Homicide - Cases Flashcards
Murder - S1 Homicide Act 1957
> Abolition of “constructive malice”.
- Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of another offence.
- For the purposes of the foregoing subsection, a killing done in the course or for the purpose of resisting an officer of justice, or of resisting or avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or of effecting or assisting an escape or rescue from legal custody, shall be treated as a killing in the course or furtherance of an offence.
Murder - S8 Criminal Justice Act 1967
> Proof of criminal intent.
- A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,—
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.
Murder - Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule Act) 1996
> S.1:
-Abolishes year and a day rule.
S.2:
-If death occurs more than 3 years after the injury or the person has already been convicted of a different offence for the circumstances related to the death then proceedings may be instituted with permission of the AG
Murder - Cunningham
> R v Cunningham [1982] AC 566, [1981] 3 W.L.R. 223.
Intention to cause GBH suffices as MR for murder.
D attacked V in pub wrongly believing that V had had sexual relations with his fiancé.
V died from injuries inflicted by D 7 days later.
Lord Hailsham LC:
-“Malice aforethought has never been limited to the intention to kill or to endanger life.”
Loss of Control - Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s54
> S.54:
- Where a person (“D”) kills or is a party to the killing of another (“V” ), D is not to be convicted of murder if—
(a) D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted from D’s loss of self-control,
(b) the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, and
(c) a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way. - For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), it does not matter whether or not the loss of control was sudden.
- In subsection (1)(c) the reference to “ the circumstances of D” is a reference to all of D’s circumstances other than those whose only relevance to D’s conduct is that they bear on D’s general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint.
- Subsection (1) does not apply if, in doing or being a party to the killing, D acted in a desire for revenge.
Loss of Control - Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s55
> S. 55:
- This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to D’s fear of serious violence from V against D or another identified person.
- This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or things done or said (or both) which—
(a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and
(b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. - This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a combination of the matters mentioned in subsections (3) and (4).
- In determining whether a loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger—
(a) D’s fear of serious violence is to be disregarded to the extent that it was caused by a thing which D incited to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence;
(b) a sense of being seriously wronged by a thing done or said is not justifiable if D incited the thing to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence;
(c) the fact that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be disregarded.
Loss of Control - Clinton
> R v Clinton [2012] EWCA Crim 2, [2012] Crim. L.R. 539.
Clinton’s wife Dawn admitted to him that she had been having an affair, he told his wife that was going to commit suicide and she replied that he didn’t have the ‘balls’ to do it.
He killed her by beating her head with a baton and strangling her
Trial judge did not allow evidence relating to sexual infidelity following s55(6)(c) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
Appealed and ordered a retrial as the judge erred in her direction.
Lord Judge CJ:
-Sexual fidelity can be the context for a qualifying trigger but not as a trigger itself under the loss of control defence.
-If a qualifying trigger is present, evidence relating to sexual infidelity arises for consideration as part of the context in which to evaluate the trigger.
Loss of Control - Asmelash
> R v Asmelash [2013] 1 Cr App R 33, [2013] Crim. L.R. 599.
Voluntary intoxication by the defendant do not form part of the circumstances relevant to the loss of control defence under s54(c) Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
D was insulted and taunted by V.
D was drunk when he stabbed the victim to death.
It was claimed that direction given by judge was wrong as it excluded evidence of intoxication.
The judge directed the jury that voluntary intoxication was not within the ‘circumstances’ in s54(c) Coroners and Justice Act.
CA - appeal dismissed, judge’s direction was correct.
Lord Judge CJ:
-Loss of control defence must be approached without reference to the defendant’s voluntary intoxication.
-Under the provocation defence judicial directions referred to a reasonably sober person, the new statute should apply similarly.
-Different considerations would arise if a defendant with a severe problem with alcohol or drugs was mercilessly taunted about the condition, to the extent that it constituted a qualifying trigger; the alcohol or drug problem would then form part of the circumstances for consideration.
Diminished Responsibility - S. 2 Homicide Act 1957
> Homicide Act 1957 s.2 (amended by Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s.52):
1. A person (“D”) who kills or is a party to the killing of another is not to be convicted of murder if D was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which—
(a) arose from a recognised medical condition,
(b) substantially impaired D’s ability to do one or more of the things mentioned in subsection (1A), and
(c) provides an explanation for D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
1A. Those things are—
(a) to understand the nature of D’s conduct;
(b) to form a rational judgment;
(c) to exercise self-control.
