TBE--T/G & C.R (Consumer Rights) Flashcards

1
Q

02/14 #12:
On November 1, Pablo contacted Alex, an insurance agent who represented Insco, an insurance company. Pablo requested that his newly licensed minor son, Sam, be added to the automobile insurance policy Pablo maintained with Insco. Alex quoted the amount of the additional premium, and Pablo sent a check in that amount to Alex.

On November 10, when Pablo received his regular annual bill and renewal notice from Insco, he noticed that Sam was not listed as an insured driver. He immediately called Alex, who reassured Pablo that the paperwork had been submitted to Insco, that Sam had been added to the policy, and that an updated policy would arrive in a few days.

Unbeknownst to Pablo, on October 15, Alex had received word from Insco that his agency was being terminated effective November 15. Also unbeknownst to Pablo, on November 10, Insco had returned to Alex the paperwork that he had submitted to Insco adding Sam to Pablo’s policy because the paperwork was so
deficient that it required “further detail.”

After Pablo’s November 10 telephone call with Alex, Pablo told Sam he could drive.

On November 11, while driving to school, Sam failed to stop at a red light and collided with another vehicle. Sam was not hurt, but his car was a total loss, and the driver in the other vehicle sustained injuries that required hospitalization. On the same day, as soon as Pablo heard about the accident, he contacted Insco to report the accident and the property damage to Sam’s car. Insco, without investigating the circumstances, told Pablo that it had no record of Sam being added as a covered driver and, therefore, there was no coverage for the property damage or any other claim arising out of the accident. Insco also told Pablo that Alex was no longer an agent for Insco, and Insco could not be held liable for any of Alex’s actions.

On November 14, Pablo was served with a personal injury lawsuit filed by the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident with Sam. Pablo promptly forwarded the lawsuit to Insco, but Insco denied coverage
for the lawsuit without further explanation. Quite distressed by Insco’s denial of coverage, Pablo engaged the services of an attorney to handle the lawsuit.

What rights and remedies, if any, does Pablo have against Insco under Texas consumer
protection laws? Explain fully.

A

Under chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Act, a person may bring a claim against an insurance company for

  1. false, deceptive, misleading, or fraudulent representations;
  2. a violation of express or implied warranties,
  3. unconscionability.

A claim under the Texas Insurance Act automatically triggers a claim under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. However, a person must be classified as a consumer to bring a cause of action under the DTPA. A consumer is someone who seeks or purchases goods or services.

Under chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Act and the DTPA, a consumer affected by the adverse actions of an insurance company may bring a claim against the company under the laundry list of items of the DTPA. The laundry list includes fraudulent, deceptive, and misleading statements and actions that the consumer relied on.

Chapter 541 also allows an insurance consumer to file a DTPA claim against an insurance company if the insurance company or its representative acted with unconscionability in its dealings with the consumer. “Unconscionability” is defined as dealing with someone in a “grossly unfair manner” in a way that takes advantage of the consumer’s lack of knowledge.

Chapter 541 of the insurance code allows someone to bring a claim against an insurance company for breach of an express warranty. An express warranty is a warranty that the representative of the insurance company communicates to the consumer and that the consumer relies on

Under Texas Insurance Law, an insurance company has an obligation to investigate an accident before denying coverage of the accident.

Under Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code, an insurance company also has a duty to promptly deny liability coverage of a claim. An insurance company must provide a policy owner with a written denial of the claim within 15 days of when the policy owner submits a claim.

DAMAGES
Under Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code and the DTPA, Pablo has remedies in the form of actual damages, reasonable attorney fees. Actual damages under Chapter 541 and the DTPA include any economic damages as well as damages for mental anguish. Actual damages and economic damages are pecuniary damages. Mental anguish damages are damages available for severe mental distress which is described as substantially interfering with the daily routine of the person filing the claim. “Knowingly” means that the insurance agency and company knew that the statements they made to a consumer were false. Additionally, Pablo might be able to receive three times both his actual damages and any mental anguish damages if he can show that Insco or Alex as Insco’s agent acted intentionally made misrepresentations to him regarding his policy. “Intentionally” means making misrepresentations with the knowledge that the person to whom they are made will rely on them.

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2
Q

07/13 #8:
Peter purchased a disability income insurance policy from lnsureco, an insurance company doing business in Texas. The policy provided that, in the event Peter was disabled and unable to work, he would
receive a monthly benefit equal to his regular salary for the length of his disability.

About a year after he obtained the policy, Peter was involved in an automobile accident that left him with a serious back injury. After a thorough medical examination, Peter’s doctor determined that Peter’s medical condition would require on-going treatment, and that Peter was totally disabled and would be unable to return work for at least 12 months.

Peter submitted a proper notice of claim with all other required medical documentation to lnsureco and requested payment of the monthly benefits under the policy.

After a month passed without hearing anything from Insureco, Peter called to check on the status of his claim. Peter spoke with Albert, an agent oflnsureco, who told him that he was in charge of reviewing Peter’s
claim and that:

  • -Insureco was aware of his “debilitating injury,” but had not gotten around to reviewing the claim or the information Peter had provided;
  • -As a matter of company practice, Insureco always took at least six months to complete its review of a “total disability” claim, regardless of the information provided in support of the claim; and
  • -Insureco wouldn’t pay on the claim if Peter had other insurance that applied, even though this condition was not set forth in the policy.

Peter explained to Albert that, in addition to daily living expenses, he had a monthly home mortgage payment, as well as a car loan payment to make and that, without the disability benefits, he was at risk for foreclosure and repossession. Albert told Peter those were his problems and that he would get back to him when he “got around to it.”

Over the next several months, Peter began receiving foreclosure and repossession notices on his house and car, and he made numerous frantic telephone calls to Albert, who never returned the calls.

Six months after Peter submitted his claim, he finally received a one-sentence letter from Insureco saying that his claim was being denied, but providing no further explanation. Peter immediately called Albert, who said that he never finished reviewing Peter’s claim or conducted any investigation. He explained that, once he recognized Peter’s doctor as the same doctor who had been involved in a prior “total disability” claim filed with lnsureco, denial of the claim was automatic, due to “suspicious circumstances.”

Peter was forced to file for bankruptcy in order to prevent foreclosure on his house and repossession of his car and his credit rating was negatively impacted. In addition, Peter was so deeply upset and stressed by the handling and denial of his claim that he had to be placed under the care of a psychiatrist.

What violations, if any, of applicable Texas consumer protection laws were committed by
Insureco and Albert, and what recovery might Peter obtain as a result thereof? Explain fully.

A

The DTPA is designed to protect consumers from deceptive business practices and misrepresentations.

A person is a consumer if he sought or acquired goods or services for lease or purchase. A service includes insurance coverage. A consumer has a cause of action under the DPTA for

(1) violation of the DTPA laundry list, a list of prohibited misrepresentations and practices,
(2) breach of warranty,
(3) unconscionable acts or course of conduct,
(4) violations of the Insurance Code, and
(5) violations of other tie-in statutes.

Laundry list
A defendant may not represent that an agreement confers rights or remedies when the agreement does not. The misrepresentation need not be intentional or knowing. However, the plaintiff must show that he relied to his detriment on the misrepresentation.

Unconscionability
A defendant is liable for unconscionable conduct when the defendant takes advantage of the consumer’s lack of knowledge or expertise to an unfairly gross degree. The behavior must be flagrant, glaring, and unmitigated. Generally, a claim for unconscionability arises out of a consumer’s technical lack of knowledge with regard to a machine or device.

Insurance Code violations
Under the Insurance Code, any person seeking or obtaining insurance coverage or policy may recover against any other person involved in selling insurance. Generally, if a plaintiff is a consumer under the DTPA, the plaintiff is also a person under the Insurance Code. Under the Insurance Code, an insurance is prohibiting from misrepresenting the terms of a policy as well as the extent of its coverage or benefits. It may not circulate false information as well. Additionally, an insurance company violates the Insurance Code if it
(1) does not approve or deny a claim within a reasonable amount of time,
(2) denies a claim without conducting a reasonable investigation,
(3) does not respond to an insured’s inquiries in a reasonable amount of time,
(4) if it fails to provide a reasonable explanation of a denial of a claim the Insurance Code, or
(5) if it fails to pay out a claim after liability has become reasonably clear.

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3
Q

07/13 #8:
Peter purchased a disability income insurance policy from lnsureco, an insurance company doing business in Texas. The policy provided that, in the event Peter was disabled and unable to work, he would
receive a monthly benefit equal to his regular salary for the length of his disability.

About a year after he obtained the policy, Peter was involved in an automobile accident that left him with a serious back injury. After a thorough medical examination, Peter’s doctor determined that Peter’s medical condition would require on-going treatment, and that Peter was totally disabled and would be unable to return work for at least 12 months.

Peter submitted a proper notice of claim with all other required medical documentation to lnsureco and requested payment of the monthly benefits under the policy.

After a month passed without hearing anything from Insureco, Peter called to check on the status of his claim. Peter spoke with Albert, an agent oflnsureco, who told him that he was in charge of reviewing Peter’s
claim and that:

  • -Insureco was aware of his “debilitating injury,” but had not gotten around to reviewing the claim or the information Peter had provided;
  • -As a matter of company practice, Insureco always took at least six months to complete its review of a “total disability” claim, regardless of the information provided in support of the claim; and
  • -Insureco wouldn’t pay on the claim if Peter had other insurance that applied, even though this condition was not set forth in the policy.

Peter explained to Albert that, in addition to daily living expenses, he had a monthly home mortgage payment, as well as a car loan payment to make and that, without the disability benefits, he was at risk for foreclosure and repossession. Albert told Peter those were his problems and that he would get back to him when he “got around to it.”

Over the next several months, Peter began receiving foreclosure and repossession notices on his house and car, and he made numerous frantic telephone calls to Albert, who never returned the calls.

Six months after Peter submitted his claim, he finally received a one-sentence letter from Insureco saying that his claim was being denied, but providing no further explanation. Peter immediately called Albert, who said that he never finished reviewing Peter’s claim or conducted any investigation. He explained that, once he recognized Peter’s doctor as the same doctor who had been involved in a prior “total disability” claim filed with lnsureco, denial of the claim was automatic, due to “suspicious circumstances.”

Peter was forced to file for bankruptcy in order to prevent foreclosure on his house and repossession of his car and his credit rating was negatively impacted. In addition, Peter was so deeply upset and stressed by the handling and denial of his claim that he had to be placed under the care of a psychiatrist.

Under Texas consumer laws, does Peter have any claim on which he might recover punitive, additional or exemplary damages? Explain fully.

A

Under the DTPA, a consumer may recover economic damages for violations that are the producing cause of his harm.

Economic damages includes lost wages, medical expenses, and any other form of penuicary loss.

Additionally, upon a showing that the defendant’s conduct was intentional or knowing, a plaintiff may recover damages for mental anguish as well as additional discretionary damages.

A plaintiff may recover damages for mental anguish i.e. pain and suffering, if he can show that the violation caused him stress and anxiety to the extent that it substantially interfered with his daily routine.

Additionally, the Insurance Code provides for broader remedies. For violations of the Insurance Code, a plaintiff may recover actual damage (i.e. economic damages plus mental anguish and other provable damages), regardless of a showing of intentional or knowing misconduct.

Additionally, because the conduct is knowing or intentional, Peter can recover additional discretionary damages - for a knowing violation, he can recover up to three times economic damages and for an intentional violation, he can recover up to three times actual damages.

Additionally, under Chapter 542 of the Insurance Code a person may recover an 18% penalty if an insurance company does not timely acknowledge (5 days), begin an investigation of the claim (15 days), approve or deny a claim (15 days may be extended to 45 days, depending on investigation), or pay out a claim when liability has become reasonably clear (5 days).

Peter will be entitled to the penalty as well because Insureco violated a substantial amount of the Code.

Finally, a prevailing consumer is entitled to all reasonably necessary attorney’s fees.

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4
Q

02/13 #11:
Carolina works as a computer programmer in a small three-person company in Austin. As a result of a sudden illness, Carolina required an extensive stay in the hospital and incurred significant medical bills. Carolina was unable to work for several months and not able to immediately pay the medical bills from her
hospitalization.

After returning to work, Carolina began receiving statements in the mail at her home from City Hospital (“Hospital”), requesting immediate payment of the unpaid medical bills. Unable to make any payments, Carolina ignored the statements. Then, she began to receive messages on her home voicemail from Dan, who was employed in Hospital’s accounting department. Dan’s messages stated he was calling from the “Credit Bureau” regarding collection of the unpaid medical bills. The calls became more frequent and would occur early in the morning, before 6 a.m., and late at night, after I I p.m.

Carolina finally called Dan back and explained that she was not able to pay the bills at this time. Dan told her that unless the bills were immediately paid in full , the Credit Bureau was going to sue her for the unpaid bills in court, file criminal charges against her, and have her arrested and ·’thrown in jail for a very long time.’’ Dan also told Carolina that she was the “type of deadbeat” that was the cause of the high cost of healthcare and that. if payment was not received in full within a week, she could expect a police officer to
come to her home. After Carolina hung up the phone, she received an email from Dan stating that she would end up in “debtor’s prison” if she didn’t take care of the unpaid bills immediately.

The telephone conversation and email with Dan upset Carolina so much that she developed a debilitating migraine headache and did not go into work the next day. Instead, Carolina went in to see her doctor, who diagnosed her with a severe migraine headache caused by stress, prescribed her pain medication and ordered her to remain out of work for three days.

The next day, Dan called Carolina’s office and asked to speak to her “supervisor.” Ellen, who was Carolina’s supervisor and the sole proprietor of the small company where Carolina worked, took the call. Dan told Ellen that Carolina o·wed Hospital a lot of money, was in ‘·serious legal trouble” and would “likely go to jail for a long time’’ if the outstanding bills were not paid immediately. Dan also threatened that Hospital could sue Ellen and her company directly over the unpaid bills, since Carolina was working there at the time the charges were incurred.

Distraught over the telephone call, Ellen immediately called Carolina at home and told her that the company was too small to take the risk of expensive legal action and that Carolina’s employment was therefore terminated.

As a direct consequence of Carolina’s termination and the loss of her services, the company was unable to complete a major contract for its main customer and lost the contract.

Did Dan’s acts expose Hospital to liability for violation of the Texas Debt Collection Act
(“Act”), and, if so, what were the violations? Explain fully.

A

The TDCA applies to debt collectors of all kinds, including creditor debt collectors, collecting any kind of debt.

The TDCA provides an exclusive list of potential violations for which an action may be brought under the Act, including:

(1) Threats or coercion,
(2) harassment or abuse,
(3) Unconscionable acts or conduct, and
(4) false or misleading statements.

Although as to threats or coercion, the ability to threaten a debtor with legal action is specifically protected (a collector may do so), a debt collector is never able to threaten any actions that are illegal or not within the scope of the law, such as jail time (there is no prison time for debts or criminal liability), arrest, or other unlawful remedies to which the debtor is not entitled.

Harassment or abuse specifically includes harassing phone calls (phone calls made before 7 am or after 9 pm) or phone calls in excessive quantities, and also includes phone calls made to a debtor’s workplace when the debt collector is aware that such calls are prohibited.

As to unconscionable acts or conduct, such conduct includes harassing words or verbal abuse, with significant overlap with the other categories under the exclusive list.

The final category, false or misleading statements, includes representations that an individual is calling from a fake company, is an attorney when the individual is in fact not an attorney, or any other false statements made in the course of attempting to collect the debt. A debt collector may not communicate with a third party regarding a debtor’s debt; he may only do so in order to obtain information regarding the debtor’s whereabouts.

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5
Q

02/13 #11:
Carolina works as a computer programmer in a small three-person company in Austin. As a result of a sudden illness, Carolina required an extensive stay in the hospital and incurred significant medical bills. Carolina was unable to work for several months and not able to immediately pay the medical bills from her
hospitalization.

After returning to work, Carolina began receiving statements in the mail at her home from City Hospital (“Hospital”), requesting immediate payment of the unpaid medical bills. Unable to make any payments, Carolina ignored the statements. Then, she began to receive messages on her home voicemail from Dan, who was employed in Hospital’s accounting department. Dan’s messages stated he was calling from the “Credit Bureau” regarding collection of the unpaid medical bills. The calls became more frequent and would occur early in the morning, before 6 a.m., and late at night, after I I p.m.

