2. Consideration Flashcards
(47 cards)
Leeds United Football Club Ltd v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2012]
Area: Public duty imposed by law and going “above and beyond”
As seen in Glasbrook Bros v Glamorgan County Council [1925], extra police security which is deemed in excess of that considered necessary by the police authorities can amount to sufficient consideration for a private promise to pay.
However, in this case, the Court sided with LUFC in arguing that the policing of the surrounding areas, in addition to the ground, was part of the general duty of the police to keep the peace.
In what case did the Supreme Court comment that the area of law relating to consideration for part payments of debt as being “ripe for examination”?
MWB Business Exchange v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016]
Glasbrook Bros v Glamorgan County Council [1925]
Whilst a public duty imposed by law will not normally be sufficient consideration (as per Collins v Godefroy [1831]), this position changes if the claimant can show that he has done something more than the duty imposed on him by law.
In this case, mine owners had asked the police for a level of security of excess of that considered necessary by police authorities, but the mine owners had promised to pay for this. However, the mine owners later refused to pay and alleged that the police were simply carrying out their public duty imposed by law. However, as the police protection was above and beyond what was necessary, the extra protection was deemed to be sufficient consideration.
What is the doctrine of promissory estoppel?
Promissory estoppel can provide a means of making a promise binding, even without consideration. It is most commonly used in relation to part payment of debts.
Defined by Lord Denning in Combe v Combe [1951]:
- One party makes a promise to the other (by words or conduct);
- The promise was intended to affect the legal relations between the parties and was intended to be acted upon;
- The other party has relied on the promise and acted on it; then
The promisor cannot go back on his promise (even though the promisee has not provided any consideration for it).
What are the 3 relevant cases for assessing if sufficient consideration has been provided in relation to a pre-existing duty imposed by law?
- Collins v Godefroy [1831]
- Glasbrook Bros v Glamorgan County Council [1925]
- Leeds United Football Club Ltd v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2012]
What does it mean that consideration must be sufficient but need not be adequate?
The law requires the parties to have entered into a bargain where each side has provided something of value that the courts can see. The courts are not generally interested in whether this is a fair bargain or not. The term “sufficiency” describes something that the courts can see of value that makes the bargain binding. Hence the law requires consideration to be something of sufficient value, but not necessarily the full or adequate market value.
What case provided the three 3 conditions for “past consideration” to be sufficient?
Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980]
Pinnel’s Case [1602]
The basic common law rule relating to part payment of a debt.
If a debtor offers to pay less, as full and final settlement, the debtor must provide an additional benefit to the creditor that amounts to consideration and effectively makes a new agreement (for the lesser sum). This benefit will usually be to pay earlier than the debt due date but can be anything of benefit:
“the gift of a horse, hawk or robe etc in satisfaction is good for it shall be intended that a horse, hawk or robe etc might be more beneficial to the claimant than money, in respect of some circumstance, or otherwise the claimant would not have accepted in satisfaction”.
What are the three exceptions to the general rule of Stilk v Myrick [1809]?
The general rule is that promises to pay more for performance of pre-existing contractual duties is not binding as no new sufficient consideration has been provided. However, it may be binding if:
1. Contained in a deed (as then consideration is not necessary).
2. The other party does something extra/in excess of their existing contractual duties (Hartley v Ponsonby [1857])
3. The party promising extra gains a “practical benefit” or avoids a “disbenefit” (Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1990])
Simantob v Shavleyan [2019]
A modern day application of the “gift of a horse, hawk or robe” from Pinnel’s Case [1602].
The COA held that an agreement to discharge a debt in part settlement was valid because it was also accompanied by an agreement by the debtor to waive their right to raise a potentially valid legal defence, to dispute her liability under the debt. The waiving of this legal right was held to constitute the equivalent of a “horse, hawk or robe” and therefore was sufficient consideration to support this new agreement.
Tweddle v Atkinson [1861]
Area: Consideration must move from the promisee AND privity of contract
Facts: The fathers of a couple, engaged to be married, agreed between themselves to pay the groom some money as a wedding gift. One of the fathers died before paying the money to the groom (Mr Tweddle) and his executors refused to pay. Mr Tweddle sued the executors of the estate.
Outcome/importance: Mr Tweddle’s case failed. Even though he was named in the agreement, he had not himself given consideration for the agreement.
This case made it clear that a person seeking to enforce a promise must have supplied for consideration for it (i.e. the consideration did not move from the promisee). Mr Tweddle was also unable to enforce the contract due to the traditional privity of contract rules.
Williams v Roffey Bros [1990]
The law surrounding consideration where the claimant is under a pre-existing contractual duty to the defendant.
In this case, the COA found that the claimant (a sub-contractor) was entitled to recover bonus payments that were promised to him if he were to complete the work on time, despite already being contracted to do the work. The law was expressed as follows:
- If A has entered into a contract with B to do work for or to supply goods or services to B in return for payment; and
- at some stage before A has completely performed their obligations under the contract, B has reason to doubt whether A will, or will be able to, complete their side of the bargain; and
- B thereupon promises A an additional payment for A to complete their obligations on time; and
- as a result of this promise, B obtains a PRACTICAL BENEFIT OR AVOIDS A DISBENEFIT; and
- B’s promise was not given as a result of economic duress or fraud on the part of A; then
the benefit to B is capable of being consideration for B’s promise , so that the promise will be legally binding.
