7300 - Dr. Jensen

Question 1

Battle Network Five Elements
7301-3 Battle Networks

Answer 1

5 Elements (Harrison framework)
Sensor Element
Communications Element
Processing Element
Decision Element
Effects Element

Question 2

Battle Network Definition
7301-3 Battle Networks

Answer 2

Jensen reading – Concept of a battle network “Unlike traditional military theory, which emphasizes massing combat power, the battle network focuses on precision and optimization. New information technologies, to include AI, produce military power by channeling information to enable greater degrees of precision and efficiency. The concept emerged, as Barry Watts’s seminal study illustrates, in the 1940 Battle of Britain. To counter German air attacks, the RAF used long-range sensor data in the form of radar returns to launch counter-air sorties…

Question 3

Sensor Element
7301-3 Battle Networks

Answer 3

Sensors of all sorts - collect data - what is happening in the battlespace

Question 4

Communications Element
7301-3 Battle Networks

Answer 4

Provides data links that pass information among systems & operators

Gateways – used to connect systems across a variety of protocols

Factors: Latency, Probability of Detection & intercept, resilience to jamming/spoofing/weather

Lasercom systems – great for data & not observable/ jammable, but not good for broadcasting & susceptible to interference (wx, etc.)

LEO Satellites for Lasercom – DARPA

Question 5

Processing Element
7301-3 Battle Networks

Answer 5

analyze, aggregate, adn synthesize data from a variety of sensor sources to inform decisions
- Processing on site, on the sensor, or transmit data to the cloud for processing

Question 6

Decision Element
7301-3 Battle Networks

Answer 6

Where a decision is translated to action
AI/ML go a step further to assist decision-making and automate some decision that do not necessarily require a human-in-the-loop

Question 7

Effects Element
7301-3 Battle Networks

Answer 7

Where information is turned into effects in the battlespace

Question 8

Virtual Attrition
7301-3 Battle Networks

Answer 8

• Not just killing EN assets, but delay/disrupt your capability
  
  • Bay of Biscay – threatening German Subs by RAF forced them to operate in a less efficient way. That led to a reduced amount of time any given U-Boat could operate against convoys
    ○ THE INDIRECT REDUCTION OF EN CAPABILITY IS THE SAME FROM AN EFFECT STANDPOINT AS ATTRITING THEM = VIRTUAL ATTRITION
  • You don’t have to kill the thing, you have to remove it / make it irrelevant
  • SIF & EABOs – best case scenario isn’t denying EN assets – it is a Bay of Biscay model
    ○ Degrade EN capabilities
  • UNDERSTAND THE NETWORK COMPETITION THAT IS GOING ON & FIGURE OUT AN INDIRECT WAY THAT YOU ARE DEFEATING THE EFFECTS
  • Selection of effects and measurement is critical to let us know if what we are doing is effective
  • How do you set up a competition for effects to cost more for the enemy than they do for you

Question 9

Defeat Mechanisms
7301-3 Battle Networks

Answer 9

US Army: Destroy, Dislocate, Disintegrate, Isolate
UK: Destruction, Dislocation, Disruption

They provide a useful tool for describing how a JFC intends to achieve an operational or strategic objective and ensure understanding of the commander’s intent by establishing common references for force employment.”

Question 10

Decision Centric Warfare (Frank Hoffman)
7301-3

Answer 10

DCW – Attrition is obsolete
○ “It’s much more about decision-making and creating dilemmas for an enemy….DOD should embrace a new theory of victory and operational concepts focused on making better & faster decisions than adversaries…decision dominance…”

Question 11

Systems Warfare (Rob Work)
7301-3

Answer 11

• “Joint forces should aim to field battle networks that “operate better and faster than adversary operational systems and ones that cannot be destroyed like the battle networks used today.”
  
