Question 1

Disclosure of privileged communication Psychotherapist-patient communication is privileged under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Accepted Answer

Jaffee v Redmond (1996)

Question 2

Standard for admissibility of expert testimony 1. Whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested 2. Whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication 3. The known or potential error rate of the technique or theory when applied 4. The existence and maintenance of standards and controls 5. Whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community

Accepted Answer

\ Daubert v Merrell Dow (1993)

Question 3

The admissibility of expert testimony Procedures that have not yet gained sufficient scientific recognition do not permit the courts to admit expert testimony on the grounds that such techniques or procedures have not yet been validated through discovery, development, and experimentation.

Accepted Answer

\ Frye v U.S. (1923)

Question 4

When appellate courts review lower courts’ decisions to admit or exclude expert testimony, what standard of review should be applied? The traditional abuse of discretion standard that governs review of evidentiary rulings extends to the admissibility of expert testimony. A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it concludes the data presented by the expert do not support the expert’s opinion.

Accepted Answer

\ General Electric v Joiner (1997)

Question 5

Application of Daubert Standard to other expert testimony The Daubert standard applies to the testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists. The U.S. Supreme Court considered that Federal Rule 702 makes no relevant distinction between “scientific” knowledge and “technical” or “other specialized” knowledge; yet, it does make clear that any knowledge of this type might become subject to expert testimony.

Accepted Answer

Kumho Tire v Carmichael (1999)

Question 6

Obstruction of justice during trial phase and subsequent sentencing guidelines. To what degree does mental illness impact impulsivity and judgment? Malingering is volitional, and personality disorders do not constitute serious mental illness. Intentional obstruction of justice (providing false evidence intended to derail the process) can receive a sentence enhancement. \ Applicable at federal level only.

Accepted Answer

U.S. v Greer (1998)

Question 7

Does Florida’s use of a cutoff IQ to establish mental retardation violate Atkins v. Virginia’s ruling that executing mentally retarded criminals violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against “cruel and unusual” punishment? The Court held that a bright-line IQ threshold requirement for determining whether someone has an intellectual disability (formerly mental retardation) is unconstitutional in deciding whether they are eligible for the death penalty. Defendants with IQ in margin of error must be permitted to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits.

Accepted Answer

Hall v Florida (2014)

Question 8

Does the Constitution require that an indigent defendant have access to the psychiatric examination and assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense based on his mental condition, when his sanity at the time of the offense is seriously in question? The Court held that the Constitution required a State to provide access to a psychiatrist’s assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one.

Accepted Answer

Ake v Oklahoma (1985)

Question 9

Fundamental (un)fairness of having to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. The Court held that because Oklahoma’s procedural rule allows the State to try a defendant who is more likely than not incompetent, it violates due process. The stringent standard is "incompatible with the dictates of due process," and that criminal defendants must be allowed to avoid trial if they prove incompetence by a "preponderance of the evidence.

Accepted Answer

Cooper v Oklahoma (1996)

Question 10

Did the lower courts violate Drope’s due process rights by proceeding with his trial when he was not present (due to his suicide attempt), and should his trial have been suspended until a competency determination was made? Was there sufficient evidence to question his competence? 1. The trial court failed to give proper weight to evidence of the petitioner’s incompetence. 2. The correct course was to suspend trial until a competency determination could be made. 3. There was insufficient inquiry to determine whether the petitioner’s right to be present should be waived. 4. Remanding the case for psychiatric evaluation did not adequately protect due process rights; however, the state could retry the case IF the defendant was competent to be tried.

Accepted Answer

Drope v Missouri (1975)

Question 11

The proper standard to employ when establishing a defendant’s competency to stand trial. A brief mental status examination is insufficient to establish a defendant’s competency to stand trial. “It is not enough for the district judge to find that ‘the defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some recollection of events,’ but that the ‘test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”

Accepted Answer

Dusky v US (1960)

Question 12

The admissibility of the evaluating psychiatrist’s testimony during the penalty phase of proceedings. When the accused does not request or introduce psychiatric evidence, he may not be compelled to respond to questions posed by the evaluator since his statements could be used against him during sentencing proceedings (Fifth Amendment). Had the accused been apprised of his rights and knowingly decided to waive them, his statements during the evaluation could have been used against him during sentencing proceedings.

Accepted Answer

Estelle v Smith (1981)

Question 13

Requirements for commitment of a defendant found incompetent to stand trial; What procedural safeguards must be observed? Specifically, how long may he or she be committed before it constitutes a violation of one’s due process rights? An indefinite commitment for incompetence to proceed is in violation of a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. At a minimum, due process requires the length of commitment to “bear some reasonable relation” to the reason for commitment. An incompetent defendant “cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.”

