Week 3/4 - Collective Action Games Flashcards

1
Q

non-excludable benefits

A

if you don’t contribute, you can still enjoy benefits

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

non-rival

A

your benefits are not affected if someone else also gets it

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

social optimum?

A

when sum of payoffs is maximized

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

when to participate?

A

P(n+1) > S(n)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

when to shirk?

A

P(n+1) < S(n)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

marginal private gain?

A

gain you get from switching (payoff after switching less payoff before)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

marginal social gain?

A

gain society gets from you switching

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

marginal spillover effect?

A

MSG - MPG

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

negative externalities exist when?

A
  • action of one person lowers another person’s payoff

- MSE is negative

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

what do we call it when one person’s actions affects another when switching?

A
  • spillover effect
  • external effect
  • externality
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

total gain for society formula?

A

(n)P(n) + (N-n)(S(n))

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

marginal social gain formula?

A

T(n+1) - T(n)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

marginal private gain formula?

A

P(n+1) - S(n)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

marginal spillover effect formula?

A

MSG - MPG

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

MPG vs MSG in decision making?

A

decisions are usually made bc of a positive MPG but society would be better off if our decision was based off of the MSG.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

when is the private gain of switching positive?

A

P(n+1) > S(n)
(and then solve for n)
(people will switch until there is n-1, then they will stop)

17
Q

when is the social gain of switching positive?

A

T(n+1) - T(n) > 0
(and then solve for n)
(TSP will be reduced once the number of players exceeds this n that we found)