week 7 - reading 2 (Mearsheimer) Flashcards
The liberal international order (LIO) in trouble?
Yes, in 2019 clear
- many blame Trump
- Mearheimer: more fundamental problems (explains how Trump has been successful to challenge the LIO)
main Question article:
Why is the LIO in big trouble + what order will replace it?
!diff name LIO = global operating system (Adm. Harry Harris)
main sets of arguments
- orders are essential for facilitating efficient and timely interactions (because we are interconnected) + LIO can arise only in unipolar systems
- US has led 2 world orders since WW2 (cold war + LIO), LIO was not liberal but mainly realist and western
- LIO was doomed to collapse: key policies on which it rests are flawed (spreading liberal democracy is hard + leads to tensions) (LIO favors international institutions over domestic ones -> tension within liberal states) = clash with nationalism
- hyperglobalization led to financial/economic problems, eroding support for LIO + allows countries other than unipolar to grow powerful
What is an order and why do orders matter?
order = organized group of international institutions that help govern the interactions among member states (states follow institutions as they think it is in their interest)
!international institutions don’t have an identity of themselves, they are simply tools of the great powers
orders are indispensable in the modern international system because:
- they manage interstate relations in a highly interdependent world (e.g. diseases, pollution, eco., military)
- they help great powers to manage the behavior of weaker states in ways that suit the great powers’ interests (often works in the benefit of the weaker states)
= aka interdependent world -> system of rules necessary to lower transaction costs and help carry out the multitude of interactions between states
different kinds of orders
- 3 important distinctions
- international orders vs bounded orders: international orders must include all of the world’s great powers + are for cooperation | bounded orders less great powers, more for regional and competition | contemporary world: international orders are a constant feature, bounded orders aren’t
*bounded orders = mainly designed for waging security competition with other great powers - different kinds of international orders: realist, agnostic, ideological
- thin and thick orders
- thick = institutions have a substantial effect on state behavior in both the economic and military realms (it is broad and deep)
- thin = three basic forms: deal only with economic or military domain (no breadth) / deal with one or two domains, but have weak institutions (no depth) / involved with both domains, but strong institutions only in one of them
what accounts for the rise and decline of international orders?
factors that account for the prevailing order: distribution of power + leading state’s ideology
factors that cause the collapse of ideological orders: nationalism and balance of power politics
- realist orders collapse when distribution of power changes significantly, it may remain realist but shift in configuration or can become agnostic or ideological
*realist orders tend to have significant staying power: major shifts in the balance of power are usually result of differential eco. growth over a long period of time (or great power wars) - agnostic orders collapse when unipolarity falls or if a universalistic ideology is adopted
*also tend to have significant staying power: unipole accepts heterogeneity, helps preserve/augment hegemon’s power - ideological international orders: often short lifespan, universalistic ideology leads to domestic and global tensions -> unipole can give up ideology -> order becomes agnostic
*can also end when new great powers emerge
different cold war orders (1945-89)
= bipolar orders:
- bipolar international order SU and US, focus on cooperation where there were common interests (incl. security agreements and treaties, that were part of the order)
- bounded order: the West (dominated by the US) = for security competition: NATO, IMF, WB, GATT, Marshallplan
- bounded order: communist countries (dominated by the SU) = for security competition: Comecon, Warsaw pact, communist information bureau
= thin order! no pronounced influence on behavior of states in economic (little/no interaction and institutions) or military realm (institutions weren’t international in scope: were bounded)
*military: did cooperate, e.g. to prevent nuclear proliferation (IAEA, NPT) + limit arms race (SALT)
!UN: little influence on behavior of countries
the LIO 1990-2019
US unipolar moment, committed to transform a bounded realist order into an international liberal order
thin institutions of the Cold War-era international order were incorporated into the ‘‘new world order’’ (Bush)
US had power advantage: could ignore realist dictates and act according to liberal principles
US and allies had legitimacy after the Cold War: won + there seemed to be no viable alternative to liberal democracy (Fukuyama: end of history)
why has the LIO failed
was doomed to fail: contained 3 fatal flaws
- intervening in the politics of countries to turn them into liberal democracies guarantees backfire + undermines legitimacy of the enterprise itself : nationalism + balance of power fight against US dominance and interference
- ILO creates serious pol. problems regarding sovereignty and national identity within liberal democracies themselves
- hyperglobalization has produced significant eco. costs for lots of people -> domestic political consequences + helps fuel the rise of China
*these 3 flaws operate synergistically, e.g. negative effect hyperglobalization on lower and middle class combines with nationalist resentment over immigration
realist orders
- in bipolar or multipolar systems: if there are 2+ great powers, there is little choice but to act according to realist accords: competition
- powers aim to gain power at expense of adversaries + make sure the balance of power doesn’t shift against them
- ideological considerations are subordinated to security considerations (even if all powers are liberal)
- sometimes powers cooperate, when it is in common interest
- bounded and international orders operate side by side (great powers make own bounded orders to wage security competition)
- sometimes institutions have liberal features, that doesn’t make the order liberal (these features make sense from a balance of power perspective, e.g. open econ.