Carolina finally call ed Dan back and explained that she was not able to pay the bills at this time. Dan told her that unless the bills were immediately paid in full , the Credit Bureau was going to sue her for the unpaid bills in court, file criminal charges against her, and have her arrested and ·’thrown in jail for a very long time.’’ Dan also told Carolina that she was the “type of deadbeat” that was the cause of the high cost of healthcare and that. if payment was not received in full within a week, she could expect a police officer to
come to her home. After Carolina hung up the phone, she received an email from Dan stating that she would end up in “debtor’s prison” if she didn’t take care of the unpaid bills immediately.

The telephone conversation and email with Dan upset Carolina so much that she developed a debilitating migraine headache and did not go into work the next day. Instead, Carolina went in to see her doctor, who diagnosed her with a severe migraine headache caused by stress, prescribed her pain medication and ordered her to remain out of work for three days.

The next day, Dan called Carolina’s office and asked to speak to her “supervisor.” Ellen, who was Carolina’s supervisor and the sole proprietor of the small company where Carolina worked, took the call. Dan told Ellen that Carolina o·wed Hospital a lot of money, was in ‘·serious legal trouble” and would “likely go to jail for a long time’’ if the outstanding bills were not paid immediately. Dan also threatened that Hospital could sue Ellen and her company directly over the unpaid bills, since Carolina was working there at the time the charges were incurred.

Distraught over the telephone call, Ellen immediately called Carolina at home and told her that the company was too small to take the risk of expensive legal action and that Carolina’s employment was therefore terminated.

As a direct consequence of Carolina’s termination and the loss of her services, the company was unable to complete a major contract for its main customer and lost the contract.

What rights and civil remedies, if any, does Carolina have under the Act against Hospital? Explain fully.

A

Under the TDCA, a debt collector who is found to have violated the terms of the statute is liable to a debtor for actual damages, injunctive relief and attorney’s fees. Actual damages are defined as damages that were available under the common law, and include, inter alia, economic damages, pain and suffering, mental anguish and lost wages. In addition to actual damages, the TDCA provides for injunctive relief and the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees. The TDCA provides that a debtor can also plead any violations of the statute through the DTPA, which is beneficial because the DTPA provides for “additional damages” that are discretionary by the fact finder of up to three times a party’s actual damages (the DTPA normally provides for only economic damages, however, since it is a TDCA violation in this case, actual damages would be recoverable).

CHECK WITH BARBRI ANSWER

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6
Q

02/13 #11:
Carolina works as a computer programmer in a small three-person company in Austin. As a result of a sudden illness, Carolina required an extensive stay in the hospital and incurred significant medical bills. Carolina was unable to work for several months and not able to immediately pay the medical bills from her
hospitalization.

After returning to work, Carolina began receiving statements in the mail at her home from City Hospital (“Hospital”), requesting immediate payment of the unpaid medical bills. Unable to make any payments, Carolina ignored the statements. Then, she began to receive messages on her home voicemail from Dan, who was employed in Hospital’s accounting department. Dan’s messages stated he was calling from the “Credit Bureau” regarding collection of the unpaid medical bills. The calls became more frequent and would occur early in the morning, before 6 a.m., and late at night, after I I p.m.

Carolina finally call ed Dan back and explained that she was not able to pay the bills at this time. Dan told her that unless the bills were immediately paid in full , the Credit Bureau was going to sue her for the unpaid bills in court, file criminal charges against her, and have her arrested and ·’thrown in jail for a very long time.’’ Dan also told Carolina that she was the “type of deadbeat” that was the cause of the high cost of healthcare and that. if payment was not received in full within a week, she could expect a police officer to
come to her home. After Carolina hung up the phone, she received an email from Dan stating that she would end up in “debtor’s prison” if she didn’t take care of the unpaid bills immediately.

The telephone conversation and email with Dan upset Carolina so much that she developed a debilitating migraine headache and did not go into work the next day. Instead, Carolina went in to see her doctor, who diagnosed her with a severe migraine headache caused by stress, prescribed her pain medication and ordered her to remain out of work for three days.

The next day, Dan called Carolina’s office and asked to speak to her “supervisor.” Ellen, who was Carolina’s supervisor and the sole proprietor of the small company where Carolina worked, took the call. Dan told Ellen that Carolina o·wed Hospital a lot of money, was in ‘·serious legal trouble” and would “likely go to jail for a long time’’ if the outstanding bills were not paid immediately. Dan also threatened that Hospital could sue Ellen and her company directly over the unpaid bills, since Carolina was working there at the time the charges were incurred.

Distraught over the telephone call, Ellen immediately called Carolina at home and told her that the company was too small to take the risk of expensive legal action and that Carolina’s employment was therefore terminated.

As a direct consequence of Carolina’s termination and the loss of her services, the company was unable to complete a major contract for its main customer and lost the contract.

What rights and civil remedies, if any, does Ellen have under the Act against Hospital?
Explain fully.

A

A third party may recover against the debt collector for improper debt collection practices as long as the debt collector’s communication or violation reached that third party and the third party has suffered actual damages.

CHECK WITH BARBRI ANSWER

Act applies to any “person” injured as consequence of violation of the Act. The law doesnt distinguish btw remedies available to consumer and to any other person who asserts a violation of the Act. Therefore, Ellen may recover actual damages, injunctive relief, and atty fees reasonably related to the amount of work performed and costs.

The issue is whether all of Ellen’s damages are compensable under the definition of actual damages.

Actual damages broadly defined and includes economic and noneconomic damages.

“tie-in” Statute?

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7
Q

02/13 #11:
Carolina works as a computer programmer in a small three-person company in Austin. As a result of a sudden illness, Carolina required an extensive stay in the hospital and incurred significant medical bills. Carolina was unable to work for several months and not able to immediately pay the medical bills from her
hospitalization.

After returning to work, Carolina began receiving statements in the mail at her home from City Hospital (“Hospital”), requesting immediate payment of the unpaid medical bills. Unable to make any payments, Carolina ignored the statements. Then, she began to receive messages on her home voicemail from Dan, who was employed in Hospital’s accounting department. Dan’s messages stated he was calling from the “Credit Bureau” regarding collection of the unpaid medical bills. The calls became more frequent and would occur early in the morning, before 6 a.m., and late at night, after I I p.m.

Carolina finally call ed Dan back and explained that she was not able to pay the bills at this time. Dan told her that unless the bills were immediately paid in full , the Credit Bureau was going to sue her for the unpaid bills in court, file criminal charges against her, and have her arrested and ·’thrown in jail for a very long time.’’ Dan also told Carolina that she was the “type of deadbeat” that was the cause of the high cost of healthcare and that. if payment was not received in full within a week, she could expect a police officer to
come to her home. After Carolina hung up the phone, she received an email from Dan stating that she would end up in “debtor’s prison” if she didn’t take care of the unpaid bills immediately.

The telephone conversation and email with Dan upset Carolina so much that she developed a debilitating migraine headache and did not go into work the next day. Instead, Carolina went in to see her doctor, who diagnosed her with a severe migraine headache caused by stress, prescribed her pain medication and ordered her to remain out of work for three days.

The next day, Dan called Carolina’s office and asked to speak to her “supervisor.” Ellen, who was Carolina’s supervisor and the sole proprietor of the small company where Carolina worked, took the call. Dan told Ellen that Carolina o·wed Hospital a lot of money, was in ‘·serious legal trouble” and would “likely go to jail for a long time’’ if the outstanding bills were not paid immediately. Dan also threatened that Hospital could sue Ellen and her company directly over the unpaid bills, since Carolina was working there at the time the charges were incurred.

Distraught over the telephone call, Ellen immediately called Carolina at home and told her that the company was too small to take the risk of expensive legal action and that Carolina’s employment was therefore terminated.

As a direct consequence of Carolina’s termination and the loss of her services, the company was unable to complete a major contract for its main customer and lost the contract.

What rights and civil remedies, if any, do Carolina and Ellen have under Texas common law? Explain fully.

A

Texas common law includes a tort for unreasonable debt collection, as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Carolina and Ellen can also bring suit under the common law tort of wrongful debt collection for any abusive, deceptive, or otherwise wrongful conduct committed by Dan in his attempt to collect Carolina’s debt.

Again, Hospital will also be vicariously liable for the acts of Dan. However, it is unclear whether Ellen can rely on the tort because she is not the debtor. If a common law action is brought, the available remedies will be an injunction (must prove substantial harm), and actual damages. They can also recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress for Dan’s extreme and outrageous comments and Carolina can recover for defamation, but negligent IED is not recognized in Texas (Dan acted intentionally anyways).

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8
Q

07/12 #3:
Peter searched online for a wedding gift for his son, George, and found a website for a local business called Discount Appliances (“Discount”). The website contained photos of washers and dryers for sale and included the following statements on the homepage: “All merchandise in LIKE NEW condition’’ and “customer Satisfaction Guaranteed!” The prices of the washers and dryers were listed next to the photos and were substantially less than the prices of new washers and dryers.

Peter called the telephone number listed on the website and spoke with Roger, a Discount representative. Roger explained that the washers and dryers were “ practically brand new,” had “never been used,” and had “only minor cosmetic scratches and dents.” Roger also told Peter not to worry about
purchasing online because the washers and dryers were subject to an “absolute 30-day Money Back Guarantee.”

After speaking with Roger, Peter went back online to the Discount website and selected a washer and dryer to buy for George. Peter filled out the online order form by typing in his name and address as the purchaser, and indicated that the appliances were to be delivered directly to George’s address.

At the bottom of the online order form, in small type, was the following statement: “Merchandise sold AS IS–No warranties. Purchaser waives all claims and assumes all risks and liabilities.’’

Discount delivered the washer and dryer to George’s home. The first time George used the washer, it leaked water and caused serious damage to George’s wood floor.

George immediately called an appliance repair shop and a service specialist was sent to look at the washer. After inspecting the appliances, the service specialist informed George that both the washer and dryer
showed signs of heavy use. In particular, the washer had worn hoses and a rusted and cracked tub that was the clear cause of the water leak.

George called Peter and told him what happened. Peter called Roger and explained the situation. Roger told Peter that there was nothing Discount could do because of the written statement at the bottom of the online order form. When Peter reminded Roger about their prior telephone conversation, Roger said that he was just expressing his opinion. When Peter asked about the “30-Day Money Back Guarantee,” Roger admitted that, “Yeah, we always say that, but we don’ t really have a guarantee since our prices are so low.” Peter followed up by sending a letter to Discount demanding a refund.

As a result of the damage caused by the leak, George had to completely replace the floor in his house and missed two weeks of work overseeing the repairs.

What claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”), if any, can Peter
make against Discount and Roger? Explain fully.

A

(a) Peter may assert claims against Discount and Roger under the DTPA for a violation of the
laundry list,
unconscionability, and
breach of express warranty.

Whether Peter’s claims may be successfully asserted depends upon his status as a consumer under the DTPA, and whether he can establish a legal and factual basis for the claims.

To be a consumer, the entity asserting consumer status must seek or acquire goods or services by purchase or lease. There is no requirement that the entity that acquires the goods must also pay for the goods.

To establish a laundry list claim, the consumer must show that a misrepresentation was made or there was a failure to disclose information, and that it was relied on.

To establish a claim for unconscionability, the consumer must show that the seller took advantage of him to a grossly unfair degree.

To establish a breach of warranty claim under the DTPA, the consumer must show that a warranty was formed outside of the DTPA, that it was not disclaimed, and that the consumer is a proper entity to assert a claim for breach of that warranty.

A consumer may assert a claim under the DTPA against any entity that violated the Act in connection with his transaction.

In this case, Peter sought to purchase a washer and dryer. Therefore, he is a consumer. Peter spoke with Roger and was told the appliances were “practically brand new,” had “never been used,” and had “only minor cosmetic scratches and dents.” Roger also told Peter not to worry about purchasing online because the washers and dryers were subject to an “Absolute 30-Day Money Back Guarantee.” These statements were made directly in connection with Peter’s transaction as statements of fact, and were not mere opinion or puffing. In reliance on these statements, Peter decided to purchase the products from Discount’s website. The defendants may try to argue that the “as is” clause negated any reliance; however, that is not the effect of a simple “as is” clause that does not mention reliance. As discussed below in connection with warranty, such clauses merely operate to negate implied warranties. Because the products were not as represented and there was not a money back guarantee, the statements are actionable under the DTPA.

Because Roger individually made these statements directly to Peter, Peter may maintain a claim under the DTPA against Roger individually.

Additionally, because Roger made these statements as an agent of Discount, Peter has a claim against Discount under the laundry list for misrepresentation based on Roger’s representations.

The Discount website also stated, “All merchandise in LIKE NEW condition” and “Customer Satisfaction Guaranteed!” These statements appear to have been made as statements of fact and were false. Although “like new” could be considered puffing, and thus not actionable, “satisfaction guaranteed” would lead a consumer to believe that the product could be returned if it was not acceptable, which, in fact, was false. This statement could give rise to an additional claim against Discount under the laundry list.

Peter also may have a claim against Roger based on unconscionability.

Roger appears to know he has superior knowledge and experience, and took advantage of Peter’s inability to verify what he was told. If Peter could show that he was taken advantage of to a grossly unfair degree, he could prevail on an unconscionability claim. It also may be argued that the unconscionable action of an agent can be imputed to the principal. If that is the case, Peter may assert his unconscionability claims against Discount, as well as Roger.

Peter also may have a claim based on breach of warranty.

Although there generally are no implied warranties in the sale of used goods, Roger’s statement, “Absolute 30-Day Money Back Guarantee,” made on behalf of the seller, Discount, appears to be a factual promise regarding the goods. Because this statement was relied on by Peter and became a basis of the bargain, under the DTPA it could constitute an express warranty of the seller. As noted above, any breach of warranty is actionable by a consumer under the DTPA, and may be asserted against the seller, Discount.

Finally, Discount’s website stated, “Merchandise sold AS IS—No warranties. Purchaser waives all claims and assumes all risks and liabilities.” Discount may argue that this language disclaimed all warranties and waived DTPA liability.

Warranties asserted under the DTPA are subject to limitations and disclaimers generally applicable outside of the DTPA. Under the UCC, an “as is” clause such as this one may waive implied warranties if it is conspicuous, but does not disclaim conflicting express warranties.

Because the warranty at issue is an express warranty, the “as is” clause has no effect. Additionally, although the clause states that the purchaser “waives” all claims, waivers under the DTPA are generally unenforceable and void.

For a DTPA waiver to be enforceable, the waiver language must comply with the DTPA, be signed by the consumer, and the consumer must be represented by an attorney. In this case, the attempted waiver is unenforceable.

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9
Q

07/12 #3:
Peter searched online for a wedding gift for his son, George, and found a website for a local business called Discount Appliances (“Discount”). The website contained photos of washers and dryers for sale and included the following statements on the homepage: “All merchandise in LIKE NEW condition’’ and “customer Satisfaction Guaranteed!” The prices of the washers and dryers were listed next to the photos and were substantially less than the prices of new washers and dryers.

Peter called the telephone number listed on the website and spoke with Roger, a Discount representative. Roger explained that the washers and dryers were “ practically brand new,” had “never been used,” and had “only minor cosmetic scratches and dents.” Roger also told Peter not to worry about
purchasing online because the washers and dryers were subject to an “absolute 30-day Money Back Guarantee.”

After speaking with Roger, Peter went back online to the Discount website and selected a washer and dryer to buy for George. Peter filled out the online order form by typing in his name and address as the purchaser, and indicated that the appliances were to be delivered directly to George’s address.

At the bottom of the online order form, in small type, was the following statement: “Merchandise sold AS IS–No warranties. Purchaser waives all claims and assumes all risks and liabilities.’’

Discount delivered the washer and dryer to George’s home. The first time George used the washer, it leaked water and caused serious damage to George’s wood floor.

George immediately called an appliance repair shop and a service specialist was sent to look at the washer. After inspecting the appliances, the service specialist informed George that both the washer and dryer
showed signs of heavy use. In particular, the washer had worn hoses and a rusted and cracked tub that was the clear cause of the water leak.

George called Peter and told him what happened. Peter called Roger and explained the situation. Roger told Peter that there was nothing Discount could do because of the written statement at the bottom of the online order form. When Peter reminded Roger about their prior telephone conversation, Roger said that he was just expressing his opinion. When Peter asked about the “30-Day Money Back Guarantee,” Roger admitted that, “Yeah, we always say that, but we don’ t really have a guarantee since our prices are so low.” Peter followed up by sending a letter to Discount demanding a refund.

As a result of the damage caused by the leak, George had to completely replace the floor in his house and missed two weeks of work overseeing the repairs.

What claims under the DTPA, if any, can George make against Discount and Roger?
Explain fully.

A

(b) George may assert claims against Discount and Roger under the DTPA for violation of the
laundry list,
section 17.46(b), and
breach of express warranty.

