Chapter 17 - Institutions and Economic Policy Flashcards

1
Q

What is the Credibility Bias? (or inflation bias)

A

Policy makers promise that they will keep inflation = 0, people believe this and expected inflation also = 0.

  • policymaker has incentive to deviate and pursue a more inflationary policy
  • promise to keep inflation = 0 not credible
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2
Q

Phillips curve with output on one axis and inflation on other.

Is PC downward or upward sloping?

A

upward sloping.

  • given level of expectations, higher inflation = stimulates output
  • higher output, bids up price of scarce resources and causes inflation
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3
Q

Phillips curve with unemployment on one axis and inflation on the other axis.

Is PC downward or upward sloping?

A

Downward sloping.

  • UE, inversely related to output
  • as output increases UE falls
  • lower the UE, higher avg wage increases made by firms and higher inflation will be
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4
Q

how could inflation bias be removed from MP?

A

1) Fixed norm for inflation
- passing law that requires CB to keep inflation at some low level/ fixed norm for inflation
- ability to stabilise output may be curtailed
- CB doesn’t have complete control over inflation (rules for when inflation falls out of a certain range)

2) MP rule
- CB has to follow specific rule for any given circumstance
- difficult to make rule for each situation
- making incomplete rules = limits flexibility

3) LT contracts
- giving board members of CB long-term contracts can ensure they care about the LT effect of their policies

4) Contract for the CB
- delegate all policy making decisions to an independent body and set up incentives for that body to keep inflation low

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5
Q

What solutions to inflation bias doe BOE employ?

A
  • Explicit inflation target of 2%
  • MP setting its objectives to be:
    1) maintain price stability
    support economic policy of

2) Gov including objectives of growth & employment

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6
Q

3 different responses to fiscal crisis

A

1) Reduce the primary deficit
- time required to increase taxes and reduce gov expenditure

2) Debt monetisation
- where the CB buys gov bonds financed by an increase in the monetary base
- bonds have repayments fixed in nominal terms = high inflation lowers value in real terms
- issue: expansion of MB = increased inflation and may increase future cost of borrowing

3) Default
- stopping payment of interest and repaying bonds that mature, the government’s debt burden immediately vanishes
- issue: difficult for government to borrow on the market again
- if it can it will be at a very high rate

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7
Q

𝜆1 > 𝜆2

interpret the candidates and which one is more inflation-averse
i.e. will target lower inflation at expense of higher UE

(also what policy will they pursue?)

A

high 𝜆 indicates a higher weight on UE
- strong incentive to pursue expansionary policy to reduce UE
(candidate 1)

low 𝜆 is more inflation averse. Candidate 2 - lower decision weight on UE and higher decision weight on inflation, therefore will target a lower level of inflation than candidate 1

Choice of candidates in the LR

  • in LR UE converges to natural level irrespective of MP
  • however choosing a more inflation averse head = lower LR inflation
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8
Q

Long Run debt ratio equation

A

D/Y = [(G - T +iD)/Y]/ 𝜋 + 𝑔

D/Y = (deficit/GDP) / GR of nominal GDP

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9
Q

Questions with loss functions and Phillips curve

A
  • When wage setters can perfectly see inflation rate chosen by policy makers, set expected inflation equal to actual inflation
  • λ = high, higher weight on employment therefore less care on inflation
  • a = low, means flatter Phillips curve
  • both combined = expansionary policy to reduce UE but at risk of high inflation
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10
Q

Calculating government expenditure relative to GDP…

Use equation
∆(D/Y) = (G-T)/Y + (r-g)D/Y

A
  • rearrange to get government expenditure of GDP on LHS
  • to do this set LHS = 0
  • net government debt on RHS is what you multiply (D/Y)

G/Y = T/Y - (r-g) D/Y

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11
Q

Reasons for deficit bias in fiscal policy (3)

A

1) Myopia
- gov can raise expenditure and lower taxes today, w/ costs coming later (power & votes if voters are oblivious to associated costs)
- Voters may be myopic & credit constrained

2) Political fragmentation (& division of power)
- politicians pushing their own specific interests, not taking responsibility for the country as a whole
- even if they agreed on an issue, the execution of its solution = disagreement and can = no action

3) Strategic deficits
- if current party thinks future party will waste resources of gov, it may spend money today to reduce scope of future policy

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12
Q

Why might myopic governments underinvest in public infrastructure?

