A350 Flight Technical Bulletin Flashcards
Problems with not being able to submit the fuel app due to being logged on to the aircraft wi-fi which doesn’t start until 10,000’
To ensure connectivity, it is sometimes simplest to disable Wi-Fi altogether while on the ground and connect via mobile data instead
Avoid opening the escape hatch due to
It being difficult to re-attach
Flight crew should ensure that the eLog app is opened on both iPads when first arriving at the aircraft.
This is to allow the iPads to synchronise with each other and the Ground Server. If this is not done, then
it is possible for previously entered defects to be hidden on one of the iPads – which in turn can prevent subsequent aircraft acceptance for the next flight, or mistakenly flying with open defects.
FCOM > Aircraft Systems > 46 – OIS > How To > How to exit from the Maintenance Applications
Engineers working on the aircraft during the turnaround often leave the Maintenance menu displayed on the OIS. If this is the case when you arrive, just press the
“OIS MENU” button on the OIS Keyboard to exit the Maintenance menu and return to a more familiar display. In case you need to return to the Maintenance menu then this is achieved by pressing SHIFT+OIS MENU. This information is also contained in the FCOM (see the reference above
A350 EFB Quick Reference Guide > Normal Procedures
Feedback indicates that the EFB laptops are often affected by varying degrees of synchronisation problems on first arriving at the aircraft.
All flight crew should familiarise themselves with the content of the A350 EFB Quick Reference Guide, which includes both ‘normal’ laptop starting procedures as well as an extensive troubleshooting guide that will, in most cases, successfully fix any EFB issues
FCOM > Aircraft Systems > 31 – Control and Display System > Display Units > Normal Operations
The tactile function can only be used to interact with the OIS, which means that only those DUs which can display the OIS are touchscreen-enabled (i.e. CAPT and F/O outer DUs as well as the centre lower DU).
For example, when the MFDs are displayed on the centre lower DU, the tactile function is automatically disabled and instead the cursor must be used to interact with the FMS in the normal manner. Further information on the tactile function is available in the FCOM reference above
FCOM > Procedures > Normal Procedures > SOP > PCP > OIS Initialization
Following a prolonged period without electrical power (e.g. during a long turnaround or after overnight off-stand parking), once the aircraft is re-powered again, it is possible for the active FMS navigation database to ‘flip’ to the older of the two databases loaded. This occurs because the aircraft is fitted with an internal timer which, after approximately 7 hours without electrical power, will briefly lose track of the correct date (and return to 1st Jan 2000!). During this short period of temporal uncertainty, the FMCs will pick the earlier of the two databases during their automatic initialisation process. Consequently, it is important to
always check the ACFT STATUS page in the FMS iaw the PCP SOP, to confirm that the active FMS database is indeed the correct one for the current date
FCOM > Limitations > Aircraft General > Weights > Weight Limitations
If operating an empty (or near-empty) positioning sector, flight crew should be aware of the ballast requirements applicable to
the A350-1000.
FCOM > Limitations > Engines > Oil
In-service monitoring by Rolls-Royce has revealed a trend for the Trent XWB-97 engines to consume more oil than expected. Other A350-1000 operators have experienced an isolated number of in-flight turnbacks due to oil quantity depletion. Consequently, Airbus and Rolls-Royce have updated the minimum oil quantity limitations for dispatch, resulting in a requirement for both oil tanks to be full when the flight time is at or above 7 hours.
While this limitation is in place, the ETOPS transit check includes a requirement for the engineers to make a statement in the eLog confirming that the oil tanks have been filled to full. If this statement has not been made, then please contact
Maintrol / T5 Engineering
Fan Cowl Door (FCD keys)
FCOM > Normal Procedures > SOP > Preliminary Cockpit Preparation > Before Walkaround
The SOP for Preliminary Cockpit Preparation includes a requirement for the PM to check that the FCD keys (if installed) are onboard and stowed. FCD keys will only be installed from aircraft ‘WBM’ (MSN 563) onwards but, in the interim, this task has been included within the SOP by Airbus for fleet commonality purposes. On those aircraft not fitted with FCD keys, the check
can obviously be omitted!
FCOM > Aircraft Systems > 22 AFS FMS > Controls and Indicators > MFD > FMS Pages > Fuel & Load Page When loading the Fuel & Load page, crews have noticed that the automatically calculated value in the FINAL reserve field is slightly higher than that shown on the Cirrus flight plan. This is because when calculating the final reserve fuel figure, the FMS assumes that the aircraft will hold at 1500 ft AGL in Conf 1 – and not in clean config as per the assumptions used in EASA regulations and OM A 8.18.9.
The use of Conf 1 for the calculation amounts to a discrepancy of ca. 15% that typically equates to approximately 400 kg – which matches the difference seen between Cirrus and the value calculated by the FMS. Therefore, under normal circumstances, when completing the FMS Fuel & Load page during Cockpit Preparation, crews should insert the Cirrus figure into the FINAL field.
Note that if the Cirrus flight plan includes an OPDEF with a fuel penalty, then all fuel figures shown on the Cirrus plan will have had this penalty already accounted for in the calculations.
However, if a failure occurs during the subsequent flight that requires an FMS fuel penalty to be applied, crews should consider removing any previously entered figures from the Fuel & Load page and allow the FMS to adjust the fuel plan as required.
Alternatively, the existing fuel figures from Cirrus could be corrected by the penalty factor.