Whether George’s claims may be successfully asserted will depend upon his status as a consumer under the DTPA, and whether he can establish a legal and factual basis for the claims.

To be a consumer, the entity asserting consumer status must seek or acquire goods or services by purchase or lease. There is no requirement that the entity that acquires the goods must also pay for the goods.

To establish a laundry list claim, the consumer must show that a misrepresentation was made or there was a failure to disclose information, and that it was relied on.

To establish a breach of warranty claim under the DTPA, the consumer must show that a warranty was formed outside of the DTPA, that it was not disclaimed, and that the consumer is a proper entity to assert a claim for breach of that warranty.

A consumer may assert a claim under the DTPA against any entity that violated the Act in connection with his transaction.

In this case, George acquired a washer and dryer, purchased by Peter. Therefore, George is a consumer. It also could be argued that he was an intended beneficiary and therefore was a consumer. When Peter spoke with Roger, he was told that the appliances were “practically brand new,” had “never been used,” and had “only minor cosmetic scratches and dents.” Roger also told Peter not to worry about purchasing online because the washers and dryers were subject to an “Absolute 30-Day Money Back Guarantee.” These statements were made directly in connection with the transaction that resulted in the purchase of the washer and dryer and were statements of fact, not mere opinion or puffing. In reliance on these statements, Peter decided to purchase the products from Discount’s website. Under the DTPA, there must be reliance by a consumer to the consumer’s detriment. As discussed above, Peter was a consumer. His reliance on the statements was to the detriment of George, also a consumer.

The defendants may try to argue that the “as is” clause negated any reliance, however, that is not the effect of a simple “as is” clause that does not mention reliance. As discussed below, in connection with warranties, such clauses merely operate to negate implied warranties.

Because the products were not as represented and there was not a money back guarantee, the statements constitute an actionable misrepresentation under the laundry list. Roger made these statements individually and as an agent of Discount. George, therefore, has a claim under the laundry list for misrepresentation against both Roger individually and Discount.

Additionally, the Discount website stated, “All merchandise in LIKE NEW condition” and “Customer Satisfaction Guaranteed!” These statements appear to have been made as statements of fact and were false. Although “like new” could be considered puffing, and thus, not actionable, “satisfaction guaranteed” would lead a consumer to believe that the product could be returned if it was not acceptable, which in fact was false. Because Peter relied on this statement to George’s detriment, this statement could give rise to a claim under the laundry list.

George, unlike Peter, does not have a claim against Roger based on unconscionability.

George did not deal directly with Roger or Discount, and, therefore, their actions could not have taken advantage of his lack of knowledge or experience.

George may also have a claim based on breach of warranty.

Although there generally are no implied warranties in the sale of used goods, Roger’s statement, “Absolute 30-Day Money Back Guarantee,” made on behalf of the seller, Discount, appears to be a factual promise regarding the goods. Because this statement was relied on by Peter and became a basis of the bargain, under the DTPA it could constitute an express warranty of the seller.

As noted above, any breach of warranty is actionable by a consumer under the DTPA and may be asserted against the seller, Discount.

Although George was not in privity with Discount, many Texas courts have held that privity is not required to assert a claim for breach of express warranty.

Finally, Discount’s website stated, “Merchandise sold AS IS—No warranties. Purchaser waives all claims and assumes all risks and liabilities.”

Warranties asserted under the DTPA are subject to limitations and disclaimers generally applicable outside of the DTPA. Under the UCC, an “as is” clause such as this one may waive implied warranties, but does not disclaim express warranties.

Because the warranty at issue is an express warranty, the “as is” clause has no effect.

Additionally, although the clause states that the purchaser “waives” all claims, waivers under the DTPA generally are unenforceable and void. For a DTPA waiver to be enforceable, the waiver language must comply with the DTPA, be signed by the consumer, and the consumer must be represented by an attorney. In this case, the attempted waiver is unenforceable.

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10
Q

07/12 #3:
Peter searched online for a wedding gift for his son, George, and found a website for a local business called Discount Appliances (“Discount”). The website contained photos of washers and dryers for sale and included the following statements on the homepage: “All merchandise in LIKE NEW condition’’ and “customer Satisfaction Guaranteed!” The prices of the washers and dryers were listed next to the photos and were substantially less than the prices of new washers and dryers.

Peter called the telephone number listed on the website and spoke with Roger, a Discount representative. Roger explained that the washers and dryers were “ practically brand new,” had “never been used,” and had “only minor cosmetic scratches and dents.” Roger also told Peter not to worry about
purchasing online because the washers and dryers were subject to an “absolute 30-day Money Back Guarantee.”

After speaking with Roger, Peter went back online to the Discount website and selected a washer and dryer to buy for George. Peter filled out the online order form by typing in his name and address as the purchaser, and indicated that the appliances were to be delivered directly to George’s address.

At the bottom of the online order form, in small type, was the following statement: “Merchandise sold AS IS–No warranties. Purchaser waives all claims and assumes all risks and liabilities.’’

Discount delivered the washer and dryer to George’s home. The first time George used the washer, it leaked water and caused serious damage to George’s wood floor.

George immediately called an appliance repair shop and a service specialist was sent to look at the washer. After inspecting the appliances, the service specialist informed George that both the washer and dryer
showed signs of heavy use. In particular, the washer had worn hoses and a rusted and cracked tub that was the clear cause of the water leak.

George called Peter and told him what happened. Peter called Roger and explained the situation. Roger told Peter that there was nothing Discount could do because of the written statement at the bottom of the online order form. When Peter reminded Roger about their prior telephone conversation, Roger said that he was just expressing his opinion. When Peter asked about the “30-Day Money Back Guarantee,” Roger admitted that, “Yeah, we always say that, but we don’ t really have a guarantee since our prices are so low.” Peter followed up by sending a letter to Discount demanding a refund.

As a result of the damage caused by the leak, George had to completely replace the floor in his house and missed two weeks of work overseeing the repairs.

Under the DTPA, what elements of damages, if any, can Peter recover against Discount? Explain fully.

A

(c) If Peter prevails against Discount under the DTPA, he may recover economic damages. If he shows that Discount acted knowingly, he may recover economic damages up to a total of three times the amount of economic loss. Or, if Peter shows that Discount acted intentionally, he may recover economic damages, damages for mental anguish, as well as up to a total of three times economic damages and mental anguish damages. Under the DTPA, Peter may also recover reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees, and in an appropriate case, any other relief the court deems appropriate (i.e., injunctive relief, which does not seem applicable in this case).

The issue in this case is whether Peter suffered any loss compensable under the DTPA.

Economic loss is defined as all pecuniary loss.

The question is whether Peter, who purchased the washer and dryer for George, suffered any pecuniary loss.

It could be argued that because Peter never took possession of the machines and never used them, he has no pecuniary loss. He paid for an item and it was delivered. On the other hand, Peter has a contract with Discount and is a consumer under the DTPA. He was misled and deceived into purchasing the product that was not as represented. Peter, therefore, should be entitled to recover for his economic loss.

Under this standard, Peter could seek to recover a refund of the price he paid for the machines or the difference in value between what he received and what he was promised, the additional cost of repairs to the machines, or the cost to purchase replacements.

If Peter shows that Discount acted knowingly (i.e., that it knew or should have known that its statement or conduct was false, deceptive, or misleading), the jury may award an amount up to a total of three times Peter’s economic loss.

In this case, Roger admits that he made the representation knowing that it was false.

Additionally, upon a showing of knowingly, the jury is authorized to award Peter damages for mental anguish. To recover damages for mental anguish, it is necessary to show a high degree of mental pain or distress. Generally, this requires direct evidence of the nature, severity, and duration of the mental anguish, and that it caused a substantial disruption of the claimant’s daily routine. It does not appear that Peter has suffered any compensable mental anguish, but he may be entitled to additional damages based on his economic loss.

If Peter is able to establish that Discount acted intentionally (which is essentially defined as knowingly plus the specific intent that the consumer act in reliance on the falsity or deception), Peter would be entitled to recover his economic and mental anguish damages, as well as up to three times both economic and mental anguish damages.

Finally, in the event Peter prevails, the court must award reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees. Attorneys’ fees under the DTPA must be awarded in a dollar amount, based on the nature and amount of work performed.

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11
Q

07/12 #3:
Peter searched online for a wedding gift for his son, George, and found a website for a local business called Discount Appliances (“Discount”). The website contained photos of washers and dryers for sale and included the following statements on the homepage: “All merchandise in LIKE NEW condition’’ and “customer Satisfaction Guaranteed!” The prices of the washers and dryers were listed next to the photos and were substantially less than the prices of new washers and dryers.

Peter called the telephone number listed on the website and spoke with Roger, a Discount representative. Roger explained that the washers and dryers were “ practically brand new,” had “never been used,” and had “only minor cosmetic scratches and dents.” Roger also told Peter not to worry about
purchasing online because the washers and dryers were subject to an “absolute 30-day Money Back Guarantee.”

After speaking with Roger, Peter went back online to the Discount website and selected a washer and dryer to buy for George. Peter filled out the online order form by typing in his name and address as the purchaser, and indicated that the appliances were to be delivered directly to George’s address.

At the bottom of the online order form, in small type, was the following statement: “Merchandise sold AS IS–No warranties. Purchaser waives all claims and assumes all risks and liabilities.’’

Discount delivered the washer and dryer to George’s home. The first time George used the washer, it leaked water and caused serious damage to George’s wood floor.

George immediately called an appliance repair shop and a service specialist was sent to look at the washer. After inspecting the appliances, the service specialist informed George that both the washer and dryer
showed signs of heavy use. In particular, the washer had worn hoses and a rusted and cracked tub that was the clear cause of the water leak.

George called Peter and told him what happened. Peter called Roger and explained the situation. Roger told Peter that there was nothing Discount could do because of the written statement at the bottom of the online order form. When Peter reminded Roger about their prior telephone conversation, Roger said that he was just expressing his opinion. When Peter asked about the “30-Day Money Back Guarantee,” Roger admitted that, “Yeah, we always say that, but we don’ t really have a guarantee since our prices are so low.” Peter followed up by sending a letter to Discount demanding a refund.

As a result of the damage caused by the leak, George had to completely replace the floor in his house and missed two weeks of work overseeing the repairs.

Under the DTPA, what elements of damages, if any, can George recover against Discount? Explain fully.

A

(d) If George prevails against Discount under the DTPA, he may recover his economic damages. If he shows that Discount acted knowingly, he may recover economic damages up to a total of three times his economic loss. Or, if George shows that Discount acted intentionally, he may recover economic damages, damages for mental anguish, as well as up to a total of three times economic damages and mental anguish damages. Under the DTPA, George may also recover reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees, and in an appropriate case any other relief the court deems appropriate.

The issue in this case is whether the damages George suffered are compensable under the DTPA.

Economic loss is defined as all pecuniary loss.

As discussed above, George is a consumer under the DTPA and may recover all economic damages produced by the defendant’s wrongful conduct. George’s direct economic damages include the cost of repairs to the washer and dryer, the cost of obtaining a washer and dryer as represented, or the return of the purchase price. George also is entitled to the consequential economic loss he suffered, including the cost to repair the floor, and the wages he lost due to the two weeks he was unable to work. (Note: Only George or Peter, not both, can recover economic damages for the cost of repairing or replacing the machines.)

As discussed above, if George shows Discount acted knowingly (i.e., that it knew or should have known that its statement or conduct was false, deceptive, or misleading), the jury may award an amount up to a total of three times George’s economic loss. If George is able to establish that Discount acted intentionally (which is knowingly plus the specific intent that the consumer act in reliance on the falsity or deception), George would be entitled to recover his economic and mental anguish damages, as well as up to a total of three times both economic and mental anguish damages.

Finally, in the event George prevails, the court must award reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. Attorneys’ fees under the DTPA must be awarded in a dollar amount, based on the nature and amount of work performed.

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12
Q

02/12 #7:
Albert retained Brenda, a licensed, professional real estate agent, to list his house in Bexar County, Texas, for sale. As part of her initial inspection of the property, Brenda measured the house’s square footage. She inadvertently calculated the square footage of the house as 3,000 sq. ft. when, in fact, the square footage was 2,500 sq. ft. Albert noticed the error in Brenda’s calculation but did not correct it. With Albert’s
approval, Brenda listed the house for sale as having 3,000 square feet and with a sales price of $250,000.

Cedric was shopping for a house and hired Brenda as his agent. Brenda arranged for Cedric to view Albert’s house. During the viewing, Cedric told Brenda that the listing had interested him because of the house’s location and size. While there, Cedric noticed that the floors appeared to be slightly warped and also saw cracks around some of the doors and windows. He asked Brenda if she thought the house had any foundation damage. Brenda told him that, in her opinion, the cracks appeared to be cosmetic and would likely have no effect on the house’s value. Based on Brenda’s statements, as well as the information he read in Brenda’s listing, Cedric purchased the house for $250,000.

Six months later, Cedric’s employer required him to move to Atlanta. Cedric contacted Edward, a real estate agent, to list the house for sale. Before listing the house, Edward reviewed Brenda’s listing from the previous year. After inspecting the house, Edward advised Cedric that the square footage in Brenda’s listing was wrong and that the house was actually only 2,500 sq. ft. Edward hired a licensed inspector to inspect the
house, and the inspector discovered the house’s foundation was significantly damaged, and the damage would negatively affect the house’s value.

Edward advised Cedric that, due to the size of the house and the damage to the foundation, the house’s value was only $190,000. Cedric was very upset at this news and became so stressed about the house’s decreased value that he developed a painful ulcer, which required him to undergo treatment by a physician.

What claims, if any, may Cedric assert against Albert and Brenda under Texas consumer laws? Explain fully.

A

(a) Cedric may assert claims for misrepresentation against Brenda and failure to disclose against Albert under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”).

The viability of his claims depends on whether the statements were factual or opinion, Albert’s intent, and whether Brenda was performing a professional service that is exempt from the DTPA.

Under the DTPA, a person who makes a misrepresentation that a consumer relies on or who fails to disclose material information with the intent to induce the consumer into the transaction may be liable for any damages produced by that misrepresentation. To be actionable, the consumer must rely on the representation or failure to disclose.

Under the DTPA, Cedric may sue any entity whose false, deceptive, or misleading conduct occurred in connection with the transaction. Because both Brenda and Albert dealt directly with Cedric, they are proper parties and may be sued under the DTPA. Even though Brenda was acting as an agent for Albert, she still may be individually responsible under the DTPA for her misrepresentations. There is no requirement of privity. An issue arises, however, regarding whether Brenda’s conduct constitutes a professional service exempt from the DTPA.

Section 17.49(c) of the DTPA provides that it does not apply to a claim for damages based on the rendering of a professional service, the essence of which is the providing of advice, judgment, opinion, or similar professional skill. It may be argued that the service of a professional real estate agent is in fact an exempt “professional service” under the DTPA, the essence of which is advice, judgment, opinion, or similar professional skill. The inquiry, however, does not end there. Section 17.49(c) also provides that its exemption does not apply to an express misrepresentation of a material fact that cannot be characterized as advice, judgment, or opinion. In the instant case, the statement that forms the basis of Cedric’s misrepresentation claim is Brenda’s statement that the house contains 3,000 square feet. This is not a matter of opinion, but rather a representation of fact, for which Brenda may be responsible under the DTPA. On the other hand, Brenda’s statement regarding the foundation cracks may be exempt from the DTPA. Brenda told Cedric that, “in her opinion,” the cracks appeared to be cosmetic and likely would have no effect on the house’s value. These statements were not made as material representations, and may be characterized as advice, judgment, or opinion. If Brenda’s services were found to be professional within the definition of section 17.49(c), the statements regarding the foundation would not be actionable.

To establish a violation of the laundry list, Cedric must show that there was either an actionable misrepresentation or failure to disclose, and that he relied upon it to his detriment. The most common way of establishing a violation of the DTPA is to show a misrepresentation of the characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities of a good or service.

Goods are defined by the DTPA to mean tangible chattels or real property purchased or leased for use.

Brenda’s statement regarding the square footage of the house is a misrepresentation of the good Cedric was purchasing and was relied upon by Cedric when deciding to make the purchase at the price of $250,000. On the other hand, even assuming that Brenda’s statement regarding the foundation is not exempt under the professional service exemption, it probably is not actionable. Brenda’s statement probably is nothing more than mere opinion or puffing, and not actionable under the laundry list.

Cedric also may have a claim against Albert under the failure to disclose provision of the laundry list.

Under the DTPA, a seller who fails to disclose information with an intent to induce a consumer into a transaction that the consumer otherwise would not enter into violates the laundry list.

