B2.01.15: Collusion (Game Theory) Flashcards

1
Q

Define collusion (firms that behave like how monopolies would)

A

An agreement to fix prices such as
- holding prices constant at some level
- raising prices by some fixed amount
- fixing price differences between products

Therefore limiting competition

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2
Q

Define overt collusion

A

Firms get together and decide to fix prices and quantities

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3
Q

Define Tacit Collusion

A

Informal agreements to not agree in price wars

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4
Q

Define price leadership collusion

A

A dominant firm in that company sets prices and smaller firms follow those pricing decisions

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5
Q

State 6 factors promoting collusive oligopolies

A
  • Small number of firms (more concentrated oligopoly)
  • Similar costs
  • High barriers to entry
  • Ineffective competition policy
  • Consumer loyalty
  • consumer Inertia
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6
Q

Explain how small number of firms (more concentrated oligopoly) promote collusive oligopolies

A

much easier to organise collusive agreements

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7
Q

Explain how similar costs promote collusive oligopolies

A

Easy to organise fixed costs and quantities to produce at as they are more likely to agree on prices or quantities

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8
Q

Explain how high barriers to entry promote collusive oligopolies

A

Supernormal profits made will not attract new entry into the market as the high barriers to entry can stop this from happening thus, benefits of collusion can last for the long term

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9
Q

Explain how ineffective competition policy promote collusive oligopolies

A

Then by colluding, firms are aware that they are likely to get away with it

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10
Q

Explain how consumer loyalty promote collusive oligopolies

A

If firms decide to cheat rivals by undercutting them on price, it will not be beneficial to that firm if consumers are loyal to those rivals

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11
Q

Explain how consumer inertia promote collusive oligopolies

A

onsumers may not want to switch to another supplier or there may be barriers to switching. If a firm cheats on a collusive agreement, there is no guarantee that lots of consumers will come to them and buy their products instead

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12
Q

Performance evaluation of collusive oligopoly (firms that behave like how monopolies would)

A

Talk about Monopolies and on a diagram:

  • Cons: Monopolies can’t achieve allocative and productive efficiency, there is Diseconomies of Scale.
  • Pros: Benefits like Dynamic Efficiency and EOS benefits too
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13
Q

What is a cartel

A

A formal agreement between firms in an industry to take actions to limit competition in order to increase market power of firms and, ultimately, increase profits

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14
Q

What is the prisoner’s dilemma

A
  • 2 individuals acting in their self-interest resulting in them not producing at the optimal outcome for both
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15
Q

What is a Nash Equilibrium

A

Pricing strats that can last in the long run

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16
Q

What is the price rigidity conclusion that can be drawn from Game Theory (Collusion)

A

Price rigidity: If the Nash Equilibrium’s reached, it makes no sense for price to change further hence, if firms are going to compete, they’re going to compete on non-price factors

17
Q

What is the temptation to collude conclusion that can be drawn from Game Theory (Collusion)

A

Temptation to collude: The Nash Equilibrium is not the best outcome for both firms combined hence, if interdependence is broken and both firms settle on a price, they both can be making supernormal profits and get to outcomes that are, joint, of best interest to firms

18
Q

What is the incentive to cheat conclusion that can be drawn from Game Theory (Collusion)

A

Incentive to cheat on the collusive agreement:
even if there’s a collusive agreement, the other firm will always have the incentive to cheat on it and try go for greater profits therefore, collusion may not last in the long run as both firms will end up back at the revenue maximisation point

19
Q

State 5 factors promoting competitive oligopolies

A
  • Large number of firms (less concentrated oligopoly)
  • New market entry possible
  • One firms with significant cost advantage
  • Homogenous goods
  • Saturated market
20
Q

Explain how large number of firms promote competitive oligopolies

A

organising collusion with lots of firms is much more difficult

21
Q

Explain how new market entry possible promote competitive oligopolies

A

making lots of supernormal profits by colluding together is not attractive as it will incentivise new firms to enter the market and take those supernormal profits away

22
Q

Explain how one firm with significant cost advantages promote competitive oligopolies

A

makes it difficult to organise a fixed a price or quantity to produce at in collusion

23
Q

Explain how homogenous goods promote competitive oligopolies

A

firms dont have the price making power to fix prices

24
Q

Explain a saturated market promotes competitive oligopolies

A

Lots of price wars and price competition thus, there will be incentives to cheat on collusive agreements is strong given the incentives of taking market share

25
Q

Performance evaluation of competitive oligopoly

A
  • Pros: Allocative & productive efficiency
  • Cons: EOS benefits lost, Dynamic efficiency is lost