1994 clark on Nietzsche

Question 1

an immoralist does not simply ignore morality

Answer 1

or deny its right to our compliance, but claims that morality is a bad thing that should be rejected

Question 2

immoralism seems to to be defensible only from the viewpoint of morality

Answer 2

which makes it appear to be as self refuting as another notoriousnieztschean claim, that truths are illusions

Question 3

sympathetic interpreters have therefore usually tried another tack, suggesting that Nietzsche is an immoralist only in a very qualified sense:

Answer 3

namely, that he rejects particular kind of morality or a particular theory or conception of morality, but in morality itself

Question 4

I will be concerned not with Nietzsche’s arguments against morality but only with the perplexing claim

Answer 4

to be against morality itself, given every possible understanding of “morality”

Question 5

Nietzsche himself sometime uses the word ‘morality’ in such a way that he is not rejecting all morality and thus

Answer 5

cannot count himself as an immoralist, for instance, when he praises ‘noble morality’ or insists that ‘higher moralities’ should be possible

Question 6

given his use of the word, I shall argue later, he counts the noble mode of valuation as a

Answer 6

non-moral mode of evaluating persons rather than as a morality

Question 7

I suggest by Nietzsche’s belief that this sense of morality (the sense given that he counts himself an “immoralist”) corresponds

Answer 7

pretty much to how we primarily use the term “morality”

Question 8

when he refers to the “overcoming of morality” this clearly means the overcoming of morality in the

Answer 8

narrower sense

Question 9

but why does he call himself an immoralist (…) if he is only rejecting morality in this narrower sense?

Answer 9

because he makes clear in this passage precisely this is morality in the traditional sense, or more literally in the sense that, in the sense “morality” has had until now

Question 10

using morality as “morality” in a nontraditional and wider sense, which makes it equivalent to

Answer 10

“codes for evaluating human beings and their conduct”

Question 11

my question is how Nietzsche made it comprehensible and plausible to himself

Answer 11

that he was rejecting precisely what we have embraced as “morality”

Question 12

to understand how Nietzsche could have considered himself an immoralist, we then need to know at least what he thinks moral values are

Answer 12

and why he did not take his own values to be moral values

Question 13

my interpretation will seem rather idiosyncratic these days

Answer 13

after all the book consists of three separate essays, each one evidently devoted to different moral phenomenon

Question 14

the problem for my interpretation is that Nietzsche makes no explicit attempt to connect

Answer 14

up these different essays

Question 15

Within each essay, the situation is similar: each turns out to consist of several different

Answer 15

stories or pieces of stories, and Nietzsche does not seem concerned to patch them together to find a unified account

Question 16

this has helped encourage the new common view (…) that Genealogy is a new

Answer 16

kind of moral inquiry, and exercise in perspectivism, one that is supposed to let in all sorts of different views without privileging one over the others

Question 17

Danto: “to treat the Genealogy as though it were precocious analytic philosophy

Answer 17

is to have swallowed the bait without having yet felt the hook’

Question 18

the application of the major point of historical method he has

Answer 18

been developing in the essay: namely that “the cause of origin of a thing and its eventual unity, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart”

Question 19

I suggest that the “stable element” in punishment is the act of inflicting a harm or loss on a person based on a judgement that the person

Answer 19

deserves this loss owing to something he or she has done

Question 20

He suggests in effect, that the stable element in punishment originated in the agreement

Answer 20

made by debtors that if unable to pay off debts, the would provide a substitute repayment in the form of some harm or physical suffering the creditor would be allowed to inflict on them

Question 21

[debts] the purpose of inflicting suffering in this case seems to be not to punish the debtor but rather to extract

Answer 21

a substitute repayment

Question 22

in thus drying that “punishment” can be defined, Nietzsche denies that

Answer 22

there is an essence of punishing, in the sense of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that distinguishes the punitive from the non punitive

Question 23

what distinguishes the punitive from

Answer 23

the non punitive

Question 24

Nietzsche’s point is that there is no single purpose that constitutes the

Answer 24

purpose of punishing. that our idea of punishing is an unstable synthesis of various purposes

Question 25

Nietzsche suggests that concepts influenced by history are like ropes held together by the intervening of strands, rather than by a

Answer 25

single strand running through the whole thing

Question 26

to analyse such concepts is not to find necessary and sufficient conditions for their use

Answer 26

but to disentangle the various strands that have become so tightly woven together by the process of of historical synthesis of strands that hides their separability from view

Question 27

it is thus by going back a forth between historical and conceptual considerations that one can hope

Answer 27

to make progress in either the history or the conceptual analysis

Question 28

we should expect Nietzsche’s view to be that a unified theory of the origins of morality would uncover

Answer 28

the origin and trace the development of different and originally independent strands of morality that this history has woven together. This, I believe is exactly what the Genealogy attempts

Question 29

a self-conscious attempt to analyse a concept with a

Answer 29

complex history- to disentangle originally independent elements that we can no longer see as such

Question 30

Nietzsche’s history of morality is a genealogy because

Answer 30

it is the history of couplings that already exists combined with something else that has its own history to give birth to a third thing, which then combines with something else that is also the product of such couplings

