3. Alcohol, Drugs & Mental Health Flashcards
What can you do with Section 20 of MODA?
A constable may enter and search a place or vehicle without a warrant if he or she has reasonable grounds— (a) to believe that it is not practicable to obtain a warrant and that in or on the place or vehicle there is— (i) a controlled drug specified or described in Schedule 1 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975; or (ii) a controlled drug specified or described in Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975; or (iii) a controlled drug specified or described in Part 1 of Schedule 3 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975; or (iv) a precursor substance specified or described in Part 3 of Schedule 4 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975; and (b) to suspect that in or on the place or vehicle an offence against the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed, in respect of that controlled drug or precursor substance; and (c) to believe that, if the entry and search is not carried out immediately, evidential material relating to the suspected offence will be destroyed, concealed, altered, or damaged.
What can you do with section 21 of MODA?
(1)A constable may, in the circumstances set out in subsection (2), search a person without a warrant. (2) The circumstances are that the constable has reasonable grounds— (a) to believe that the person is in possession of — (i) a controlled drug specified or described in Schedule 1 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975; or (ii) a controlled drug specified or described in Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975; or (iii) a controlled drug specified or described in Part 1 of Schedule 3 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975; or (iv) a precursor substance specified or described in Part 3 of Schedule 4 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975; and (b) to suspect that an offence against the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed, in respect of that controlled drug or precursor substance. (3) This section does not— (a) limit section 20 or 21; or (b) authorise a constable to enter or search a place or vehicle except in accordance with those sections
Explain section 124 of MODA
(1)Unless authorised by another enactment, an enforcement officer must not conduct an internal search of any part of the body of any person, except for, with the person’s consent, searching the person’s mouth. (2) A constable must not require any other person to conduct an internal search of any part of the body of any person, except as provided in section 23 (which relates to internal searches in some circumstances of people under arrest for offences against the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975)
When may you search a person in relation to drugs?
People found in or on places or vehicles If you are conducting a search of a place or vehicle under section 20 (relates to some Misuse of Drugs offences -see the Warrantless powers to search places, vehicles and things chapter) you may, without a warrant, search any person found in or on the place or vehicle. (s21) Warrantless searches of people suspected of drug offences You may search a person without a warrant if you have reasonable grounds to: • believe a person is in possession of: − a controlled drug specified or described in Schedule 1, Part 1 of Schedule 2, or Part 1 of Schedule 3 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, or − a precursor substance specified or described in Part 3 of Schedule 4, and • suspect that an offence against the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 has been, is being, or is about to be committed in respect of that controlled drug or precursor substance. (s22) Approval for drug related searches Unless impracticable in the circumstances, obtain approval from a sergeant or above before exercising this warrantless search power.
What is an internal search?
A constable, authorised officer or searcher may conduct a visual examination (whether or not facilitated by any instrument or device designed to illuminate or magnify) of the mouth, nose, and ears, but must not insert any instrument, device, or thing into any of those orifices. A visual examination in these circumstances is not an “internal search” and is permitted as part of a rub-down search. (s87)
Who may conduct an internal search?
An internal search must be conducted by a registered medical practitioner
When can an internal search be required?
