Hong Kong and Taiwan

Question 1

Central thesis of John Caroll

Answer 1

Argues Hong Kong is at a crossroads where Chinese history, British colonial history and world history intersect. Hong Kong was colonised by the British in 1940s. Hong Kong became China’s most crucial link to the rest of the world, for China watchers and for the Chinese to view the west. Traces the development of a Hong Kong identity, arguing this emerged in the 1920s, not in 1970s as commonly claimed. This identity distinct from their counterparts on the mainland was particularly strong during the Chinese Communist Revolution (1927, then Chinese Civil War). By the 1990s, most Chinese in Hong Kong preferred colonial rule

Question 2

Central thesis of Edmund Cheung (Executive Power)

Answer 2

There has been a steady process of hollowing-out of executive power under Tung’s administration since the 1997 handover, resulting from 1) growing political challenges, 2) policy failure, and 3) internal fissures. Tung’s weakness in government was demonstrated by 1 July protests of 2003, which alarmed the CCP who tightened their control over HK. Before the Handover, Hong Kong had an ‘executive-led’ system of governance built upon colonial rule by bureaucrats. The Chief Executive has largely inherited the previous colonial governor’s ‘immense powers’.

Question 3

Cheung: Why did colonial rule enjoy effective governance in Hong Kong?

Answer 3

1) Elites integration,
2) colonial rule inducing public acquiescence - people accepted their fate to be ruled or acquiesced an undemocratic system so long as the rulers were able to provide basic freedoms and to deliver economic affluence, social mobility and some channels for public consultation and participation,
3) Government’s capacity to make sound policy,
4) Government staying above privileged private interests,
5) weak legislature (so no institutionalised political challenge),
6) weak civil society

Question 4

Cheung: What were the governance problems under Tung?

Answer 4

1) Executive-legislative relationship now separated. There was no guarantee that the legislature would necessarily support government, so the government had to secure enough legislative votes to pass government bills and budgets.
2) Government-elites relationship where elites now have much more political power,
3) Government-society relationship - citizens have higher standards for government accountability now that it was no longer a colonial power,
4) Tung generally regarded as ineffective leader.
Even though it seemed like Tung inherited immense powers, such constitutionally defined powers have to be cemented by political connectedness and integration among the elites as well as between government, elites and civil society, in order to create an impact, creating institutionalised weakness

Question 5

Cheung: What happened in the 2003 protests and after?

Answer 5

Hong Kong citizens were worried about losing political freedoms and civil liberties under the proposed national security legislation. CCP reversed its post-1997 policy of non-intervention in the SAR’s domestic affairs, opting instead for a new policy of active attention, in particular to political and constitutional issues. Since mid-2003, more and more mainland Chinese officials and researchers were tasked to visit Hong Kong to obtain information and make assessment of the local situation. A new Institute on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs was set up under the State Council in December 2003 to help monitor Hong Kong’s development and provide timely advice to the national leaders.

Question 6

Central thesis of Edmund Cheung (HK-China, 2015)

Answer 6

Analyses CEPA (2003) between CCP and HK, the first trade agreement between Hong Kong and the mainland which covers liberalisation of trade in goods, liberalisation of trade in services, mutual recognition of professional qualifications and other trade facilitation measures. This is because of collaborative governance regime (CGR) which shows commitment on both sides to continue trade agreement.

Question 7

Cheung: What are the conditions for a collaborative governance regime?

Answer 7

1) environmental conditions generating incentives for both parties to cooperate (eg. SARS 2003, China joining WTO in 2001, global financial crisis 2008),
2) a committed leadership on both sides to drive the regime, and
3) institutional arrangements that could facilitate the collaborative dynamics of principled engagement, shared motivation and capacity for joint action

Question 8

Cheung: What governs the economic relationship between Hong Kong and China? (short)

Answer 8

The HKSAR functions like a highly autonomous city-state, with substantial powers in economic, financial and social affairs, and international economic relations. A relatively clear delineation of power between the central authorities and the HKSAR is stipulated in the Basic Law, but it has not specified how the HKSAR should conduct intergovernmental relations with their Chinese counterparts. Consequently, this has allowed both the central and HKSAR governments room to innovate on intergovernmental mechanisms.

