2007 SRO Flashcards
From full power, the following occurs:
- A loss of 4160VAC Bus 1A.
- A Main Steam Line Break has occurred inside containment.
- Containment High Pressure actuates.
What is the expected effect on the stator winding temperatures of the two operating Primary Coolant
Pumps (PCP), and what procedural guidance will be used for this condition?
Stator winding temperatures will first begin rising….
a. after Component Cooling Water to containment isolates. The Emergency Operating Procedure
requires establishing a temperature trend on the Plant Process Computer (PPC).
b. when the Main Steam Line Break occurs. The Alarm Response Procedure provides guidance to
have the System Engineer evaluate the condition if stator temperatures exceed 140° C.
c. when the Main Steam Line Break occurs. The Alarm Response Procedure provides guidance to
trip a PCP if stator temperatures exceed 185° F.
d. after Component Cooling Water to containment isolates. ONP-6.2, Loss of CCW, provides
guidance to trip a PCP if stator temperatures exceed 140° C.
a. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that CCW cools the motor stator. Only air flow through the motor cools
that stator.
b. CORRECT
c. INCORRECT – Correct occurrence but wrong guidance. Plausible if the student believes that a PCP should be tripped
due to high motor winding temperature.
d. INCORRECT - Plausible if the student believes that CCW can affect motor winding temperature
At 0948, a Loss of Shutdown Cooling event occurs. The plant is in MODE 6 with Reactor Cavity Water
Level at 648 feet. The time for PCS temperature to reach 200°F is 3 hours. Operators are dispatched
to close the equipment hatch and to verify containment closure. Which one of the following lists the
time by which the containment must be closed?
a. 1048
b. 1148
c. 1248
d. 1348
a. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student thinks because the in service SDC train can be secured for ≤1 hours per 8 hour
period that the equipment hatch must be closed within this time. This is a requirement for MODE 5
b. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student thinks because both SDC trains can be inoperable for ≤2 hours per 8 hour period
that the equipment hatch must be closed within this time. This is a requirement for MODE 5
c. CORRECT
d. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student correctly believes that the containment must be closed within 4 hours per LCO
3.9.4.A.4, however, ONP-17, 4.8 and GOP-14 attachment 10, section 1.0 states that containment closure shall be
completed prior to exceeding the time for the PCS to reach 200°F.
Question:
With the plant in MODE 1, the shell side of E-54A, Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger
developed a leak and had to be isolated from the header to stop the leak. How does this affect the
CCW System’s ability to perform its design function, and which guidance applies?
100% of CCW post accident cooling capability is …
a. still available. SOP-16, Component Cooling Water System, requires starting an additional CCW
pump to maintain E-54B CCW Hx differential pressure within required limits.
b. NOT available. ONP-6.2 Attachment 1, CCW Leak Isolation, is performed to restore required post
accident cooling capability.
c. still available. Technical Specification 3.7.7, CCW System, requires that E-54A CCW Heat
Exchanger be restored to service within 72 hours.
d. NOT available. Technical Specification 3.0.3 requires initiating actions for plant shutdown within
one hour.
a. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student applies the requirements associated with securing SW to the tube side of a CCW
heat exchanger.
b. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that ONP-6.2 entry is appropriate for this condition.
c. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that only condition ‘A’ is applicable for this condition.
d. CORRECT – Per LCO 3.7.7 and 3.03
A Surveillance Requirement in the Technical Specifications requires the alternate power supply for
Pressurizer heaters to be capable of powering the affected heaters within five (5) hours. What is the
basis for these five (5) hours?
a. Ensures that a 20° F subcooling margin, due to pressure decay, is not exceeded.
b. Allows the operating crew to evaluate stripping unneeded Bus 1C loads to prevent overloading
D/G 1-1.
c. Prevents exceeding 375 kW on the remaining heaters which have power from Bus 1D.
d. Ensures full restoration of all Pressurizer Heaters in order to preclude reactor head voiding.
a. CORRECT
b. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that the most limiting equipment in this situation is the D/G 1-1.
c. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student misapplies tech spec 3.9.4 and believes that each bus is limited to supplying 375
kW.
d. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes the limiting scenario is a bubble moving from the PZR to the Reactor
Head.