Question 31

Genealogy is simply a

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natural history

Question 32

if there is something new in Nietzsche’s use of Genealogy, it is the suggestion in particular that

Answer 32

concepts are formed in the same way as other living things- and, in particular, that this is true of the concept of morality

Question 33

Nietzsche begins by arguing on philological grounds that “good” originally

Answer 33

meant the same as “noble” or “of the ruling class” whereas “bad” meant “common”

Question 34

Nietzsche explains the origin of regarding particular characteristics as “good”- the origin of judgements of virtue- along the same lines, claiming that the nobles called “good”

Answer 34

the characteristics they perceived as belonging to themselves and distinguishing them from the commoners. their self affirmation or happiness was such that they took any characteristic particular to themselves to be part of their good goodness that is, an aspect of their superiority to the common human being

Question 35

[good and bad] at first they perceived the distinction in crude physical terms like wealth and power

Answer 35

as time went on their view of the distinction between themselves and commoners came to centre on traits of the soul or character, such as loyalty, truthfulness, and courage

Question 36

[noble characteristics] they began to designate themselves as ‘the truthful” as

Answer 36

“distinct from the lying common man”

Question 37

in this process, Nietzsche claims ‘good’ finally lost all connection to political class and became identical

Answer 37

with the superiority of the soul

Question 38

goof/ bad here is not a moral distinction

Answer 38

in other words, calling commoners “bad” is certainly making a value judgement about them, but it is not judging them to be “morally bad” or “Immoral”

Question 39

[goodness] it is merely the natural view point of a group of individuals well pleased with themselves when

Answer 39

comparing themselves to a group they would not be happy be part of

Question 40

From within the good/ bad mode of valuation

Answer 40

the attitude toward the liar is not one of moral disapproval

Question 41

good versus evil however is clearly supposed to be a moral

Answer 41

distinction like good versus bad, it distinguishes superior from inferior people

Question 42

unlike bad, evil is equivalent to

Answer 42

immoral or morally bad

Question 43

the main difference seems to be that the evil are blamed for

Answer 43

being bad are not blamed for being bad any more than the nobles consider themselves deserving of reward for being good

Question 44

according to Nietzsche’s theory, this way of judging goodness originated in resentment

Answer 44

directed against the nobles and their easy sense of superiority

Question 45

the resentful call the noble “evil” and themselves “good”. rather than reflecting the good’s natural

Answer 45

sense of their own superiority

Question 46

as burning something in effigy acts out or plays- up resentment, calling someone

Answer 46

“evil” can satisfy the same kind of feelings by playing at depriving others of their self-proclaimed goodness or superiority

Question 47

if they can be blamed for what they are

Answer 47

they can be thought deserving of punishment on that basis

Question 48

since it will then seem natural to regard the good as deserving of reward

Answer 48

for being good, it will be much easier for the good to convince themselves that they really are superior and do not want to be like the nobles at all

Question 49

The first essay does not compare two different moralities

Answer 49

instead it attempts to isolate from the historically conditioned synthesis we call ‘morality’ a particular strand- the idea of moral worth or goodness- and show how it developed from something that existed prior yo morality.

Question 50

the revolt against the noble mode of valuation lies according to Nietzsche’s story

Answer 50

at the beginning of the specifically nonmoral mode of evaluating persons was transformed into a specifically moral mode, of how pagan virtue became moral virtue

Question 51

but it would also be misleading to say that this account is supposed to explain the origin of morality

Answer 51

morality is a very complex affair on Nietzsche’s account and the moralisation of virtue could not have taken place without earlier developments that also contribute central strands our concept of morality

Question 52

the idea of blaming people for what they are that transforms the noble mode of valuation

Answer 52

into a moral mode

Question 53

but blaming too must have a history, and must already be present in some form to be used to transform

Answer 53

“bad’ to “evil”

Question 54

blaming people only makes sense if there are

Answer 54

standards for acceptable behaviour

Question 55

the third essay suggests that the oldest strand woven into the concept of morality is rules or codes if conduct

Answer 55

that set out standards of right, of socially permitted and forbidden behaviour

Question 56

the task of the ‘morality of mores’ was to create

Answer 56

a memory and that this was done with the use of severe punishments

Question 57

through the experience and threat of punishment

Answer 57

Nietzsche claims “one finally remembers five or six ‘I will not’s’ in regurd to which one had given one’s promise so as to participate in the advantages of society

Question 58

the rules are ‘I will not’s’ rather tan I ‘ought not’s’ I presume, because they are kept in place as rules demanding obedience largely by the

Answer 58

threat of punishment, and therefore function as hypothetical- rather than as categorical or moral- imperatives

Question 59

the big story of the second essay is the development of bad conscience, initially characterised as

Answer 59

“the consciousness of guilt’. this suggests that the on Nietzsche’s view the mores become moral rules when they are connected to guilt

Question 60

being guilty originally was nothing more than owing debt

Answer 60

as is suggested already by the fact that the same German word (Schulz) is used to translate both “debt” and “guilt”

Question 61

the person did something that breaks his pledge to the community, and therefore to some extent threatens its

Answer 61

stability, angering its members

Question 62

this is what Nietzsche thinks guilt is in its origins: a debt or substitute payment owed to society for failure

Answer 62

to obey the communities rules

Question 63

you now have an obligation to the community to obey the rules, and if you renege on it, you deserve punishment

Answer 63

that is “owe” it as a matter of fairness or justice

Question 64

but then how can Nietzsche consider himself an immoralist?