  • Sees the Battle Networks as the key weapons

Question 12

Deep Battle
7301-1

Answer 12

Deep battle envisaged the breaking of the enemy’s forward defenses, or tactical zones, through combined arms assaults, which would be followed up by fresh uncommitted mobile operational reserves sent to exploit the strategic depth of an enemy front.

Question 13

Isserson (Deep Battle)
7301-1

Answer 13

Evolution: Napoleon–> Single point, Moltke –> multiple separate points, 20th Cent –> continuous line
- ○ “Development of the main features of an operation – its lateral dispersion and distribution in depth.”
○ No assets to exploit breaches / gaps in line.

“Senseless to break down a door if there was no one to go through.” 37

“A series of successive operations is a modern operation.” 48

“We are facing a new epoch in military art, and that we have to shift from a linear strategy to a deep strategy.” 48

“A modern operation is an operation in depth. It must be planned for the entire depth, and it must be prepared to overcome the entire depth” 55

A contemporary operation for a deep breakthrough is a unique combination of two types of maneuver. The attack echelon which breaks the front, occupies a broad continues line. The break through echelon operates on interior operational lines to inflict a concentrated depth-to-depth blow….synthesis of two types of maneuver. 70

Question 14

Operational Art
7301-1

Answer 14

JP 5-0 “Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and evaluating risks.”

Army “the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose.”

Question 15

Lykke National Security Stool
7301-2 Decision Making

Answer 15

Question 16

Heuristics
7301-2 Decision Making

Answer 16

Kahneman & Taversky

Mental shortcuts that can facilitate problem-solving and probability judgments. These strategies are generalizations, or rules-of-thumb, reduce cognitive load, and can be effective for making immediate judgments, however, they often result in irrational or inaccurate conclusions.

Cautionary that heuristics can lead to bias / poor decisions.

Question 17

Natural Decision Making
7301-2 Decision Making

Answer 17

Gary Klein - basically says heuristics are good

The Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) community defines intuition as based on large numbers of patterns gained through experience, resulting in different forms of tacit knowledge. This view contrasts with Fast and Frugal Heuristics (FFH) researchers, who view intuition in terms of general purpose heuristics. The NDM view also differs from the Heuristics and Biases (HB) community, which sees intuitions as a source of bias and error. Seven suggestions are offered to assist the FFH and H&B communities in improving intuitive decision making and in conducting research that has greater potential for application.

Rather than trying to help people analyze which option to choose, the NDM community recommends that intuitions be strengthened by providing a broader experience base that lets people build better tacit knowledge, such as perceptual skills and richer mental models, as a means of achieving better decisions.

Question 18

Space Operational Environment (JP 3-14 Space Operations)
7301-4 Cyber & Space

Answer 18

The space domain is the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible. Like the air, land, and maritime domains, space is a physical domain where military, civil, and commercial activities are conducted. Space is a medium in, from, and to which activities are conducted to cause or enable actions throughout an operational environment (OE). Space activities and operations may create effects in other domains, and activities and operations in other domains may create effects in space.

Generally >100km MSL

“Space underpins all instruments of our national power, and access to and freedom to maneuver in the domain are foundational to the US’s status as a great power. -p.1 Space Threat Assessment

Question 19

Space Mission Areas
7301-4 Cyber & Space

Answer 19

Space Domain Awareness
Offensive Space Operations
Defensive Space Operations
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
Intelligence, Surveillance & reconnaissance
Satellite Communications
Environmental Monitoring
Missile Warning
Nuclear Detonation Detection
Spacecraft Operations
Spacelift

Question 20

Types of Counter Space Weapons
7301-4 Cyber & Space

Answer 20

Kinetic physical - strike directly or explode near a satellite or ground station - 3 types - direct ascent anti-satellite, co-orbital ASAT, and ground station attack
(ASAT = anti-satellite)

Non-kinetic physical - physical effects without making physical contact (lasers, high-powered microwave (HPM), nuclear EMP

Electronic - target the EM spectrum through which space systems transmit & receive data. Jammers, Spoofers, meaconing (Meaconing is the interception and rebroadcast of navigation signals. These signals are rebroadcast on the received frequency, typically with power higher than the original signal, to confuse enemy navigation. Consequently, aircraft or ground stations are given inaccurate bearings.)

