Deterrence failure and war (7)

Question 1

what is deterrence theory?

Answer 1

“deterrence is dissuasion by threat.”
It works by threatening a cost on an attacker great enough so that they won’t attack: if you attack me, I will inflict a cost on you so great you will not be willing to go to war.
a theory that predicts not war, but peace, when one side is able to keep another from attacking it.

Question 2

what is the goal of deterrence theory

Answer 2

keep war from happening rather than winning a war. can be seen as a method of defence

Question 3

what is the difference between conventional weapons to deter and non-conventional

Answer 3

Conventional= weapons such as tanks, ships, airplanes
non-conventinal= chemical weapons, nuclear weapons weapon of mass destruction

Question 4

what are the two type of deterrence, in terms of geolocalisation?

Answer 4

Local deterrence ( deter an attack upon one-self ), extended deterrence ( deter an attack upon an ally)

Question 5

what is the credibility problem in extended deterrence?

Answer 5

When an ally is defended, the enemy may attack believing that the deterring state is not really serious about defending its ally.

Question 6

is deterrence a descriptive theory?

Answer 6

no, it is actually the policy of keeping other states from attacking the state itself or its allies.

Question 7

what are the two types of deterrence?

Answer 7

o Immediate Deterrence: when one state seeks to actively deter a threat from another. Immediate deterrence failure is an attack by one state on the deterring state.
o General Deterrence Failure: when two states are not in confrontation because one state is so much weaker that there is no active confrontation.

Question 8

what is RDT

Answer 8

Rational Deterrence Theory (RDT) is the political science theory that is used to estimate when deterrence succeeds or fails.

Question 9

based on RDT, what are the 3 necessary causes for deterrence to succeed?

Answer 9

• 1- Capability: The state must have enough force to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy.
  o EG: The deterring state doesn’t need a larger army than the enemy, just to inflict a cost on the enemy than the enemy is not willing to suffer.
• 2- Credibility: The enemy must believe that the state will use its force.
  o (2-A): Create a credible commitment by burning the bridges: this a metaphor for the ancient practice of deploying an ancient army and then burning the bridges and thereby cutting off any chance of retreat: the soldiers therefore won or were killed.
  o (2-B): Lowering the trip-wire threshold to stop salami tactics: salami tactics is a metaphor for consuming a large object a bit at a time so as not to provoke a reaction.
• 3. Communication. The deterrent threat must be communicated to the enemy or the enemy won’t know and the deterrent policy will not work.
     All three of these must be present: if even one is missing, then deterrence will not succeed.

Question 10

when does Nuclear weapons deter

Answer 10

when they have second-strike capability

Question 11

what is the crystal ball effect ( nuclear weapons )

Answer 11

nuclear weapon make the consequences of nuclear war very understandable, and therefore they generally have deter crises and escalate those in which they are present.

Question 11

• Nuclear weapons can create…

Answer 11

instability: meaning they can cause an outbreak of war, if there is an absence of second-strike capability: where one side has sufficient nuclear superiority to overcome the nuclear arsenal of the other:
o This creates a reciprocal fear of surprise attack that leads to attempts at mutual preemption and an outbreak of war.

Question 12

what cant be deterred even by nuclear weapons

Answer 12

• Irrational leadership may not be deterable,

Question 13

what is rationality of irrationality

Answer 13

States may pretend to be irrational (termed the rationality of irrationality) to compel adversaries to back down during crises (thereby risking an outbreak of war)

Question 14

what is stability-instability paradox

Answer 14

• Perfect nuclear stability (termed the stability-instability paradox) is the outcome of two nuclear weapons arsenals cancelling each other out, and thereby making war safe at a lower level of conflict.
• There is evidence that states possessing nuclear weapons, even small “minimal deterrents” such as that possessed by China, which are involved in crises, are very reluctant to escalate.
  Example: 1969 Russian-Chinese and 1999 India-Pakistan border conflicts.
  _Even states possessing small nuclear arsenals, termed “minimal deterrents,” were powerful deterrents. A state needs sufficient nuclear weapons to destroy an adversary’s cities.

Question 15

Sagan’s theory on the use of nuclear weapons

Answer 15

• military leaders are less likely to use nuclear weapons because they more easily appreciate the ease of escalation and the political artificiality of nuclear versus conventional weapons. - Civilian governments are more likely to escalate because they are more likely to engage in brinksmanship because of the belief in the tangibility of the conventional-nuclear threshold.
  (EG: The prevalence of chemical and biological deterrence arsenals during the Second World War led to a voluntary restriction by the combatants not to use chemical weapons.)
  (EG: The presence of nuclear arsenals in both the USSR and China 1969 made escalation unlikely, and a border war therefore erupted between the two states in 1969.)
  (EG: The 1999 Kargil conflict between a nuclear armed Pakistan and India would not have been possible prior to the demonstration of their mutual nuclear arsenals in 1998)

Question 16

what are the impacts of nuclear weapons?( 3)

Answer 16

_(1): Nukes prevent conquest of the state:
_But not attacks, even against nuclear states.
_Nuclear armed states have become attacked in a limited fashion.
Example: PRC attacked US in 1950-53. The presence of nuclear weapons in a major power war may either result in mutual-deterrence, or compel both sides to only use battlefield nuclear weapons.This may be what will happen in a US-Chinese confrontation over Taiwan. Nuclear air to air missiles, nuclear depth charges, nuclear torpedoes, nuclear anti-satellite weapons.
_(2): Create security:
_(a): wide margin of safety for diplomacy: less need to move first.
_Example: South African nuclear weapons compelled the world not to disregard it.
_(b): trade nuclear protection for benefits from allies:
_Example: democracy and capitalism in Germany and Japan.
(c): frees up other resources
_Example: nuclear weapons are between 10-15% of the U.S. defense budget – they are inexpensive.
_(3): Swagger appeal: nuclear weapons bring status.