In this case, Albert knew about the error in the square footage designation and took no steps to correct it or disclose the true facts to Cedric. It can be assumed that Albert knew that this information would make a difference to Cedric, and Albert’s failure to make the disclosure was intended to induce Cedric into the transaction. Albert, as principal, also may be responsible for the misrepresentations of his agent, Brenda, under general principles of agency law.

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13
Q

02/12 #7:
Albert retained Brenda, a licensed, professional real estate agent, to list his house in Bexar County, Texas, for sale. As part of her initial inspection of the property, Brenda measured the house’s square footage. She inadvertently calculated the square footage of the house as 3,000 sq. ft. when, in fact, the square footage was 2,500 sq. ft. Albert noticed the error in Brenda’s calculation but did not correct it. With Albert’s
approval, Brenda listed the house for sale as having 3,000 square feet and with a sales price of $250,000.

Cedric was shopping for a house and hired Brenda as his agent. Brenda arranged for Cedric to view Albert’s house. During the viewing, Cedric told Brenda that the listing had interested him because of the house’s location and size. While there, Cedric noticed that the floors appeared to be slightly warped and also saw cracks around some of the doors and windows. He asked Brenda if she thought the house had any foundation damage. Brenda told him that, in her opinion, the cracks appeared to be cosmetic and would likely have no effect on the house’s value. Based on Brenda’s statements, as well as the information he read in Brenda’s listing, Cedric purchased the house for $250,000.

Six months later, Cedric’s employer required him to move to Atlanta. Cedric contacted Edward, a real estate agent, to list the house for sale. Before listing the house, Edward reviewed Brenda’s listing from the previous year. After inspecting the house, Edward advised Cedric that the square footage in Brenda’s listing was wrong and that the house was actually only 2,500 sq. ft. Edward hired a licensed inspector to inspect the
house, and the inspector discovered the house’s foundation was significantly damaged, and the damage would negatively affect the house’s value.

Edward advised Cedric that, due to the size of the house and the damage to the foundation, the house’s value was only $190,000. Cedric was very upset at this news and became so stressed about the house’s decreased value that he developed a painful ulcer, which required him to undergo treatment by a physician.

What remedies, if any, are available to Cedric against Albert and Brenda under Texas consumer laws? Explain fully.

A

(b) If Cedric prevails against Albert and/or Brenda, under the DTPA he will be able to recover his economic damages and reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

If he can show either party acted knowingly, he can recover damages for mental anguish as well as up to three times his economic damages against that party. Or, if he can show either party acted intentionally, he may recover up to three times both his economic and mental damages against that party. To recover any damages, he must show the false, deceptive, or misleading act was a producing cause of his damages.

Assuming Cedric prevails against Brenda based on her misrepresentations regarding the square footage of the house, or Albert for his failure to disclose the proper square footage, Cedric can recover the difference in value between the house as represented and its true value. If Cedric recovers against Brenda for her misrepresentations regarding the foundation, he would be able to recover either the difference in value between the value of the house with the defective foundation and the amount he paid, or the cost of repairs. Cedric also may recover for the additional economic damages he suffered as a result of the misrepresentations, specifically any costs of medical treatment or lost wages resulting from his ulcer.

Finally, if Cedric can show that Brenda or Albert acted knowingly (i.e., that they knew or should have known their conduct was false, deceptive, or misleading), he can recover damages for mental anguish.

With respect to Albert, acting knowingly will be easy to prove due to the intent requirement imposed by the DTPA’s “failure to disclose” provision. Assuming Cedric establishes either or both acted knowingly, to recover damages for mental anguish he must show a high degree of mental pain. It is unclear whether being “very upset” will be sufficient. He also must show a physical manifestation or a substantial disruption in his daily routine. If he can prove the ulcer was produced by the misrepresentations, he should be able to meet this standard.

The amount of damages Cedric is entitled to also will be affected by his percentage of responsibility.

Under Texas’s Proportionate Responsibility Act, the jury will allocate responsibility between all defendants and Cedric.

Based on the facts, Cedric may be found responsible for some of the damage caused by the damaged foundation. Cedric was aware of the warped floors and cracked doors and may be found to have acted in a way that could lead a jury to find he was responsible for some of his damages.

Cedric also may be entitled to additional or punitive damages under the DTPA.

If Cedric can prove that Brenda or Albert acted knowingly, he is entitled to up to three times his economic damages against that defendant. If Cedric can prove that Brenda or Albert acted intentionally, he is entitled to up to three times his economic and mental anguish damages against that defendant.

Finally, if Cedric prevails, the court will award reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees. The fees should be based on an hourly rate for the amount of work performed, and not a percentage of the recovery.

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14
Q

07/11 #6:
Leonard leased the apartment over his garage to Terry. Because he was concerned about crime in the neighborhood, Leonard contacted Quality Security Systems (“Quality”) to look into a security system for Terry’s apartment. Quality’s salesperson, Chester, told Leonard that Quality’s system: was the best and most reliable system available on the market; would be installed and tested by experienced, licensed, and bonded security specialists; and had been awarded the highest rating by the Security Specialists Association of America (SSAA).

Persuaded by Chester’s sales pitch, Leonard agreed to purchase a security system from Quality for Terry’s apartment. Attached to the contract of sale was a form entitled “Waiver of Consumer Rights.” It was printed in large, bold print. The form stated that, by signing the contract, the purchaser waived all consumer rights under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). Leonard signed the contract and the waiver form. An employee of Quality installed a security system in Terry’s apartment.

Two months later, on January 10, 2010, Terry’s apartment was burglarized and all of her valuables were stolen. At the time of the burglary, the security system’s alarm did not sound. On February 10,2010, without giving prior notice to Quality, Terry filed suit against Quality alleging violations of the DTPA. Quality filed its answer to Terry’s complaint on March 10,2010. As affirmative defenses, Quality asserted that: (1) Terry was not a “consumer” as defined in the DTPA and therefore had no standing to sue; and (2)
Terry’s suit was barred by the waiver in the form signed by Leonard.

At trial, Quality moved the court for the first time to dismiss Terry’s suit on the ground that Terry had failed to give Quality timely and proper notice of her claim as required by the DTP A. The court denied the motion to dismiss.

The evidence introduced at trial showed that the Quality employee who installed the security system was neither licensed nor bonded, had never installed a security system, had not properly connected the alarm, and never tested it. The evidence further showed that Quality’s system had been rated “inferior” and stripped of its SSAA rating two years before Leonard signed the contract.

Should Quality prevail on its affirmative defense that Terry is not a consumer? Explain fully.

A

(a) Quality should not prevail on its defense that Terry is not a consumer.

The issue is who qualifies as a “consumer” for purposes of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”).

Under the DTPA, a consumer is an entity that seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, goods or services. In this case, the alarm system is clearly a good, and any maintenance or monitoring would be considered a service.

According to the facts, Quality installed a security system in Terry’s apartment that was contracted and paid for by Leonard.

A person may be a consumer provided she acquires goods by a purchase; there is no requirement that the consumer actually be the one who pays or that the consumer be in privity with the party who supplies the goods or services.

While Quality could argue that Terry is not a consumer because she did not acquire the security system, which was at all times owned by Leonard, the courts have held that it is not necessary that the consumer be the owner of the goods to “acquire” them for purposes of the DTPA.

As Leonard’s tenant, Terry was an intended beneficiary of Leonard’s purchase. Therefore, Terry was a consumer for purposes of the DTPA.

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15
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07/11 #6:
Leonard leased the apartment over his garage to Terry. Because he was concerned about crime in the neighborhood, Leonard contacted Quality Security Systems (“Quality”) to look into a security system for Terry’s apartment. Quality’s salesperson, Chester, told Leonard that Quality’s system: was the best and most reliable system available on the market; would be installed and tested by experienced, licensed, and bonded security specialists; and had been awarded the highest rating by the Security Specialists Association of America (SSAA).

Persuaded by Chester’s sales pitch, Leonard agreed to purchase a security system from Quality for Terry’s apartment. Attached to the contract of sale was a form entitled “Waiver of Consumer Rights.” It was printed in large, bold print. The form stated that, by signing the contract, the purchaser waived all consumer rights under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). Leonard signed the contract and the waiver form. An employee of Quality installed a security system in Terry’s apartment.

Two months later, on January 10, 2010, Terry’s apartment was burglarized and all of her valuables were stolen. At the time of the burglary, the security system’s alarm did not sound. On February 10,2010, without giving prior notice to Quality, Terry filed suit against Quality alleging violations of the DTPA. Quality filed its answer to Terry’s complaint on March 10,2010. As affirmative defenses, Quality asserted that: (1) Terry was not a “consumer” as defined in the DTPA and therefore had no standing to sue; and (2)
Terry’s suit was barred by the waiver in the form signed by Leonard.

At trial, Quality moved the court for the first time to dismiss Terry’s suit on the ground that Terry had failed to give Quality timely and proper notice of her claim as required by the DTP A. The court denied the motion to dismiss.

The evidence introduced at trial showed that the Quality employee who installed the security system was neither licensed nor bonded, had never installed a security system, had not properly connected the alarm, and never tested it. The evidence further showed that Quality’s system had been rated “inferior” and stripped of its SSAA rating two years before Leonard signed the contract.

Should Quality prevail on its affirmative defense that Terry’s suit is barred by the waiver signed by Leonard? Explain fully.

A

(b) Quality should not prevail on its claim that Terry’s suit is barred by the waiver she signed.

The issue is what constitutes a valid waiver of rights under the DTPA.

As part of the purchase of the security system, Leonard signed a purported waiver of the DTPA. As a general rule, the Act may not be waived and waivers are void and unenforceable. To be enforceable, the waiver must be signed by the consumer and the consumer must be represented by an attorney.

First, the facts indicate that Leonard, not Terry, signed the waiver.

Second, there is nothing in the facts to indicate that Leonard or Terry was represented by an attorney. Even if the waiver was valid as to Leonard, it should not be effective to waive Terry’s rights under the DTPA because Terry did not sign it.

Therefore, the waiver is not enforceable.

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16
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07/11 #6:
Leonard leased the apartment over his garage to Terry. Because he was concerned about crime in the neighborhood, Leonard contacted Quality Security Systems (“Quality”) to look into a security system for Terry’s apartment. Quality’s salesperson, Chester, told Leonard that Quality’s system: was the best and most reliable system available on the market; would be installed and tested by experienced, licensed, and bonded security specialists; and had been awarded the highest rating by the Security Specialists Association of America (SSAA).

Persuaded by Chester’s sales pitch, Leonard agreed to purchase a security system from Quality for Terry’s apartment. Attached to the contract of sale was a form entitled “Waiver of Consumer Rights.” It was printed in large, bold print. The form stated that, by signing the contract, the purchaser waived all consumer rights under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). Leonard signed the contract and the waiver form. An employee of Quality installed a security system in Terry’s apartment.

Two months later, on January 10, 2010, Terry’s apartment was burglarized and all of her valuables were stolen. At the time of the burglary, the security system’s alarm did not sound. On February 10,2010, without giving prior notice to Quality, Terry filed suit against Quality alleging violations of the DTPA. Quality filed its answer to Terry’s complaint on March 10,2010. As affirmative defenses, Quality asserted that: (1) Terry was not a “consumer” as defined in the DTPA and therefore had no standing to sue; and (2)
Terry’s suit was barred by the waiver in the form signed by Leonard.

At trial, Quality moved the court for the first time to dismiss Terry’s suit on the ground that Terry had failed to give Quality timely and proper notice of her claim as required by the DTP A. The court denied the motion to dismiss.

The evidence introduced at trial showed that the Quality employee who installed the security system was neither licensed nor bonded, had never installed a security system, had not properly connected the alarm, and never tested it. The evidence further showed that Quality’s system had been rated “inferior” and stripped of its SSAA rating two years before Leonard signed the contract.

Should the court grant Quality’s Motion to Dismiss Terry’s lawsuit? Explain fully.

A

(c) The court should not grant Quality’s motion to dismiss.

The issue is what consequences arise from Terry’s failure to give proper notice of her claims.

Under section 17.505 of the DTPA, a consumer must give the defendant written notice of the consumer’s specific complaint and amount of damages at least 60 days before filing suit. The Act provides that in the event proper notice is not given, the defendant may move to abate the proceeding to allow for notice.

In the instant case, Terry did not give proper notice. Quality’s motion to dismiss should be denied, however, because dismissal is not the proper remedy for the failure to give notice. Furthermore, even if the court viewed the motion as a motion to abate, section 17.505 requires that any motion to abate must be filed not later than 30 days after filing an answer, and here the motion was made at trial.

Although we do not know the specific date of the trial, it is very likely more than 30 days after filing the answer. Therefore, the motion to dismiss should be denied.

17
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07/11 #6:
Leonard leased the apartment over his garage to Terry. Because he was concerned about crime in the neighborhood, Leonard contacted Quality Security Systems (“Quality”) to look into a security system for Terry’s apartment. Quality’s salesperson, Chester, told Leonard that Quality’s system: was the best and most reliable system available on the market; would be installed and tested by experienced, licensed, and bonded security specialists; and had been awarded the highest rating by the Security Specialists Association of America (SSAA).

Persuaded by Chester’s sales pitch, Leonard agreed to purchase a security system from Quality for Terry’s apartment. Attached to the contract of sale was a form entitled “Waiver of Consumer Rights.” It was printed in large, bold print. The form stated that, by signing the contract, the purchaser waived all consumer rights under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). Leonard signed the contract and the waiver form. An employee of Quality installed a security system in Terry’s apartment.

Two months later, on January 10, 2010, Terry’s apartment was burglarized and all of her valuables were stolen. At the time of the burglary, the security system’s alarm did not sound. On February 10,2010, without giving prior notice to Quality, Terry filed suit against Quality alleging violations of the DTPA. Quality filed its answer to Terry’s complaint on March 10,2010. As affirmative defenses, Quality asserted that: (1) Terry was not a “consumer” as defined in the DTPA and therefore had no standing to sue; and (2)
Terry’s suit was barred by the waiver in the form signed by Leonard.

At trial, Quality moved the court for the first time to dismiss Terry’s suit on the ground that Terry had failed to give Quality timely and proper notice of her claim as required by the DTP A. The court denied the motion to dismiss.

The evidence introduced at trial showed that the Quality employee who installed the security system was neither licensed nor bonded, had never installed a security system, had not properly connected the alarm, and never tested it. The evidence further showed that Quality’s system had been rated “inferior” and stripped of its SSAA rating two years before Leonard signed the contract.

Assuming Terry is a consumer under the DTPA, what claims, if any, does she have against Quality under the DTPA? Explain fully.

A

(d) Assuming that she is a consumer, Terry will have claims under the DTPA pursuant to section 17.50(a).

The issue is what claims does Terry have under the DTPA.

Section 17.50(a) of the DTPA allows a consumer to maintain a claim based on:

(i) a violation of the DTPA’s “laundry list” of false, deceptive, or misleading acts and practices;
(ii) breach of an express or implied warranty; or
(iii) an unconscionable act or practice.

To maintain a claim based on the laundry list, Terry must also show reliance on the prohibited act or practice. To be actionable as a misrepresentation, the statements must be statements of fact rather than mere puffing or opinion.

Terry’s laundry list claims against Quality should be based on misrepresentations regarding the uses, benefits, quality, attributes, and characteristics of the alarm system. Specifically, Quality represented that the system was the best and most reliable on the market; would be installed and tested by experienced, licensed, and bonded security specialists; and had been awarded the highest rating by the SSAA. While “the best” arguably is a statement of opinion, all of the other statements were made as statements of fact, and the statements also were untrue. Reliance also can be established. Although there is no indication in the facts that Terry relied on the misrepresentations, Leonard, who as the purchaser and owner of the system is also a consumer, did in fact rely. The facts state that Leonard was “persuaded” by the sales pitch. Therefore, there was reliance by “a” consumer (Leonard) to “the” consumer’s (Terry’s) detriment.

Terry may also maintain a claim against Quality for breach of express or implied warranty. To determine if there were any express warranties, it would be necessary to determine if the contract between Quality and Leonard created any warranties. Also, the statement that the system was the most reliable system available could constitute an express warranty, assuming that the contract did not contain a merger clause or disclaimer. While the attempted waiver of DTPA rights would not constitute a waiver, the contract itself could have had language stating that the system was sold “as is, with no warranties express or implied.”

Finally, Terry may argue that there is an implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance arising from the installation of the system.

The facts suggest that the alarm failed to sound because of faulty installation; hence, a breach of implied warranty may exist.