Question 9

Central thesis of Samson Yuen

Answer 9

1. Argues that Hong Kong’s ‘hybrid regime’ adaptively switched its response to this protest from repression to attrition, after police repression catalyzed heightened mobilization. This entailed defensive and offensive tactics that extended beyond ignoring protests.
2. By switching to this strategy, the regime actively sought to a) maintain elite cohesion and b) block political opportunities while c) leveraging counter-movements and d) legal interventions to increase the participation cost of the protests and mobilize public discontent. This was an effective regime response and a flexible holder of tactics.

Question 10

Central thesis for Ma and Zheng

Answer 10

Looks at the Umbrella Movement, arguing how trajectories can create favourable conditions for the spontaneous civil resistance despite the absence of political opportunities.

Question 11

Ma and Zheng: What happened in the Umbrella Movement?

Answer 11

1. For 79 days in 2014
2. Sparked by disgruntlement over Beijing’s denial of an unfettered, free chief executive election in 2017,
3. Protest began with a class boycott and later morphed into a spontaneous, resilient street occupation of three centralized locations in the city.
4. 18-20% of the population participated in the movement.
5. The use of social media led to an autonomous and spontaneous, decentralised protest structure

Question 12

Ma and Zheng: What caused the Umbrella Movement?

Answer 12

1. The Umbrella Movement originated from frustration about the futility of three decades of the democracy movement in Hong Kong.
2. Despite strong public support, the democrats have had no institutional power or channel through which they could draw Beijing into negotiations or force the latter to deliver full democracy to Hong Kong, so they tried more radical, nonconventional, and extra-legal means to fight for democracy, culminating in the mass-scale occupation campaign.
3. It was a spontaneous transition of the long-planned Occupy Central campaign

Question 13

Ma and Zheng: What was the China context at the time of the Umbrella Movement?

Answer 13

It took place at a time when China has become
1. more autocratic,
2. increased its international influence and prowess, and
3. grown more confident that the ‘China model’ of governance is superior and capable of standing against the pressure of Western democracies

Question 14

Ma and Zheng: What were the effects of the Umbrella Movement?

Answer 14

1) The Chinese government was wary of the movement’s spillover effects, so people on the mainland who voiced support for the Umbrella Movement were arrested and punished heavily.
2) The March 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, when students crashed the gate of the Legislative Yuan and occupied it for several days, was commonly seen as a twin of the Umbrella Movement.
3) In the perspective of Hong Kong studies, the Umbrella Movement dealt another blow to long-held notions that Hong Kong’s people are apathetic, that they only harbored a “partial vision of democracy” or were “attentive spectators” and “occasional activists”.
4) The resilience of this massive protest also indicates that the analysis of institutional deficiencies, legitimacy crises, or governance ills alone is insufficient for explaining the outbreak of the campaign

Question 15

Central thesis of Stan Wong

Answer 15

What predicted disapproval of Hong Kong citizens towards the Umbrella Movement? (1) satisfaction with the performance of the chief executive; (2) distrust of democracy as a solution to Hong Kong’s problems; and (3) concern about the negative impact of the protest on the rule of law.

Question 16

Central thesis of Lo and Bettinger

Answer 16

Similarity - For civic solidarity in Hong Kong and Taiwan, cultural codes of liberty have become the dominant cultural source for discourse in civil society, even though they were not typically considered part of Chinese values. Values of caring and state paternalism, which resemble subsets of Confucian values, are competing, alternate cultural codes.

