Lecture 3: Alliances, Coercion and Diplomacy

Question 1

Definition: Alliance

Answer 1

A formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states - Waltz

Question 2

5 types of alliances/pacts/agreements covered by definition of alliance

Answer 2

Defensive, offensive, non-aggression pacts, neutrality pacts, consultation agreements

Question 3

The autonomy-security tradeoff regarding alliances

Answer 3

Alliances produce additional security quickly (and without having to divert resources to military), but with less reliability than investing in own military and at the political cost of moderating conflicting interests with the ally

Question 4

When entering into an alliance, what do powerful and weak states get and sacrifice

Answer 4

Powerful states gain autonomy at the expense of security, while weak states gain security at the expense of autonomy

Question 5

Asymmetric alliance

Answer 5

All allies are better off than without the alliance, but gain in different areas; some achieve security gains, other autonomy -> more stable

Question 6

Symmetric alliances

Answer 6

Allies gain on the same dimension -> less stable

Question 7

3 strategies that alliances are useful for

Answer 7

1. Total war
2. Containment
3. Deterrence

Question 8

3 dangers of alliances

Answer 8

1. Chain-ganging: states get dragged into war to save reckless allies (e.g. WW1; possibly Russia-Ukraine)
2. Buck-passing: states let others bear the burden of halting the rise of a state that threatens hegemony by shifting the responsibility/blame onto them
3. Autonomy-security trade-off

Question 9

3 reasons to enter into an alliance despite the risks

Answer 9

1. To affect the balance of power; to aggregate power to contrast a more powerful state or if not possible, “bandwagon” with the powerful state
2. States ally to balance against threats (geographic, ideological etc.) rather than material power per se
3. Domestic affinity with ally (cultural, ideological, political)

Question 10

5 reasons why some alliances last longer than others

Answer 10

1. Shifts in the distribution of power can end/create alliances
2. Changes in the threat posed by states (or the perception thereof)
3. Regime type -> alliances among liberal democracies are esp. strong and resilient
4. Institutionalization; e.g. creation of organizations, buraucracies etc., and institutional capacity to allow for alliance shift when original threat is no longer present
5. Socialization between elites to reinforce shared understanding of the world

Question 11

Can you evaluate the success of alliances?

Answer 11

No, because of selection bias: if an alliance is successful, it will deter attacks, and then we are less likely to observe an effect

Question 12

3 Definitions: Coercion

Answer 12

1. The activity of causing someone to do something against his will, or of bringing about his doing what he does against his will - Held
2. The latent use of force (the threat)
3. A coercive strategy involves the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats of force to influence another’s strategic choices

Question 13

2 possible goals of coercion

Answer 13

1. Deterrence: to persuade an opponent not to initiate action; aims to preserve the status quo
2. Compellence: to persuade an opponent to change its behavior (don’t complete, undo, change); aims to change the status quo

Question 14

2 strategies/methods of coercion

Answer 14

1. Punishment: impose costs to deter
2. Denial: take actions that create difficulty for target to successfully undertake the action you want to deter

Question 15

2 Coercion costs faced by the target state

Answer 15

1. Resistance costs: costs due to punishment imposed by the coercer and/or steps taken to prevent the punishment
2. Compliance costs: costs due to giving in to the coercer (what are you giving up, e.g. the thing you wanted to do?)

Question 16

Coercion costs faced by the coercer

Answer 16

Enforcement costs: costs of punishing the target or implementing denial strategy

Question 17

The efficacy of coercion depends on

Answer 17

1. Clarify of communication (how concrete is the threat, how do you communicate it?)
2. Credibility of threats and reputation

Question 18

Internalized deterrence

Answer 18

Given international institutions, alliances, and expected costs of doing something, the threat might not even have to be issued -> states can pre-modify their actions to avoid it

Question 19

Geneva Interim Agreement (November 2012)

Answer 19

Restrictions placed on Iran to get them to stop stockpiling enriched uranium

Question 20

JCPOA (October 2015)

Answer 20

Restrictions of Iran’s program and an inspections system, for 15 years in exchange for relieving sanctions

Question 21

What was influential in signing the Iran nuclear deal?

Answer 21

The costs of being disconnected from SWIFT

Question 22

Paradox of power

Answer 22

Targets of a powerful state’s coercion can find strategies to resist the powerful, even if they are weak

Question 23

3 functions of diplomacy

Answer 23

1. Communication
2. Representation (explaining intentions to lower uncertainty)
3. Reproduction of international society

Question 24

5 concrete examples of what diplomacy is good for

Answer 24

1. Conveying messages
2. Provides framework for “normal” relationships to communicate better
3. Creates and maintains relationships between countries/leaders/bureaucracies
4. Face-to-face interaction has more positive impact than other communication
5. Form of intelligence collection

Question 25

Definition: soft power

Answer 25

When one country gets other countries to want what it wants, instead of ordering them to do it

Question 26

Reading: Coercive diplomacy and the Iranian nuclear crisis - Benjamin Harris

Answer 26

Coercive diplomacy was used by US, UK, FR, RU, CH and DE to negotiate end to Iranian nuclear crisis 2002-2013 - used a mix of impactful sanctions and incentives (sanctions relief, enrichment capabilities) for compliance to hit Iranian economy (they could not have done so alone). SWIFT ban influential in this. Coercive diplomacy pressured Iran to the point where the cost of continued resistance was too high to endure

But what was paramount in winning Iranian compliance (incentives) would eventually result in US withdrawal from the agreement

Many factors impact a coercer’s ability to conduct coercive diplomacy successfully, and target regimes are often unpredictable and willing to endure costs beyond rationality