Week 3: Functionalism, consciousness, and eliminativism Flashcards

1
Q

What is computationalism?

A

Computationalism is concerned with thought with an emphasis on minds functioning like computers (and the other way around). Human thought is like what a computer does.
Following functionalism (defining thinking in terms of the functional properities of the realizers of the causal roles), thinking can be defined in abstraction from brains, making it possible to conceive of other systems as being capable of thought as well.

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2
Q

Which three concepts are important for the idea of a thinking computer?

A
  1. Symbols: physical forms that stand for other things.
  2. Syntax: the physical properties by means of which a symbol can be recognized.
  3. Semantics: all properties that have to do with meaning.
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3
Q

What are the two points that make up the basic idea behind computationalism?

A
  1. A computer is a machine that performs computations on strings of symbols and by doing so, produces other strings of symbols. These computations are merely based on syntax.
  2. It is possible to program computers in such a way that if we look at the semantic properties of these symbols, meaninful trains of thought emerge.
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4
Q

What is the language of thought?

A

Symbols are manipulated based on a program that Fodor calls the language of thought: our brain is programmed with symbols that signal or stand for states of affairs in our world. The language of thought is innate, and it is able to explain a number of features of human thought that other theories cannot.
The rationality of our thought is explained by the fact that the language of thought respects the semantic properties of the symbols it manipulates.
Another feature is compositionality: the idea that thoughts consist of discrete, identifiable and re-identifiable components.
Our thoughts are also systematic, which means that if we think, for instance, that John loves Mary, we grasp a more general structure (X loves Y) that allows us to also think that Mary loves John.

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5
Q

How does the Chinese room argue against computationalism?

A

In the Chinese room, a Clerk who does not speak Chinese in in a closed box that receives Chinese symbols as input and produce Chinese symbols as output. The clerk receives the input, looks the symbols up in a file and then produces the output. According to Fodor, this system must be a thinking entity. Searle argues by saying that it is the simulation of thinking.

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6
Q

What is connectionism?

A

Connectionism poses a solution to some general issues encountered with computationalism: computers cannot learn, they are not creative, and computionalism uses a top-down approach.
Connectionism uses a bottom-up approach that begins with neural networks being imitated by computers and are trained to perform simple cognitive tasks. Connectionist systems are much more flexible, spontaneous, and even more creative than classical AI systems, and they are able to learn.
There is parallel processing allowing a damaged connectionist system to continue functioning, at least partially.

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7
Q

What is eliminativism?

A

The rejection of mental realism. Churchland predicted that eventually the notion of mind would be eliminated from our worldviews. Eliminativism argues that the mind-body problem is actually a non-problem that results from our use of folk psychology. Three arguments are given in support of this stance.
1. Elimination is the consequence of accepting better theories
2. Folk psychology is a theory.
3. Neuroscience is a better theory (theories should be judged by how much the theory explains, how much progress there is in developing the htoery, and how well the theory fits with other accepted theories).

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8
Q

What were the two responses to eliminativism?

A
  1. There are two different notions of folk-psychology. First, it is a language-based theory that is, in part, culturally dependent. Second, it refers to an innate theory we use to understand the behaviours of others. Folk-psychology could be eliminated in the first notion as it involves postulating mental states in the heads of others to understand their behaviour and eliminativism claims these states don’t exist.
  2. Denial: Dennet claims that folk-psychology is more like a craft, a practical ability, we acquire this ability in our ubringing and while there may be theory-like elements in it, it cannot at all be compared to systematic, rigorous, and falsifiable scientific theories.
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9
Q

What is mental realism?

A

The idea that mental states exist as discrete entities in our heads that cause our behaviour.

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10
Q

What is intrepretivism?

A

Dennett thinks that the mind really exists, but not in the same way as observable objects. Thus, he rejects the idea of industrial strength mental realism. The mind is not a physical entity that you can bump into, you need to look at reality through a particular kind of lens to see them.
The mind is the intrepretation of patterns in our behaviour and our brain may have a causal influence on our mind (behavioural presentation) and thus forms part of the process (the brain is part of thinking).

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11
Q

What are the personal and subpersonal levels of description?

A
  • Personal level: ascribe states and properties to a person as a whole (e.g. height)
  • Sub-personal level: the level at which we describe parts of people (e.g. brain processes).
    According to Dennett, mental states belong to the person level of description. We cannot separate the ascription of mental states from the everyday practices in which we use such ascriptions. In those practices, we connect beliefs, desires, intentions to behaviour of people as a whole: we do not speak of or imply anything about individual brain states.
    It is wrong to say that brains think, perceive, or intend, or that mental states are brain states. People think, perceive, and intend and people have mental states.
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12
Q

What are stances in intrepretivism?

A

The personal level of people and their mental states is perceived if we dadopt an intentional stance towards people. The intentional stances looks at the intention (mental state) of the person. The sub-personal level of brains and events is perceived if we adopt a physical stance towards human beings. The physical stance looks at the pattern of molecules and physical properties. The design stance can be assigned to both personal and sub-personal levels and focus on patterns of evolution (what was something designed for?)

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13
Q

What is phenomenal consciousness?

A

The subjective, experiential quality of consciousness is called phenomenal consciousness. This is also refered to as the what-it-is-like consciousness. The properties of phenomenally conscious experiences that determine their specific qualitative feel—their what-it-is-likeness—are called qualia.
E.g. What pain feels like. What red looks like. What salt tates like.

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14
Q

What is access consciousness?

A

Access consciousness are thoughts that are:
* Directly available to co-determined your actions.
* Directly available as input for your speech (you can tell what you are thinking about to anyone who asks you).
* Available as input for further thoughts.
What makes your thoughts consciousness it its accessibility. Embodied knowledge (e.g. grammar rules of a native language) is impossible to spell out and it is difficult to think about it in abstract terms.

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15
Q

What is the connection between phenomenal and access consciousness?

A

Being access conscious and being phenomenally conscious are different ways for the contents of our minds to be conscious, but this does not mean that these two senses of consciousness are mutually exclusive.

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16
Q

What is the hard problem?

A

Consider: “If we explain how pain is caused and what it causes, have we thereby explained how pain feels? Have we explained the pain-quale?”
Functionalism cannot explain the subjective experiential feeling of phenomenal consciousness. The what-it-is-likeness of experience cannot be captured in terms of the causal roles of experiences.

17
Q

What is the easy problem?

A

The easy problem accounts for access consciousness being defined by mental states such as causal role states and explaining it functionally (functionalism).
E.g. It’s raining outside. The belief is not only caused by your perceptions while it causes you to stay in and change your plans, it is also directly available to your speech and future thought.