Difference - In Taiwan, politically-divided members of civil society share the same cultural language and have a basis for mutual engagement, but this cannot be found in Hong Kong. This civic solidarity, or a sense of ‘we-ness’ or a symbolic, collectively community bonded together distinctly by civic ties rather than family, kinship, ethnicity etc.

Question 17

Lo and Bettinger: What is the situation with national identity in Taiwan?

Answer 17

Bad: The pro-unification/ pro-independence divide (and variants of it) fractured the island’s collective imagination of national identities, giving rise to worries that social fragmentation may become a serious threat to meaningful deliberations among citizens.
Good: some scholars observe that public debate may be strengthening a sense of civic community which may keep the national identity controversy at bay.

Question 18

Central thesis of Miriam Lo (5)

Answer 18

1. Analyses China’s new ‘united front work’, where mainland China uses ‘penetrative politics’ to influence Hong Kong politics through infiltrating different associations, including youth groups, women’s groups, trade unions, political parties, such as the (pro-government) DAB.
2. The Liaison Office is obedient to Xi’s ‘hard authoritarianism’, eg. 2014 White Paper on the implementation of the Basic Law which emphasized Beijing’s ‘comprehensive jurisdiction’ over HK.
3. Hong Kong’s one country, two systems, is drifting towards one country, two mixed systems with some degree of convergence.
4. The security hysteria of PRC authorities is intertwined with their geopolitical mindset. They see China as the political heartland and Hong Kong as a political borderland, and HK being susceptible to foreign influence after being colonised for so long.
5. Hong Kong people are post-materialistic and uphold their core values of human rights, the rule of law and transparency

Question 19

Lo: What are the objectives of China’s new united front work in Hong Kong?

Answer 19

(1) winning the hearts and minds of more Hong Kong people than ever before,
(2) securing most Hong Kong people’s support of the central government’s policies toward Hong Kong,
(3) enhancing patriotism and the Chinese national and politico-cultural identity of the Hong Kong people,
(4) achieving Beijing’s dominant control or “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong,
(5) isolating and defeating political enemies and opposition, including the moderate democrats and radical ones,
(6) strengthening a coalition of “patriotic” elites governing Hong Kong and
(7) protecting Beijing’s interest of maintaining the supremacy of “one country,” specifically its national security interest

Question 20

Lo: What is the role of the Liaison Office in the PRC’s new united front work?

Answer 20

Even though Article 22 of the Basic Law says ‘no department of the Central People’s Government… may intervene in the affairs which the HKSAR administers on its own’, the Liaison Office has intervened a lot. It plays the role of organizer, facilitator, coordinator and mobilizer in united front politics.
It 1) organizes pro-Beijing groups and the DAB, coordinating among themselves and mobilizes supporters to vote for candidates in the pro-PRC front in elections;
2) facilitates the process of developing the patriotic front by holding study sessions immediately after the annual CPPCC and NPC meetings, interpreting the PRC leaders’ remarks and policies,
3) creating new pro-Beijing groups,
4) interacting with more Hong Kong people so as to reduce the secrecy of the Liaison Office,
5) encouraging its own staff members to learn Cantonese in order to be better local cadres and
6) organizing daily and weekly meetings with all sectors of the society to deepen the depth and broaden the breath of penetrative politics.
In recent years, the Liaison Office has opened its headquarters to the members of the public, conducting new united front work in a far more transparent and grassroots-based manner. Under the authoritarian regime of President Xi Jinping, the Liaison Office has become a loyal implementation agent, obedient to Xi’s shift towards ‘hard’ authoritarianism

Question 21

Lo: How has Xi turned to hard authoritarianism?

Answer 21

1) changing the Chinese constitution, terminating the limits on the term of office of both the president and vice-president,
2) utilizing the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress to interpret the Basic Law in November 2016 for the sake of terminating and punishing the disrespectful behavior of two Hong Kong legislators-elect who dared challenging the PRC’s legitimacy and authority

Question 22

Lo: How has the united front work changed in more recent years?