agnostic and ideological orders
in unipolar system -> no bounded orders (still: there can be regional institutions)
2 types:
ideological orders: unipolar has universalistic ideology (assumes that its values and system should be exported)
- e.g. LIO, communism
agnostic orders: unipole no universalistic ideology, not committed to shaping local politics on a global scale, more tolerant in dealing with other countries
main tasks in creating a liberal order
+ relation with liberal theories of peace
- expand membership in the institutions that made up the Western order + new institutiosn
- create an open and inclusive international economy that maximized free trade + fostered unfettered capital markets
- vigorously spread liberal democracy around the world
= related with principal liberal theories of peace: liberal institutionalism, economic interdependence theory, democratic peace theory
= proces of making an LIO was synonomous with creating a peaceful world
e.g. expansion NATO not for deterrence strategy to contain Russia, but towards liberal ends to incorporate eastern european countries
e.g. engage with China rather than contain it
e.g. Bush Doctrine: winning global war on terror required confronting countries whose regimes were closely tied to terrorist organizations -> best solution = make all Middle Eastern countries liberal
the Golden Years 1990-2004
- efforts to integrate China and Russia into eco. institutions were generally successful
- European integration + EU and NATO expansion towards Eastern Europe only few problems (e.g. wars over Bosnia and Kosovo, order was slow to respond, peace imposed on Balkans by 1999)
- mixed dev. in the Greater Middle East, but overall slow and steady incorporation into the liberal international order
- more and more countries became democratic (supporting Fukuyamas end of history)
- hyperglobalization led to wealth (but: Asia major financial crisis 1997-1998)
- more attention human rights
- nuclear nonproliferation successful
a few setbacks: 1998 India and Pakistan tested nukes + policy failures in Somalia and Haiti + slow reaction Rwandan genocide 1994 + failed to end wars in Congo and Sudan + Al-Qaida grew more dangerous within Afghanistan
= in short time big progress in spreading the LIO across the globe
the liberal order goes downhill 2005-19
cracks in the order began to appear and widened
- Greater Middle East: Iraq War was becoming a disaster, situation in Afghanistan began to deteriorate (Taliban came back), regime change stimulation by US in Libya and Syria led to civil wars, US played crucial role in creating Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
- Oslo Peace Process failed + Palestinians no hope of acquiring own state
- EU setback in 2005 (French and Dutch voters rejected proposal for a Constitution for Europe) + 2009 Eurozone crisis + Brexit + xenophobia right-wing parties + illiberal views eastern Europe + 2014 civil war Eastern Ukraine (involves Russia)
- transatlantic relations have weakened (e.g. Trump hate against ILO institutions, Merkel we should not rely on US)
- 2007-08 global financial crisis -> questions competence ILO elites
- deterioration relations Russia and the West + fear conflict with China (US now concerned with containing)
- nr of liberal democracies declined since 2006, more soft authoritarianism
the perils of democracy promotion
endeavor of spreading democracy was doomed from the start:
- never has been + never will be universal agreement on what constitutes the ideal political system (e.g. in times fascism and communism were preferred over democracy)
- illiberal democracies are appearing in Eastern Europe, China and Russia have embraced authoritarian rule, there are republics and dictatorships
nationalism: nation-states don’t want others to tell them how they should order their political system
-> LIO provokes fierce resistance
- US has fought many wars (mostly in the Greater Middle East), regularly they fail
- turning the major powers into enemies (that are not liberal democracies): no attack on powerful non-liberal powers, as that is too costly , still effort to make China and Russia more liberal
turning the liberal democracies against the liberal order
liberal international policies clash with nationalism
- delegating authority in international institutions is seen as surrendering sovereignty + makes for concerns about a democratic deficit -> e.g. Brexit, Trump’s America First
- LIO adopts policies that clash with national identity: idea of one whole rather than discrete nations
-> e.g. refugee crisis: LIO wants open borders and refugee acceptance, nations don’t
