Negligence Cases Flashcards
Kime v. Hobbs
“Keep On Trucking”
ISSUE: How to differentiate between employee and independent contractor.
SYNOPSIS: Joan Kime (Π) was seriously injured in a collision between the vehicle in which she was a passenger and a tractor-live-stock trailer unit driven by Edward Yelli. Yelli owned the truck-tractor, and William Hobbs (Δ), a farmer-rancher, owned the livestock trailer. At the time of the accident, Yelli was hauling cattle for Δ.
IMPORTANT: The right of control is the chief factor in distinguishing an employment relationship from that of an independent contractor. An independent contractor is one who, in the course of an independent occupation or employment, undertakes work subject to the will or control of the person for whom the work is done only as to the result of the work and not as to the methods or means used.
Rudolph v. Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation
“Jet Skis out the BASS”
ISSUE: If you can’t foresee the victim, is there duty?
SYNOPSIS: Grand Canyon Bass Busters (GCBB) held a bass fishing tournament at a lake. A boat operated by James Kirkland collided with Π’s daughter’s jet ski, who died at the scene. Kirkland and his passenger, Phil Allen, were tournament participants that had 5 minutes to reach the one weigh station four miles away before the deadline of 1pm, and so were traveling at a speed in excess of forty miles per hour.
IMPORTANT:
A. Duty “arises out of the recognition that relations between individuals may impose upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other.”
B. There is no requirement that a foreseeable plaintiff must be connected with or personally known to the defendant for a duty to exist. All persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct.
C. [W]hether the risk was unreasonable…merges with foreseeability to set the scope of the duty of reasonable care.
Reed v. Tacoma Ry. & P. Co
“Fucking up doesn’t make you a fuckup”
ISSUE: Does contributory negligence bar action?
SYNOPSIS: Π’s daughter’s car was struck by the Δ’s streetcar when crossing over the tracks in front of him.
IMPORTANT: The correct test is whether “the person act[ed] as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under similar circumstances.” The mere fact that one errs in judgment is not conclusive proof that he did not act as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under like circumstances. One may be mistaken as to the best course to pursue without being guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
Edwards v. Johnson
“Women: Lock’n’Load”
ISSUE: Different standards for women?
SYNOPSIS: Π went to Δ’s back door at 9:30pm on business as he had done before. The house was dark. Δ was at home alone with her three kids. Π knew that her husband was away on business. Δ had heard of prowlers recently in the neighborhood. Hearing the knock, she loaded her shotgun, cocked it, and went to the back door. She went to open the curtain with her left hand, accidentally striking the barrel of the gun against the door and discharging it.
IMPORTANT: Consider “Reasonable Woman” idea as well as the “emergency” suggested by court.
Foster v. Strutz
“Ruining Foster’s Strutz”
ISSUE: What constitutes emergency?
SYNOPSIS: Π was standing alongside a pickup. Five assailants approached Δs’ car, striking the man through the open window. The male Δ shielded the female Δ, who was in the driver’s seat, by pulling her down into his lap. One man hits the gearshift, knocking it into reverse. Δ hits the accelerator, believing the car will go forward. It reverses, crushing Π’s foot between the bumper and side of the pickup truck.
IMPORTANT: If you make a mistake in an emergency situation, as long as the mistake was reasonable, there may be no negligence. A sudden emergency is “an event that requires, if not an instantaneous response, certainly something fairly close to that.” The emergency wasn’t sudden (they had ten to fifteen seconds to react).
Bashi v. Wodarz
“Crazy Car Can’t Clear”
ISSUE: Sudden onset disability isn’t liable. Insanity?
SYNOPSIS: Δ was involved in a rear-end auto accident. She left the scene without stopping. Later she was involved in a second automobile accident with Πs. Δ doesn’t remember the event & claims she had no control of her actions at that time due to a sudden occurrence of mental problems, for which she claims a family history of.
IMPORTANT: Cohen v. Petty says that between an innocent passenger and an innocent fainting driver, the former must suffer. HOWEVER, a person of unsound mind, of whatever degree, is civilly liable for a wrong done by the person, but is not liable in exemplary damages unless at the time of the act the person was capable of knowing that the act was wrongful.
Robinson v. Lindsay
“Rule of Thumb for Snowmobiles”
ISSUE: Standard of Care
SYNOPSIS: Π lost full use of a thumb in a snowmobile accident when 11. Δ was 13 and was the driver.
IMPORTANT: When the activity a child engages in is inherently dangerous or adult in nature, as is the operation of powerful mechanized vehicles, the child will be held to an adult standard of care. This rule protects the need of children to be children but at the same time discourages immature individuals from engaging in inherently dangerous activities.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
“All float on…until you sink”
ISSUE: How to determine the standard of care and establish negligence.
