post midterm 2

Question 1

Ftypes of international law (custom, treaty)

Answer 1

custom: where sovereigns recognize some practices as appropriate and correct
- decisions of dispute
- settlement panels/tribunals
- declarations of UN security council

Question 2

why international law constrains

Answer 2

• shapes behavior of states
• even though states are not held to law and can do whatever they want to, they all observe the principles and obligations
• other states also hold them accountable to the laws

Question 3

stages of treaty (signature, ratification)

Answer 3

1. negotiation - decides what goes into it
2. signature - sign the treaty
3. ratification - making solemn pledge to abide by the treaty
4. entry into force - becomes active
   - ICC can’t do anything about cases prior to when the nation has entered the force
5. changes, amendments, protocols

Question 4

Briand-Kellogg Pact 1928

Answer 4

• making war illegal as a solution for international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relation to one another

Question 5

Locarno Agreement

Answer 5

• sought to secure the post-war territorial settlement and return normalizing relations with Germany and that they

Question 6

counterfactual thinking

Answer 6

• way for testing cause and effect
• if you changed something, what would the outcome be
• what would state behavior be in the absence of a treaty
• why go through all the bother if it doesn’t matter

Question 7

Leyla Sahin vs. Turkey

Answer 7

• Leyla sues University of Istanbul because they didn’t allow her to wear a headscarf
• suing under article 9: freedom of thought, conscience, and religion
• ECHR rules in favor of Turkey
• used same article because it says that the state has right to decide what is best and appropriate for the state
• states only agree with things that they have their best interests in
• same with international law and treaties

Question 8

defensive alliance

Answer 8

• written promises to assist an ally militarily in the event of attack on the ally’s sovereignty or territorial entity
• NATO - attack on one is an attack on all

Question 9

offensive alliance

Answer 9

• states pledge to join one another to attack another state

Question 10

neutrality

Answer 10

• alliance member promises not to join a conflict between one or more alliance partners and a third party on the side of an ally’s adversary
• can still offer resources

Question 11

nonagression

Answer 11

• must promise specifically to refrain from the use of force in relations with the alliance partner, to refrain from participating in any action against the alliance partner and/or to settle all disputes peacefully in relations with the alliance partner
• negotiate

Question 12

consultation

Answer 12

• promises to consult with one or more alliance partners in the event of crises with the potential to become militarized

Question 13

how alliances affect the bargaining model of war

Answer 13

• capability aggregation: allows you to multiply your military with the thelp of other countries rather than spending money
• states with alliances are more likely to win in a bargain because the state without an ally is more likely to settle
• for states with alliances, it is less costly to go to war because they can spread the costs evenly

Question 14

free rider problem

Answer 14

• collective good = collective security
• able to get without making any significant contributions yourself
• US spending by far the most on defense in NATO, while in comparison, other countries are not spending the same percentage of GDP putting the larger share of the burden on the US and overall taking advantage of it

Question 15

entrapment and chain ganging

Answer 15

• alliances works too well - tightens bonds such that demanders feel they can pull over adversaries
• pull ally into war

Question 16

abandonment vs. entrapment

Answer 16

• sabrosky states comply 25% of the time
• balancing act - alliance credibility vs. straightjacket
• when you form an alliance, their problems become your problems
• not all states follow through with their agreements
• abandonment has decreased in recent decades because the state’s reputations have become more important and issue-linkage affects trade and credibility
• whatever lessons abandonment increases risk of entrapment and vice versa

Question 17

issue linkage

Answer 17

• allies ten to coordinate cooperational relations in other areas as well- free trade, alliance that precedes trade agreement
• lucrative source of trade potentially on the line
• makes more expensive/costly to reject ally
• simultaneous discussion of two or more issues for joint settlement- is a bargaining tactic that 1) increases the probability of states reaching a negotiated agreement and 2) motivates state to remain committed
• ex: current effort to get aid to Ukraine, Israel, and money for border security example of failing issue linkage

Question 18

tying hands

Answer 18

• costlier for them to remain on those promises
• berlin brigade

Question 19

moral hazard

Answer 19

• actors might take riskier actions because other parties bear the costs of those risks

Question 20

excludable

Answer 20

can other actors be prevented from consuming the good

Question 21

rival

Answer 21

• does one actor’s consumption of the good diminish the amount available to others