A significant penalty will then
increase the reserve fuel quantity as well as the fuel to the alternate (so long as the flight plan to the alternate has been correctly completed).
Fuel imbalance / non-standard distribution after refuelling
FCOM > Procedures > Normal Procedures > SOP > Before Start Clearance
During refuelling, a significant imbalance has occasionally developed between the wing tanks (up to 2700 kg). Investigations have revealed that this imbalance has been caused by a slow gravity transfer from one of the wings tanks to the centre tank, which in turn has occurred due to the refuelling operative using a slightly incorrect sequence in pressurising the fuel lines on the bowser and making certain selections on the refuel panel. After refuelling, FCOM guidance (PRO-NOR-SOP-70 Before Start Clearance > Loadsheet) requires crews to check that, in addition to the correct quantity being loaded, the fuel is also correctly balanced. To correct a significant imbalance, engineering should attend the aircraft to manually balance the fuel. While there is no guidance on what constitutes a significant imbalance, it is worth bearing in mind that the FUEL WINGS NOT BALANCED alert will be triggered once the imbalance reaches 3000 kg (matching the FCOM limitation). If this occurs,
e.g. due to APU fuel burn from the left wing tank and/or fuel ‘sloshing’ during ground manoeuvring, then the only means of balancing the fuel via this procedure is to use the external refuel panel – which clearly requires returning to stand and getting an engineer to attend.
RR Trent XWB-97 oil ‘gulping’ during engine start
FCOM > Procedures > Normal Procedures > SOP > Engine Start
During the first minute of engine start, a significant drop in engine oil quantity can be seen on the ENG SD page. This effect is acknowledged by Rolls-Royce and is included in the FCOM. It is common to see a drop of the order of 8-10 qts and, as the FCOM states, under some circumstances the indication may even reach 0 before recovering to normal levels as the engine warms up. In practice, while oil quantities are being filled to full during each ETOPS transit check, it is unlikely that
an indication of 0 would be seen in BA operations. But the effect is noticeable and one to be aware of.
Before Takeoff -checklist display on the MFD
FCOM > Normal Procedures > SOP > Taxi
Due to display limitations, the Before Takeoff -checklist does not quite fit onto a single MFD page.
This has occasionally resulted in some crews omitting to tick the first few checklist items, following a seemingly uncommanded downward ‘jump’ of the checklist during taxi-out.
This ‘jump’ can be caused either by an accidental movement of the KCCU wheel or by the flight crew pressing the T.O CONFIG pb while the checklist is displayed on the MFD.
Pressing the T.O CONFIG pb causes the checklist to scroll to the bottom, consequently hiding the first few checklist lines from view.
To avoid this, crews should
(i) be aware of this potential trap, and
(ii) display the Before Takeoff -checklist only once the relevant procedural items in the Taxi SOP have been completed, i.e. A/BRK pb armed and T.O CONFIG pb pressed (iaw FCOM PRO-NOR-SOP-100).
Doing so should avoid any unintended scrolling of the checklist.
Reversion to Direct Law after shutdown of one engine during taxi out
FCOM > Normal Procedures > Supplementary Procedures > Engine > One Engine Taxi
In case of unforeseen delays during taxi out, some crews may decide to shut an engine down to conserve fuel. Doing so will result in reversion to Direct Law after ca. 5-10 minutes, because the FQMS is programmed to erase all weight data from itself after either engine is switched off.
Without valid weight data for the PRIMs, the aircraft cannot remain in Normal Law while on the ground and consequently reverts to Direct Law. Although perhaps a little alarming, this is not really an issue because the first line of the accompanying ECAM alert for F/CTL DIRECT LAW (PROT LOST) instructs the crew to re-enter the ZFW & ZFWCG values.
As soon as this is done, Normal Law is restored.
Depending on when the engine is started up again, the alert may trigger once more but it can be cleared by a further re-entry of the weight data.
It is also worth noting that
while the FCOM describes the procedures for planned one engine taxi at departure, a little interpolation may be necessary in the case where normal a two-engine taxi out is essentially converted into one-engine taxi at departure: In this situation, it can be useful to review the guidance and procedures for one-engine taxi at arrival first and then, having shut an engine down, to carefully follow the procedures for one-engine taxi at departure.
AFDX switch failures and numerous ECAM alerts
FCOM PRO-ABN-AVNCS AVIONICS NETWORK SWITCH/CABLE FAULT (NETWORK DEGRADED)
Occasionally a switch within the avionics network can fail (‘switches’ being elements of the network that manage communications between aircraft systems) – resulting in a series of ECAM alerts associated mainly with backup/secondary systems.
While the number of ECAMs may make the problem appear serious, on closer inspection the failures usually consist of redundant systems with limited impact on the operation. In the instances when this has happened, access to the ATC Mailbox has been lost – with a consequent loss of CPDLC and ADS capability (which can of course have implications for flight in the NAT HLA). At other times, the ATC Mailbox has remained available, but access to the ATC COM page (on the FMS) has been lost, resulting in an inability to connect to/converse with ATC.
In case you cannot access the ATC COM page, Airbus recommends
cycling the displays around using the CAPT(F/O) OIS ON CENTER pb. Doing so transfers the FMS pages to one/both of the outer DUs, where the ATC COM page should be usable again. Airbus monitors the fleet for AFDX failures on an on-going basis and endeavour to contact BA should a failure occur. Therefore, if you experience a series of seemingly disparate failures, Maintrol should usually be able to provide further information from Airbus to confirm what has occurred.
