3. Types of reform processes: elite majority imposition and elite-mass interaction

Question 1

benoit –> motivations for electoral system in three main types

Answer 1

self-interest derived explanation

general interest derived explanation

non-instrumental motivations

Question 2

self-interest derived preference explanation (benoit)

Answer 2

policy seeking

office seeking

personal gain

Question 3

policy seeking

Answer 3

parties push for electoral systems that will help them achieve certain policy goals

aim here = ensure that they have enough political power to pass laws and policies that align with their ideology / agenda

for example: proportional representation might give a party a strong enough presence in parliament to drive policy

Question 4

which type of reform is benoit

Answer 4

elite majority imposition.

his model: if political parties think they can benefit (win seats) by a new electoral system, they will implement a new electoral system.

people / principles / media / outside world do not exist

Question 5

office seeking

Answer 5

main goal is not necessarily to enact specific policies, but to hold as many seats as possible

= maximizing power in general sense

party will support the system that it thinks will give it the most seats in legislature.

might involve backing a system that favours larger parties / reduces competition from smaller ones

Question 6

personal gain

Answer 6

key individuals might influence electoral rules for personal gain or status (personally benefiting > party benefits)

could involve seeking leadership positions, securing inflluence, making deals.

acknowledges that internal party politics can play a significant role in decision-making, not just party strategy

Question 7

general interest derived explanations (benoit)

Answer 7

representation

governability

social / political engineering

other general motivations

Question 8

representation

Answer 8

parties might advocate for systems that they believe will lead to a fairer representation of different groups in society.

could mean supporting proportional representation (allows smaller parties / minorities to have a voice, instead of winner-takes all, which tend to favour larger parties).

Question 9

governability

Answer 9

focuses on the stability / efficiency of governance.

involves choosing an electoral system that will lead to a stable government capable of making decisions effectively (preferring systems that produce clear majorities, enabling a single party / coalition to govern without constant need for negotiation / compromise)

Question 10

social / political engineering

Answer 10

sometimes electoral systems are designed to manage conflicts between different social groups.

system might be chosen to encourage cooperation between ethnic groups or to prevent one group from dominating others.

in cases where conflict management is paramount, this may override other criteria in electoral system choice.

Question 11

non-instrumental motivations (benoit)

Answer 11

historical precedent

sociological

economic

technocratic decision

popular demand

external influences

idiosyncratic factors

Question 12

historical precedent

Answer 12

decisions about electoral systems can be influenced by the past.

in moments of crisis, political actors may look back to what worked during previous periods.

= can lead to a revival of old systems as a way to legitimize current system.

Question 13

sociological

Answer 13

consider the social composition of a country (ethnic / religious diversity) which might push for electoral systems that take these factors into account.

Question 14

economic

Answer 14

economic conditions / pressures can shape political institutions.

a country’s reliance on international trade or the strength of particular economic sectors might influence the choice of electoral systems that favour stability.

Question 15

technocratic decision

Answer 15

sometimes electoral systems are designed by experts who choose based on technical criteria like efficiency, ease of implementation, or administrative capacity, rather than political concerns.

= decisions made by committees or outside experts, may prioritize functionality over strategy.

Question 16

popular demand

Answer 16

change of electoral institutions by popular demand may occur when the normal process for institutional reform is bypassed and placed before the public in the form of a plebiscite.

Question 17

external influences

Answer 17

foreign powers / international organizations / colonial legacies can shape electoral choices.

a country might inherit its electoral system from a former colonial power, or a new system might be recommended or imposed by international actors during political transitions.

Question 18

idiosyncratic factors

Answer 18

electoral systems are shaped by unique, one-off events / chance occurrences / influential personalities, or particular historical moments.

Question 19

benoit his model of electoral system change

Answer 19

= seat-maximizing model

based on the assumption that the objective of political parties is to maximize their share of seats in the legislature.

– stability is achieved when no party coalition expects to gain from further adjustments

important: fiat power / decision rules / equilibrium

Question 20

fiat power

Answer 20

power a coalition holds to unilaterally change electoral laws

Question 21

decision rules

Answer 21

institutional thresholds required to alter electoral systems

the kind of majority that is needed to change or pass a law

can vary, is not fixed. determines how many votes yo need to have fiat power

Question 22

equilibrium

Answer 22

the system reaches stability when further modifications would not advantage any coalition.