A constable can only require a person to permit a medical practitioner to conduct an internal examination in circumstances listed in section 23 of the Act. They relate to people under arrest for some offences against the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 and when the constable has reasonable grounds to believe the person has certain property secreted within their body
Explain Hoete v R (2013) CRNZ 429 Reasonable grounds for belief, formerly s18(2) MDA, now s 20 Search & Surveillance Act 2012
Following receipt of a 111 call from a petrol station attendant in Karaka in December 2011, the police attended and found Mr Mackenzie in his parked motor vehicle. Acting on the 111 call, further information provided by the attendant at the scene, notification of Mackenzie’s previous involvement with methamphetamine, the location of his vehicle (behind the petrol station) and observations of him, the police conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle under s 18(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975. The search of the car revealed, along with methamphetamine, related paraphernalia, and precursor chemicals, a search of Mackenzie’s person also revealed a camera memory card. Subsequently, in January 2012, the memory card was examined by police using a computer. It contained images of methamphetamine manufacturing and information that led police to identify Ms Hoete’s house as the location of that activity. As a result of the information received by police from the search of Mackenzie’s vehicle and the examination of the memory card, the appellants were charged with manufacturing methamphetamine and various possession charges. The warrantless search of the vehicle was considered in this case, along with the admissibility of evidence obtained from a total of three searches. The Court of Appeal did not accept the appellants’ arguments as to a lack of reasonable grounds for the warrantless search and commented in summary: “It is well-established that the question whether a constable has reasonable grounds for holding the requisite belief is to be determined objectively see R v Laugalis (1993) 10 CRM√NZ 350 (CA), and that: Such belief may be based on the cumulative effect of multiple factors see R v Yeh [2007] NZCA 580; the belief must be held by either the searching officer or the superior officer who ordered the warrantless search, at least where that officer is directly involved in the search; R v Grace 1989 1 NZLR 197 202, R v Taylor (1193) 10 CRNZ (CA), at 395 and information given to the searching officer or to the superior officer who ordered the search is relevant in the assessment of whether there were reasonable grounds for the belief being held. see Yeung v R [2010] NZCA 605, [36]-[42] Held Hoete failed to establish sufficient grounds to support appeals; Police had grounds to conduct warrantless search under s18(2) MDA. Police had no reasonable basis to examine and subsequently seize the memory card; the District Court therefore erred in not finding that evidence improperly obtained, however the court correctly declared evidence admissible at trial regardless that improperly obtained as probative value outweighed impropriety. Result Appeal dismissed.
Explain R v Merrett CA280/05, 3 March 2006 Reasonable grounds for belief, formerly s18(2) MDA, now s20 Search & Surveillance Act 2012
This case involved an unsuccessful appeal by M against ruling that evidence found during search admissible; police searched M’s home without warrant pursuant to s18(2) Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 and found items which led them to charge M with manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of precursor substances; M argued two main points: a) police did not have reasonable grounds for believing he was person referred to in tick list of known drug dealer; b) also unreasonable to believe package containing drugs would be at M’s home given five-day delay since its delivery to premises of M’s father and M’s father’s inability to say when package removed from his premises. While the court found that there were reasonable grounds for (a) above, there were not reasonable grounds for believing that drugs would be found at the appellant’s home. The Court noted: “This is essentially a timing issue. Had the delay between delivery of the package and the police search been much shorter, we think reasonable grounds for belief would have existed. Equally, if Merrett had said that the package remained unopened at his premises until a short while before the detective’s visit, it would have been reasonable to believe that the drugs were still at the appellant’s premises. But this question must be approached realistically and on the basis that the appellant was a mere recipient for the importer. On this approach, it follows, in our view that the reasonable expectation must be that having taken possession of the package the appellant would have already given it to the importer or dealt with it in terms of the importer’s instructions. Hence, while there were grounds for suspecting the appellant’s involvement with the drugs, there was no objective basis to support a reasonable belief the drugs would still be at the premises. Held Search unreasonable even though police had genuine subjective belief in its legitimacy and were required to act quickly. This case also concerned the admission of evidence gathered, and given the circumstances in which police required to make decision, exclusion of evidence would be disproportionate to breach of right involved; appeal dismissed.