Finally, section 17.50(a) allows a claim based on unconscionability, if the defendant took advantage of the consumer to a grossly unfair degree.

Because Terry did not deal directly with Quality, she will not be able to maintain a claim based on unconscionability.

In sum, Terry likely will have claims under section 17.50(a) of the DTPA based on misrepresentation and breach of warranty.

18
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02/11 #12:
Jenny contacted Myra, an agent for Insurance Company (“Insurance”), in January of 2009, to obtain premises liability and property damage insurance coverage for her high-end furniture store, Classic Furniture
(“Classic”). When Myra came to inspect the premises, Jenny showed her a detached building located behind Classic where restorations were performed on valuable antiques (“Restoration Building”). Myra delivered to Jenny a policy of insurance issued by Insurance and assured Jenny it would cover the entire business and its
contents. When Jenny received the policy, she noted that there was no reference made to the Restoration Building. She called Myra, who told her that the omission was simply a mistake and that the policy did include coverage for the Restoration Building. Jenny made the required premium payment on behalf of Classic.

On July I, 2009, a fire destroyed the Restoration Building and its contents. The fire department’s investigator determined that the fire was caused by a short circuit in an electrical switch. Jenny sent the appropriate completed claim forms to Insurance’s office on July 5, 2009, including a copy of the fire department’s final investigation report.

Insurance never conducted an investigation into the cause of the fire. Jenny called Insurance several times and left messages inquiring about the status of Classic’s claim. Her calls were never returned. On August 15, 2009, Jenny received a letter from Insurance advising her that Classic’s claim was being denied because: (1) the policy did not cover the Restoration Building; and (2) Insurance suspected that the fire was caused by arson (which was not covered by the policy).

Jenny hired an attorney, Albert, to help her with Classic’s claim on the policy. Albert agreed to represent Classic on a 33% contingency fee basis on whatever he collected from Insurance.

What causes of action under Texas consumer Jaws, if any, does Classic have against Insurance for denying coverage under the policy and denying Classic’s claim for the loss of the Restoration Building? Explain fully.

A

(a) Classic may have claims against Insurance under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) and the Texas Insurance Code. It also may have a claim under the Prompt Payment of Claims Act.

At issue are what claims Classic may bring against Insurance regarding its claim.

Under the DTPA, a private cause of action may be maintained by a consumer whenever a person commits an act or practice that is in violation of the “laundry list” (section 17.46(b)); a breach of an express or implied warranty; unconscionable; or a violation of Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code. A consumer is someone who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services. The term includes a business consumer, provided the business consumer has $25 million or less in assets.

Although the facts do not specifically state, it appears that Classic is a separate legal entity and has less than $25 million in assets. Because Classic purchased insurance from Insurance, it is a consumer. Insurance will be liable for the conduct of its agent, Myra. Classic may recover under the Act if it establishes that Insurance, directly or through its agent Myra, committed a prohibited act or practice, and that the act or practice was a producing cause of damages.

To establish a violation of the laundry list, Classic must establish either a misrepresentation regarding the existence or terms of the policy, or the failure to disclose a material fact with the intent to induce another to enter into a transaction that it otherwise would not have entered into.

Based on the facts, it appears that Insurance may have violated the laundry list when Myra misrepresented that the policy covered the Restoration Building, when apparently it did not.

In addition to claims under the laundry list, Classic may maintain an action if Insurance breached an express or implied warranty or acted unconscionably. The DTPA does not establish any warranties. Warranties must be established independent of the Act. It does not appear that Insurance breached any express or implied warranties to Classic. There are no implied warranties arising out of the relationship between an insurer and insured.

Arguably, the statement by Myra that the policy “included coverage for the Restoration Building” constituted an express warranty. The policy did not contain the coverage represented. The complete failure on the part of Insurance to perform, however, would constitute a breach of contract, not a breach of warranty. To constitute a breach of warranty there must be defective performance, not complete nonperformance.

The DTPA also allows a consumer to maintain a claim based on an unconscionable act or practice. To prove unconscionability, Classic must show that Insurance took advantage of its lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity to a grossly unfair degree. “Grossly” is defined to mean glaringly noticeable, flagrant, complete, and unmitigated. It is an objective standard and there is no requirement that Classic show that Insurance acted with knowledge, intent, negligence, or conscious indifference.

Classic will try to show that it had limited knowledge and ability dealing with insurance coverage, and that Insurance, through Myra, took advantage of it to a grossly unfair degree by selling a policy that did not provide the expected coverage. This claim, however, will be difficult to establish.

Finally, the DTPA allows a consumer to maintain a cause of action under the Act for any violation of Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code. As discussed below, Classic may have a claim under the Insurance Code. Those claims are automatically actionable under the DTPA.

Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code is similar to the DTPA in terms of prohibited conduct and remedies; however, it applies only to acts or practices that occur in connection with the practice of insurance. Because Classic sought and purchased a policy from Insurance, the acts and practices of Insurance are subject to Chapter 541. Unlike the DTPA, it is not necessary for an entity to be a “consumer” to maintain an action under the Insurance Code. Under Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code, any “person” who sustains actual damages caused by a violation of Chapter 541 or a violation of the DTPA laundry list may maintain an action.

As discussed above, the conduct of Insurance, through Myra, likely violated the DTPA laundry list. Hence, Classic has an additional cause of action based on Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code.

Chapter 541 itself also prohibits misrepresentation regarding the terms or existence of an insurance policy. Classic would use an argument similar to that used for purposes of the DTPA to establish such misrepresentations, i.e., that Insurance misrepresented the existence or terms of the insurance policy, in violation of Chapter 541.

In addition to prohibiting misrepresentations, the Insurance Code prohibits unfair acts or practices, including unfair settlement practices. Classic could attempt to show that Insurance engaged in an unfair settlement practice under Chapter 541 by misrepresenting a material fact or coverage with respect to its claim, and by failing to act in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement after liability became reasonably clear. It also has a claim under this provision based on Insurance’s refusal to pay because it claimed arson, if it shows that Insurance refused to pay the claim without conducting a reasonable investigation.

According to the facts, the fire department investigator determined that the fire was caused by a short circuit, and Insurance itself never conducted an investigation into the cause of the fire.

Finally, Insurance may have violated Chapter 541 by failing to promptly provide Classic a reasonable explanation of the basis for denying coverage.

Classic may also have a claim against Insurance under the Prompt Payment of Claims Act. Under this law, generally an insurance carrier must respond to an insured’s claim within 15 days. Insurance’s failure to respond until more than a month later violates this Act.

In sum, Classic may have claims against Insurance under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Texas Insurance Code. It also may have a claim under the Prompt Payment of Claims Act.

19
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02/11 #12:
Jenny contacted Myra, an agent for Insurance Company (“Insurance”), in January of 2009, to obtain premises liability and property damage insurance coverage for her high-end furniture store, Classic Furniture
(“Classic”). When Myra came to inspect the premises, Jenny showed her a detached building located behind Classic where restorations were performed on valuable antiques (“Restoration Building”). Myra delivered to Jenny a policy of insurance issued by Insurance and assured Jenny it would cover the entire business and its
contents. When Jenny received the policy, she noted that there was no reference made to the Restoration Building. She called Myra, who told her that the omission was simply a mistake and that the policy did include coverage for the Restoration Building. Jenny made the required premium payment on behalf of Classic.

On July I, 2009, a fire destroyed the Restoration Building and its contents. The fire department’s investigator determined that the fire was caused by a short circuit in an electrical switch. Jenny sent the appropriate completed claim forms to Insurance’s office on July 5, 2009, including a copy of the fire department’s final investigation report.

Insurance never conducted an investigation into the cause of the fire. Jenny called Insurance several times and left messages inquiring about the status of Classic’s claim. Her calls were never returned. On August 15, 2009, Jenny received a letter from Insurance advising her that Classic’s claim was being denied because: (1) the policy did not cover the Restoration Building; and (2) Insurance suspected that the fire was caused by arson (which was not covered by the policy).

Jenny hired an attorney, Albert, to help her with Classic’s claim on the policy. Albert agreed to represent Classic on a 33% contingency fee basis on whatever he collected from Insurance.

What remedies, if any, is Classic entitled to obtain against Insurance? Explain fully.

A

(b) Classic is entitled to a variety of remedies against Insurance if it prevails under the DTPA, including economic damages, possibly damages for mental anguish, and possibly additional damages, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Economic loss is defined as all pecuniary loss. Under this standard, Classic may recover all of the costs to repair the building, the value of any lost furniture, equipment, or fixtures, lost income, and any other money it had to expend to relocate, store, or repair furniture. If Classic shows that Insurance acted knowingly, i.e., that it knew or should have known that its statement or conduct was false, deceptive, or misleading, the jury may award additional damages of up to three times Classic’s economic loss. Additionally, upon a showing of Insurance acting knowingly, the jury is authorized to award Classic damages for mental anguish. To recover damages for mental anguish, it is necessary to show a high degree of mental pain or distress. Generally, this requires direct evidence of the nature, severity, and duration of the mental anguish, and that it caused a substantial disruption of its daily routine. If Classic is able to establish that Insurance acted intentionally, essentially defined as knowingly plus the specific intent that the consumer act in reliance on the falsity or deception, Classic would be entitled to recover its economic and mental anguish damages, as well as additional damages of up to three times both economic and mental anguish damages.

In the event Classic prevails, the court “shall” award reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees. Although the 33% contingency fee agreement between Classic and its attorney is valid and enforceable as between them, attorneys’ fees that Insurance must pay under the DTPA will be awarded in a dollar amount, based on the nature and amount of work performed.

If Classic prevails under Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code, Classic may recover its “actual damages,” necessary attorneys’ fees and additional damages of up to three times its actual damages if it shows that Insurance acted “knowingly.” Under Chapter 541, Insurance is entitled to recover all of its “actual damages.” The term “actual damages” has been broadly defined by the courts to include all damages recoverable under common law, including economic loss and mental anguish. All of the economic damages discussed above would be recoverable as actual damages under Chapter 541. Damages for mental anguish are also recoverable, but may be recovered based on an economic loss only on a showing that the conduct was committed with a culpable mental state, such as “knowingly,” just as under the DTPA. In addition, Classic may be able to recover additional damages of up to three times its actual damages, including any damages awarded for mental anguish, if it shows that Insurance acted knowingly. It also may recover any other relief the court deems proper, including an injunction, and necessary attorneys’ fees. As discussed above, the award of attorneys’ fees must be in a dollar amount.

Finally, assuming Classic establishes a claim under the Prompt Payment of Claims Act, it will be entitled to damages in the amount of 18% interest on its claim, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees.

In sum, Classic is entitled to a variety of remedies against Insurance if it prevails under the DTPA, including economic damages, possibly damages for mental anguish, and possibly additional damages, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and interest on its insurance claim.

20
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07/10 #10:
Sharon went to Dean’s Marine intending to purchase a boat to use at her lake house in the Texas Hill Country. Dean, the sole proprietor of Dean’s Marine, told Sharon that he had a previously owned 2007 WaveSlasher that had just been placed on the lot. He told Sharon that, although it was used, the WaveSlasher was in great condition and ran “like new.” He also told her that the purchase price was $3,000.

Sharon told Dean that she knew nothing about mechanical matters, and that she needed a boat that was in good condition because she didn’t want to get stranded on the lake. Dean assured her that the WaveSlasher was ready for use and showed her the Dean’s Marine “30-point Quality Inspection Checklist,” which indicated that all parts of the WaveS lasher had been inspected by his mechanic and were in good working order. Sharon, reassured by the inspection report, agreed to buy the WaveSlasher. The contract of sale included a statement in conspicuous, large print that the WaveS lasher was being sold “As is. No warranties.”

In fact, the mechanic employed by Dean’s Marine had quit the day before Dean’s Marine acquired the WaveSlasher. Dean, who is not a mechanic, had filled out the “30-point Quality Inspection Checklist” himself, never having started the engine and after having done only a cursory, visual inspection of the exterior of the WaveSlasher.

The day after she purchased the WaveSlasher, Sharon went to the lake to try it out. After running it for about an hour, she heard a grinding noise and smelled smoke. A few minutes later, the WaveSlasher’s engine
stopped running. Sharon was stranded on the lake for several hours and had to flag down a passing boater to tow her to shore. Her wait in the sun caused her to suffer a severe and painful sunburn, which had to be
treated by her physician. She was so upset about being stranded on the lake that she experienced nightmares about the incident for weeks afterwards.

Sharon took the WaveSlasher to a mechanic the following day and paid him to inspect it. The mechanic told her that any competent inspection would have revealed that there were obvious signs that the WaveSlasher’s engine had been poorly maintained for a long period of time.

What claims, if any, might Sharon assert against Dean’s Marine under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act? Explain fully.

A

(a) Sharon has several claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”), based on
misrepresentation,
unconscionability, and
breach of warranty.

At issue is whether Dean violated the DTPA when he made several false statements while selling Sharon the WaveSlasher.

Under the DTPA, a “consumer” may maintain a cause of action based on a violation of the “laundry list” (section 17.46(b)), breach of an express or implied warranty, or an unconscionable action or course of action, provided that the goods or services purchased form the basis of the complaint and that defendant committed the misconduct in connection with the transaction. A consumer is an entity who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, goods or services.

In the instant case, Sharon is clearly a consumer because she bought a boat, or in DTPA terms, acquired by purchase a good. She may assert claims under the Act because the purchase of the boat forms the basis of her DTPA claim. Moreover, because Sharon at all times dealt directly with Dean, and Dean’s Marine is a sole proprietorship, the “in connection” with requirement is also satisfied.

Sharon’s misrepresentation claims will be based on the DTPA’s laundry list, a list of 27 acts or practices that are prima facie false, deceptive, and misleading. One practice specifically prohibited under the laundry list is misrepresenting the characteristics, benefits, standard, quality, or grade of goods.

Misrepresentations may be oral or written; however, the statements must be of fact and not merely opinion. Statements that constitute mere opinion, or puffing, are not actionable under the DTPA. Furthermore, the DTPA requires that, in addition to establishing the prohibited act or practice, the consumer must show that she relied on the act to her detriment.

In this case, Dean represented that the boat was “in great condition,”“ran like new,” was in “good working order,” and had been inspected by a mechanic using Dean’s Marine “30-point Quality Inspection Checklist.” These statements appear to be statements of fact, not merely opinions. Because the boat in fact had serious mechanical problems and had not been inspected by a mechanic, and Sharon specifically purchased the boat in reliance on the inspection report, Sharon has a valid laundry list claim under the DTPA.

Regarding the “as is” clause, the laundry list is a statutory cause of action established by the DTPA, and the DTPA generally may not be waived or disclaimed. Therefore, the “as is” clause in the contract will not affect Sharon’s claim for violations of the laundry list.

Sharon may also have a claim that Dean’s conduct was unconscionable under the DTPA.
Unconscionability is defined as “an act or practice which, to the consumer’s detriment, takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity to a grossly unfair degree.” Gross is defined as glaringly noticeable, flagrant, and unmitigated.

According to the facts, Sharon specifically told Dean that she knew nothing about mechanical matters. Therefore, Dean’s conduct of selling her a boat with serious mechanical defects took advantage of this lack of knowledge, arguably to a grossly unfair degree. Based on the price paid, the condition of the boat, and the resulting problems, it appears that Dean acted unconscionably.

The final claim Sharon may assert under the DTPA is a claim for breach of warranty.

The DTPA gives consumers a cause of action under the Act for breach of any express or implied warranty. The DTPA, however, does not create any warranties. Any warranty must be established independent of the Act. Implied warranties arise as a matter of law and are not based on the words or conduct of the business. Express warranties arise based on representations of the seller.

Because this contract involves a good, the transaction is governed by Chapter 2 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code.

Under Chapter 2, there is an implied warranty of merchantability whenever a merchant sells a good. The Texas courts, however, have repeatedly held that no implied warranty arises in the sale of used goods.

Even assuming an implied warranty did exist, the boat in this case was sold with a conspicuous “As is. No warranties” clause.

Under the DTPA, disclaimers or limitations of warranties are valid and enforceable provided they are valid and enforceable outside the Act. Under Chapter 2, implied warranties may be waived by a conspicuous statement that the goods are sold “as is.”

Therefore, the disclaimer in the instant case appears to be effective to waive any implied warranty under Chapter 2. Accordingly, Sharon may not assert an implied warranty of merchantability claim against Dean.

Sharon might also argue that Dean made an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.

Under Chapter 2, this warranty applies to any seller and would apply to new or used goods. This warranty, however, requires that the buyer have a “particular” purpose, and Sharon’s purpose is the “ordinary” purpose of the boat. Additionally, as discussed above, even assuming the existence of this implied warranty, it would be disclaimed by the “as is” clause.