A

It will care about expenditure that has an immediate payoff than future payoff

  • investment in public infrastructure e.g. transport systems and schools will be lower than is optimal
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13
Q

How can deficit bias be removed?

A

1) Debt targets and ceilings
- relatively permanent commitment on debt = day to day constraint on policy restrictions

2) Budgetary procedures
- make sure effects of fiscal policy are fully considered before measures are passed
- sufficient time given for considering this then policy may be more constrained

3) Delegation
- fiscal policy to independent body
- issue: might lack democratic accountability
- distributional consequences = fiscal policy can get inherently political

4) Fiscal policy councils
- similar to delegation but would give advice on fiscal policy

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14
Q

In a world with FULL Ricardian equivalence, how serious is the problem of high government debt?

A

Individuals take account of utility of future generations

  • if gov cuts taxes, people will save to compensate
  • therefore aggregate consumption, saving and production are unaffected by the level of debt
  • and so is the utility of future generations
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15
Q

Intergenerational redistribution (unlikely that Ricardian equivalence holds, so how does this affect IntR?)

A

People will spend some of their disposable income, thus aggregate savings falls with tax cut.

  • in closed economy = lower capital accumulation
  • with fully integrated FM = capital stock unaffected BUT foreign assets will decline
  • in reality - combo of 2
  • decline in K-stock and foreign assets = future generations are poorer
  • running a deficit, government allows people today to borrow at expense of future generations = redistribution of income from future to current generations

Matter of judgement! productivity increases over time therefore, future generations will probably be better off than those currently living and paying taxes
- also can expect future generations to experience difficulty from environmental problems (CC) and ageing population

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16
Q

Tax smoothing argument

A

Argument for temporary deficits if government consumption varies over time

  • running a deficit when gov consumption is temporarily high and repaying in future periods
  • e.g. during war and natural disasters
17
Q

argument for high government debt would be to force high taxes…

  • does higher steady state level of debt = much higher taxes
  • use equation for ∆ in debt ratio to analyse
A
  • set ∆ in debt ratio (LHS) = 0 to get

T/Y = G/Y + (r-g)*D/Y

  • relation between debt level and taxes depend on relation between real IR and g
  • if r > g then higher tax required
  • if r = g then doesn’t imply higher taxes relative to GDP
  • g, counteracts the effect of IR on debt ratio
  • to keep D/Y constant it is enough to keep the primary deficit = 0
18
Q

Sustainability and fiscal crisis

  • high debt may become unsustainable
  • lenders start to worry debt will not be paid back so require a higher IR to compensate for risk of default
A

When debt is unsustainable some adjustments occur:

1) primary deficit is reduced by increased taxes or reduced government expenditure
2) government defaults on debt
3) CB monetises the debt (buys gov bonds to expand monetary base)

Issues:

1) fierce political resistance to increasing tax
- takes time to cut gov expenditure (mostly wages, involves firing gov employees)
- UE insurance system funded, if they don’t find new job = gov transfers

2) Government defaults
- outright default, government stops paying interest on debt and doesn’t repay bonds
- adv: debt wiped out
- dis: lenders lose trust in gov
- from day of default, gov has to finance all expenditure through tax (cannot borrow)
- gov defaults = bankruptcies of banks and other institutions

3) monetising debt
- increases inflation so real value of debt is reduced
- most bonds, interest payments and repayment fixed in nominal terms therefore reduced realised return
- unexpected high inflation
- investors require higher IR to compensate for inflation