CH1 PUBLIC SPENDING AS DESIGNED FOR THE MEDIAN VOTER Flashcards

1
Q

The Hotelling model

A

HOTELLING (1929)

  • 2 ice cream vendors on the beach
  • Are going to place themselves in the middle
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

The median voter theorem

A

Parties are going to locate themselves in the middle (Hotelling model) to appeal as many voters as possible = not in their interests to appeal minorities
(simplified model : assumes that parties only compete on one dimension)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

The median voter - interests and author

A

MILTZER, RICHARD, “a rational theory of the size of government” (1981)
Below-average income : redistribution in their interest

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Democracy good for the poor ? - theory

A

MILTZER, RICHARD, “a rational theory of the size of government” (1981)
Because of the robin hood effect, democracy tend to create more redistribution mechanisms than authoritarian systems

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

“Robin hood effect” - theory

A

MILTZER, RICHARD, “A rational theory of the size of government” (1981)
The more unequal the society the more political parties are incited to commit with more redistribution mechanisms

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Limits to the median voter theorem - subject + authors + date

A
  • Political partiy members : ALDRICH (1983)
  • Targeting non median voters : DIXIT, LONDREGAN (1996)
  • Political/electoral institutions : PERSSON, TABELLINI (1999)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

The importance of political party members

A

ALDRICH (1983) : members constraining party manifestos
Parties have to keep their members happy
Cannot do whatever they want
Have to be credible: committing to more redistribution cannot always be credible

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Democracy good for the poor? - empirically

A

Mixed evidence :

  • Démocracies have allowed funding multiple social services (Latin America: education, health, Africa: education)
  • Child mortality rates are a strong indicator of poverty : did not really decrease in the context of redistribution (ROSS - 2006) –> tends to help more the middle class than the poorest classes
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

“Robin hood effect” - empirically

A

Countries with a relatively flatting construction have the highest amount of redistribution = robin hood paradox

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Targeting non-median voters

A

DIXIT, LONDREGAN (1996)
Promises of redistribution for relevant groups
Can be in the interest of the party to target non median voters like swing voters
Swing voters tend to be in the middle class

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Director’s law

A

Most of redistribution mechanisms in public policies are designed to benefit the middle class

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

DIXIT, LONDREGAN + DIRECTOR’S LAW =

A

Biased Welfare State

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Political/electoral institutions

A

PERSSON, TABELLINI (1999)
Parties do not behave in the same way in the context of a majoritarian system or a proportional one
- Majoritarian system : redistribution towards selected districts
- Proportional system : incentive for parties to design wider redistribution mechanisms + coalition governments

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Plan chapitre

A

I. Foundations : the median voter and the size of government

  • “median voter theorem”
  • hotelling model, HOTELLING
  • ” a rational theory of the size of government”, MELTZER, RICHARD

II. Expansion : the role of parties and institutions

  • role of political party members, ALDRICH
  • targeting non median voters, DIXIT, LONDREGAN
  • political institutions, PERSSON, TABELLINI

III. Application : inequality as harmful for the environment
- the median voter and the environment, KEMPF, ROSSIGNOL

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

The median voter and the environment

A

KEMPF, ROSSIGNOL (2007)

  • growth (generates pollution) VS environment
  • redistribution either for growth or environment
  • democracy : the median voter theorem apply - policies depending on conflicts of interests = the poorer in favour of economic growth / the richer in favour of the protection of the environment
  • the more unequal the society, the more harmful for the environment : –> median voter favours growth

In this model, the key explanation for the existence of environmental policies is of an economic nature

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Nuances to the median voter and the environment

A
  • Unequal richer countries : more harm for the environment
  • Equal poorer countries : more harm for the environment
    The main explanation for a given country’s environmental policy is the level of economic development