Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Question 1

liberal part of liberal intergovernmentalism

Answer 1

1. self interested cooperation is beneficial for all participating states, even for weaker partners.
2. Putnam’s two level game: governments are both on the international level in a game with other international actors, as well as on the domestic level with domestic actors.

Question 2

four core assumptions

Answer 2

1. national stage of preferencing
2. international stage of bargaining
3. international stage of delegating
4. national stage of selling

Question 3

national stage of referencing

Answer 3

preferences are formed on a national level
1. these preferences are shaped by issue-specific conflicts.
2. these conflicts are between societal groups vying for the attention of governmental elites

Question 4

international stage of bargaining

Answer 4

governments rationally defend the interests of their state
1. state is a unitary actor once it operates on the international level
2. the interdependence between the states is asymmetrical, uneven distribution of benefits of an agreement.
3. states have market power and the states with larger markets are more attractive partners
4. exit power strengthens the bargaining position of a state
5. market power + exit power= political power

Question 5

international stage of delegating

Answer 5

international negotiations are purely intergovernmental
1. supranational institutions have no role in negotiating, only in the delegation of these decisions so that the natural institutions can act on them
2. supranational institutions are efficient
3. supranational institutions create credible commitment by having countries Gove away control and sovereignty
4. supranational institutions can facilitate but not drive integration. they have no power to push their preferences

Question 6

national stage of selling

Answer 6

two level strategy to overcome domestic opposition
1. unpopular decisions are blamed on europe
2. popular decisions are taken national credit for

Question 7

schellings paradox

Answer 7

weakness is strength. a domestic weak position can demand more in international negotiations, for it must present an agreeable deal at the domestic front.

Question 8

empirical critiques

Answer 8

1. it is limited to big treaty reforms and there is no explanation for ordinary legislative procedures and how these supranationalism institutions function when it comes to European integration
2. applied selectively.
3. sources are not verifiable

Question 9

theoretical critiques

Answer 9

1. moravscik uses outcome to explain what the interests of states were before a decision was made
2. it does not cover supranational organisations and transnational interest groups properly
3. two level game doesn’t reflect multilevel eu
4. conception of state interests is mainly economic terms
5. influence of international bargains on domestic preferences is not covered

Question 10

asymmetrische interdepence

Answer 10

de kosten en baten verschillen per actor bij een overeenkomst