Question 21

Cyberspace Operations (JP 3-12)
7301-4 Cyber & Space

Answer 21

Cyberspace operations (CO) are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. A cyberspace capability is a device or computer program, including any combination of software, firmware, or hardware, designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace.

Question 22

3 Types of Cyberspace Missions (JP 3-12)
7301-4 Cyber & Space

Answer 22

1) Offensive Cyberspace Operations
2) Defensive Cyberspace Operations
3) DODIN

Question 23

Cyberspace Layer Model (JP 3-12)
7301-4 Cyber & Space

Answer 23

To assist in the planning and execution of CO, cyberspace can be described in terms of three interrelated layers: physical network, logical network, and cyber-persona.

Question 24

Computational Propaganda
7301-5 Information & Deception

Answer 24

“Computational propaganda is a term that neatly encapsulates this recent phenomenon - and emerging field of study - of digital misinformation and manipulation. As a communicative practice, computational propaganda describes the use of algorithms, automation, and human curation to purposefully manage and distribute misleading information over social media networks.” p. 3

Question 25

Deception Examples
7301-5 Information & Deception

Answer 25

Task Force Troy - Gen Draude in Desert Storm
Luftwaffe Deception - dummy installations, decoy fires, simulating pathfinder markers. “Cat & Mouse”

Japaneese Ruse that their torpedo boats were ivo England - led to Dogger bank incident

Question 26

MILDEC Definition (JP 3-31.4)
7301-5 Information & Deception

Answer 26

Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or VEO decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.
- “Mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces.” I-1

Dr. Jensen sees deception as most aligned with surprise and economy of force

Question 27

3 Categories of MILDEC
7301-5 Information & Deception

Answer 27

Joint MILDEC
DISO
Tactical Deception (TAC-D)

Question 28

MILDEC Means
7301-5 Information & Deception

Answer 28

Physical - movement, exercises, dummy/decoy, tactical actions, log actions, test & eval, recon & surveillance

Technical - Emission, Multimedia,

Administrative - resources, methods & techniques to convey or deny oral/pictorial/doc/physical evidence

Question 29

MILDEC Techniques
7301-5 Information & Deception

Answer 29

Feints, Demonstrations, Ruses, Displays

Question 30

Magruder Principle
7301-5 Information & Deception

Answer 30

It is generally easier to induce a deception target to maintain a preexisting belief than to deceive the deception target for the purpose of changing that belief. The German Army did this to the US Army in their Operation “WACHT AM RHEIN,” meaning “Watch on the Rhine.” Even the code name for their winter offensive in the Ardennes in 1944 connoted a defensive operation, which is what US forces believed would occur.

Question 31

MILDEC Components
7301-5 Information & Deception

Answer 31

MILDEC Goal - statement of the purpose

MILDEC Objective - a concise statement of what the MILDEC will cause the adversary to do or not do

Deception Target - adversary decision maker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective

Conduits to target - info or intel gateways to the deception target

Deception story - succinct statement or narrative of exactly what the MILDEC planner wants the target to believe to be the true situation, then decide and act on that basis…

Question 32

Five Features of Competitive Strategy (Mahnken article)

7301-6 What is Competitive Strategy and Campaign Analysis

Answer 32

1) First, it presupposes a concrete, sophisticated opponent

2) Assume interaction between competitors - assumes that one competitor makes strategic choices at least in part due to the actions of the other

3) Acknowledges that the choices competitors have open to them are constrained…the competitive strategies approach seeks to identify and exploit those constraints.

4) Acknowledges that interaction may play out over the course of years or decades. It is interested not only in influencing the use of forces but also in research and development, acquisition, and deployment over time.