With the plant at full power a loss of all offsite power occurs. D/G 1-1 FAILS to start automatically, or
manually. Which one of the following describes an effect on the noted Component Cooling Water
Pump, and what procedure will be used to address the concern?
a. P-52B discharge pressure may be less than required. Per SOP-16, Component Cooling Water
System, stop P-52B if CCW heat exchanger deltaP limits are exceeded.
b. P-52A discharge pressure may be less than required. Per ONP-6.2, Loss of CCW, start all
available CCW pumps.
c. P-52B discharge pressure may be less than required. Per ONP-2.1, Loss of AC Power, isolate
selected radwaste loads if needed to restore discharge pressure.
d. P-52C discharge pressure may be less than required. Per SOP-16, Component Cooling Water
System, isolate selected radwaste loads to restore discharge pressure.
a. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that SOP-16 contains guidance to control CCW HX dP by stopping a
CCW pump. Student also fails to recognize that HX dP limits are for optimal operation of the pump and not an immediate
operational concern.
b. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that P-52A will be in service. If D/G 1-1 fails to start, power will not be
available to P-52A during a loss of off-site power.
c. CORRECT
d. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that P-52C will be in service. If D/G 1-1 fails to start, power will not be
available to P-52C during a loss of off-site power
A manual reactor trip has occurred due to a loss of DC Bus D21-2. The NRC must be notified …
a. after notifying the county and state but no longer than 1 hour from classification per EI-3,
Communications and Notifications.
b. after notifying the county and state but no longer than 15 minutes from classification per EI-3,
Communications and Notifications.
c. of a non-emergency event within 1 hour per ADMIN 4.00, Operations Organization, Responsibilities
and Conduct.
d. via the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) within 1 hour per 10CFR50.72.
a. CORRECT -
b. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that the NRC must be notified in the same time frame as the local and
state authorities.
c. INCORRECT- Plausible if the student believes that this is a 1 hour reportability issue.
d. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that ERDS is an acceptable form of notification.
This is HIGH Cog because the candidate needs to recognize that a loss of D21-2 will cause a loss of all annunciators in the
control room which is classified as an unusual event (UE) and will require entry into the functional recovery procedure, EOP-
9.0.
A plant startup is in progress at 13% power. A review of post-maintenance documentation indicates
that there is NO reasonable assurance that control rod 17 is trippable. The control room team has
determined that the required action is to place the plant in MODE 3 within 6 hours.
What is the Technical Specification basis for this action?
a. Quadrant Power Tilt (QPT) limit may be exceeded with one stuck rod.
b. ASI limit may be exceeded with one stuck rod.
c. The plant is outside of the safety analysis since one additional rod is assumed to stick on a reactor
trip.
d. The plant is outside of the safety analysis since all shutdown rods are assumed to insert on a
reactor trip to achieve a 3.5% shutdown margin.
a. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that the stuck control rod will have a large effect on QPT. QPT not
applicable
With the plant shutdown in MODE 5 alarm EK-0608C “NI CHANNEL TROUBLE” annunciates. It is
determined that the cause of the alarm is Wide Range Nuclear Instrument 4A channel failing low.
Which one of the following accurately describes the operability of the Source Range/Wide Range
Neutron Flux Monitoring Channels?
a. Declare one channel inoperable. Enter LCO 3.3.9, “Neutron Flux Monitoring Channels.”
b. Both channels remain operable if Source Range NI-2A is capable of detecting the existing neutron
flux and is in reasonable agreement with Source Range NI-1A.
c. Declare one channel inoperable. No LCO action statement should be entered because only one
channel is required to be operable in the current MODE.
d. Both channels remain operable if Wide Range Nuclear Instrument 4A detector voltage remains
above 45VDC.
a. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student misapplies the tech spec and interprets a neutron flux channel as requiring both a
WR and SR NI to be operable.
b. CORRECT -
c. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that only one channel of neutron flux instruments is required since the
plant is in MODE 5 and not refueling.
d. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that the detector is still able to detect a flux but is not indicating due to a
low power supply voltage.
The plant is currently in action level 3 for high dose equivalent Iodine-131 due to fuel cladding leaks.
Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitor, RIA-0707, is out of service. A Steam Generator tube
rupture event then occurs. Safety Injection Actuation has not occurred. To confirm proper event
diagnosis, Chemistry technicians will be directed to sample:
a. Steam Generators for boron and activity.
b. Blowdown Demineralizers effluent for boron and activity.
c. Steam Generators for lithium and activity.
d. Blowdown Demineralizers effluent for lithium and activity.
a. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that boron concentration in the S/G is meaningful. Boron is added to the
S/Gs under normal operation to prevent S/G tube denting.
b. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that this would be a good place to sample to ensure dose levels are lower
to personnel. However, the demineralizers would remove much of the activity.
c. CORRECT
d. INCORRECT – Plausible for the same reason as ‘b’.