Question 23

seat-maximizing model by Benoit in steps

Answer 23

1. common knowledge of electoral system alternatives
2. believes about relative political support
3. beliefs about expected seat shares under each electoral system alternative
4. seat-maximizing preference among electoral system alternatives
5. electoral system change

Question 24

which type of reform is renwick

Answer 24

elite-mass interaction

(the process whereby you can see that there is interaction between politicians and citizens)

= politicians / elites bypassed. Bottom-up process with gathering for example signatures

Question 25

elite-mass interactions: 3 steps

Answer 25

1. minority of politicians favours reforms (principled). they are not succesfull because the majority opposes the reforms 2. mass mobilization (inherent weakness, contingent crisis, strategic leadership) 3. public pressure causes minority to convince majority (act-contingent motivations +preference change) majority votes against their own interest, because they are worried about the next elections.

Question 26

difference act contingent / outcome contingent

Answer 26

act contingent = linked to the mere act of supporting a change, linked to public opinion. Also linked to the fear. Fear of media / opinion polls / the people (elections) outcome contingents = only the benefits matter

Question 27

act contingent and elite-mass interaction

Answer 27

linked to the fear. Fear of media / opinion polls / the people (elections). if there is more media attention, negative polls and election looming, it is more likely you see elite-mass interaction.

Question 28

what causes popular mobilization to occur around such an issue as reform of the electoral system

Answer 28

three factors: 1. inherent weaknesses in the prevailing system 2. contingent crises that focus attention on these weaknesses 3. strategic leadership

Question 29

why do politicians bow to popular pressure

Answer 29

answer lies in act contingency: politicians fear that they will lose votes at the next election if they ignore voters’ demands for change. cases suggest that other factors matter too: experiences gained during an extended reform process might change politicians own preferences

Question 30

onion model (jacobs)

Answer 30

political elites rank reforms according to their impact. includes inside-out reasoning and outside-in reasoning --> it is mostly about why and when do which types of electoral reform occur

Question 31

inside - out reasoning onion model

Answer 31

high impact changes are hard / the core. you only do that when you can maximize your benefits. when you do not benefit that much, you move further outside of the onion.

Question 32

outside - in reasoning onion model

Answer 32

pressured from outside (demonstrating), to show that you are responsive / doing something, you implement a small change. if they do not notice, you move further in. you can also first start at local level, then provincial, afterwards national level.

Question 33

act contingent motivation and onion model

Answer 33

the act of supporting a change looks good to voters. So politicians follow this thought.  

Question 34

onion model - public dissatisfaction

Answer 34

when confronted with public dissatisfaction or reformist politicians, non-reformist politicians are most likely to give up the outer layers and allow, for instance, an increase in the impact of preference votes

Question 35

onion-model - self interest

Answer 35

when politicians expect to maximize self-interest they will reason inside out and focus on the inner layers (the electoral reforms that political elites deem to have the greatest impact) and implement reforms affecting proportionality of the electoral system

Question 36

ranking types of reforms

Answer 36

major proportionality reform > minor proportionality reform > major ballot structure reform > minor ballot structure. first is the 'core', the last the 'outer layer'.

Question 37

theories about the field of major electoral reform / onion model

Answer 37

rational choice (seat-maximizing) sociological-institutionalist approach

Question 38

rational choice & onion model

Answer 38

Political parties will implement an electoral reform when 1. they have the required majority to do 2. such a reform would increase their seat share. political elites are primarily interested in the outcome of a reform political elites optimize political parties actively seek information about the consequences of reforms

Question 39

sociological-institutionalists approach & onion model

Answer 39

reforms occur as an elite response to popular demands for new forms of participation. political elites are always involved, but here they interact with the public opinion

Question 40

combination of theories

Answer 40

neither rational choice, nor sociological institutionalism by itself can explain all of the instances of major electoral reform --> combining needed when public dissatisfaction is high, one can expect reforms through elite mass interaction. conversely if there is little or no public dissatisfaction, government politicians can freely introduce a blatantly partisan electoral reform

Question 41

theories and the way of reasoning

Answer 41

Rational choice is connected to inside-out reasoning and sociological institutionalism to outside-in. the inner layers include the reforms that are perceived to have most impact and thus provide most opportunities to reformers who are driven by outcome-contingent motivations (rational). the sociological institutionalist considers reform to be an act of adapting to legitimacy of the system. they are expected to protect the inner layers even though they cannot ignore the pressure on them.