Explain Hill v AttorneyGeneral (1990) 6 CRNZ 219 (CA) – Reasonable grounds for belief, formerly s18(2) MDA, now s20 Search & Surveillance Act 2012
A taxi owned by Hill was stopped by traffic officers shortly after midnight. The police were called and searched the taxi without warrant under the Misuse of Drugs Act. Hill later began civil proceedings on a variety of grounds, but was unsuccessful. In the course of his appeal to the Court of Appeal the lawfulness of the search for drugs was considered by the Court. Held At the relevant time the relevant part of s 18(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act provided as follows: “(2) where any member of the police has reasonable ground for believing that there is in or on any … vehicle … any controlled drug specified or described in the First Schedule or in Part I of the Second Schedule or in Part I of the Third Schedule to the Act and that an offence against this Act has been or is suspected of having been committed in respect of that drug, he … may enter and search the … vehicle and any person found therein or thereon as if authorised to do so by a search warrant issued under section 198 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 and by subsection (1) of this section.” (See now s20 Search and Surveillance Act 2012) Just as it has provided safeguards for the proper use and monitoring of a search warrant under s18(2), so too has the legislation carefully limited the subject matter. It is not every controlled drug to which the subsection may apply. It is only those falling within the First Schedule, Part I of the Second Schedule and Part I of the Third Schedule. To put it more directly, parliament has deliberately excluded any application of s18(2) to the Class B drugs in Parts II and III of the Second Schedule and of Class C drugs in Parts II to VI of the Third Schedule. The right to search without warrant is triggered only when there is an objective belief that one of the drugs expressly included in the First Schedule or in Part I of the other Schedules is present. In reply to a question in cross-examination, the sergeant who carried out the search said that he did not know what drug he was looking for and this it did not matter as he had good cause to suspect drugs were in the car. “Reasonable grounds for believing” for the purposes of s18(2) is not limited to personal observations of the officer concerned. He was also entitled to act on credible information put before him by others. In weighing the probability of the information supplied to him, the sergeant was entitled to have regard to the time, place and circumstances of the transaction which had been reported to him. In the light of the information there was an apparent disposal of a drug in the form of a white substance, presumably powder, in plastic bags traded on the street in exchange for money or other value. “Reasonable grounds for believing” for the purposes of s18(2) is not limited to personal observations of the officer concerned. He was also entitled to act on credible information put before him by others. In weighing the probability of the information supplied to him, the sergeant was entitled to have regard to the time, place and circumstances of the transaction which had been reported to him. In the light of the information there was an apparent disposal of a drug in the form of a white substance, presumably powder, in plastic bags traded on the street in exchange for money or other value. While there were reasonable grounds for believing the transaction involved a controlled drug, the sergeant did not know what the drug was and there was nothing in the evidence as to the transaction itself to justify the inference that he had reasonable cause to believe that it was a controlled drug to which s18(2) applied. What the sergeant was told could afford reasonable grounds for belief that an appropriate drug was likely to be in the vehicle. The difficulty arose in his crossexamination when it became clear he had not directed his mind beyond the possibility, that the transaction involved prohibited drugs of some kind. The Act requires that decision to search be made on more specific grounds of belief than that. It is not necessary for the police officer to repeat the exact words of the section in his evidence about his belief; the Court can draw appropriate inferences from the circumstances about his state of mind. But in this case the sergeant had precluded this by his answers in cross-examination. Comment The decision emphasises the specific nature of the power to search for drugs without warrant. The power applies only to those well-known drugs in the First Schedule and the first Parts of the Second and Third Schedules – and, since 2006, to specific precursor substances. “Reasonable ground for belief” will usually be a two step process: • First, are there reasonable grounds for believing a controlled drug is in the house, vehicle etc, in respect of which an offence against the Act has been or is being committed; AND • Second, are there reasonable grounds for believing the drug involved is one of those specified. In most cases there should be little difficulty in forming the second belief on reasonable ground. The information prompting the search will often identify the drug involved. It would be helpful, however, for all members to keep abreast of the packaging and distribution methods used locally and the types of controlled drugs which are currently available. The searching officer does not need to know the identity of the drug, just that there are “reasonable grounds for believing” it is involved. In the Hill case the sergeant’s evidence was that he did not turn his mind to this issue.
