Week 2: Paradigms, revolutions, and research programs

Question 1

Kuhn’s philosophy: Paradigm

Answer 1

paradigm - a whole way of doing science, in some particular field. Package of claims about the world, methods for gathering and analysing data, and habits of scientific thought and action

Question 2

Kuhn’s philosophy: Normal science

Answer 2

normal science - doesn’t question status quo, does not aim to produce real novelty

Question 3

Kuhn’s philosophy: Disciplinary matrix

Answer 3

disciplinary matrix - “paradigm” in a broad sense: what the members of a scientific community, and they alone, share. all the shared commitments that bind scientists into a distinct community.

the pieces that make up a paradigm? incl. exemplars, metaphysical beliefs, values

exemplars - community’s shared set of standard achievements or concrete problem solutions. specific cases

Question 4

Kuhn’s philosophy: Anomaly and scientific crisis

Answer 4

anomaly - a- (abscess of) & -nomos (law), failure to solve a puzzle in practice of science

scientific crises - when a series of anomalies start to appear - scientists start to philosophize (they stop solving puzzles and start reflecting on the paradigm itself).

Here new ideas and methods may arrive. Kuhn argues that they are good for science.

Question 5

Kuhn’s philosophy: Revolution

Answer 5

revolution - the big changes in how scientists see the world, occur when one paradigm replaces another

Question 6

Kuhn’s philosophy: Incommensurability

Answer 6

incommensurability - not comparable using a common standard (incomparability)

Question 7

How do these concepts: Paradigm,, Normal science, Disciplinary matrix, Anomaly and scientific crisis, Revolution, and Incommensurability play a role in Kuhn’s view of scientific development?

Answer 7

First there’s a paradigm –> We have normal science –> We have a disciplinary matrix –> Then we start to have anomalies –> once they pile up we have a crisis –> this leads to an revolution –> and finally we have a new paradigm.

Question 8

Three levels of scientific practice

Answer 8

the three levels;
1) individual scientist/hypothesis
2)communities of scientists and their social network
3) embedding of scientific community within larger society

Question 9

Which of the three levels of scientific practice (Godfrey-Smith p. 112) was Kuhn primarily interested in? Which level did Popper focus on? How is this reflected in their accounts of scientific change?

Answer 9

much of the subtlety and interest in kuhn’s view is about level 2 relationships
popper more interested in the individual
kuhn: few anomalies don’t matter, once they build up, science has to change; makes sense he’s primarily interested in level 2. popper: one failure and the theory is out the window; makes sense he’d be interested in level 1.

Question 10

Is it a consequence of Kuhn’s paradigm theory that scientific progress over longer historical periods is impossible?

Answer 10

in a strict reading, kuhn says we cannot measure progress outside of a paradigm
no progress between paradigms

So therefore there can’t be a longer period of scientific progress, as it instead will just be a shift from one paradigm to another.

Question 11

Normative view of science

Answer 11

How science should be/ What scientist should do to be a “good scientist”

Question 12

Descriptive view of science

Answer 12

How science is. General picture

Question 13

Is it Kuhn’s intention to describe science as it is, or as it should be (is Kuhn descriptive or normative)?

Answer 13

Kuhn’s intention seems to be more describing science, but at some points he uses a more normative perspective; we should appreciate revolutions

popper very normative

Question 14

. How can Kuhn’s conceptual framework be used to describe challenges for interdisciplinary integration? Can you give examples of this? (From Green & Andersen or own examples)

Answer 14

other disciplines have other toolboxes

problems/challenges: different standards for good science/experiments e.g. reproducability, different models (complexity vs system, how detailed they like to be), elements of different disciplinary matrices that don’t overlap

Question 15

Describe Lakatos’ views on research programs and key concepts in his philosophy (‘hard core’, ‘protective belt’, ‘positive heuristic’, ‘negative heuristic’, etc.)

Answer 15

good science: already recognises good science

hard core: main postulate

heuristics are just guidelines

positive heuristics: protect (support) hard core

negative heuristics: undermine scientific research programme i.e. hard core

protective belt: built up of multiple heuristics to strengthen hard core

Question 16

Explain what the main differences are between Popper’s and Kuhn’s standards for ‘good’ science, according to Havstad and Smith (2019, p. 840).

Answer 16

popper: criterion of falsifiability
- structured model: conjectures and refutations
- revision of objective to avoid ad hoc hypothesis

kuhn: operate under a paradigm
- holding on to underlying theory despite anomalies
- recognised that anomalies occur regularly in scientific research

Question 17

According to Havstad and Smith, how can one use Lakatos’ philosophy to understand the development of theories about the evolution of birds? (Please explain the article’s Figures 1 and 3)

Answer 17

Sicentific research program: Birds are dinosaurs movement (BADM)

hard core: birds are dinosaurs, more specifically maniraptoran theropods

positive heuristics: feathers are found in both birds and dinosaurs

negative heuristics: no furcula) fused claws not found

BAND
core: birds not dinosaurs

positive: similarities between birds and sphenouchus

negative: simuliarities between birds and deino something

new knowledge can emerge
e.g. discovery of dinosaurs w clavicles
static and degenerative research program
when BADM progresses, it is difficult to come with counter arguments from BAND

Question 18

What criticisms have been made against Lakatos’ theory? What do you think about his account?