Answer 64

the only plausible answer I can find for him is that he denies that regarding obedience to the rules as a matter of fairness id equivalent to granting them the status of moral rules

Question 65

debt is moralised into guilt, and duty into moral duty, through the development of the bad conscience and of the

Answer 65

idea of having a debt to God

Question 66

Nietzsche evidently believes therefore, that er can regard obedience to the rules necessary for communal existence as a matter of

Answer 66

fairness without the help of ideas of moral duty or guilt, and therefore without regarding them as moral rules

Question 67

it may be thought that a system of rules involving an idea of fairness must have room for acting from conscience and that

Answer 67

conscience necessarily brings with it ideas of guilt

Question 68

conscience obeys the rules that make community existence possible but

Answer 68

not out of fear of punishment

Question 68

Nietzsche admits the role of conscience, but

Answer 68

explicitly distinguishes conscience form “bad conscience” the consciousness of guilt

Question 69

[community rules] they are obeyed from an identification with the aims of the community, and from pride in being a person who

Answer 69

can be relied on to keep promises- which Nietzsche calls “the proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility”

Question 70

[material debt] once you have paid it off, no debt or guilt remains

Answer 70

in the case of moral guilt, however, it seems that we remain guilty or whatever wrongs we have done, even if we have suffered an appropriate punishment

Question 71

material indebtedness, unlike guilt, does not automatically lower ones down on you because you don’t have what it takes to keep you word,

Answer 71

as it clearly is in the case of moral guilt. indebtedness and worth may be interconnected, but are two separable issues; whereas this is not the case which debt comes to guilt

Question 72

the second essay of genealogy tries to show is the possibility- indeed the historical reality- of a nonmaterial version of social contract,

Answer 72

involving what we can recognise to be nonmoral version of social contract, involving what we can recognise to be nonmoral ideas of fairness, justice, obligation, and conscience

Question 73

this suggests that Nietzsche’s objection is not to justice or the common good (…) nor social norms that apply to all (…) but rather

Answer 73

the moralisation of these ideas and norms

Question 74

debt becomes guilt insofar as people start using the idea of being indebted

Answer 74

to inflict suffering on themselves

Question 75

bad conscience develops when restrictions on the external expression of hostile impulses

Answer 75

becomes so severe that they can only be satisfied only through internalisation

Question 76

the tribe exists only through the sacrifices and

Answer 76

accomplishments of ancestors. (…) eventually the ancestor grows into a god and finally into god, the god before whom all human beings are guilty

Question 77

but why isn’t the debt we owe to God just debt?

Answer 77

[atheism does not kill guilt] guilt can remain without one someone to whom it is owed

Question 78

bad conscience

Answer 78

internalising aggression

Question 79

the formation of pagan gods who are merely human beings writ large and more powerful into a purely spiritual God was the need form a weapon against the

Answer 79

self- a standard of good we could never live up to

Question 80

Nietzsche thus denies that owing a debt to a divine being is enough to make

Answer 80

this debt a matter of moral guilt

Question 81

we owe god not a debt for what we do

Answer 81

but for who we are

Question 82

the material concept of debt was transformed into the fully moral concept of guilt when the divine being to whom the debt was owed was

Answer 82

conceived non naturalistically or ascetically as repudiation of the value of natural human existence

Question 83

what transforms debt into guilt- makes it un payable and a matter of our worth as persons is the ascetic idea and its attendant

Answer 83

ascetic conception of virtue, which Nietzsche discusses at length in the third genealogy

Question 84

rules became moral rules when their violation was thought to incur guilt, and

Answer 84

ascetic ideal

Question 85

the noble nonmoral conception of virtue or goodness becomes moral virtue precisely insofar as

Answer 85

people are blamed for what they are- that is, are considered guilty

Question 86

I have tried to show that he thinks the ascetic ideal is tightly

Answer 86

intertwined with our idea of morality and I have argued elsewhere that he rejects the ascetic ideal

Question 87

NIetzsches work on morality involves prying apart central components of our concept of morality

Answer 87

and showing how these strands came together in the course of human history

Question 88

“morality” is not something that has always been with human beings

Answer 88

but is instead an extremely complex affair that developed the course of history through multiple coupling of originally separate strands that we can no longer see as independent

Question 89

by separating them, I think Nietzsche tries to show us the possibility of gaining much of what morality gives us, indeed what

Answer 89

we cannot do without, in alternative ways, and specifically without a tie to the aesthetic ideal

Question 90

as an immoralist, he claims that some such alternative is superior

Answer 90

to the present synthesis that we call “morality”