Explain Collins v Police [2007] BCL 56 Search: demeanour, appearance and “reasonable grounds to believe”
Background This was an appeal against conviction in the District Court on two charges of possessing Class A Drugs (methamphetamine and cocaine) contrary to s7(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975. The prosecutions arose following the search of a vehicle in down town Auckland in the early hours of a Sunday morning. The issue was whether police had proper grounds for conducting the search under s 18(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, that is; did the searchers have reasonable grounds to believe there were drugs in the vehicle. (See now s20 Search and Surveillance Act 2012) The driver of the vehicle was approached by two officers when he happened to park up after being seen driving at 10 to 15 kph in a vehicle with expired registration with a wide-eyed gaze. The constable observed, during the kerb side conversation, that the accused was dry swallowing; rubbing his tongue over his lips, and was nervous and anxious. The constable said the signs were consistent with a person who had recently consumed methamphetamine. The second officer, a sergeant with 28-years experience including two years patrolling the CBD and focusing on drug offending, described a fidgety and nervous person, reluctant to maintain eye contact, with very slim build and grey complexion with eyes wide and glazed. He said there were common signs of someone who had recently used methamphetamine. The decision The High Court found that evidence of demeanour and appearance, whilst perhaps warranting strong grounds for suspicion and, seemingly, an actual belief in the consumption by the officers concerned, did not provide police with reasonable grounds for the belief under the Act. The court found the problem with accepting the lawfulness of the search in these circumstances was the symptoms were also symptoms that could be exhibited by persons who have consumed drugs lawfully obtained and that nervousness can be experienced by innocent people being interviewed by the police in public. The conviction was quashed. Comment Although each case will be decided on its facts, evidence of demeanour and appearance alone is unlikely to justify a search under the Search and Surveillance Act provisions or, indeed, any other police procedure requiring reasonable belief on the part of an officer.
Explain R v T (1996) 3 HRNZ 77 (CA) internal search, see now s 124 Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (formerly s18A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975)
Facts Police executed a search warrant at certain premises. After the police had gained entry it appeared to the officers that the appellant, who was inside, had something concealed in her mouth. The appellant was restrained and told to spit the object out. She refused, and made a further attempt to swallow the item. The appellant was then laid face-first on a bed and again was told to spit out the object. Eventually she spat out a large roll of Glad wrap which was later found to contain 17 morphine sulphate tablets. Appeal The appellant was charged with possession for supply of a Class B controlled drug. She argued on appeal that the package was obtained by unlawful means amounting to unreasonable search and seizure in breach of her rights under section 21 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act. The unlawfulness relied upon was contravention of what is now s 124 Search and Surveillance Act 2012. Decision The Court of Appeal confirmed the finding in the District Court that there had not been an internal search within the ambit of the section. The prohibition in the section is of a manual or visual examination of the interior of the mouth and does not prohibit the viewing of what can be seen by normal observation of the face, and when the mouth is open for speech. The Court noted that the purpose of the section is to prevent invasion of the body contrary to accepted standards of dignity and privacy and, although the police had restrained the appellant (to prevent her swallowing) their conduct had not amounted to an internal examination. Comment This decision is consistent with previous decisions involving mere observations by police rather than searches per se and accords with common sense. Clearly not every observation attracts the need for statutory authority or a search warrant. Actions following an observation, however, should not go beyond what is reasonably necessary to carry out any authorised search, and should never put the suspect in any form of physical danger.