Question 22

private goods

Answer 22

• excludable and rival
  problem- pollution
  ex: hamburgers, clothing

Question 23

public goods

Answer 23

• non-excludable and non-rival
• problem: individual incentives to free-ride
• results in the under provision of the good, greater environmental harm
• clean air, national defense
• classic prisoner’s dilemma logic: individual incentives to defect (free ride)

Question 24

common pool resources

Answer 24

• non-excludable but rival in consumption
• problem: over-exploitation of many natural resources
• whales, fish, wildlife

Question 25

does international law matter

Answer 25

• no
• has minimal influence on state’s behavior bc states do not allow their core interests to be threatened
• states only make agreements to what they would have done anyways
• most treaties require states to make only modest differences to what they would have
  yes
• constrains gov
• why would states bother doing it if its meaningless, do it because it works
• forms what is acceptable, counterfactual interference

Question 26

why desire to comply with law

Answer 26

• audience costs: costlier for a gov to go back on a legal promise than a verbal promise
• clarity amidst anarchy: better sense of what is a violation
• reciprocity - to make sure no one does anything crazy, avoid “beggar-thy-neighbor”

Question 27

externalities

Answer 27

• when a decision creates costs or benefits for actors other than the actor making the decision
• means too much of good (or here bad) will be produced
• ex: CO2 emissions from building a house, water pollution from growing flowers
• challenge: internalizing externalities
• way to internalize: cap and trade
• gov sets a cap on the emissions and give firms permits and credits for emissions allowed to be produced

Question 28

pigovian tax

Answer 28

• set to reflect social costs of externalities
• tax assessed against private individuals or businesses for engaging in activities that create adverse side effects for society
• tobacco, sugar, carbon

Question 29

international whaling commission and moratorium

Answer 29

• conference made up of states who were interested in whaling and they were concerned about the depleting number of whales
• set the quota too high because they were self-interested
• continued to overfish and population was depleting
• EU encouraged countries to join even if they didn’t have to
• found a loophole that even land locked countries could do so - by doing so they had the majority to set a moratorium
• put a 5 year ban on whaling
• prevents tragedy of the commons through moratorium, temporary prohibition

Question 30

sources of environmental cooperation and examples

Answer 30

1. number and relative size of actors:
   - smaller number of actors = cooperation easier; (+) acid rain agreements
2. privileged groups:
   - composed of one, or a few, actors who receive sufficient benefits themselves from the public good to be willing to supply it iteration and issue linkage
   - groups that interact repeatedly (iteration) or on other issues (linkage) more successful
   ex: US and Canada: trade partners, military allies, able to cooperate on acid rain and air quality
3. issue linkage:
   - joint products (linkage) - positive environmental externalities from private decisions
   - public good as by product of efforts to obtain private good
   - less free-riding since private benefits increase along with public good institutions

Question 31

soft law/hard law

Answer 31

• role of institutions is to set standards of behavior, verify compliance and reduce the costs of joint decision making
• when setting standards, starts out as non-binding norms “soft laws”
• some become “hard laws”- formal obligations, monitoring mechanisms

Question 32

migrant

Answer 32

• generic term for person staying outside their country of origin
• potentially for various reasons
• no commonly accepted legal definition
• often used interchangeably, but important legal/social implication

Question 33

refugee

Answer 33

• person who has fled their own country because at risk of serious human rights violations or persecutions
• afforded protections under international and some domestic laws

Question 34

asylum seeker

Answer 34

• someone who has fled their country because of these risks, but awaiting decision on their claim to be recognized as refugee

Question 35

internally displaced person

Answer 35

• fled their homes out of fear for their safety, but have not crossed an international border

Question 36

patterns in european and syrian refugee crisis

Question 37

main push factors in migration

Answer 37

• conflict, repression, environmental stress and scarcity, lack of economic opportunities

Question 38

main pull factors in migration

Answer 38

• political and security stability, economic opportunity, preexisting networks
• immigration law and policy
• incentives vs. criminilization, enforcement

Question 39

Heckscher-Ohlin theory and patterns over migration

Answer 39

• land, capital, labor
• HO accounts for some broad trends, but politics always mattered
• vast push-pull are political not economic

Question 40

politics of immigration attitudes

Answer 40

• some support for economic motives, generally strongest predictors are ideological
• competition for recruiting high-skilled workers
• militarization and securitiztion of immigration
• uneven distributional consequences

Question 41

vaccine nationalism and diplomacy
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Answer 41

• cooperating over producing at adequate amounts and distributing vaccines to where they would do the most good (how define this) more challenging