Answer 22

1) The tone of the 2014 White Paper on the implementation of the Basic Law emphasized Beijing’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong. From Article 29 to Article 32 of the revised united front regulations in 2015, united front work in Hong Kong would have to
2) emphasize the support of HKSAR government policies,
3) the consolidation of the national identity of Hong Kong people,
4) the mobilization of Chinese to oppose Taiwan’s “independence,” and
5) the co-optation of more people to such institutions as the NPC and CPPCC.

Question 23

Lo: What is the electoral landscape in Hong Kong?

Answer 23

Sixth-fourth golden rule, which referred to 60% of pro-democracy votes versus 40% of pro-Beijing votes in legislative direct elections from 1991 to 1997 - Beijing’s ‘sharp power’ is not that sharp in that it affects institutions but has not captured the hearts and minds of people

Question 24

Lo: What are penetrative politics in Hong Kong? (with examples)

Answer 24

The DAB, FTU (Federation of Trade Unions), Fujianese interest groups, women groups and other pro-Beijing religious groups constitute the transmission belts for the CCP to penetrate into the Hong Kong polity. It is now openly, visibly and prominently conducted. However, the clashes of two concepts of citizenship - the Hong Kong one that entails peaceful resistance and the mainland that stresses political obedience - are prominent in the local resistance to China’s new united front politics. The resistant citizenship of many Hong Kong people could be seen in June 2019, when almost a million protestors succeeded in delaying the discussion of an extradition bill in the legislature.

Question 25

Lo: What area has China failed in?

Answer 25

Education is the most troublesome segment of the civil society, seen by the opposition to the national education policy in 2012 and the eruption of the 2014 Occupy Central Movement. The ongoing encouragement of Hong Kong’s scientists to go into the Greater Bay Area to conduct scientific research would likely politically co-opt some local academics, while some others will remain politically autonomous or indifferent.

Question 26

Lo: Why is China worried about Hong Kong?

Answer 26

The local pro-Beijing media have been utilizing their editorials, commentaries and reports to rationalize and strengthen such perception of the national security threat. The security hysteria of PRC authorities is intertwined with their geopolitical mindset. 1. They see China as the political heartland and Hong Kong as a political borderland. The borderland, to them, should not challenge the heartland, not to mention threatening the heartland’s authority and legitimacy. 2. In particular, Hong Kong was governed by the British for so long that it is accustomed to receiving foreign influence and intervention. In response to foreign intervention and influence on Hong Kong, 3. Beijing has to take decisive measures in its policies toward Hong Kong, including the swift response to the call for “Hong Kong independence” and the interpretation of the Basic Law in November 2016 over the disrespectful behavior of two legislators-elect.

Question 27

Central thesis of Steinhardt et al

Answer 27

1) national and local identities are two distinct attitudes instead of two extremes of an axis, that
2) national and local identities were perceived as compatible for most years since 1997, that
3) the key shift occurred not in local identity but in nationalistic sentiments.
4) Political trust in the central government is the main factor affecting identities, and
5) discontent with livelihood conditions and socio-structural variables have no significant effect or are largely the result of differences in political trust. Study defeats the ‘rise of localism’ argument, instead showing that the sense of belonging to China has become weaker and more politically partisan, with a declining compatibility of the two identities

Question 28

Steinhardt et al: What happened to nationalistic sentiments in the two decades after the handover?

Answer 28

There was a trend of pro-China sentiment, increasing linguistic and economic integration after handover, which changed during late 2000s, with a gradual strengthening of nationalistic sentiment until 2008 and a decrease since then. A new wave of heritage preservation activism emerged over development projects of the historic Star Ferry and Queen’s Piers, Wedding Card Street, and Tsoi Yuen Village. Later, Popular contention increasingly carried antagonistic sentiments against China. In 2011, protests against Mainland mothers giving birth in Hong Kong erupted. In 2012, a student-led resistance movement resulted in the shelving of plans for a national education curriculum in secondary schools. In 2014 the universal suffrage movement of ‘Occupy Central’ led to prolonged occupations of extended public areas in core business and commercial districts and featured considerable anti-China sentiments. Public opinion polls administrated at the time likewise suggested a gravitation towards local identity.