Explain R v Roulston [1998] 2 NZLR 468 – internal search, see now s 124 Search & Surveillance Act 2012 (formerly s18A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975)
The appellant was strip-searched by police pursuant to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975. In the course of removing his underpants a small package subsequently found to contain restricted drugs was seen in the crutch of his underpants. The appellant placed the package in his mouth. It appeared to the constable that the appellant was attempting to swallow it. A struggle ensued during which police officers applied force to the appellant’s neck and head area, closing his nostrils and depressing his throat. The appellant opened his mouth to shout out and the package was ejected on to the floor where it was seized by a police officer. On the balance of probabilities the Court found that the appellant’s motive for placing the package in his mouth was in order to provoke an internal search of his mouth by the police in contravention of what is now s 124 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 in the expectation or hope of successfully challenging the admissibility of critical evidence. The Court found on the balance of probabilities that the primary purpose for the officers’ action was to induce the appellant to eject the package but behind that primary purpose, the officers wished both to prevent him from ingesting the drugs putting his life and health at risk and to secure and preserve the evidence. The appellant argued that the evidence should be inadmissible. He argued that the actions of the police • amounted to at least an attempt to conduct an internal search in contravention of the section; • were an unreasonable search in breach of s21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; and • amounted to cruel and degrading treatment contrary to s9 and s23(5) New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Held (1) An internal search was not completed as neither of the constables put their fingers or any instrument into the appellant’s mouth. It was unrealistic to suggest that what occurred was an internal search in that the police were attempting to conduct an internal search but, because of the appellant’s efforts to resist them, they were unable to carry it out. Rather, the police attempt to seize the package was interrupted by the appellant placing it in his mouth and the police endeavoured to prevent him swallowing the package. It would be artificial to classify this incident in the course of a lawful search as an “internal search” or an attempt to undertake an internal search. (2) One of the officers’ concerns was fear for the appellant’s safety should he be permitted to swallow the package. In seeking to prevent him doing so they used no more force than reasonably necessary. In the context, it could not be said that the search or seizure of the drug was unreasonable. In reaching this conclusion regard could be had to s41 Crimes Act 1961, the plain meaning of which was to provide persons with justification in using such force as is reasonably necessary in circumstances where that force is required to prevent a suicide or the commission of any offence likely to cause immediate and serious injury to the person or property of anyone. (3) It was far-fetched to argue that the actions of the police amounted to cruel and degrading treatment contrary to s9 and s23(5) New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Appeal dismissed Observation Where a person being searched deliberately places a drug in the mouth to avoid it being seized or to provoke the police into the use of force, there is no persuasive case for preventing the police using reasonable force to take possession of the drug, particularly in view of the operation of s41 Crimes Act 1961 which provides justification for the use of force as may be reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of suicide or of an offence which would be likely to cause immediate and serious injury to the person or property of anyone. In this case, the suspect, by placing the drug in the mouth, placed his health or life at such risk, justifying the appropriate use of force by the officers concerned.
Explain Sneller v Police [2007] NZAR 405 (High Court) obstruction, internal search, see now s 124 Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (formerly s18A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975
Facts In this case S appealed successfully from conviction for wilfully obstructing a constable acting in the execution of powers under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, when he refused to spit something out of his mouth when requested, and a resulting lengthy physical struggle failed to overcome his resistance (though the application of pepper spray resulted in S expelling chewed pieces of some substance like plastic wrap which produced negative results on drug tests). The HC noted that the power of search of persons in what is now s124 Search and Surveillance Act 2012 is limited as regards internal searches, which require the person’s consent if an internal search of the mouth is to be undertaken. It held that, given the elements of the section and applying R v Tupara ((1996) 3 HRNZ 77 (CA) forcing a mouth open to permit inspection constitutes an internal search and therefore requires consent, a duty to co-operate by opening the mouth and spitting out, which in effect overrides the protections of the provision, cannot be implied. Passive resistance rather than obstruction was involved here and S had acted with lawful excuse. Held S was entitled to decline to allow police to undertake internal search of his mouth and no specific power in MDA entitling police to require S to spit out contents of his mouth. S was not obstructing police when he passively declined to spit out item. In the circumstances, police case did not fail due to failure to produce actual warrant because S’s counsel did not challenge police witnesses as to whether warrant existed and what were its terms; appeal allowed
What is a hazardous substance?
(a) With one or more of the following intrinsic properties: (i) Explosiveness: (ii) Flammability: (iii) A capacity to oxidise: (iv) Corrosiveness: (v) Toxicity (including chronic toxicity): (vi) Eco-toxicity, with or without bioaccumulation; or (b) Which on contact with air or water (other than air or water where the temperature or pressure has been artificially increased or decreased) generates a substance with any one or more of the properties specified in paragraph (a) of this definition
What is the meaning of term “new organism”?
