number of first-place votes they receive.

Question 24

Condorcet candidate

Answer 24

a candidate that beats all the other candidates in pairwise comparisons

Question 25

plurality-with-elimination method

Answer 25

a voting method that chooses the candidate with a majority of the votes; when there isn’t one it eliminates the candidate(s) with the least votes and transfers those votes to the next highest candidate on those ballots, continuing this way until there is a majority candidate.

Question 26

method of pairwise comparisons

Answer 26

a voting method based on head-to-head comparisons between candidates that assigns one point to the winner of each comparison, none to the lower, and 1/2 point to each of the two candidates in the case of a tie.

Question 27

majority criterion

Answer 27

a fairness criterion that says that when a candidate receives a majority of the firs-place votes, the candidate should be the winner of the election.

Question 28

Condorcet criterion

Answer 28

a fairness criterion that says when there is a condorcet candidate then that candidate should be thew inner of the election.

Question 29

monotonicity criterion

Answer 29

a fairness criterion that says that a candidate that would otherwise win an election should not lose the election merely because some voters changed their ballots in a manner that favors that candidate.

Question 30

independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives criterion

Answer 30

a criterion that says that a candidate that would otherwise win an election should not lose the election merely because one of the losing candidates withdraws from the race.

Question 31

Arrows-impossibility theorem

Answer 31

a theorem that demonstrates that a voting method that is guaranteed to always produce fair outcomes is a mathematical impossibility.

Question 32

standard quota

Answer 32

for a state with population p, the ratio p/SD; it represents what the fair apportionment to the state would be if the seats were divisible into factional parts.

Question 33

upper quota

Answer 33

the states standard quota rounded up. no matter what it rounds up.

Question 34

lower quota

Answer 34

states standard quota rounded down. no matter what it rounds down.

Question 35

Hamilton’s method

Answer 35

uses the standard divisor and standard quotas; first gives each state its lower quota, then gives out surplus seats according to the “remainders” highest remainder first and so on.

Question 36

Jefferson’s method

Answer 36

a divisor method that produces an apportionment by using modified quotas that are always rounded down

Question 37

modified quota

Answer 37

a quota obtained using a modified divisor

Question 38

Adam’s method

Answer 38

a divisor method that produces an appointment by using modified quotas that are always rounded up.

Question 39

Webster’s method

Answer 39

a divisor method that produces an apportionment by using modified quotas that are rounded using conventional rounding.

Question 40

geometric mean

Answer 40

to figure geometric mean of a and b calculate the square root of a*b

Question 41

Huntington-Hill mehod

Answer 41

a divisor method that produces an apportionment by using modified quotas that are rounded according to the geometric mean.

Question 42

quota rule

Answer 42

a state should never be apportioned less than its lower quota or more than its upper quota

Question 43

upper-quota violation

Answer 43

an apportionment of seats to a state that is less than the state’s upper quota

Question 44

lower-quota violation

Answer 44

an apportionment of seats to a state that is less than the state’s lower quota

Question 45

population paradox

Answer 45

an apportionment paradox where a state may lose seats to another state merely because its population increased at a higher rate.

Question 46

new-states paradox

Answer 46

an apportionment paradox where a state may lose seats to another state merely because a new state, together with its apportionment of seats have been added to the apportionment calculations

Question 47

Balinski and Young’s Impossibility theorem

Answer 47

a perfect apportionment method (no violations of the quota rule and no apportionment paradoxes) is a mathematical impossibility.

Question 48

determine standard divisor (SD)

Answer 48

divide total population by number of seats

Question 49

determine number of seats per state

Answer 49

divide each state population by SD

Question 50

Alabama Paradox

Answer 50

An appointment where a state may lose seats to another state merely because of an increase in the number of seats being apportioned,