Question 29

Steinhardt et al: What was the turning point in Hong Kong identity?

Answer 29

1. A small pocket of vocal activists began to deliberate the notion of independence from China. In 2016, a ‘localist’ candidate running on an independence platform and facing rioting charges won 15% of the popular vote in a by-election for the Hong Kong Legislative Council.
2. Soon after, an embryonic Hong Kong National Party declared its birth, explicitly vowing to strive for independence.
3. Around the same time, a poll by HKU found that Hong Konger’s sense of pride in being Chinese nationals had dropped to the lowest point since 1997.

Question 30

Steinhardt et al: How did the Hong Konger identity emerge?

Answer 30

The idea of being a Hong Konger only began to arise in the 1960s and 1970s. It was a combined result of
1) China’s self-isolation and lawlessness during the Cultural Revolution,
2) Hong Kong’s economic take-off and thriving cultural industry, as well as
3) the immigration, citizenship, social and cultural policies by the colonial government. By the 1980s the Hong Konger identity had become common sense

Question 31

Steinhardt et al: What were the perceived problems brought by the mainland?

Answer 31

1) Real estate prices hiking sharply, many locals believing they were priced out of the market by rich Mainlanders.
2) increasing number of Mainland mothers giving birth in Hong Kong stretched already scarce medical care resources until a change in policy in 2012.
3) Competition for places in selected elite schools.
4) Scramble for infant milk powder and immunisation vaccines.
5) Expanding flow of Mainland visitors using public transport

Question 32

Central thesis of Sebastian Veg

Answer 32

Discusses the rise of localism bentu and civic identity in post-Handover Hong Kong. Using three case studies, the June Fourth vigil, the 2012 anti-National Education protest and the 2014 Umbrella movement, it distinguishes between groups advocating civic identification with the local community (Scholarism, HKFS) and others highlighting ethnic identification (Chin Wan). Argues that the shift from pan-Chinese to a stronger localist identification is underpinned by a shift from an ethnocultural mode to a civic mode of identification, or a growing disconnect between the two. ‘The most significant aspect of the broader evolution in Hong Kong may not be the tilt towards localism but rather the shift from an ethnic and cultural form of (pan-Chinese) identification, which was a corollary of colonial depoliticization, to a civic-based form of identification grounded in a democratic community’. Demonstrates that while local and national identification were traditionally not incompatible, the civic-based identification with a local democratic community, as advocated by most participants in recent movements, is becoming increasingly incompatible with the ethnic and cultural definition of the Chinese nation that is now being promoted by the Beijing government.

Question 33

Veg: How did the Hong Konger identity emerge?

Answer 33

1. A distinct local identity, (“Hongkongers”), rooted in consumerism and Cantonese pop culture, emerged in the 1970s.
2. Post-1997 - CCP had hoped that Chinese identity would overpower Hong Kong-based identity after the takeover but didn’t happen. The generation born around 1997 and educated after the Handover identifies the least with the Chinese nation:
   a. anti-Article 23 protest in 2003,
   b. the patriotism debate in 2003–2004,
   c. the cultural heritage protection campaigns of 2004–2010,
   d. and the anti-National Education protests in 2012.
   2008 - disconnect between the two identities.
   2010 - pride in non-political symbols of China such as the Great Wall collapsed.
   2012 - majority of 18-29 year-olds identifying exclusively with Hong Kong.

Question 34

Veg: How does the previous compatibility of Hong Kong and Chinese identities compare to now?