5) Assumes sufficient understanding of the competitor to be able to formulate and implement a long-term competitive strategy.’

- 12 - THE LOGIC OF COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES "Competitive strategies try to get competitors to play our game, a game that we are likely to win. This is done by getting them to make the kind of mistakes that they are inclined to make, by getting them to do that which is in their nature, despite the fact that they should not do so, given their resources…Greek tragedy…
- 15 - The competitive strategies approach understands that organization may be locked into routines that lead to error because thy led to success in the past and that individuals may be locked into "lessons learned" that have served them well in the past but can be inappropriate at a given time
- 16 - Doesn't assume EN is stupid - they have blindspots & we have blind spots - we need to leverage cognitive asymmetry

Question 33

Science of Military Strategy

7301-6 What is Competitive Strategy and Campaign Analysis

Answer 33

The PLA defines the “science of strategy” as “the discipline of studying the overall situation and rules of war, national defense, and army building”.

2020 - Published by PLA

Use the word “Strategic” a lot

Emphasize that China is peace-loving

Ch. 1 Intro to Strategy
Ch. 2 Strategic Judgment
Ch. 3 Strategic Decision
Ch. 4 Strategic Planning
CH. 5 Strategy Implementation
Ch. 6 Strategic Evaluation
Part II
Ch. 7 Prevention and Handling of Military Crisis
Ch. 8 Strategic Deterrence
Ch. 9 Military Conflict in New Domains
Ch. 10 War Planning
Ch. 11 War Operation
Ch. 12 Battle Situation Control
Ch. 13 Operational Guidance
Ch. 14 Non-War Military Operations
Ch. 15 Overseas Use of Military Forces
Part III
Ch. 16 Strategic Guidance for Military Force Construction and Development
Ch. 17 Army Construction and Development
Ch. 18 Navy Construction & Development
Ch. 19 Air Force Construction & Development
CH. 20 Rocket Force Construction & Development
Ch. 21 Military Space Force Construction & Development
Ch. 22 Construction & Development of Cyberspace Forces
Ch. 23 Construction & Development of Logistics Support Forces
Ch 24 Construction & Development of Armed Police Forces
Ch. 25 Construction & Development of Reserve Forces

Question 34

6 Steps of Campaign Analysis (Tecott & Halterman)
7301-6 What is Competitive Strategy and Campaign Analysis

Answer 34

6 Steps of Campaign Analysis

1) Formulate a question

2) Specify a Scenario - make explicit choices about how to incorporate the political backdrop into an analysis of mil operations

3) Construct a model - “A model is a mathematical or otherwise logically rigorous representation of a system of a system’s behavior
-Don’t make it too complicated - “More complicated models are also more difficult to interpret…”

4) Assign Variables
- Several approaches - “Most Plausible” or “Best estimate”
- Most conservative (be generous to Enemy & stingy with FR)

5) Run Model and Conduct Sensitivity analysis
- “Because researchers are rarely certain about the value of every parameter, they often conduct sensitivity analysis to show how outcomes are affected by changes in key input variables.”
- “Run the analysis twice, seeing how outcomes change as the parameter values change…”

6) Interpret and Present Results
“The most likely outcome is that all nuclear weapons are destroyed” vs. “The probability that at least one nuclear weapon survives is 30 percent.”

Question 35

4 Strategic Concepts / Theories of Victory (Bradford Lee - Theory & History for Practitioners)
7301-6 What is Competitive Strategy and Campaign Analysis

Answer 35

Denial
Cost Imposition
Attacking the Enemy’s Strategy
Attacking the Enemy’s Political System

(Sun Tzu says there are three ways for competitive advantage - 1) Information Superiority 2) Maneuver Warfare 3) Interaction Games (“The Strategist’s Keys”))

Question 36

3 Components of Deterrence
7301-7 Modern Planning and Deterrence

Answer 36

Capability
Credibility
Communication

Question 37

Deterrence
7301-7 Modern Planning and Deterrence

Answer 37

Deny benefits, impose costs, encourage restraint (consequences of action)

- Haffa Reading - "Deterrence is simply the persuasion of one's opponent that the costs and risks of a given course of action outweigh its benefits. The classic focus of deterrence theory has been on creating military capability to prevent taking aggressive military action. Thus, deterrence, for our purpose here, can be defined as "the manipulation of an adversary's estimation of the cost/benefit calculation of taking a given action…thereby convincing the opponent to avoid taking that action."

