10 MARKER 1 PARAGRAPHS Flashcards Preview

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Flashcards in 10 MARKER 1 PARAGRAPHS Deck (25)
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1
Q

1 -

A

situation of passage and purpose

3

2
Q

2 -

A

entertainment of direct realism

5

3
Q

3 -

A

perceptual relativity seen in table

4

4
Q

4 -

A

Locke briefly

2

5
Q

5 -

A

indirect realism, no absolute vantage point, veil of perception
5

6
Q

How many overall

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3
5
4
2
5
7
Q

1.1

A
  • This passage occurs near the very beginning of Russell’s work, in which he discusses the difficulties of finding certain knowledge about the world,
8
Q

1.2

A
  • foremost the problems that arise when attempting to derive knowledge from our immediate experience with a philosophical level of rigorous doubt rather than an everyday credulity,
9
Q

1.3

A
  • which can be made “plain” when we “concentrate attention” on the specific example of the table he is writing at.
10
Q

2.1

A
  • Russell then highlights that the table, when considered without applying philosophical doubt to one’s beliefs, seems to possess certain fixed qualities, inherent to the table, which seem to be the immediate objects of his awareness.
11
Q

2.2

A
  • He writes that the “to the eye” the table is “oblong, brown and shiny”, and lists multiple other qualities he perceives the table to have.
12
Q

2.3

A
  • Furthermore, Russell’s beliefs about the qualities of the table are corroborated by “anyone else who sees and feels and hears the table”, as they will arrive at the table having the same qualities as Russell believes it have from their own sense experiences of the table,
13
Q

2.4

A
  • which seems to lend reliability or veracity to Russell’s description of the table, “so that it might seem as if no difficulty would arise”.
14
Q

2.5

A
  • Here, Russell seems to put forward a direct realist theory of perception, which holds that the qualities of an object exist within the object and one’s perception of the table is unmediated.
15
Q

3.1

A
  • Russell contends, however, that “our troubles begin” when “we try to be more precise” in our evaluation of knowledge about the table, as when we assess this knowledge critically, ambiguities and obscurities in our reasoning become apparent.
16
Q

3.2

A
  • Indeed, direct realism is often referred to as ‘naïve realism’ due to its accused failure to engage properly with the philosophical problems of perception.
17
Q

3.3

A
  • This is seen in the belief “that the table is ‘really’ of the same colour all over”- despite the table, to his immediate senses, in certain areas being “brighter” shades of brown and even a different colour entirely (“white”), both due to his earlier conclusion that the table is also “shiny”.
18
Q

3.4

A
  • Moreover, Russell points out that the inconsistency of the table’s colour “will be different …. if I move”, highlighting that his experience of an object’s qualities seems to differ when he himself is under different conditions- that is, it seems to be perspectival.
19
Q

4.1

A
  • Here, Russell also raises the issue of whether the table has intrinsic qualities which are different to the perceived qualities.
20
Q

4.2

A
  • This concern is illustrated by Locke’s thesis, that objects possess ‘primary qualities’, such as shape, size or position, which are not at all dependant on the perceiver, and have the power to cause sense-data of ‘secondary qualities’, such as colour, sound and taste, which are dependent on the perceiver and so are perspectival.
21
Q

5.1

A
  • Russell, through focusing on the issue of perceptual variation, seems to advocate indirect realism, which maintains that the immediate objects of awareness are not physical objects but sense-data, and which he asserts later in the chapter.
22
Q

5.2

A
  • Russell moreover points out that because it is impossible for two spectators, in accordance to Leibniz’s Law, or perhaps simply obvious sense, to see the table “from exactly the same point of view … at the same moment”,
23
Q

5.3

A
  • it is impossible for two spectators to “see exactly the same distribution of colours” due to perceptual variation and the privacy of sense-data.
24
Q

5.4

A
  • In addition to later dismissing others’ testimony of sense-data as this testimony itself consists of sense-data, Russell in this way casts doubt on the role that the immediate experiences of others can play in substantiating one’s own conclusions about reality if sense-data are in fact private to every person.
25
Q

5.5

A
  • More widely, Russell seems to allude to the ‘veil of perception’, the problem that, as a result of the assertion that one only ever has access to sense-data, it is seemingly impossible to know even anything about the ‘real world’ or the “real table”.