SYNOPSIS: Δ had several barges. One of them (Anna C) was left by its Bargee for 21 hours. It got loose & crashed into a tanker, causing that tanker’s propeller to break a hole in the barge near the bottom. The Anna C “careened, dumped her cargo…, and sank.”
IMPORTANT: Hand’s risk calculus!
Hagerman Construction, Inc. v. Copeland
“Deconstructing Copeland”
“Nothing But Net…Wait, No Net.”
ISSUE: Is that evidence regarding other projects is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial?
SYNOPSIS: Δ, an experienced ironworker employed by Beasley (a subcontractor of Π), fell to his death through an unprotected opening in the precast concrete nearly forty-five feet above the ground. Court allowed two expert witnesses to testify regarding contractual responsibility for safety as well as custom/practice, and three construction workers to testify about other projects and that the general contractor typically covers openings.
IMPORTANT: The conduct of other persons in substantially similar conditions may be relevant to the reasonableness, under the circumstances, of a particular individual’s acts or omissions. This is relevant to establish standard of care. Custom is well known and predictable, as well as changes with the community.
Trimarco v. Klein
“Pain in the Glass”
ISSUE: Regardless of statutes not being retroactive, does availability and changing custom transform the standards of care?
SYNOPSIS: As Π was in the process of sliding the glass door (untreated and untempered) on the shower open, it shattered. Π used expert testimony, safety standards, and customs to support the case.
IMPORTANT: “What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.” Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behymer.
1. When proof of an accepted practice is accompanied by evidence that the defendant conformed to it, this may establish due care.
2. When proof of a customary practice is coupled with a showing that it was ignored and that this departure was a proximate cause of the accident, it may serve to establish liability.
The T.J. Hooper
“Radio Killed the…not-radio?”
ISSUE: Whether a lack of custom is a defense against negligence.
SYNOPSIS: Two barges picked up cargoes, towed by two tugs. Weather was good when they left, ended up bad. They did not carry radio receiving sets. No customs for radios. Trial judge found that all of the vessels were unseaworthy.
IMPORTANT: Custom is not a bar for negligence. The ruling incentivizes new technology and standards.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman
“Runaway Train, Never Coming Back”
ISSUE: Whether due care (usually a matter for the fact-finder, i.e. jury) should be decided by judge who asserts a clear standard of conduct.
SYNOPSIS: Π was struck and killed by one of Δ’s trains as he was driving across a railroad crossing. Π’s view of the crossing was blocked and he did not stop, look, or listen for approaching trains.
IMPORTANT: If you know you could be killed, you have to stop. Judges, refusing to give a case to a jury, override the jury standard (controversial).
Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co.
“Back-train-tracking”
ISSUE: What criteria must courts of law use in establishing a standard of prudent conduct as a rule of law?
SYNOPSIS: Π approached a Wabash (Δ) railroad crossing in his truck. Π stopped and looked and listened as well as he could. Π heard no bell or whistle and drove slowly ahead and was struck by a passenger train.
IMPORTANT: It is up to the jury to decide whether a particular course of action was prudent under the circumstances. The standard for measuring negligence is conduct that falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of harm. That standard must be determined by the fact finder (jury) on a case by case basis. The negligence standard never changes; it is only the circumstances that change and how a reasonable person acts under them.
Ferrell v. Baxter
“Road Rules Challenge”
ISSUE: Statutes can establish Prima Facie negligence.
SYNOPSIS: Collision between Joan Farrell (Δ1) and a mack truck owned by Sea-Land, Inc. (Δ2) driven by Melvin Greaves (Δ3). Δ1 drove; Π was front passenger. The road was icy. Δ3 said the car was speeding and over the line because he was eight inches from the snow berm on the side of the road, leaving sixteen inches of room. Π says truck was over the line and that Δ1 was paying attention to the road, not speeding. State trooper said the point of impact was in the truck’s lane. Δ1 said she “must have” unintentionally put her foot on the brake.
IMPORTANT: Jury instruction gave statutes on speed and driving on the right side, and that violations would establish a prima facie case that the defendant was negligent.
Negligence per se: Violation of statute (representing the standard of care) becomes negligence insofar as breach of duty unless excuse can be provided. Causation still must be considered as the breach may not be connected to the duty.
Wright v. Brown
“Dog Bites Man, Man Sues County”
ISSUE: How to determine if statutes apply. SYNOPSIS: Δ's dog attacked one person, which resulted in its quarantine. Let off prior to the expiration of the statutory fourteen-day quarantine period. Dog then bites Π. Π alleged that co-Δ allowed the dog to roam freely, creating unreasonable danger in contravention of the statute. The complaint also stated a cause of action for negligence, alleging that the co-Δ failed to comply with the standard of conduct required by the local statute. IMPORTANT: That principle of the law sets forth two conditions which must coexist before statutory negligence can be actionable. First, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons protected by the statute. Second, the injury must be of the type which the statute was intended to prevent.