On the other hand, Dean breached his express warranty regarding the condition of the boat.

Under Chapter 2 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, an express warranty is any affirmation of fact or promise made by a seller that relates to the goods and becomes a part of the basis of the bargain.

In this case, Dean made several statements of fact that could give rise to a warranty; specifically, he stated that the boat was in “good condition,”“like new,” and had been inspected by a mechanic. These statements constitute warranties, and the breach of any of those warranties is actionable through the DTPA. Unlike implied warranties, express warranties may not be waived and are not affected by an inconsistent “as is” clause.

21
Q

07/10 #10:
Sharon went to Dean’s Marine intending to purchase a boat to use at her lake house in the Texas Hill Country. Dean, the sole proprietor of Dean’s Marine, told Sharon that he had a previously owned 2007 WaveSlasher that had just been placed on the lot. He told Sharon that, although it was used, the WaveSlasher was in great condition and ran “like new.” He also told her that the purchase price was $3,000.

Sharon told Dean that she knew nothing about mechanical matters, and that she needed a boat that was in good condition because she didn’t want to get stranded on the lake. Dean assured her that the WaveSlasher was ready for use and showed her the Dean’s Marine “30-point Quality Inspection Checklist,” which indicated that all parts of the WaveS lasher had been inspected by his mechanic and were in good working order. Sharon, reassured by the inspection report, agreed to buy the WaveSlasher. The contract of sale included a statement in conspicuous, large print that the WaveS lasher was being sold “As is. No warranties.”

In fact, the mechanic employed by Dean’s Marine had quit the day before Dean’s Marine acquired the WaveSlasher. Dean, who is not a mechanic, had filled out the “30-point Quality Inspection Checklist” himself, never having started the engine and after having done only a cursory, visual inspection of the exterior of the WaveSlasher.

The day after she purchased the WaveSlasher, Sharon went to the lake to try it out. After running it for about an hour, she heard a grinding noise and smelled smoke. A few minutes later, the WaveSlasher’s engine
stopped running. Sharon was stranded on the lake for several hours and had to flag down a passing boater to tow her to shore. Her wait in the sun caused her to suffer a severe and painful sunburn, which had to be
treated by her physician. She was so upset about being stranded on the lake that she experienced nightmares about the incident for weeks afterwards.

Sharon took the WaveSlasher to a mechanic the following day and paid him to inspect it. The mechanic told her that any competent inspection would have revealed that there were obvious signs that the WaveSlasher’s engine had been poorly maintained for a long period of time.

What damages and other remedies are available to Sharon for her claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act? Explain fully.

A

(b) Sharon can recover economic damages, including the cost to repair the boat or the difference in value between the represented worth of the boat and the delivered worth of the boat, and medical expenses incurred from her sunburn. She may also recover mental anguish damages for the nightmares she experienced about the incident if she can prove these nightmares caused a substantial disruption in her daily routine. Moreover, Sharon can recover money paid to the mechanic to inspect the boat after the incident as well as consequential damages, such as the costs of towing and storing the boat. Additionally, Sharon can recover additional or punitive damages if she proves that Dean acted “knowingly” or “intentionally.” Finally, Sharon can recover all reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

At issue are the remedies available to Sharon for her claims brought under the DTPA.

Under the DTPA, a consumer who prevails on her claims may recover all economic damages produced by the actionable conduct. Economic damages are compensatory damages for pecuniary loss. This includes all direct and consequential economic loss, but does not include noneconomic damages such as mental anguish, pain and suffering, loss of consortium, etc. Damages for mental anguish are also available if the trier of fact finds that the defendant knowingly committed his misconduct. “Knowingly” is defined to mean actual awareness, at the time of the act or practice complained of, of the falsity, deception, or unfairness of the act or practice giving rise to the consumer’s claim. In addition, the DTPA permits recovery of additional damages. Where a defendant acted knowingly, a trier of fact may award the consumer up to three times her economic damages. Where a defendant acts intentionally, a trier of fact may award the consumer up to three times both her economic and mental anguish damages. Intentionally requires a showing that the defendant acted knowingly and had the specific intent that the consumer act in reliance on his conduct. This intent may be inferred from objective manifestations that indicate the defendant acted intentionally or with flagrant disregard of prudent and fair business practices. Finally, a plaintiff who prevails in her suit is entitled to all reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

Here, Sharon’s economic damages include the cost to repair the boat, or the difference in value between what the boat was worth as represented and what the boat was worth as delivered. Sharon would be entitled to recover under whichever theory results in the greatest recovery. She also could recover the money she paid the mechanic to inspect her boat. Assuming she establishes that the defective boat caused her sunburn, she also would be entitled to her medical expenses. Any such recovery could be reduced proportionately, however, if Dean establishes that some of the sunburn injury was due to Sharon’s negligence, such as failing to wear sunscreen. She also could collect consequential damages, such as the cost of towing or storing the boat.

In addition to economic damages, Sharon may be able to recover damages for mental anguish under the DTPA if she establishes that Dean committed the wrongful conduct “knowingly.”

Here, it appears that Dean acted “knowingly” because Dean knew that he did not inspect the boat and what he represented was not based on fact. Thus, if Sharon establishes that she suffered mental anguish, she would be allowed to recover damages for that suffering under the DTPA.

To recover damages for mental anguish, however, she would have to show a high degree of mental pain and suffering that caused a substantial disruption in her daily routine. It is unclear whether nightmares would be sufficient to support an award for mental anguish damages.

Moreover, Sharon might be entitled to treble damages under the DTPA if she establishes that Dean acted “knowingly” or “intentionally.”

As discussed above, it appears that Dean knowingly misrepresented the boat’s condition. Therefore, Sharon should at least recover up to three times her economic damages. Sharon may, however, be able to show that Dean acted “intentionally,” or with flagrant disregard of prudent business practices, when Dean, who is not a mechanic, filled out the quality inspection list, given that he never started the engine and only conducted a cursory, visual inspection of the exterior of the WaveSlasher. The mechanic who subsequently inspected the boat told Sharon that any competent inspection would have revealed obvious signs of a poorly maintained engine. If Sharon proves intent, she could recover an amount up to a total of not more than three times both her economic damages and damages for mental anguish.

Finally, if Sharon prevails under the DTPA, she “shall” recover reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

22
Q

02/10 #5:
Patty purchased a big screen TV on a monthly payment credit plan from Big Box Electronics (“Big Box”) in San Antonio. Patty made monthly payments until she lost her job. Big Box hired Dubious Debt Collections, Inc. (“Dubious”) to collect the money owed by Patty. Dubious’ agent, Rocky, made numerous phone calls to Patty’s home phone, including calls early in the morning and late at night, but could not reach
Patty. Rocky left several threatening messages on Patty’s answering machine.

Frustrated with his inability to contact Patty directly, Rocky contacted Patty’s mother, Marge, by phone, and told her that Patty owed his company a great deal of money and was shirking her financial obligations. He told Marge that if she refused to help him contact Patty, he would take immediate action to have Patty arrested for failing to pay her debts. Upon hearing this, Marge became so upset that she fainted, hitting her head on the coffee table. Her injuries required medical attention in the emergency room.

Larry, Big Box’s in-house collector, became impatient when Dubious’ debt collecting methods proved unsuccessful and promptly fired Dubious. Larry located Patty and told her during a phone call that Big Box would file a lawsuit against her if she failed to pay the amount owed. Additionally, although Larry knew that Patty’s monthly payment agreement did not provide for collection of any amounts over and above the consumer debt, Larry told Patty that she would have to reimburse Big Box for the fees the company had incurred in hiring Dubious to collect on the debt. Patty felt so intimidated by the call from Larry that she suffered anxiety attacks.

Patty and Marge retained Ann, an attorney, to advise them on their legal options.

What consumer law violations, if any, did Dubious and Rocky commit in their efforts to
collect from Patty? Explain fully.

A

(a) Dubious and Rocky likely violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), the Texas Debt Collection Act (“TDCA”), and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”).

At issue is whether Dubious and Rocky violated the FDCPA, TDCPA, and DTPA when Rocky contacted Patty and Marge to collect money Patty owed Big Box.

The FDCPA is a federal law that seeks to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by “debt collectors.”

The Act defines “debt” to include only consumer debts. It defines the term “debt collector” to mean anyone in the business of debt collection or anyone who regularly collects debts owed another. In other words, the federal law applies only to third-party debt collectors.

Here, Big Box hired third party Dubious to collect money owed by Patty. Dubious’s agent, Rocky, subsequently made several allegedly harassing phone calls. Therefore, Rocky, as agent, and Dubious, as principal, are both debt collectors for purposes of the FDCPA because they attempted to collect a debt owed to another party, Big Box.

The FDCPA has a broad range of prohibitions, covering any conduct that is harassing, abusive, false, misleading, or unfair. It also includes provisions prohibiting specific types of conduct, or requiring certain disclosures at the time of the communication. In the instant case, Rocky, as agent for Dubious, appears to have violated several provisions of the FDCPA.

First, Rocky may have called Patty at an inconvenient time. Under the FDCPA, a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer at any “inconvenient” time. Calls made before 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m. are assumed inconvenient. Here, Rocky made numerous phone calls to Patty’s home phone, including calls early in the morning and late at night. Although the facts do not state the specific time of the calls, if these early morning or late night phone calls occurred before 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m., then both Rocky and Dubious violated the FDCPA.

Second, neither Rocky nor Dubious sent Patty the required validation notice. Under the FDCPA, within five days after the initial communication with the consumer, the debt collector must send the consumer written notice containing the name of the creditor, the amount of the debt, and a statement that the consumer has 30 days to dispute the debt. If the consumer disputes the debt, the debt collector must obtain verification of the debt and mail it to the consumer. The debt collector also must cease collection until such time as the debt is verified. Here, the facts do not indicate that Patty received the required validation notice. The failure to send such notice is a violation of the FDCPA.

Third, Rocky improperly communicated with third parties. Under the FDCPA, a debt collector may not communicate with third parties except to acquire location information. Furthermore, any debt collector communicating with a third person for purposes of acquiring location information about the consumer must do so in a way that does not embarrass the consumer or indicate to the other person that the consumer is in debt. Here, both Rocky and Dubious violated the Act in two different ways.

First, Rocky improperly contacted Patty’s mother Marge. Although Rocky asked about “contacting” Patty during this phone call, he still communicated with Marge for purposes other than to acquire location information. Specifically, Rocky told Marge that Patty owed his company a great deal of money and was shirking her financial obligations. Because Rocky disclosed a consumer’s debt to a third party, Rocky violated the FDCPA.

Second, Rocky and Dubious may have violated the Act with respect to the messages left on Patty’s answering machine. Here, Rocky left several threatening messages on Patty’s answering machine. If a third party happened to overhear these messages, then both Rocky and Dubious violated the Act.

Finally, Rocky and Dubious violated the FDCPA in several respects when Rocky told Marge that he would take immediate steps to have Patty arrested.

First, the FDCPA prohibits the use of debt collection practices that violate state law. Since Texas law prohibits threatening arrest for failing to pay debts, Rocky violated the FDCPA when he made this threat.

Second, a debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. This prohibition is not limited to conduct that affects the consumer but rather applies to conduct against any person. Rocky’s threats to Marge constitute unlawful harassment and abuse.

Third, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt that specifically includes threatening to take any action that cannot legally be taken. This prohibition is also not limited to representations made to the consumer. Because Rocky could not legally have Patty arrested, his threat constitutes a false and deceptive misrepresentation.

Finally, the FDCPA also prohibits unfair or unconscionable acts or practices. Again, this prohibition is not limited to conduct that affects the consumer. Although the FDCPA provides a list of conduct that is prima facie unfair or unconscionable, this list is nonexclusive. Therefore, although Rocky’s statement does not fall within the enumerated list, it may still be considered unfair and unconscionable if a trier of fact so determines.

In addition to violating the FDCPA, Rocky and Dubious have violated the TDCA.

Like the FDCPA, the TDCA is designed to protect consumers from the effects of wrongful debt collection activities. Also similar to the FDCPA, the Texas Act applies to any “debt collector,” and provides a cause of action for any “person.” Also like the FDCPA, the TDCA uses the word “consumer” to describe the type of obligations covered by the Act.

For purposes of the Act, a consumer is an individual who owes a consumer debt. A consumer debt is an obligation or alleged obligation, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, arising from a transaction.

Under the facts, Patty is a “consumer” under state law. Consequently, her debt is a consumer debt and Rocky and Dubious are subject to the state debt collection law.

Rocky and Dubious violated several provisions of the TDCA.

First, Rocky’s threat to Marge constitutes coercive conduct prohibited by the TDCA. The TDCA contains several provisions prohibiting certain abusive debt collection methods, including threats or coercion, harassment, unconscionable and unfair acts, and misrepresentations. Unlike the FDCPA, however, the practices listed in the provisions of the Texas Act are exclusive. Conduct not within the list of prohibited practices is not actionable, even if it is found to be false, deceptive, misleading, or threatening. Threats or coercive conduct prohibited by the Texas Act include:

(i) using or threatening to use violence or other criminal means to cause harm to a person or property of a person;
(ii) accusing falsely or threatening to accuse falsely a person of fraud or any other crime;
(iii) threatening that the debtor will be arrested for nonpayment of a consumer debt without proper court proceedings;
(iv) threatening to file a charge, complaint, or criminal action against a debtor when the debtor has not violated a criminal statute; and
(v) threatening to take an action prohibited by law. Here, the facts do not provide any basis for concluding that Rocky had the legal right to have Patty immediately arrested.

Thus, Rocky and Dubious violated all of the above provisions when Rocky contacted Marge.

Second, Rocky’s phone calls to Patty constitute abusive conduct prohibited by the TDCA. Abusive conduct under the Texas Act includes:

(i) placing telephone calls without disclosing the name of the individual making the call and with the intent to annoy, harass, or threaten a person at the called number; or
(ii) causing a telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously, or making repeated or continuous telephone calls, with the intent to harass a person at the called number.

Here, the facts state that Rocky made numerous phone calls to Patty’s home phone and left several threatening messages on the answering machine. Rocky’s repeated phone calls with the intent to threaten and harass Patty to collect Big Box’s debt constitutes abusive conduct in violation of the Texas Act.

Finally, Dubious’s and Rocky’s conduct will be actionable under the DTPA.

To have a private cause of action under the DTPA, a person must first establish that she is a consumer.

A consumer is someone who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services.

In this case, Patty purchased the TV and is, therefore, a consumer. Marge, however, is not a consumer under the DTPA because she did not make the purchase.

Under the DTPA, claims may be brought based on other statutes that “tie in” to the DTPA, one of which is the TDCA.

Any violation of that statute’s debt collection provisions is automatically actionable through the “tie-in” provisions of the DTPA.

Here, Dubious and Rocky’s violation of the debt collection statute also constitutes a violation of the DTPA. Therefore, Patty may maintain a claim under the DTPA.

23
Q

02/10 #5:
Patty purchased a big screen TV on a monthly payment credit plan from Big Box Electronics (“Big Box”) in San Antonio. Patty made monthly payments until she lost her job. Big Box hired Dubious Debt Collections, Inc. (“Dubious”) to collect the money owed by Patty. Dubious’ agent, Rocky, made numerous phone calls to Patty’s home phone, including calls early in the morning and late at night, but could not reach
Patty. Rocky left several threatening messages on Patty’s answering machine.

Frustrated with his inability to contact Patty directly, Rocky contacted Patty’s mother, Marge, by phone, and told her that Patty owed his company a great deal of money and was shirking her financial obligations. He told Marge that if she refused to help him contact Patty, he would take immediate action to have Patty arrested for failing to pay her debts. Upon hearing this, Marge became so upset that she fainted, hitting her head on the coffee table. Her injuries required medical attention in the emergency room.

Larry, Big Box’s in-house collector, became impatient when Dubious’ debt collecting methods proved unsuccessful and promptly fired Dubious. Larry located Patty and told her during a phone call that Big Box would file a lawsuit against her if she failed to pay the amount owed. Additionally, although Larry knew that Patty’s monthly payment agreement did not provide for collection of any amounts over and above the consumer debt, Larry told Patty that she would have to reimburse Big Box for the fees the company had incurred in hiring Dubious to collect on the debt. Patty felt so intimidated by the call from Larry that she suffered anxiety attacks.

Patty and Marge retained Ann, an attorney, to advise them on their legal options.

What consumer law violations, if any, did Larry and Big Box commit in their efforts to
collect from Patty? Explain fully.