Given the following conditions:
• Reactor Protective system has initiated a trip from a valid Containment High Pressure (CHP)
signal
• PCS Pressure is 1190 psia
• PZR Level is 12%
• ‘A’ S/G Pressure is 850 psia, ‘B’ S/G Pressure is 520 psia
• TC in both loops are lowering
• PCS subcooling is 95 °F
• EOP-1.0 “Standard Post Trip Actions” has been completed
Which one of the following describes (1) the appropriate procedure to enter, (2) the actions that need to
be taken, and (3) the reason for the actions?
a. (1) EOP-6.0, “Excess Steam Demand Event”
(2) Isolate the ‘B’ Steam Generator per EOP supplement 18 AND maintain ‘A’ S/G pressure within
50 psi of ‘B” S/G.
(3) This will isolate the affected S/G and maintain heat removal to avoid a pressurized thermal
shock condition.
b. (1) EOP-6.0, “Excess Steam Demand Event”
(2) Isolate the ‘B’ Steam Generator per EOP supplement 18 AND maintain ‘A’ S/G pressure within
50 psi of ‘B’ S/G after ‘B’ S/G indicates it has boiled dry.
(3) This will prevent overcooling the PCS to avoid a pressurized thermal shock condition.
c. (1) EOP-9.0, “Functional Recovery Procedure”
(2) Isolate the ‘B’ Steam Generator per EOP supplement 18 when level reaches -84% AND
stabilize PCS temperature with ‘A’ Steam Generator per EOP-6.0
(3) This allows maximum safety injection flow for Pressurizer level recovery
d. (1) EOP-9.0, “Functional Recovery Procedure”
(2) Isolate BOTH Steam Generators per EOP supplement 17 and 18 AND establish once-through
cooling per EOP-9.0.
(3) This prevents challenging the Containment design pressure limit of 55 psig.
a. CORRECT -
b. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that ‘A’ S/G should NOT be steamed until after ‘B’ S/G is dry to prevent
adding to the cooldown.
c. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that EOP-9.0 is the correct procedure to enter. The student could believe
that there is a ESDE in ‘A’ S/G also since TC in both loops is lowering.
d. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that there is also an ESDE in ‘A’ S/G and once-through cooling needs to
be established due to isolation of both S/Gs.
Question:
WIth the plant operating at 50% power, EK-0937, EK-0938 and EK-0939, “PRI COOLANT PUMP P-
50A, P-50B, P-50C BACKSTOP OIL LOW FLOW” annunciate simultaneously and do not clear. Which
one of the following describes the correct action to take?
a. Immediately trip the reactor and enter EOP-1.0, “Standard Post Trip Actions.” Trip P-50A, P-50B,
and P-50C, because backstop oil flow to these pumps is lost.
b. Immediately start the DC backstop oil pump because power has been lost to all AC backstop oil
pumps.
c. Dispatch Electrical Maintenance to check amps on supply breakers to backstop oil pumps to verify
one backstop oil pump is running for each PCP.
d. Perform a normal plant shutdown per GOP-8, Shutdown to MODE 2 or MODE 3 ≥ 525 °F, because
the backstop device can only operate for 12 hours without oil flow.
a. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that this alarm is indicative of no backstop oil flow and damage to the
PCP is imminent.
b. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student confuses the backstop pumps with the lift pumps
c. CORRECT
d. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that there is no backstop oil flow and there is no immediate concern for
damage to the PCP. This is plausible because P-50D does not have a backstop oil pump.
Which one of the following instrumentation indications that are used during Shutdown Cooling
operations is also identified as post-accident monitoring instrumentation per Technical Specifications?
a. FIC-0306, SDC HX Bypass Flow
b. PIA-0306, LPSI Pump Discharge Pressure
c. TI-0912, SDC HX CCW Outlet Temperature
d. Cold Leg Temperature (wide range)
a. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that, since SI flow is through the bypass on SDC HX, this flow indicator
would be required during accident conditions.
b. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that LPSI discharge pressure is important during a large break LOCA.
c. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that this indication is important when a RAS initiates.
d. CORRECT
During a LOCA with all Safety Injection pumps and Containment Spray pumps operating, SIRWT level
reaches 2% and a RAS initiates. All equipment has been verified aligned per RAS with the exception of
CV-3029, East ESG Containment Sump Isolation, which does not open. How does this impact
operation of the Containment Spray and Safety Injection systems and what action(s) need(s) to be
taken?
a. Left channel Containment Spray and HPSI Pumps have lost suction from containment sump.