A new organism is— a) An organism belonging to a species that was not present in New Zealand immediately before 29 July 1998: b) An organism belonging to a species, subspecies, infrasubspecies, variety, strain, or cultivar prescribed as a risk species, where that organism was not present in New Zealand at the time of promulgation of the relevant regulation: c) An organism for which a containment approval has been given under this Act: ca) an organism for which a conditional release approval has been given: cb) a qualifying organism approved for release with controls: d) A genetically modified organism: e) An organism that belongs to a species, subspecies, infrasubspecies, variety, strain, or cultivar that has been eradicated from New Zealand
In Section 135, what does “Emergency” and “enforcement officer” mean?
Emergency means— (a) Actual or imminent danger to human health or safety; or (b) A danger to the environment or chattels so significant that immediate action is required to remove the danger— arising from a hazardous substance or new organism: Enforcement officer includes any constable, and any employee, volunteer, or contractor of Fire and Emergency New Zealand exercising powers under the Fire and Emergency New Zealand Act 2017
Explain Section 136 – Declaration of emergency
Where any enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that— (a) there is an emergency; and (b) Either, — (i) no state of emergency has been declared under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002; or (ii) the emergency is not being dealt with under the Fire and Emergency New Zealand Act 2017; or (iii) no emergency has been declared under section 144 of the Biosecurity Act 1993; or (iv) no other enforcement officer has declared an emergency under this Act; and (c) All or any of the powers set out in section 137 of this Act should be exercised in order to — (i) enter any premises or dwelling; or (ii) remove the cause of the emergency; or (iii) stabilise the situation to limit the actual or likely adverse effects of the emergency; or (iv) protect the health and safety of people, chattels, or the environment from the actual or likely adverse effects of any emergency,— the enforcement officer may declare a hazardous substance or new organisms emergency. (2) A hazardous substance or new organisms emergency shall be declared by the enforcement officer by — (a) identifying himself or herself to any persons in the vicinity; and (b) stating his or her authority to exercise emergency powers; and (c) announcing the nature of the emergency and the area likely to be affected. (3) Every enforcement officer shall notify — (a) The person who appointed him or her as an enforcement officer, if he or she was appointed under section 98 of this Act; and (b) The Authority — of every occasion on which a hazardous substances or new organisms emergency is declared by that officer under this section. (4) Any emergency declared under this section shall cease — (a) 48 hours after the time of declaration; or (b) when a state of emergency is declared under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002; or (c) when the emergency is treated by Fire and Emergency New Zealand as an emergency under the Fire and Emergency New Zealand Act 2017; or (d) when an emergency is declared under section 144 of the Biosecurity Act 1993, — whichever is the sooner. (5) Where the conditions which caused the emergency to be declared under subsection (1) of this section still exist 48 hours after the time of declaration of the emergency and the emergency has not been treated as an emergency under any of the provisions in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of subsection (4) of this section, one further declaration of emergency may be made under this Act and the provisions of subsection (4) of this section shall apply accordingly. (6) Any emergency declared under this section shall have effect over the area specified under subsection (2)(c) of this section. Note: ‘The Authority’ referred to in s136 (3) (b) is: The Environmental Protection Authority.
What may an Enforcement officer do under Section 137 – Emergency powers?