Answer 18

static theories

can be mistaken for degenerative
stagnant periods and then progressive after a period

lakatos view on good science
can’t distinguish science from pseudo science, only degenerative from progressive

Question 19

It has been debated whether Darwin’s theory of natural selection is a (falsifiable) scientific theory in Popper’s sense, or whether it rather constitutes a theoretical basic element in the paradigm of our time (a la Kuhn) that we cannot practice biology without. The evolutionary biologist J.B.S. Haldane (1892-1964) believed that if a “Precambrian rabbit” were found, he would be willing to give up the theory of evolution. What do you think the reaction would be to such a finding? And can concepts from Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos be used to illuminate this?

Answer 19

to popper, strictly, darwin’s theory is not falsifiable, the fittest will always survive. not a theory, a basic principle.

in kuhns philosophy it is an anomaly which could lead to a crisis/revolution

for lakatos, it would make a big dent in the hard core

evolution could so easily be disproved if just a single fossil turned up in the wrong date order. evolution has passed the test with flying colours. (richard dawkins, 2009)

Question 20

Kuhn (1922-96)

Answer 20

Published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

“Actual scientists are now, increasingly reading Kuhn instead of Popper”

Question 21

Normal science and puzzle-solving

Answer 21

Normal, everyday science doesn’t question the status quo and does not aim to produce real novelty.

Puzzle-solving is about applying known theories, tools and methods in new contexts in which we expect them to work.

Question 22

Exemplar: ‘paradigm’ in the narrow sense

Answer 22

The community’s shared set of standard achievements or concrete puzzle solutions. Exemplars are the basis for seeing resemblances that create new puzzles

Question 23

Disciplinary matrix: broad sense of ‘paradigm’

Answer 23

What the members of a scientific community, and them alone, share. All shared commitments that bind scientists into a distinct community.

Question 24

Anomalies and crisis

Answer 24

An anomaly stands to a crisis like a splash of snow stands to an avalanche

In a crisis, scientists start philosophizing. It is a period of extraordinary rather than normal science

Kuhn argues that crises are a good thing for science

Question 25

Revolutions

Answer 25

Scientific revolutions (plural) vs. The scientific revolution

Paradigm 1 –> normal science –> crisis and revolutions –> paradigm 2 –> etc.

Revolutions bring about “changes in worldview”. After a revolution, scientists “work in a different world” and “speak a different language”.

Revolutions raise the question of progress.
- Incommensurability

Question 26

Incommensurability

Answer 26

Not comparable using a common standard

Question 27

Kuhn’s holdning til positivisterne og Popper

Answer 27

Mente at deres opfattelse af videnskabelig udvikling er for rationalistisk.

Question 28

Kuhns centrale spørsgmal

Answer 28

Hvordan har videnskaben faktisk udviklet sig?

Hvad er forholdet mellem tradition (teoretiske rammer) og fornyelse i videnskaben?

Question 29

Hvad inspirerede Kuhn til paradigmeteorien?

Answer 29

Uforståeligheden af Aristoteles’ skrifter om fysik.

“…as I was reading him, Aristotle appeared not only ignorant of mechanics, but a dreadfully bad physical scientist as well”

Hvis vi vil forstå Aristoteles, må vi forsøge at forstå Aristoteles verden, altså den teoretiske og historiske ramme for hans skrifter.

Question 30

Videnskab uden fælles standarder kaldes for…

Answer 30

førparadigmatiske situationer

Question 31

Videnskab er et socialt og historisk fænomen

Answer 31

Videnskabelige teorier udvikles altid i et forskersamfund i en bestemt historisk periode. Videnskab forudsætter fælles standarder i form af grundlæggende teoretiske antagelser, teorier og metoder.

Question 32

Den faglige matrice (vigtigt!)

Answer 32

Eksemplarer - grundlæggende forklaringer/mekanismer og skabeloner for problemløsning.
* Skoleksempler på anvendelsen af de symbolske generalisationer, centrale figurer i lærebøger

Symbolske generaliseringer - lovmæssigheder og principper
* Newtons 2. lov, ligevægtsligningen

Værdier - generelle målsætsninger og idealer for videnskabelighed
* nøjagtighed, simpelhed, vægten på reproducerbarhed og kvantitative mål.

Metafysiske overbevisninger - Fælles forpligtende opfattelser af hvordan naturen grundlæggende er indrettet
* Kroppen som en compliceert maskine, hjertet som en pumpe, gener som “koder”

Question 33

Hvorfor er den faglige matrice vigtig for biologer?

Answer 33

Kuhns begreber kan være nyttigt værktøj i analysen af videnskabelige discipliners historie samt nutidige videnskabelige kontroverser.

Forskere fra forskellige discipliner kan være uenige om videnskabelige standarder og teoretiske forudsætninger.

Biologier om fysikernes tilgang: modellerne for simple og idealiserede til at indfange den biologiske kompleksitet. Det er vigtigt at modellerne giver et realistisk og nøjagtigt billede af den biologiske process.

Question 34

Systembiologi

Answer 34

En interdisciplinær tilgang til løsning af komplekse problemer, ofte via modellering af store datasæt fra comics-discipliner

Involverer ofte samarbejde mellem eksperimentelle biologer og forskere specialiseret i matematik modellering eller computerstimulering