Q3: Lemos Flashcards
What thesis does Lemos reject?
Lemos rejects an intuitive thesis that is related to the trichotomy thesis:
For any two things, x and y, with finite intrinsic values, m and n, there is a finite difference in value between x and y.
In other words, some states of affairs have intrinsic value that is infinitely greater than the intrinsic values of states of affairs of lesser kinds.
Lemos’ 3 cases
Case 1: A world, W, where one enjoys a thousand-years of ecstasy versus a world, W*, where one “enjoys” a drab eternity
Case 2: A world, W, just like our own versus an O-worm world, W*, where worms experience nothing, but then a small burst of pleasure when they procreate
Case 3: A world, W, where we live a mortal life versus a world, W*, where we live an immortal life as a cricket
Lemos’ Argument for Higher-Order Goods
(1) Our intuitions in the above cases are correct.
(2) If 1), then there are higher-order goods.
(3) Thus, there are higher-order goods.
Important distinction between higher-order goods and goods being more valuable than others
The view that there are higher-order goods that are infinitely better than any number of lower-order goods must be distinguished from the view that some types of goods are more valuable than particular goods of other kinds.
Picture of quality adjusted hedonism which is not compatible with higher order goods
For example, quality-adjusted Hedonism makes it possible for what Lemos would see as lower order goods to have equal or more value to higher order goods due to quantity and using an additive property.
This means that you may get 2 pleasure from a good worth 20 for an overall value of 40, or get a value of 40 from 4 instances of a good worth only 10. This comes in conflict with Lemos’s view that regardless of quantity, some goods are higher-order which means they are more valuable.
The principle of organic unity
The principle of organic unities tells us that the value of a whole is not necessarily the same as the sum of the values of its parts
Principle of rank
According to this principle, a whole can be a higher good even if none of its parts are themselves higher goods. Thus, even if it is true with respect to every part of some whole that there is some amount of pleasure that is better than it is, it does not follow that there is some amount of pleasure that is better than the whole of which they are parts.
Lemos’ intrinsic higher order good definition
An intrinsic good, x, of kind K, is of a higher order than an intrinsic good, y, of a kind, L iff x is intrinsically better than y, and no number of z’s of kind L are jointly intrinsically better than some good of kind K.
This means that something is a higher-order good if it is intrinsically better, and no amount of the other thing would outweigh the value of the first. Being intrinsic to something means no matter what else is going on, it has that property.
Objection to intuition
However, with this reliance on people’s intuitions comes a criticism. Perhaps our intuitions are not correct, and we just have an anthropomorphic bias. This means that we view world W as better because of the resemblance to our own existence. It is easy to say that our interests and pleasures are “higher-order” compared to a worm or a cricket, because we are not a worm or cricket.
But what if we were? Then wouldn’t it be not so obvious whether W or W* is better? Also, we can imagine an “angelic” world in which there are beings in another world who experience higher-order goods then we do. According to Lemos, our intuition should be that a world with at least one angelic being is intrinsically better than our world. This does not seem right. However, Lemos could respond by saying that this “angelic” world is inconceivable.
Huemer’s cases
Another worry for Lemos comes from Michael Huemer. If x is really infinitely better than y, then one should not take any risk, however small, of losing x so as to acquire y.
More concretely, I should prefer Option 1 to Option 2:
Option 1: Having a .0000000000000000001 chance of getting 1000 years of ecstasy and having a .9999999999999999999999 chance of being annihilated.
Option 2: Having a .9999999999999999999999 chance of a living the drab eternity to a .0000000000000000001 chance of being annihilated.
If Lemos is right, we should prefer option 1 to option 2; i.e., assuming that we aim to acquire the more valuable outcome.
Lemos’ response to Huemer cases
Lemos doubts that the scenarios described above need involve one’s death.
“This seems the state all of us once enjoyed as newborn infants. If it is logically possible that our consciousness was once like that, I see no compelling reason to think it logically impossible for us to be like that again. Furthermore, I see no good reason to think it logically impossible for some misfortune, some accident or disease, to befall me that would result in my being such a contented imbecile. This is a sad vulnerability we all share.”