(1) When a hazardous substance or new organisms emergency has been declared under section 136 of this Act, any enforcement officer may— (a) enter any premises or any dwelling at any time without complying with the provisions of section 103 or section 119 of this Act: (b) exercise any of the powers set out in section 103 of this Act: (c) exercise any of the powers set out in section 119(5) of this Act: (d) direct any person to stop any activity which may contribute to the emergency: (e) request any person, either verbally or in writing, to take any action to prevent or limit the extent of the emergency: (f) direct any person to leave any place in the vicinity of the emergency: (g) direct any person to refrain from entering the vicinity of the emergency: (h) requisition any property for use in the emergency: (i) destroy any property or any other thing in order to prevent or limit the extent of the emergency: (j) secure the site for up to 24 hours following the decision of the enforcement officer that the immediate danger is past. (2) If an enforcement officer enters any private property pursuant to the powers conferred by subsection (1) of this section, he or she shall advise the occupier of the property as soon as practicable.
What does Section 267 under the Sale & Supply of alcohol act allow us to do?
A constable or an inspector may at any reasonable time enter and inspect any licensed premises, or any part of any licensed premises, to ascertain whether the licensee is complying with the provisions of this Act and the conditions of the licence. (2) A constable or an inspector may at any time enter and inspect any licensed premises when he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that any offence against this Act is being committed on those licensed premises. Continued on next page 22 Chapter 3 of 10: Drugs, Alcohol and Mental Health, Core Policing Knowledge – June 2023 Senior sergeant syllabus Section 267 – Powers of entry on licensed premises continued (3) For the purposes of exercising the power conferred by this section, a constable or an inspector may— (a) require the production of any licence, or any book, notice, record, list, or other document that is required by this Act to be kept, and examine and make copies of it; and (b) Require the licensee or manager to provide any information or assistance reasonably required by a constable or an inspector relating to any matter within the duties of the licensee or manager. (4) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of not more than $2,000 who, without reasonable excuse,— (a) refuses or fails to admit to any licensed premises any constable or inspector who demands entry under this section; or (B delays unreasonably in admitting to any licensed premises any constable or inspector who demands entry under this section. (5) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of not more than $2,000 who, being the licensee or a manager of any licensed premises, without reasonable excuse, refuses or fails— (a) to produce the licence or any document when required to do so under subsection (3)(a); or (b) To provide any assistance or information when required to do so under subsection (3) (b)
What does Section 269 of the Sale & Supply of alcohol act allow us to do?
A constable who has reasonable cause to suspect that any person has committed or is committing or is attempting to commit any offence against this Act may require the person to provide particulars of his or her name and address and date of birth. (2) A constable who believes on reasonable grounds that any particulars provided on requirement under subsection (1) are false may require the person concerned to provide satisfactory evidence of the particulars. (3) If any person, without reasonable excuse, refuses or fails to provide any particulars or evidence when required to do so by a constable under this section, and persists in refusing or failing after being cautioned by the constable, he or she may be arrested, without warrant, by any constable. Continued on next page Chapter 3 of 10: Drugs, Alcohol and Mental Health, Core Policing Knowledge – June 2023 Senior sergeant syllabus 23 Section 269 – Power of Police to demand information continued (4) A person commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of not more than $2,000 who, having been required by any constable to provide any particulars or evidence under this section, without reasonable excuse,— (a) refuses or fails to provide the particulars or evidence; or (b) provides any particulars or evidence knowing that the particulars or evidence are false in a material respect
Define “Mental Disorder” according to Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, – mental disorder, in relation to any person, means an abnormal state of mind (whether of a continuous or an intermittent nature), characterised by delusions, or by disorders of mood or perception or volition or cognition, of such a degree that it – (a) Poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that person or of others; or (b) Seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of himself or herself; – and mentally disordered, in relation to any such person, has a corresponding meaning
Who can request assistance under Section 38 of Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992?
Anyone who believes that a person may be suffering from a mental disorder may at any time request the assistance of a duly authorised officer.
What must a DAO assisting under Section 38 of Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 do?
The duly authorised officer who receives the request must— (a) Investigate the matter to the extent necessary to satisfy himself or herself— (i) That the concern expressed by the maker of the request is genuine; and (ii) That there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person to whom the request relates may be suffering from a mental disorder; and Decide, on reasonable grounds, whether or not the person needs to have an examination urgently in the person’s own interests or the interests of any other person.