Answer 34

1. Previously, Hongkongers were consistently considered as (a) ‘culturally Chinese’, and (b) politically committed mainly or strongly to pan-Chinese issues (Chinese as an official language, the Diaoyu Islands, the June Fourth vigil, democracy in China)
2. Their growing identification with Hong Kong (consumer identity, pop culture) remained overall unpolitical and compatible with ethnic and cultural Chineseness. Liberal values like the rule of law or human rights were considered part of the Hongkonger identity, but generally connected to a well-functioning market or a well-run administration rather than to a political identity as a citizen.
3. However, members of the new generation (a) reject cultural Chinese identity and (b) identify as citizens with Hong Kong as a political community

Question 35

Veg: What are the four matrices of local vs pan-Chinese identification?

Answer 35

1) Pan-Chinese with ethnic = traditional cultural nationalism.
2) Local with ethnic = Hong Kong or Cantonese chauvinism, anti-mainland xenophobia.
3) Pan-Chinese with civic = KMT and Democracy Movement.
4) Local with civic = democratic federalism, local autonomy, Scholarism or Demosisto. The new ‘localist’ identity may overlap with a pan-Chinese civic community, but reject a pan-Chinese ethnocultural identity.
Hongkongers increasingly identify in civic terms, rejecting the essentialism implicit in defining themselves as an ethnic nation

Question 36

Veg: What are some events or people which document this shift in identity?

Answer 36

1) Chin Wan (2011) discusses localism and advocated for Hong Kong interests first, though as a classic pan-Chinese ethnic nationalist with a localist touch.
2) 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen vigil with massive turnout triggered by increased awareness, caused by a) crackdown on human rights in China, b) comments made by the Hong Kong Chief Executive, c) liberal studies program, d) rise of social media.
3) June Fourth vigils (2012) - Joshua Wong wanted to ‘express our love for China through the June Fourth vigil’, hoping that China will turn democratic.
4) HK Federation of Students withdrew from Tiananmen vigil (2015) because of localist split.
5) Umbrella Movement (2014), notions of subjectivity, autonomy and agency were the central themes, with Joshua Wong suggesting a constitutional referendum on future post-2047

Question 37

Veg: What happened in the anti-National Education movement?

Answer 37

In 2012, without the direct involvement of any political party, the movement mobilized over 100,000 people, first to sign a petition, then to take part in a massive march on 29 July, and finally to participate in an eight-day sit-in at government headquarters. It was organised by Scholarism and Joshua Wong with 20 other civic groups. The two main voices of opposition were: 1) the government’s financial support to groups producing pro-Beijing teaching materials (cronyism and lack of respect of standard procedures) and 2) the fear that students would be assessed on subjective criteria like “loyalty” (a state-prescribed identity). The movement had the broad support of public opinion and forced the chief executive to withdraw the project in September 2012 on the eve of legislative elections

Question 38

Central thesis of Kuan-Hsing Chen

Answer 38

1. Argues for an understanding of ‘Asia as method’, proposing min jian as an alternative conception of society and arguing that ‘civil society’ is too exclusionary.
2. For example, a ‘civil society’ framework believes min jian practices are superstitious, such as the traditional calendar.
3. Min jian also allows for more flexibility in shifting power structures and remains in ‘constant negotiation with the state’.

Question 39

Chen: Who does Chen reference and how?

Answer 39

References Chatterjee’s concept of ‘political society’ which captures democratic struggle in postcolonial India. Chatterjee uses the example of a squatter community, which has survived around the railway in Calcutta for 50 years. Since 1990, the community has been confronting the crisis of being evacuated, and is able to formulate a discourse of moral right to survive so that civil society groups can be mobilized to support the community and to negotiate with the state.

Question 40

Chen: Why is studying modernity in the non-West different?

Answer 40

1. In the latest phase of globalisation, there may be an emerging opposition between modernity and democracy, i.e. between civil society and political society.
2. Civil society is an outdated term because many affiliated with this camp have been coopted by the new regime, so most of their groupings have lost energy or credibility.
3. Using the case of Taiwan, Chen proposes displacing ‘state vs civil society’ with ‘power block vs the people’.