1B. For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), an abnormality of mental functioning provides an explanation for D’s conduct if it causes, or is a significant contributory factor in causing, D to carry out that conduct.
Diminished Responsibility - Dowds
> R v Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim 281, [2012] Crim LR 612:
-Diminished responsibility does not apply to voluntary intoxication.
-D stabbed V 60 times.
-D claimed the partial defence of diminished responsibility against the charge for murder, on the basis that he was acutely drunk.
-CA held that D was rightly convicted for murder
because voluntary intoxication does not fall within the scope of “recognised medical condition” under s2(1) Homicide Act 1957 as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
-S.2 Homicide Act was made with knowledge of the intoxication doctrine that voluntary drunkenness could not form a defence, so if Parliament had meant to overrule this then it would have been explicit.
-Use of ‘recognised medical condition’ was used to extend law to new developments in medicine and psychiatry, not to incorporate voluntary intoxication.
Diminished Responsibility - Golds
> R v Golds [2016] UKSC 61:
- Under s2(1)(b) Homicide Act, substantial means significant or important, not just more than trivial.
- The issue arose as to the meaning of substantial under the s2(1)(b) Homicide Act.
- Lords Hughes:
1. ‘Substantial’ did not mean ‘having some substance’ or ‘anything more than merely trivial’ but rather required something ‘important or weighty’: [27].
2. Ordinarily the judge should not have to define the term substantial in his direction to the jury, it should be taken by its ordinary meaning by the jury, but if the issue arises as to whether being more the merely trivial suffices, the judge should clarify that it does not: [43]. - D stabbed him wife 22 times.
- Used defence of diminished responsibility and 3 experts stated he was suffering from a recognised medical condition which “substantially impaired” his ability to understand the nature of his conduct, to form rational judgments, or exercise self-control.
- Judge directed the jury that “substantially” was an everyday word and did not need defining.
- Convicted of murder.
- Appealed that this definition of substantially was a misdirection.
- Held that a judge could refuse to provide an explanation for “substantially,” but if the jury requested a further explanation it should be defined as “beyond something which…did not really make any great difference”.
- It was for the jury to decide whether the defendant’s condition substantially impaired his judgement and contributed to the act.
Infanticide - Infanticide Act 1938
> Offence of infanticide:
- Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child being a child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then, the circumstances were such that but for this Act the offence would have amounted to murder [or manslaughter], she shall be guilty of felony, to wit of infanticide, and may for such offence be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of the child.
- Nothing in this Act shall affect the power of the jury upon an indictment for the murder of a child to return a verdict of manslaughter, or a verdict of guilty but insane.
Suicide Pact - Homicide Act
> Homicide Act 1957, S.4:
- Suicide pacts:
1. It shall be manslaughter, and shall not be murder, for a person acting in pursuance of a suicide pact between him and another to kill the other or be a party to the other being killed by a third person.
2. Where it is shown that a person charged with the murder of another killed the other or was a party to his being killed, it shall be for the defence to prove that the person charged was acting in pursuance of a suicide pact between him and the other.
3. For the purposes of this section “suicide pact” means a common agreement between two or more persons having for its object the death of all of them, whether or not each is to take his own life, but nothing done by a person who enters into a suicide pact shall be treated as done by him in pursuance of the pact unless it is done while he has the settled intention of dying in pursuance of the pact.
> Cf s.2 of Suicide Act 1961
Suicide Pact cf Suicide Act 1961
> Suicide Act 1961, S.2:
-Criminal liability for complicity in another’s suicide:
- A person (“D”) commits an offence if—
(a) D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person, and
(b) D’s act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide.
1A. The person referred to in subsection (1)(a) need not be a specific person (or class of persons) known to, or identified by, D.
1B. D may commit an offence under this section whether or not a suicide, or an attempt at suicide, occurs.
1C. An offence under this section is triable on indictment and a person convicted of such an offence is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years.
Constructive manslaughter - definition
> Constructive manslaughter is a form of involuntary manslaughter in that an unlawful killing has taken place where the defendant lacks the mens rea of murder.