Initiate post-RAS injection from Spent Fuel Pool per EOP Supplement 44.
b. Right channel Containment Spray and HPSI Pumps have lost suction from containment sump.
STOP Containment Spray Pump P-54A AND ensure OPEN CV-3071, P-66A subcooling valve per
EOP Supplement 42.
c. Left channel Containment Spray and HPSI Pumps have lost suction from containment sump.
Initiate post-RAS refill of SIRW Tank per EOP Supplement 43.
d. Right channel Containment Spray and HPSI Pumps have lost suction from containment sump.
STOP Containment Spray Pump P-54A AND P-66A, HPSI Pump per EOP-4.0 Operator Actions.
a. INCORRECT – Plausible is the student believes that CV-3029 is associated with left channel equipment.
b. CORRECT - EOP-4.0 step 52 directs performance of EOP Supplement 42 when SIRW Tank level reaches 2%. EOP
Supplement 42 directs P-54A be secured and CV-3071 verified open if CV-3029 does not open on RAS. CV-3029
supplies all right channel safety injection and containment spray pumps. P-67A trips on RAS, P-54A needs to be
tripped for equipment protection, and P-66A will continue to operate as long as CV-3071 is open which is
supplied from the containment spray header (P-54B and P-54C)
c. INCORRECT – Plausible for same reason as ‘a’
d. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student fails to recognize that P-66A still has suction available from the left train CSS
pumps via CV-3071.
During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture, why do we use the turbine bypass valve (TBV) instead of the
atmospheric dump valves (ADVs)?
a. Minimizes the release of radioactivity.
b. Ensures availability of Steam Driven Aux. Feedwater P-8B.
c. Minimizes PCS shrinkage due to excess cooldown.
d. Ensures finer control over PCS temperature and pressure.
a. CORRECT -
b. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that P-8B exhaust is directed to the Main Condenser. When the TBV is
used, condenser vacuum is maintained;
c. INCORRECT – Plausible due to difference in steam flow (15%) from ADVs associated with one S/G versus steam flow
from TBV (4.5%).
d. INCORRECT – Plausible from same reason as ‘c’.
Given the following conditions:
• The plant is at full power.
• “A” Train of Control Room HVAC is in service in Normal Mode.
• The following alarm annunciates:
o EK-0239, “CRHVAC TRAIN ‘A’ RIA-1818A HI RAD/FAIL”
• It is determined that RIA-1818A has failed and is inoperable.
What are the consequences of continuing to operate the ‘A’ Train Control Room HVAC system and
what actions will be taken to mitigate this condition?
a. If radiation entered the Control Room envelope, the ‘A’ train would not be able to automatically
swap to Emergency Mode. The affected CRHVAC Train (A) shall be placed in Emergency Mode
within 1 hour, OR the opposite CRHVAC train (B) must be started within 1 hour, AND the affected
train must be Caution Tagged to only run in Purge Mode.
b. If radiation entered the Control Room envelope, the ‘A’ train would not be able to automatically
swap to Emergency Mode. The affected CRHVAC Train (A) shall be placed in Emergency Mode
immediately, OR the opposite CRHVAC train (B) must be started immediately, AND the affected
train must be Caution Tagged to only run in Emergency Mode.
c. Any radioactive contamination entering the Control Room envelope from the outside will not be
detected. The affected CRHVAC Train (A) shall be placed in Emergency Mode immediately, OR
the opposite CRHVAC train (B) must be started immediately, AND the affected train must be
Caution Tagged to only run in Emergency Mode.
d. Any radioactive contamination entering the Control Room envelope from the outside will not be
detected. The affected CRHVAC Train (A) shall be placed in Emergency Mode within 1 hour, OR
the opposite CRHVAC train (B) must be started within 1 hour, AND the affected train must be
Caution Tagged to only run in Purge Mode.
a. INCORRECT – Plausible if the student believes that RIA-1818A will cause the Control Room HVAC system to
automatically swap to emergency; this provides an indication and alarm feature only. Also if the student believes that
purge mode will keep radioactivity out of the control room.
b. INCORRECT – Plausible for same reason as ‘a’.
c. CORRECT.
d. INCORRECT – Correct consequence, incorrect action. Plausible if the student believes that purge mode will keep
radioactivity out of the control room.