Question 38

Counterforce
7301-7 Modern Planning and Deterrence

Answer 38

3 Counterforce Strategies
1) Forward Defense
2) Denial
3) Cost-imposition

Question 39

3 Traditional Approaches to Nuclear Survivability
7301-7 Modern Planning and Deterrence

Answer 39

1) Hardening 2) Concealment 3) Redundancy

Question 40

Entanglement
7301.8 Conventional Deterrence

Answer 40

Nuclear forces overlapping with conventional forces (China’s missiles, same bomber/sub carrying conventional & nuclear weapons…)
Creates ambiguity & risks miscalculation…Vulnerability & Uncertainty - leads to worst case biasing & escalation

Question 41

Key Deterrence Thinkers & Thoughts
7301.7 Modern Planning & Deterrence **

Question 42

COFM
7301-9 Military Innovation: Generating Military Power and Effectiveness

Answer 42

Correlation of Forces and Means

COFM in today’s Russia is almost exclusively a military assessment that refers to an operational planning tool within the armed forces. It has additional applications in force-structure planning, weapons development, and other strategic decisionmaking…

“Put simply, combat potential in the context of a COFM calculation is a means to quantify the value of a weapon with a single numeric indicator, or the coefficient of combat potential…

Question 43

Cult of the Offensive

7301-9 Military Innovation: Generating Military Power and Effectiveness

Answer 43

Snyder reading
- 109 - “Why then were theses self-defeating, war-causing strategies adopted (WWI outbreak, etc.)? Although the particulars varied from country to country, in each case strategic policymaking was skewed by a pathological pattern of civil-military relations that allowed or encouraged the military to use wartime operational strategy to solve its institutional problems. When strategy went awry, it was because a penchant for offense helped the military organization to preserve its autonomy, prestige, and traditions, to simplify its institutional routines, or to resolve a dispute within the organization…”
110 “In part, then, the ‘cult of the offensive’ of 1914 reflected the endemic preference of military organizations for offensive strategies

125 Mismatch between mil strategy & Diplomacy - “If German diplomats had devised a military strategy on their own, it is by no means certain that they would have come up with anything like the Schlieffen Plan. This all-or-nothing operational scheme fit poorly with the diplomatic strategy of expansion by means of brinkmanship and controlled, coercive pressure, which they pursued until 1914.

Question 44

Confounding Variables
Intervening Variables

7301-9 Military Innovation: Generating Military Power and Effectiveness

Answer 44

Confounding variable - “What else will explain” (murder rate in summer & ice cream sales in summer…ice cream sales don’t cause murders)

Intervening Variables - changing a factor that changes the outcome

Question 45

Military Power

7301-9 Military Innovation: Generating Military Power and Effectiveness

Answer 45

Military power: the use of military instruments to alter the behavior of a target in a direct or indirect manner

Ends = change behavior (what)
Ways = concept of employment (how)
Means = some combination of military instruments applied in a direct or indirect manner (with)

Note: No definition of Mil Power in JP 1-02, NSS, NMS, QDR

Question 46

Mil Innovation Process (3 steps)

7301-9 Military Innovation: Generating Military Power and Effectiveness

Answer 46

Graphic

Question 47

China’s Top 5 war Plans (Ian Easton reading)
7301-10 Introduction to Modern PLA Concepts