A

(b) Larry, as agent, and Big Box, as principal, are liable under the TDCA and the DTPA. Neither, however, has any liability under the FDCPA.

At issue is whether Larry and Big Box violated the TDCA and DTPA when Larry threatened to file a lawsuit against Patty and stated that she would have to reimburse Big Box for the fees incurred in hiring Dubious to collect on the debt.

The TDCA regulates conduct by debt collectors. A debt collector for purposes of the TDCA is not limited to third party debt collectors. Accordingly, the TDCA applies to Larry and Big Box, the original creditor.

Larry made fraudulent, deceptive, and misleading representations to Patty when attempting to collect Patty’s debt owed to Big Box in violation of the TDCA.

The TDCA prohibits a debt collector from using fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt. Although creditors may file a lawsuit against a delinquent debtor, the TDCA prohibits

(i) representing that a consumer debt may be increased by the addition of attorneys’ fees, investigation fees, service fees, or other charges if a written contract or statute does not authorize the additional fees or charges;
(ii) representing that a consumer debt will definitely be increased by the addition of attorneys’ fees, investigation fees, service fees, or other charges if the award of the fees or charges is subject to judicial discretion; or
(iii) collecting or attempting to collect interest or a charge, fee, or expense incidental to the obligation unless the interest or incidental charge, fee, or expense is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the obligation or is legally chargeable to the consumer.

Here, Larry not only threatened to file a lawsuit against Patty but also stated that she would have to reimburse Big Box for the fees incurred in hiring Dubious to collect on the debt, despite knowing that the monthly payment agreement did not provide for collection of any amounts over the consumer debt. Larry’s knowing misrepresentations regarding Patty’s liability for fees above the amount of the debt appear to violate each of these provisions.

Larry’s and Big Box’s conduct is also actionable under the DTPA.

As discussed above, a consumer has a claim under the DTPA if she can establish that the purchase forms the basis of her complaint, that the defendants either engaged in conduct that violated the laundry list or acted in an unconscionable manner, and that the conduct occurred “in connection with” her transaction. Here, Patty could argue that the payment plan was part of the transaction (the methods of payment), and any violation of the DTPA in connection with collection was, therefore, in connection with her transaction.

The DTPA includes a list of 27 different acts and practices deemed prima facie false, deceptive, or misleading, including representing that an agreement involves rights, remedies, or obligations that it does not have or involve, or that are prohibited by law.

Unconscionability is an act or practice that takes advantage of a consumer’s lack of knowledge and experience to a grossly unfair degree.

Based on the facts, it appears that Larry, and consequently Big Box as the principal, knowingly misrepresented the nature of Patty’s legal rights and obligations, which is actionable under the DTPA laundry list. He also might be deemed to have acted unconscionably, by taking advantage of Patty’s lack of knowledge and experience in matters related to debt collection.

Moreover, Larry and Big Box’s violation of the TDCA, a tie-in provision to the DTPA as discussed above, provides Patty with an additional basis for maintaining a claim under the DTPA.

Finally, neither Larry nor Big Box violated the FDCA.

Unlike the TDCA, which is broader in scope, the FDCPA applies only to third-party debt collectors collecting the debt of another. Therefore, people collecting debts owed to them individually are not regulated by the FDCPA. Individuals collecting their own debt only fall within the FDCPA when any entity in the process of collecting its own debt uses a name other than its own, which would indicate that a third person is collecting the debt.

In the instant case, Big Box employed Larry as its in-house collector. Therefore, Big Box and Larry attempted to collect their own debt from Patty. Because there is no indication that they used any other name in the collection process, neither Larry nor Big Box will incur any liability under the FDCPA.

24
Q

02/10 #5:
Patty purchased a big screen TV on a monthly payment credit plan from Big Box Electronics (“Big Box”) in San Antonio. Patty made monthly payments until she lost her job. Big Box hired Dubious Debt Collections, Inc. (“Dubious”) to collect the money owed by Patty. Dubious’ agent, Rocky, made numerous phone calls to Patty’s home phone, including calls early in the morning and late at night, but could not reach
Patty. Rocky left several threatening messages on Patty’s answering machine.

Frustrated with his inability to contact Patty directly, Rocky contacted Patty’s mother, Marge, by phone, and told her that Patty owed his company a great deal of money and was shirking her financial obligations. He told Marge that if she refused to help him contact Patty, he would take immediate action to have Patty arrested for failing to pay her debts. Upon hearing this, Marge became so upset that she fainted, hitting her head on the coffee table. Her injuries required medical attention in the emergency room.

Larry, Big Box’s in-house collector, became impatient when Dubious’ debt collecting methods proved unsuccessful and promptly fired Dubious. Larry located Patty and told her during a phone call that Big Box would file a lawsuit against her if she failed to pay the amount owed. Additionally, although Larry knew that Patty’s monthly payment agreement did not provide for collection of any amounts over and above the consumer debt, Larry told Patty that she would have to reimburse Big Box for the fees the company had incurred in hiring Dubious to collect on the debt. Patty felt so intimidated by the call from Larry that she suffered anxiety attacks.

Patty and Marge retained Ann, an attorney, to advise them on their legal options.

What remedies, if any, are available to Patty and Marge for any such violations? Explain fully.

A

(c) The remedies available to Patty and Marge depend on the statute under which they recover.

At issue are the remedies available to Patty and Marge for the above TDCA, FDCPA, and DTPA violations.

Under the TDCA, a person may sue for injunctive relief in the form of a cease and desist order or actual damages. The term actual damages is consistent with the DTPA’s definition. Accordingly, actual damages includes all economic damages as well as damages for pain and suffering and mental anguish. Economic damages consists of compensatory damages for pecuniary loss, including costs of repair and replacement. In order to recover damages for mental anguish, a person must show a relatively high degree of mental pain and distress that causes a substantial disruption in daily routine. In addition, a person who successfully maintains an action under the TDCA is entitled to attorneys’ fees reasonably related to the amount of work performed and costs.

Based on the facts, it is unclear to what extent Patty suffered any damages as a result of Rocky’s phone call. On the other hand, Larry’s calls to Patty caused her to suffer anxiety attacks. This would entitle her to her medical expenses and lost wages. Patty may also recover damages for mental anguish if she establishes that her anxiety attacks caused by Larry’s violation substantially disrupted her daily routine. As noted above, Patty’s mother, Marge, may also bring a claim under the TDCA. If successful, Marge would be entitled to recover for any economic damages, such as medical expenses and lost income. She also could recover for pain and suffering resulting from her fall. The facts do not indicate that Marge suffered any mental anguish; if she did, however, her standard of recovery would be the same as Patty.

Finally, if successful under the TDCA, Patty and Marge would be entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

Patty and Marge have several remedies under the FDCPA.

A debt collector who fails to comply with the FDCPA is liable to any person in an amount equal to any actual damage sustained by such person. In addition, in the case of any action by an individual, the court may award additional damages not exceeding $1,000. Finally, similar to the TDCA, a person successful under the FDCPA is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees.

If Patty and Marge prevail under the FDCPA, they are entitled to recover actual damages in an amount similar to those available under the TDCA. In addition, under federal law, they would be entitled to a statutory penalty of up to $1,000 each. Finally, if successful under the FDCPA, they would be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees.

In addition to the damages recoverable under state and federal debt collection statutes, a consumer who prevails on her claims under the DTPA may obtain economic damages.

Damages for mental anguish are also available if the trier of fact finds that the defendant knowingly committed his misconduct. “Knowingly” means actual awareness, at the time of the act or practice complained of, of the falsity, deception, or unfairness of the act or practice giving rise to the consumer’s claim. In addition, if a defendant acted knowingly, a trier of fact may award the consumer up to three times her economic damages. A finding of intentional conduct entitles the consumer to up to three times both economic damages and damages for mental anguish. In addition to damages, the DTPA provides for equitable remedies, including injunctive relief.

Finally, similar to the TDCA and FDCPA, a plaintiff who prevails in her suit is entitled to all reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

Here, the facts indicate Larry “knew” that Patty did not owe the money he attempted to collect. Therefore, Patty should be able to recover at least economic damages, damages for mental anguish, and additional damages up to a total of three times her economic damages. If Patty can show the parties acted intentionally, she can also recover treble damages for mental anguish. She may also recover reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

Patty’s damages, however, slightly differ if she brought the action under a tie-in statute as opposed to filing a pure DTPA claim.

The DTPA provides that if the consumer brings a claim through a tie-in statute, the consumer may recover any actual damages incurred rather than solely economic damages. The provision permitting recovery of up to three times economic damages also applies, with the term “economic damages” deemed to mean “actual damages” for purposes of tripling the damage recovery.

Therefore, if Patty brings her state debt collection claim through the DTPA’s tie-in statute provision, she can recover damages for mental anguish suffered as a result of her panic attacks without needing to prove that Larry acted knowingly. Patty can also recover treble damages for both economic and mental anguish damages if she proves that Larry acted knowingly (without having to prove that he acted intentionally, the required mental state to recover the same amount in a pure DTPA claim).
Under the DTPA, Patty also may seek injunctive or other equitable relief where appropriate. For example, she may obtain an injunction against any of the parties from engaging in conduct in violation of the Debt Collection Practices Act.

Finally, in Texas, wrongful debt collection claims may also be brought in tort.

If Patty and Marge prevailed on a common law tort claim, they would be entitled to all actual damages, as well as exemplary damages, pursuant to Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

25
Q

07/09 #8:
Wes, a salesperson employed by Personal Kitchen, sold Mary a set of kitchen knives and copper pans, both manufactured by Top Shelf. With only Wes and Mary present, Wes told Mary that the pans and the knives carried “a full, unlimited one-year warranty” and that as part of the warranty, Mary had a 60-day “trial period” to “cancel the transaction” for any reason.

The sale contract Mary signed was a Personal Kitchen form, which contained the following terms and no others: a description of the pans and knives; the purchase price; a “limited warranty” providing for repair or replacement of the pans at the discretion of the manufacturer; a statement that the knives were covered by a manufacturer’s unconditional warranty; and, in small print in the signature block of the form, a statement that “purchaser waives all rights under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.”

The first time Mary used the pans, the copper began to flake. She also used the knives and found that the cutting edges quickly became dull.

Forty-five (45) days later, relying on Wes’s statement that she could cancel the transaction within 60 days, Mary called Personal Kitchen ‘s owner and said she wanted to cancel the transaction and get her money back. The owner told Mary that, under company policy, she had missed her deadline because she had only five business days from the date of purchase to cancel the transaction. He refused to cancel the transaction or make any other accommodation.

When Mary presented a warranty claim to Top Shelf, that company rejected her claim, telling her that her retention of the pans and the knives for several weeks constituted a waiver of the manufacturer’s warranty.

Mary sued Personal Kitchen and Top Shelf for relief under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”). Both defendants asserted as a defense that Mary had waived all rights under the Act. Personal Kitchen, separately, asserted as a defense that Mary’s effort to cancel the transaction failed because she had missed Personal Kitchen’s five-day deadline. Top Shelf, separately, asserted the defense of waiver based upon Mary’s retention of the merchandise for several weeks.

What facts can Mary assert to overcome the defense asserted by Personal Kitchen and Top Shelf that she waived all rights under the DTPA? Explain fully.

A

(a) Mary can assert a number of facts to show that the waiver was invalid.

At issue is whether Mary can assert sufficient facts to overcome the defense asserted by Personal Kitchen and Top Shelf that she waived all rights under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”).

Under the DTPA, a waiver by a consumer of the provisions of the Act is contrary to public policy and is unenforceable and void. A consumer may, however, waive the protections of the Act if

(i) the waiver is in writing and signed by the consumer;
(ii) the consumer is not in a significantly disparate bargaining position; and
(iii) the consumer is represented by legal counsel in seeking or acquiring the goods.

For the waiver to be valid, the consumer’s counsel may not be directly or indirectly identified or selected by the defendant. The DTPA also requires the waiver be in bold typeface, conspicuous, and at least 10 points in size. Finally, the waiver language must be in substantially the same form as that suggested by the Act. The suggested language requires that the consumer state that she has consulted with her attorney.

The DTPA requires that it be liberally construed and applied to protect consumers. In light of this mandate, the defendant should have the burden of proving that all the requirements of the DTPA waiver provision have been met.

In the instant case, the waiver written by Personal Kitchen fails to comply with almost every requirement of the Act. Therefore the waiver is void and unenforceable. Mary was not represented by an attorney, the waiver was not bold and conspicuous, and the waiver did not contain the required language. Additionally, she could argue that she was in a significantly disparate bargaining position. Even if the waiver were valid, it would only be valid with respect to Personal Kitchen.

Mary can assert numerous facts to show that the purported waiver was invalid.

26
Q

07/09 #8:
Wes, a salesperson employed by Personal Kitchen, sold Mary a set of kitchen knives and copper pans, both manufactured by Top Shelf. With only Wes and Mary present, Wes told Mary that the pans and the knives carried “a full, unlimited one-year warranty” and that as part of the warranty, Mary had a 60-day “trial period” to “cancel the transaction” for any reason.

The sale contract Mary signed was a Personal Kitchen form, which contained the following terms and no others: a description of the pans and knives; the purchase price; a “limited warranty” providing for repair or replacement of the pans at the discretion of the manufacturer; a statement that the knives were covered by a manufacturer’s unconditional warranty; and, in small print in the signature block of the form, a statement that “purchaser waives all rights under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.”

The first time Mary used the pans, the copper began to flake. She also used the knives and found that the cutting edges quickly became dull.

Forty-five (45) days later, relying on Wes’s statement that she could cancel the transaction within 60 days, Mary called Personal Kitchen ‘s owner and said she wanted to cancel the transaction and get her money back. The owner told Mary that, under company policy, she had missed her deadline because she had only five business days from the date of purchase to cancel the transaction. He refused to cancel the transaction or make any other accommodation.

When Mary presented a warranty claim to Top Shelf, that company rejected her claim, telling her that her retention of the pans and the knives for several weeks constituted a waiver of the manufacturer’s warranty.

Mary sued Personal Kitchen and Top Shelf for relief under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”). Both defendants asserted as a defense that Mary had waived all rights under the Act. Personal Kitchen, separately, asserted as a defense that Mary’s effort to cancel the transaction failed because she had missed Personal Kitchen’s five-day deadline. Top Shelf, separately, asserted the defense of waiver based upon Mary’s retention of the merchandise for several weeks.

Can Personal Kitchen prevail on its defense that Mary did not seek to cancel the contract
within five business days? Explain fully.

A

(b) Personal Kitchen will not prevail.

At issue is whether Personal Kitchen can prevail on its defense that Mary did not seek to cancel the contract within five business days.

Under the DTPA, an unannounced, unknown, company “policy” is ineffective to modify a consumer’s rights in any way under the DTPA. A misrepresentation claim is based on the defendant’s representation of a statement that is untrue or inaccurate.

Here, Wes, as agent for Personal Kitchen, made a representation that Mary had 60 days to cancel the transaction for any reason. A “secret” company policy does not alter liability for this misrepresentation; Personal Kitchen will be liable on what it represented and any warranty it made through Wes.
Personal Kitchen will not prevail on its “five-day rule” defense.

27
Q

07/09 #8:
Wes, a salesperson employed by Personal Kitchen, sold Mary a set of kitchen knives and copper pans, both manufactured by Top Shelf. With only Wes and Mary present, Wes told Mary that the pans and the knives carried “a full, unlimited one-year warranty” and that as part of the warranty, Mary had a 60-day “trial period” to “cancel the transaction” for any reason.

The sale contract Mary signed was a Personal Kitchen form, which contained the following terms and no others: a description of the pans and knives; the purchase price; a “limited warranty” providing for repair or replacement of the pans at the discretion of the manufacturer; a statement that the knives were covered by a manufacturer’s unconditional warranty; and, in small print in the signature block of the form, a statement that “purchaser waives all rights under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.”

The first time Mary used the pans, the copper began to flake. She also used the knives and found that the cutting edges quickly became dull.

Forty-five (45) days later, relying on Wes’s statement that she could cancel the transaction within 60 days, Mary called Personal Kitchen ‘s owner and said she wanted to cancel the transaction and get her money back. The owner told Mary that, under company policy, she had missed her deadline because she had only five business days from the date of purchase to cancel the transaction. He refused to cancel the transaction or make any other accommodation.

When Mary presented a warranty claim to Top Shelf, that company rejected her claim, telling her that her retention of the pans and the knives for several weeks constituted a waiver of the manufacturer’s warranty.