Question 41

Chen: What is his definition of min jian?

Answer 41

Describes roughly a folk, people or commoners society, but not exactly, because min means people or populace and jian means in-between and space

Question 42

Chen: What is min jian’s relation to the modern state and civil society?

Answer 42

The modernising state, under the pressure of elite civil society groups, try to suppress min jian institutions by invoking moral terms like superstition, feudalism, out of date, bad custom, waste

Question 43

Central thesis of Ya-Chung Chuang

Answer 43

1. Examines the recent crisis of democracy in Taiwan due to the PRC effect, where China has asserted sovereignty and hegemony and attempted to dismantle democracy.
2. The Sunflower Movement has emphasised this, using the politics of ‘xiangmin’ (country people), for their style of straightforwardness, involving netizens as cyberactors.
3. What is the definition of xiangmin? Country people, a mutant new species empowered by information and networking technology.

Question 44

Chuang: What are some examples of what ‘xiangmin’ have done?

Answer 44

1) ‘Martian-Taiwanese’ - a new hybrid of languages of Chinese, Japanese and emojis.
2) Cultural styles of parody and mimicry in cyberwriting that bring “farcical” effects and serve as countermeasures against the centralization of power.
3) Example of someone’s house getting demolished by the government and xiangmin, who swarmed the site and fought with police and the managers of the renewal project. The next day, newspaper headlines all remarked on this democratic breakdown and xiangmin heroism.

Question 45

Chuang: Why is there increased Chinese nationalist sentiment?

Answer 45

The PRC effect has diffused the idea of the ‘China model’, which has been salient because Taiwan has been suffering from 1) ongoing economic downturn, 2) sociocultural depression, and 3) continued political and diplomatic isolation, leading to antidemocratic backlash in the name of economic development

Question 46

Chuang: How has China’s political culture evolved over time?

Answer 46

1) A new ‘new China’ and turn to neo-authoritarianism post-1989.
2) The repurposing of Confucianism and soft power, such as Confucius institutes emerging all over the world to theorise new Chinese supremacy

Question 47

Central thesis of John Copper

Answer 47

Assesses the presidency of Taiwan’s Chen Shui-bian in 2000 to 2008, when he was elected the first non-Nationalist Party president, concluding he failed. Problems with his presidency:
1) domestic governance, where he failed political reform and instead resorted to exploiting ethnic tensions to help his party maintain power;
2) the economy;
3) foreign and defense policy, where relationships with the US and China deteriorated;
4) corruption by his appointees, and his family.

Question 48

Central thesis of Chien-min Chao (2003)

Answer 48

1. Taiwan citizens harbor a new value system that emphasizes individualism, indigenization, and a Western lifestyle as a result of democratization and development of civil society.
2. In China, due to economic growth and strengthening of industrial and military capabilities, they embrace neo-collectivism (in which both collective and newly “transplanted” private ownership are equally important) and nationalism or neo-patriotism, bolstering a new superpower image of China

Question 49

Chao: What are the similarities between Taiwan and Hong Kong?

Answer 49

1) rooted in Confucian values using the same traditional Chinese language.
2) similar historical experience of authoritarian rule but enjoy relatively free markets owing to the capitalist economic structure and strong connections with the West, in particular the United States

Question 50

Chao: What are the differences between Taiwan and Hong Kong?

Answer 50

Political development. Democratization in Taiwan started in late 1980s when the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) government lifted the martial law that had been imposed since 1949 - now considered a full-fledged democracy. Hong Kong - Chinese government appointed a provisional legislature to replace the last Hong Kong legislative council at the 1997 transition and declared its own plan of democratization. After much procrastination in the last two decades, the franchise is extended to only half of the legislature, and the rest is elected indirectly from professional constituencies adapted from the colonial days

Question 51

Chao: What were the effects of Hong Kong’s trade agreement?