Question 17

what are the three elements of dangerous illusions of nuclear stability

Answer 17

_(1): nukes have made war unthinkable: BUT: wars still happen despite nuclear weapons.
_(2): common problems such as the environment have made war irrelevant.
_(3): economic interdependence has made war unthinkable.

Question 18

what are the risks of exercising nuclear weapons?

Answer 18

_(1): Threats and use would accelerate nuclear proliferation: nuclear weapons states.
_(2): For most states, only state survival is worth the cost of risking a nuclear war.
_However, if states come to believe in a domino theory (that the failure to defend an interest, will result in a cascade failure of all interests), then states may escalate disputes in the presence of nuclear weapons.

Question 19

what are the 3 main critics of RDT

Answer 19

1) There is no way to tell whether one state did not attack another because it was successfully deterred or because it simply did not want to attack
2) Deterrence does not explain many important cases because it cannot explain risk taking
3) RDT is also static in that it assumes a given deterrence challenge can be explained without regard to earlier deterrence failures or successes

Question 20

T. V. Paul’s theory explaining paradoxical deterrence failures

Answer 20

Explains events where a weaker state attacks a more powerful state.
- Rational deterrence theory is rational and therefore does not account for domestic calculations, misperceptions, irrational behavior or especially risk-behaviour.
- One conclusion is that RDT cannot explain deterrence failure in crises, where there are intense cognitive and psychological biase

Question 21

Russel Leng’s study on deterrence

Answer 21

A statistical study that concluded that a deterrence success in one instance incrases the likelihood of war in the future because on average it hardens the deterrer’s resolution and emboldens the challenger

Question 22

Mearsheimer’s conventional deterrence

Answer 22

principal argument is that the type of military doctrine explains conventional deterrence failure: states with Blitzkrieg and Limited-Aims strategies will be difficult to deter and are therefore more likely to go to war.
Basic calculus: det(+) = cost(+), time(+), and p(success)(-)

Question 23

Four defensive strategies a state can choose for conventional deterrence (Mearsheimer)

Answer 23

1) static defense
2) Forward defense
3) Defense in depth
4) Mobile defense

Question 24

what is static defense

Answer 24

relies on fixed defensive positions around key positions within friendly territory.
- Advantage: very hard to defeat directly
- Disadvantage: very easy to bypass and encourages limited gains attacks

Question 25

what is Forward defense

Answer 25

deployment of strength forward.
- Advantage: deploys maximum strength forward deterring limited gains attacks
- Disadvantage: very easy to bypass because once you get through the frontline the rear area is completely undefended.

Question 26

what is Defense in depth

Answer 26

placement of forces arrayed in multiple layers and spread out
- Advantage: is that it is very good at slowing down fast moving deep penetrating attackers, typical of Blitzkrieg.
- Disadvantage: is that it leaves a state vulnerable to a limited attack because the strength of the defense is not concentrated.
ex; battle of kursk 1943 soviet against german

Question 27

Mobile defense

Answer 27

The use of highly-mobile armoured forces to intercept attacking forces
- Advantage - permits blocking and counter-attacking of the enemy
- Disadvantage: Very hard to show up at the right place and the right time without brilliant intelligence
ex; west german had planned attack east german 1980s

Question 28

Three attacking strategies that a state can choose from

Answer 28

1) Attrition
2) Blitzkrieg
3) Limited aims

Question 29

what is Attrition

Answer 29

Use of attacking forces in such a way as to inflict losses on the enemy: the attacker accepts losses in a favourable ratio to the defending forces
- Advantages: low risk of defeat
- Disadvantages: low payoff (costly victory)
ex;iran-iraq war 1980-1988

Question 30

what is Blitzkrieg

Answer 30

Penetration of the enemy along a narrow front and breakthrough into the enemy’s vulnernerable rear: destruction of supply, command and reserve formations, and conquest of unoccupied territory.
- Advantage: high payoff when it works
- Disadvantage: high cost when it fails
- Disadvantage: depends on open territory, does not work against an enemy that is too densely deployed, and usually there is only one chance to get it right. When it fails, it normally turns into an attrition attack
ex; defeat of france in 1939 in 6 days by german

Question 31

what is Limited aims

Answer 31

an attack which uses terrain and surprise to avoid the defender’s main force and to capture a limited territorial objective and establish a fait accompli that the defender could not alter
- Advantage: permits capture of poorly defended territory
- Disadvantage: does not work if enemy responds
1956 israeli offensive on egypt to take sinaï

Question 32

Mearsheimers two circumstances for deterrence failure

Answer 32

1) When the attacker has a blitzkrieg strategy and the defender has a static or forward defense, OR
2) When the attacker has a limited gains strategy and the defender has a static or defense in depth.

Question 33

Problem with Mearsheimer’s theory of deterrence failure

Answer 33

If blitzkrieg strategies lead to war, then he should provide a theory that predicts when states adopt blitzkrieg strategies