Mary sued Personal Kitchen and Top Shelf for relief under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”). Both defendants asserted as a defense that Mary had waived all rights under the Act. Personal Kitchen, separately, asserted as a defense that Mary’s effort to cancel the transaction failed because she had missed Personal Kitchen’s five-day deadline. Top Shelf, separately, asserted the defense of waiver based upon Mary’s retention of the merchandise for several weeks.

Under the DTPA, what claims can Mary assert, what relief can she obtain, and is she
likely to prevail against either of the defendants? Explain fully.

A

(c) Mary can assert a number of claims against the defendants under the DTPA and is likely to recover economic damages, attorneys’ fees, and possibly damages for mental anguish.

At issue is what claims Mary can assert under the DTPA, what relief she can obtain, and whether she is likely to prevail against either of the defendants.

Someone who has purchased goods, a consumer, can recover by showing that the defendants have engaged in false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the laundry list, breach of an express or implied warranty, or unconscionability. A consumer must also show the conduct occurred “in connection with” her transaction.

The “in connection with” requirement is satisfied with respect to the defendant Personal Kitchen because Mary dealt directly with an agent of Personal Kitchen and signed a contract that was a Personal Kitchen form.

To establish a violation of the laundry list, Mary must show that there was either an actionable misrepresentation or a failure to disclose, and that she relied on it to her detriment. Wes, as an agent for Personal Kitchen, represented that the knives had a “full, unlimited one-year warranty,” and that Mary had a “60-day trial period to cancel for any reason.” Both of these statements were untrue. Under agency principles, Wes’s statements will impose liability on Personal Kitchen for violations of the laundry list.

The laundry list prohibits misrepresentations regarding legal rights or the nature of a warranty. Personal Kitchen provided Mary with a contract stating there was an unconditional manufacturer’s warranty. Top Shelf says there was no such warranty. Unless the contract disclaimed implied warranties, Personal Kitchen as a seller made an implied warranty of merchantability. Personal Kitchen asserted that it had no warranty liability, a misrepresentation.

In addition, Top Shelf’s statement that the retention of goods for several weeks voids its warranty may constitute a misrepresentation. The facts are unclear as to exactly what warranty was made by Top Shelf. If there was in fact an unconditional manufacturer’s warranty, then Top Shelf misrepresented its warranty and legal rights by asserting that she retained the goods for too long. Top Shelf may have made an implied warranty of merchantability.

Any representations that Mary waived the DTPA, when in fact the waiver was totally ineffective as a disclaimer, may constitute a misrepresentation, because that is asserting that legal rights have been waived when they have not been.

The DTPA gives consumers a cause of action under breach of express or implied warranty. Mary may have a claim under the DTPA for breach of express warranty against Top Shelf if it is determined that it made an unconditional warranty. She also may have a claim against Personal Kitchen for breach of implied warranty.

The final cause of action under the DTPA is unconscionability. Although Mary appears to have been taken advantage of by the conduct of all defendants, without substantial additional information regarding her knowledge, abilities, and capacity, it is impossible to make a determination of unconscionability.

If Mary establishes a violation of the DTPA, she is entitled to recover all of her economic damages that were produced by the actionable conduct. Mary may recover for mental anguish if she establishes that the wrongful conduct was committed knowingly. She would also have to show a high degree of mental pain and suffering that caused a substantial disruption to her daily routine. If Mary can show that the defendant acted either knowingly or intentionally, she can recover additional damages. Finally, if Mary recovers under the DTPA, she shall recover reasonable attorneys’ fees.

In sum, Mary has several claims under the DTPA against Personal Kitchen and Top Shelf that are likely to succeed.

28
Q

02/09 #10:
Bill owned a rent house that was completely destroyed by a fire. The house was insured by Insco Insurance Company (“Insco”) under an insurance policy with $100,000 policy limits for fire loss. The house and the land recently had been appraised at a value of $120,000. Bill reported the loss to Stace, the Insco agent who had sold him the policy, and Stace made a timely report of the loss to the home office of Insco as required by the policy.

The Fire Marshall, an independent investigator hired by Insco, and an in-house adjuster employed by Insco all inspected the site of the fire and concluded that the cause of the fire had been a faulty electrical outlet. They all filed reports with Insco to that effect.

Anxious to rebuild the house so he could rent it again, Bill asked Stace when he could expect to receive a settlement from Insco. Without first contacting Insco to ascertain the status of the matter, Stace said, “Everything looks fine. You should be getting your check soon – certainly within 90 days.”

Relying on Stace’s representation, Bill obtained a 90-day construction loan in the amount of $100,000 from First Bank, secured by a first deed of trust on the property. He also hired Alamo Construction Co. to rebuild the house at a price of $100,000.

Several times during the next two weeks, Bill placed phone calls to Stace and wrote letters to Insco to inquire into the status of his claim. Neither Stace nor Insco responded. Finally, about two months later, Stace phoned Bill and told him, “Your claim is out of my hands. Insco thinks it’s a suspicious fire.” After leaving several unreturned phone messages, Bill finally reached Insco’s in-house adjuster, who told him that Insco was denying the claim because Insco believed the fire was caused by arson.

In the meantime, construction on the house was proceeding, and, after 90 days, Bill exhausted the $100,000 he had borrowed from First Bank. When the loan became due, First Bank demanded payment, and, when Bill could not pay, First Bank foreclosed on its deed of trust. Bill had to take a lot of unpaid time off work, he became emotionally upset, and incurred medical bills resulting from his stress.

Nine months later, Insco told Bill it had reconsidered the claim, saying that, although it did not believe it was liable, it offered to pay $45,000 in full satisfaction of Bill’s claim. Bill refused the offer and hired an attorney to sue Insco. Under the threat of suit, Insco tendered the full policy limits of $100,000.

Assume that Bill is a “consumer” under all applicable Texas consumer laws.

Under Texas consumer laws, what causes of action can Bill assert against Stace, and what types of damages can he recover from Stace? Explain fully.

A

(a) Bill can sue Stace under the Texas Insurance Code and recover actual damages, and can sue under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) and recover economic damages.

At issue is what causes of action Bill can assert against Stace and what types of damages he can recover from Stace under the DTPA and Texas Insurance Code.

Under the DTPA, a private cause of action may be maintained by a “consumer” based on an act or practice that is: a violation of the laundry list section; a breach of an express or implied warranty; an unconscionable act or practice; or a violation of Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code. A consumer may maintain an action against an individual if he individually violated the DTPA.

To establish a violation of the laundry list, the consumer must establish either a misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact with the intent to enter into a transaction that he otherwise would not have entered into.

To maintain a claim based on an unconscionable act under the DTPA, the consumer must prove unconscionability by showing that the business took advantage of his lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity to a grossly unfair degree. “Grossly” is defined to mean glaringly noticeable, flagrant, complete, and unmitigated. It is an objective standard and the consumer need not prove that the business acted with knowledge, intent, negligence, or conscious indifference.

Any claim under Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code is automatically actionable under the DTPA. It is a violation of Chapter 541 to misrepresent the terms of a policy or the benefits of the policy.
The consumer may have separate and distinct claims under the Texas Insurance Code. Chapter
541 of the Insurance Code is similar to the DTPA in terms of prohibited conduct and remedies;
however, it applies only to acts or practices in connection with the practice of insurance. Unlike the
DTPA, it is not necessary to be a “consumer” to maintain an action under the Insurance Code. Under
Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code, any “person” who sustains actual damages caused by a violation of
Chapter 541 or violation of the DTPA laundry list may maintain an action.

Bill is a consumer, so he may maintain a private cause of action against Stace under the DTPA for a violation of the laundry list, breach of warranty, an unconscionable act or practice, or violation of the Insurance Code.

Stace misrepresented the status of Bill’s claim and the terms of the policy by stating, “You should be getting your check soon—certainly within 90 days.” Although the statement “everything looks fine” may be considered puffing or an opinion and not actionable, the misrepresentations regarding the check appear to be a misrepresentation of fact. Bill must show that he relied on this misrepresentation to establish liability under the DTPA, and he did so by obtaining a construction loan and hiring a construction company.

Bill may be able to show that he had limited knowledge and ability dealing with insurance coverage, and that Stace took advantage of him to a grossly unfair degree by telling him things were fine, thereby inducing Bill to borrow money and begin work on repairs.

Stace’s statement regarding payment could be viewed as a misrepresentation of the policy terms or the benefits of the policy.

Because Bill purchased a policy of insurance from Stace, the acts and practices of Stace are subject to Chapter 541.

Under the DTPA, Bill’s economic damages could include the amount he is entitled to under the policy, any loss resulting from the foreclosure, damages for any lost income, as well as his medical bills.
It does not appear that Stace acted “knowingly.” Stace does not appear to have known of the actual facts with respect to the settlement of Bill’s claim. Thus, even if Bill establishes that he suffered compensable mental anguish, he would not be allowed to recover damages for that suffering under the
DTPA.

Attorneys’ fees should be awarded based on the time Bill’s attorney has worked on the case and not on the basis of a percentage of the judgment.

Through the independent claim under the Insurance Code, Bill would be entitled to all the damages he could recover under the DTPA, as well as any compensable damages for mental anguish. He also may recover any other relief the court deems proper, and reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

Thus, Bill has claims against Stace for a violation of the laundry list, an unconscionable act, and Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code under the DTPA. Bill also has a distinct claim against Stace under the Texas Insurance Code. Bill may recover economic damages under the DTPA and actual damages under the Texas Insurance Code.

29
Q

02/09 #10:
Bill owned a rent house that was completely destroyed by a fire. The house was insured by Insco Insurance Company (“Insco”) under an insurance policy with $100,000 policy limits for fire loss. The house and the land recently had been appraised at a value of $120,000. Bill reported the loss to Stace, the Insco agent who had sold him the policy, and Stace made a timely report of the loss to the home office of Insco as required by the policy.

The Fire Marshall, an independent investigator hired by Insco, and an in-house adjuster employed by Insco all inspected the site of the fire and concluded that the cause of the fire had been a faulty electrical outlet. They all filed reports with Insco to that effect.

Anxious to rebuild the house so he could rent it again, Bill asked Stace when he could expect to receive a settlement from Insco. Without first contacting Insco to ascertain the status of the matter, Stace said, “Everything looks fine. You should be getting your check soon – certainly within 90 days.”

Relying on Stace’s representation, Bill obtained a 90-day construction loan in the amount of $100,000 from First Bank, secured by a first deed of trust on the property. He also hired Alamo Construction Co. to rebuild the house at a price of $100,000.

Several times during the next two weeks, Bill placed phone calls to Stace and wrote letters to Insco to inquire into the status of his claim. Neither Stace nor Insco responded. Finally, about two months later, Stace phoned Bill and told him, “Your claim is out of my hands. Insco thinks it’s a suspicious fire.” After leaving several unreturned phone messages, Bill finally reached Insco’s in-house adjuster, who told him that Insco was denying the claim because Insco believed the fire was caused by arson.

In the meantime, construction on the house was proceeding, and, after 90 days, Bill exhausted the $100,000 he had borrowed from First Bank. When the loan became due, First Bank demanded payment, and, when Bill could not pay, First Bank foreclosed on its deed of trust. Bill had to take a lot of unpaid time off work, he became emotionally upset, and incurred medical bills resulting from his stress.

Nine months later, Insco told Bill it had reconsidered the claim, saying that, although it did not believe it was liable, it offered to pay $45,000 in full satisfaction of Bill’s claim. Bill refused the offer and hired an attorney to sue Insco. Under the threat of suit, Insco tendered the full policy limits of $100,000.

Assume that Bill is a “consumer” under all applicable Texas consumer laws.

Under Texas consumer laws, what causes of action can Bill assert against Insco, and what types of damages can he recover from Insco? Explain fully.

A

(b) Bill can recover a broad range of damages from Insco under both the DTPA and the Texas Insurance Code.

At issue is, under Texas consumer laws, what causes of action Bill can assert against Insco and what types of damages he can recover.

When an agent is acting within the scope of the authority conferred by the principal, the principal will have the same liability under the DTPA and the Insurance Code as the agent.

Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code prohibits “unfair settlement practices.” The term “unfair settlement practices” is defined to include the failure to settle in good faith claims for which liability is reasonably clear, refusing to pay a claim without a reasonable investigation, and undertaking to enforce a full and final release when only a partial payment has been made.

Any claims that may be established under the Insurance Code may also be established under the
DTPA.

The consumer’s damages for his claims will be the same, whether the claims are asserted against the agent or the principal. However, he will be entitled to only a single recovery. Establishing a violation of Chapter 541 entitles recovery of all actual damages. The term “actual damages” has been broadly defined by the courts to include all damages recoverable under common law, including economic loss and mental anguish. Damages for mental anguish require acting knowingly. “Knowingly” is defined as actual awareness, but it may be inferred if objective manifestations indicate that a person acted with actual awareness.

Other relief the court deems proper is also available, in addition to reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

The Insurance Code generally requires that claims be accepted or denied within 15 days, or 30 days if the insurer has a reasonable basis to believe the loss resulted from arson. If the insurer accepts the claims, payment must be made five days after notice of acceptance. The insurer is also required to reject the claim in writing. If the consumer establishes a breach of this prompt payment provision, he would be entitled to a penalty of 18% interest per year until the claim is paid, plus reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

Under the DTPA, a consumer may recover only his economic damages for all direct and consequential economic loss, but not his noneconomic damages such as mental anguish, pain and suffering, loss of consortium, etc. However, the DTPA authorizes recovery for mental anguish if the consumer establishes that the wrongful conduct was committed “knowingly.” To recover damages for mental anguish, the consumer would have to show a high degree of mental pain and suffering that caused a substantial disruption in his daily routine.

The DTPA authorizes recovery of additional or punitive damages if the consumer can prove that the business acted “knowingly.” In addition, if the consumer can show that the business acted “intentionally,” he may recover an amount up to a total of more than three times economic damages and damages for mental anguish. “Intentionally” requires a showing that Insco acted knowingly and had specific intent that the consumer act in reliance on its conduct. The intent may be inferred from objective manifestations that indicate the business acted intentionally or with flagrant disregard of prudent and fair business practices.

If the consumer prevails under the DTPA, he is also entitled to recover court costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees. Attorneys’ fees should be awarded based on the time the attorney worked on the case, not on a percentage of the judgment.

Because Stace was at all times acting as an agent for Insco, and there is nothing to indicate that Stace’s conduct was outside the scope of the authority conferred by Insco, Insco will have the same liability under the DTPA and the Insurance Code as Stace arising from Stace’s representations relating to the insurance policy.

Bill may argue that he has a claim under each of the above provisions. The investigations and reports filed with Insco indicate that the fire was caused by a faulty electrical outlet, and not arson. Hence, liability is reasonably clear and Insco’s failure to pay would be considered bad faith. Although Insco states that it did not believe it was liable, the demand for a settlement in full in exchange for less than half the full amount of liability might be considered an unfair settlement practice under the Insurance Code.

Bill also has claims under the DTPA, because any claims established under the Insurance Code may also be established under the DTPA.

Bill’s damages for his claims will be the same, whether the claims are asserted against Stace or Insco, but he will be entitled to only a single recovery.

Bill should be entitled to all his economic damages, as well as any compensable damages for mental anguish. This would include the amount due under the policy, any loss resulting from the foreclosure, lost wages, medical expenses, and damages for mental anguish. Bill may also be able to recover up to three times his actual damages, including damages for mental anguish, if he shows Insco acted knowingly.

Bill would also be entitled to any other relief the court deems proper, and reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

Bill may also have a claim against Insco for breach of the Insurance Code’s prompt payment of claims provisions. According to the facts, Insco took more than two months to deny Bill’s claim. Bill would be entitled to a penalty of 18% interest per year until the claim is paid.

Bill’s economic damages could include the amount he is entitled to under the policy, any loss resulting from the foreclosure, damages for any lost income, as well as his medical bills.

If Bill establishes that he suffered compensable mental anguish, including mental pain and suffering that caused a substantial disruption to his daily routine, he will be entitled to recover those damages under the DTPA.

If Bill proves that Insco acted “knowingly,” he is entitled to three times economic damages. If Bill proves that Insco acted “intentionally,” he is entitled to three times economic and mental anguish damages.
If Bill prevails under the DTPA, he is entitled to recover court costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

In conclusion, Bill has claims under both the DTPA and the Texas Insurance Code against Insco. In addition to the same claims Bill may have against Stace, Bill may also have additional claims against Insco based on the manner in which Insco handled the claim. Bill may be able to recover actual, economic, mental anguish, and additional or punitive damages. Bill may be able to recover damages for breach of prompt payment and reasonable court costs and attorneys’ fees.