Answer 47

○ Joint Firepower strike operations against Taiwan
○ Joint Blockade Operations against Taiwan
○ Joint Attack Operations against Taiwan
○ Joint Anti-Air Raid Operations
○ Joint Border Area Operations

Dec 31 2015 China started a “sweeping military reorganization and reform program” to build a joint force
China’s foremost objective is to conquer ROC while deterring, delaying, or destroying U.S. mil action to assist Taiwan

Question 48

PLA Operational Concepts
7301-10 Introduction to Modern PLA Concepts

Answer 48

Informatized Local Wars. Warfare is confrontation between “information-based systems-of-systems”
-Informatized War - need for superiority in 3 domains - information, air, and maritime…”Three superiorities” that are necessary

Dr. Jensen “Information is main effort - kinetic effects enable information effects.”

3 Operational Concepts
1) War control depends on information dominance
§ Seize info dominance through network warfare - paralyze EN * protect your own
§ Enable rapid & effective decision making
§ Enable Efficient operations -integrating all their systems across services (that sounds nice)
§ Degrade EN decision making for operational advantage - kinetic & non-kinetic attack on EN network sites

2) Combat space (where kinetic action happens) is shrinking but war space (inclusive of everything - space, cyber, legal, political, etc.) has expanded
§ Managing effects within the combat space
§ Full-dimensional campaigns (sounds like integrating WFFs)
§ Employing the three warfares
□ Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare

3) Target-centric warfare (TCW) provides the means to defeat an adversary’s operational system
§ TCW is the concept of attacking critical points in the enemy’s operational system to achieve decisive effects with minimal collateral damage. (also called key target warfare” and “trump card and data link-centric warfare”) - sounds like CV
§ TCW places a premium on info-sharing, delegated decision making, and adaptable units capable of working in new environments using “new type operational forces” (sounds like kill web)

Question 49

Target Centric Warfare
7301-10 Introduction to Modern PLA Concepts

Answer 49

Target-centric warfare (TCW) provides the means to defeat an adversary’s operational system
§ TCW is the concept of attacking critical points in the enemy’s operational system to achieve decisive effects with minimal collateral damage. (also called key target warfare” and “trump card and data link-centric warfare”) - sounds like CV
§ TCW places a premium on info-sharing, delegated decision making, and adaptable units capable of working in new environments using “new type operational forces” (sounds like kill web)

Question 50

System Destruction Warfare
7301-10 Introduction to Modern PLA Concepts

Answer 50

• The PLA characterizes and understands modern warfare as a confrontation between opposing operational systems rather than merely opposing armies. The PLA’s very theory of victory in modern warfare recognizes system destruction warfare as the current method of modern war fighting. Under this theory, warfare is no longer centered on the annihilation of enemy forces on the battlefield. Rather, it is won by the belligerent that can disrupt, paralyze, or destroy the operational capability of the enemy’s operational system…

○ PLA’s current theory of victory is based on successfully waging system destruction warfare…seeks to paralyze and even destroy the critical functions of an enemy’s operational system. According to this theory, the enemy ‘loses the will and ability to resist” once its operational system cannot effectively function…

○ 5 Parts of Operational system
§ Command System, Firepower strike System, Information Confrontation System, Reconnaissance-Intel System, Support System

Question 51

AirSea Battle (Krapinetovich article)
7301-11 A2AD and Analogies

Answer 51

• US deciding between being denied access to vital area or exploring ways to ensure access
• “Recently the USAF & USN Agreed to address the issue…Operational concept called AirSea Battle which appears designed to assess how US power projection capabilities can be preserved in the face of the military challenges posed by China & Iran
• Need to be concerned with China’s ability to challenge us by disrupting FOM & narrow our strategic options

AirSea Battle - 2009 - ADM Roughead

Question 52

Types of Advantage
7301-4: CONOP II

Answer 52

A position of relative advantage
in 1) space and 2) time with a
3) favorable COFM (forces) that also
4) maintains freedom of action (options)