Accepted Answer

Jackson v Indiana (1972)

Question 14

Should the burden of proof lie with the prosecution to demonstrate competency or the defense to prove incompetency to proceed? A state statute presuming a defendant is competent to proceed and placing the burden of proof on the defendant to prove otherwise is “constitutionally adequate” to guard against due process violations that would result from sending an incompetent defendant to trial.

Accepted Answer

Medina v California (1992)

Question 15

The right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; Court’s duty to hold a hearing on competency in light of “bona fide doubt.” The conviction of a legally incompetent person violates due process. Even in the absence of a request for such a hearing, if sufficient evidence exists to warrant such a hearing, it should be ordered by the judge.

Accepted Answer

Pate v Robinson (1966)

Question 16

Is it a violation of the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to forcefully administer antipsychotic medication during the trial phase? Forced administration of antipsychotic medication during trial violates a defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights absent the following: (1) the need for medication, (2) medical appropriateness, (3) consideration of reasonable alternatives, and (4) consideration of the possible bias against the defendant.

Accepted Answer

Riggins v Nevada (1992)

Question 17

Should (non-dangerous) criminal defendants be involuntarily medicated for the purpose of achieving competency to proceed? The Court must conclude the following: 1. Important government interests are at stake. 2. Involuntary medication will significantly further state interests, and administration of psychotropic medication will likely render the defendant competent to proceed (and side effects will not have a deleterious effect on competency). 3. Less intrusive means are not likely to achieve the same results. 4. Administration of medication is medically appropriate.

Accepted Answer

Sell v U.S. (2003)

Question 18

Does a mentally retarded defendant’s successful completion of a competency group legitimately mean that he is competent to stand trial? The hospital’s certification of competency failed to meet the minimal standards of reliability under Daubert and the hospital’s finding of “competent to stand trial’ was rejected.

Accepted Answer

U.S. v Duhon (2000)

Question 19

Memory loss and competence to stand trial; is it a denial of due process or of the right to effective assistance of counsel to try a defendant suffering from amnesia? The Court should consider the following factors: 1) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant’s capacity to assist. 2) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant’s ability to testify on his own behalf. 3) The extent to which the evidence could be extrinsically reconstructed in view of the defendant’s amnesia. 4) The extent to which the government assisted the defendant and counsel in that reconstruction. 5) The strength of the prosecution’s case. Most important here is whether the government’s case “is such as to negate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence.” 6) Any other facts and circumstances which would indicate whether or not the defendant had a fair trial.

Accepted Answer

Wilson v U.S. (1968)

Question 20

What constitutes a “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” waiver of Miranda rights? In addition, should the state have to prove voluntary waiver of Miranda rights by “clear and convincing evidence?” Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not “voluntary” within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Statements made by the defendant after receiving his Miranda rights could be admitted without violation of due process. The State only needs to be prove voluntary waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence.

Accepted Answer

Colorado v Connelly (1986)

Question 21

Under what circumstances can an individual, during State criminal court proceedings, waive his right to counsel in the interest of self-representation? A defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.

Accepted Answer

Faretta v California (1975)

Question 22

Is the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel higher than the competency standard for standing trial? The standards for competency to plead and to waive the right to counsel are the same as the standard for competency to stand trial. The Dusky standard uniformly applies to all three areas of competency addressed in this case.

Accepted Answer

Godinez v Moran (1993)

Question 23

Were Gault’s constitutional due process rights (notice of charges, counsel, questioning of witnesses, protection against self-incrimination, a transcript of the proceedings, and appellate review) denied given that he is a juvenile? They ruled that Gault’s commitment to the State Industrial School was a violation of the 14th Amendment due to his being denied the right to an attorney, not being formally notified of the charges against him, not being informed of his right against self-incrimination, and no opportunity to confront his accusers.

Accepted Answer

In re Gault (1967)

Question 24

Does mental illness limit a defendant’s right to self-representation? Are Dusky criteria sufficient to establish a defendant’s competence to proceed pro se, or should the standard be higher? A higher standard for competency to proceed pro se should be utilized given the more complex abilities required to represent oneself in court as opposed to assist and consult with counsel. A court is permitted “to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”

Accepted Answer

Indiana v Edwards (2008)

ABPP Case Law Reversed Flashcards

All cards from the ABPP Case Law deck are reversed.

Brainscape's Knowledge GenomeTM

ABPP Case Law Reversed Flashcards

All cards from the ABPP Case Law deck are reversed.

Brainscape's Knowledge Genome^TM