Midterm 2 HW Questions Flashcards
In the 2-sided search model, an increase in productivity does not
a. reduce the unemployment rate
b. increase the vacancy rate
c. reduce labor market tightness
d. increase the size of the labor force
c. reduce labor market tightness
Higher productivity increases the firm benefit if it forms a match, so there is more entry of firms into the market, increasing j (labor market tightness)
A decrease in matching efficiency
a. is not related to sectoral shocks
b. can explain the shift in the Beveridge Curve
c. is due to a change in productivity of firms
d. can never happen
b. can explain the shift in the Beveridge Curve
A change in “e” changes the relationship between u (=1-em(1,j)) and v (=1-em(1/j,1) and shifts the Beveridge curve
In the 2-sided search model, a decrease in matching efficiency
a. has no effect on vacancies
b. reduces the unemployment rate
c. increases labor market tightness
d. decreases the size of the labor force
d. decreases the size of the labor force
As the odds of matching falls, the payoff from search falls and fewer people enter the labor force (they stay home and do non-market work)
A market failure associated with Keynesian economics is
a. pollution externalities
b. economic agents cannot agree on prices and wages that are socially efficient
c. banking panics
d. insurance is imperfect
b. economic agents cannot agree on prices and wages that are socially efficient
This is the particular “coordination failure” that Keynesian economists think cause business cycles to have such lasting impacts on labor markets. In the DMP framework this coordination failure is the result of imperfect information about what the correct wage/price should be.
In the Keynesian 2-sided search model, if the wage is high then
a. the vacancy rate is low
b. No answer text provided
c. labor market tightness is high
d. the unemployment rate is low
a. the vacancy rate is low
cost/benefit of the match from the firm perspective is high therefore we move along the matching function to a low j. v = 1 - e(1/j,1) so the vacancy rate falls.
Consider the effects of an increase in the job-separation rate s in the one-sided search model.
a. The reservation wage is unaffected because the separation rate doesn’t affect MPN
b. The reservation wage falls because there is more unemployment and workers get more desperate
c. The reservation wage rises in order to bring the Value of employment back up to equilibrium
c. The reservation wage rises in order to bring the Value of employment back up to equilibrium
The immediate impact of a rise in “s” is that the value of unemployment rises relative to the value of employment–jobs don’t last as long so they aren’t as valuable. The value of unemployment is unchanged, so although V(e) fall we know w* must adjust so that V(e) = V(u) in equilibrium. If job separation rates are higher that reduces the value of employment and firms must offer a higher wage in order to attract workers in compensation–this is reflected in a higher reservation wage (lowest wage workers will accept in equilibrium)
Consider the one-sided search model from Chapter 6 and the effect of a decrease in the probability of getting a job offer. The most likely outcome is
a. upward pressure on wages to compensate workers for the lower probability of finding a job
b. a reduction in the job separation rate to bring the market to equilibrium
c. downward pressure on wages as the Value of unemployment falls
c. downward pressure on wages as the Value of unemployment falls
Consider the one-sided search model from Chapter 6. If the government makes it more difficult to collect unemployment benefits or reduces the amount of the benefit, we would expect
a. An decrease in the real wage and a decrease in the unemployment rate
b. an increase in the real wage and an increase in the unemployment rate
c. an increase in the real wage and a decrease in the unemployment rate
d. a decrease in the real wage and an increase in the unemployment rate
a. An decrease in the real wage and a decrease in the unemployment rate
The value of unemployment falls, reducing w*. As wages fall more people accept jobs and the transitions out of unemployment are higher (less unemployment)
If N is the working-age population, Q is the labor force, and U is the number of unemployed, then the employment/population ratio is measured as
a. U/Q
b. Q/N
c. (Q-U)/N
d. N/Q
c. (Q-U)/N
In the one-sided search model, the welfare of an unemployed worker
a. increases with the size of the unemployment insurance benefit
b. increases with the size of the unemployment benefit if they are unemployed
c. decreases with the size of the unemployment insurance benefit
a. increases with the size of the unemployment insurance benefit
As V(U) increases, w increase, so workers gain whether or not they are employed
The labor force participation rate is
a. a leading economic variable
b. pro-cyclical
c. more variable than GDP
d. counter-cyclical
b. pro-cyclical
Although income and substitution effects may cancel out in the long run (no relationship between GDP and labor force participation), in the short run it is clear that as GDP rises, the employment rate rises more than the unemployment rate falls and the labor force participation rate increases. It doesn’t have to be this way in theory but it turns out this way in the data.
The labor force participation rate was higher in 2012 than in 1948 because
a. the unemployment rate became less variable over time
b. the labor force was larger in 2012 than in 1948
c. of the Great Moderation
d. the participation rate of women rose during that time period
d. the participation rate of women rose during that time period
Total labor force participation rates increased over this period even though male labor force participation rates have trended downward since the 1950’s (this is the “missing men” issue we talked about in class)
From 2009 to 2012 the Beveridge Curve
a. became flat
b. shifted to the right
c. shifted to the left
d. could not be discerned in the data
b. shifted to the right
This is best explained in our labor search model by a fall in match efficiency (e), as firms began searching for higher-skilled workers to complement new capital technologies.
In the two sided search model
a. There are N consumers, Q is the labor force, and j is the number of job openings relative to the number looking for jobs
b. There are Q consumers, N is the labor force, and j is the vacancy rate
c. There are Q consumers, N is the labor force, and j is the number of consumers relative to the number of job openings
d. There are N firms, Q is the labor force, and j is the vacancy rate
a. There are N consumers, Q is the labor force, and j is the number of job openings relative to the number looking for jobs
The matching function m(job searchers, job openings) captures the idea that
a. firms are profit-maximizing
b. supply and demand determine the market wage
c. it is costly and time-consuming to get firms and workers together to produce output
d. consumers have to be paid to work
c. it is costly and time-consuming to get firms and workers together to produce output
the production function for the matching technology implies that worker-firm matches are endogenous (depend on the economic environment) rather than exogenous (automatic) they way they are assumed to be in “standard” efficient models