Answer 51

CEPA 1. brought quick growth of Chinese investments and recovered the city’s frail economy, but it also 2. introduced China’s permeating influence. This has led to 3. separatist sentiments, especially due to 4. mainland immigrants under the ‘one-way permit’ scheme that brings 150 mainlanders to Hong Kong every day

Question 52

Chao: What were the effects of Taiwan’s trade agreement?

Answer 52

Public opinion was very opposed to the signing of ECFA, especially the younger citizens who suspected the trade pact was actually part of a unification scheme conspired by the KMT and China. Local activists and college students’ demonstrations in 2014 later escalated into occupying the Legislative Yuan building to prevent the Taiwan parliament from passing any bills, including CSSTA. The later-called Sunflower Movement lasted for almost a month

Question 53

Chao: How did the Umbrella Movement compare to the Sunflower Movement?

Answer 53

Difference - The Sunflower Movement prevented the government from closer trade pacts or economic integration with China, while the Umbrella Movement did not achieve any responsive action from the Hong Kong government or from Beijing.
Similarities - Both movements led to new political groups pursuing more ‘localist’ causes or disintegration from China, demanding more self-determination or even independence. This represents the ‘localism’ camp in HK and the ‘Third Force’ camp in Taiwan

Question 54

Central thesis of Ian Rowen

Answer 54

Analyses the Sunflower Movement, arguing that it
1) spawned the biggest pro-democracy protest rally in the island’s history,
2) reframed popular discourse about Taiwan’s political and social trajectory,
3) precipitated the midterm electoral defeat of the ruling party, and
4) prefigured unprecedented protest in nearby Hong Kong

Question 55

Central thesis of Steve Tsang

Answer 55

Analyses the implications of Ma Ying-jeou’s reelection for Taiwan. Argues there is no leadership change, but forces the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to persuade voters it can manage relations in China effectively. Ma also has to clearly define the limits of his mainland policy to minimise Beijing’s expectations of his second term, especially as Beijing will put pressure on him to move forward with political integration. For the US and East Asia, Ma’s reelection is good because it minimises the risk of confrontation; but there are still many problems, such as the US’s continued arms sales to Taiwan and the continued South China Sea territorial disputes

Question 56

Central thesis of Samson Yuen (2014 HK and Taiwan)

Answer 56

Argues there is an increasing encroachment of China into Taiwan and Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, CEPA brings questionable economic benefits but is mainly for the CCP’s united front work. In Taiwan, the CCP has strengthened language against them.

Question 57

Yuen: How has China increasingly encroached on Hong Kong?

Answer 57

1) In 2014, State Grid Corporation of China, the largest state-owned electric utility, purchased an 18% stake in Hong Kong Electric and became the second largest shareholder in this sole electricity provider on Hong Kong Island.
2) The introduction of CEPA provides an open and legitimate platform for united front work.
3) Hong Kong business elites have been increasingly over-represented among the Hong Kong delegations to the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
4) Premier Li Keqiang (2014) report removed the default statement ‘the people of Hong Kong governing Hong Kong’, gangren zigang, and ‘high degree of autonomy, gaodu zizhi.

Question 58

Yuen: How has China increasingly encroached on Taiwan?

Answer 58

1) Premier Li Keqiang’s (2014) report says that Beijing will ‘fully implement’, as opposed to merely ‘adhering to’ major policies concerning Taiwan affairs.
2) Number of principles, including upholding 1992 Consensus under the one-China framework, strengthening cross-straits political trust, promoting economic integration etc.
3) Signing follow-up treaty (CSSTA) to the ECFA - former deputy defence minister of Taiwan, Lin, commented that Beijing had realised it would be ‘cheaper to buy Taiwan than to attack Taiwan’.
4) Pro-Beijing Want Want group’s acquisition of the China Times, which threatens Taiwan’s media freedom