How did Lord Denning comment on how promissory estoppel is to be used, in the case of Combe v Combe [1951]?
“The principle stated in the High Trees case … does not create new causes of action where none existed before. It only prevents a party from insisting upon his strict legal rights, when it would be unjust to allow him to enforce them, having regard to the dealings which taken place between the parties”.
It is now settled that the doctrine can be used only as a defence, that is “as a shield not as a sword”.
In which case did the House of Lords comment the following on the doctrine of promissory estoppel:
“I desire to add that the time may soon come when the whole sequence of cases based on promissory estoppel since the war, beginning with Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd, may need to be reviewed and reduced to a coherent doctrine by the courts”.
Woodhouse v Nigerian Produce [1972]
Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947]
The claimants leased a block a flats from the defendant, at the rate of £2500 p.a. Due to the war, the occupancy rates drastically fell and so in 1940, the parties agreed to reduce the rent by 50%. Neither party stipulated how long this reduced rent was to apply for. The defendants paid the reduced rate for 5 years, as the flats gradually became full again in 1945. The claimant syed the defendant for payment of the full rental from July 1945 onwards.
Lord Denning held that the arrangement was only intended to last whilst war conditions affected the letting of the flats and therefore the claimant’s claim should succeed.
However, the doctrine of promissory estoppel was developed by obiter comments of Lord Denning, when commenting on a potential claim by the Claimants to claim back full rent for the war years. Lord Denning said such an action would fail. If a promisor had made a promise to the promisee, intending that the promise be acted upon by the promisee, then the promisor would be estopped from going back on his promise.
What two cases illustrate the traditional rule that “consideration must move from the promisee”?
Tweddle v Atkinson [1861]
and
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915]
Foakes v Beer [1884]
The defendant paid off a CCJ by instalments, as agreed and ultimately in full. The claimant later sued for interest, despite agreeing that no proceedings would be brought against the defendant if he paid the judgment debt in the agreed manner.
The House of Lords applied the rule from Pinnel’s Case [1602] and found that the claimant was entitled to claim this additional interest. The debtor had not provided some additional benefit/new element and therefore insufficient consideration for a new agreement. The defendant was simply complying with their pre-existing legal obligation. (Note that this decision has caused controversy and has been criticised for being harsh).
Re Selectmove [1995]
A company claimed that HMRC had agreed that they could pay off their tax bill by way of instalments. HMRC argued that this was not agreed and, in any event, such an agreement would not be binding, since the company was doing less than what was required of it. The company argued that the instalment plan was the “practical benefit” to the HMRC (as per Williams v Roffey Bros [1990], in that it ensured that the company continued in business and thus more likely to meet its debts.
The Court held that the decision in Williams v Roffey Bros [1990] had no effect on the rules as to part payment of debts, which were set out in Foakes v Beer [1884] (which confirmed the approach from Pinnel’s Case [1602]).
(Is this an arbitrary distinction between promises to pay more v promises to pay less??)
Hartley v Ponsonby [1857]
A decision in contrast with the decision of Stilk v Myrick [1809].
As per Stilk v Myrick [1809], the claimant’s performance of a pre-existing contractual duty will not usually amount to consideration to support another contract (i.e. a bonus for getting the ship back safely).
However, in this case, the ship’s crew had done something in excess of their existing contractual obligations and so there was sufficient consideration to support a new contract.
Collins v Godefroy [1831]
If a person is legally obliged to do something because of some duty imposed by law, then the promise to carry out that obligation cannot amount to consideration to support a new contract.
In this case, the claimant was subpoenaed to attend a court hearing to provide evidence on the defendant’s behalf and alleged that the defendant had promised to pay him for his trouble. It was held that there was consideration to support the defendant’s promise, as the claimant was already under a duty to attend the court.
Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestle Co Ltd [1960]
Area: Consideration need only be sufficient, not adequate
Facts: As part of a promotion, Nestle were selling records (the copyright of which were owned by Chappell) for sale at 1s & 6p, plus three wrappers, from their sixpenny chocolate bars. Chappell sued to prevent the promotion, since they would receive a much lower royalty from it.
Outcome/importance: The wrappers were held to be part of the consideration, even though they were thrown away when received.
As Lord Somervell commented:
“It is said that, when received, the wrappers are of no value to Nestle. This is irrelevant. A contracting party can stipulate for what consideration he chooses. A peppercorn does not cease to be good consideration if it is established that the promisee does not like pepper and will throw away the corn”.
This upholds the principle from Thomas v Thomas [1842].
Ajayi v Briscoe [1964]
In order to go back to the original agreement/bring the promissory estoppel to an end, the promisor must give the promisee reasonable notice. This notice must give the promisee a reasonable opportunity to resume his position. It may be that the promise is irrevocable if the promisee cannot resume his position.
Currie v Misa [1875]
Area: (Old fashioned) Definition of consideration
“some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other”.