3.4.2 Dualist Theories - 5 markers Flashcards
(11 cards)
Outline Descartes’ indivisibility argument for substance dualism
Substance dualism is the theory of mind that claims that the mind and body are not identical, and that they are in fact two entirely different “substances”. The mind is a “thinking thing” which is non extended (does not take up space), and the body (like all physical things) is an “extended things” which does not think.
Descartes’ “indivisibility argument” for substance dualism goes as follows:
P1: All physical things are divisible
P2: The mind is not divisible
C1: Therefore, the mind is not a physical thing.
Explain Descartes’ conceivability argument for substance dualism
Substance dualism is the theory of mind that claims that the mind and body are not identical, and that they are in fact two entirely different “substances”. The mind is a “thinking thing” which is non extended (does not take up space), and the body (like all physical things) is an “extended things” which does not think.
Descartes’ concievability argument for substance dualism can be put formally:
P1: It is concievable for my mind to exist without my body.
P2: If it is conceivable for one thing to exist without the other, it is metaphysically possible for one thing to exist without the other.
C1: Therefore, it is metaphysically possible my mind to exist without my body.
P3: If it is metaphysically possible for one thing to exist without another, they are not identical
C2: Therefore, my mind is not identical with my body.
Explain how substance dualism and property dualism differ.
Substance dualists claim that there are nonphysical/immaterial/mental substances, i.e substances which don’t possess typical features of physical substances such as spatial dimensions and mass. WHILE…
Property substance dualists do not claim that there are non-physical/immaterial/mental
substances.
Substance dualists claim that all mental properties are non-physical properties of nonphysical/immaterial/mental substance.
WHILE…
Property dualists claim that some or all mental
properties (typically, phenomenal/intentional
properties) are non-physical properties of
physical/material substance (ordinarily claiming
that they are properties of brains/brain states).
Explain the conceptual interaction problem
Interactionism is a theory of causation, that argues that mental causation is two-way i.e. things that happen in the mind (mental events) cause things to happen in the brain (physical events), and things that happen in the brain cause things to happen in the mind. However, interactionism raises the problem of conceptual interaction, which can be put formally as such:
P1.Physical things only move if they are pushed.
P2.Only something that is extended and can touch the thing that is moved can exert such a force.
P3.But the mind has no extension, so it can’t touch the body.
C1.Therefore, the mind cannot move the body.
Explain interactionist dualism.
Interactionism is the theory that the mind and brain causally interact with each other. Interactionist dualists believe that events caused in the brain can cause things to happen in the mind, and that events in the mind can cause things to happen in the brain. This can be illustrated with a story of burning your finger on a hot pan involving both physical and mental things interacting in a causal sequence: I burn my finger on a hot pan. this causes nerve signals to travel to my brain, where C-fibres fire (Physical-to-Physical causation). The firing of C-fibres cause me to feel intense pain in my finger (Physical-to-mental causation). The feeling of pain makes we want to move my finger away from whatever burned me (Physical-to-mental causation). My desire to move my fingers causes motor neurones in my brain to fire (Mental-to-Physical causation) The motor neurones cause my arm to move away from the hot pan (Physical-to-Physical causation).
Outline Jackson’s knowledge/”Mary” argument for dualism
Dualism is the theory of mind that claims that the mental exists and is not identical to the physical.
Jackson’s knowledge/”Mary”argument for dualism can be put formally:
P1: Mary knows all the physical facts.
P2: When she leaves the room, Mary learns a new facts.
C1: Therefore, before she left the room, Mary did not know all facts.
C2: Therefore, there are non-physical facts.
P3: If there are non-physical facts, there are non-physical things.
C3: Therefore, there are non-physical things.
What do property dualists mean when they say that mental properties do not supervene on physical properties
Supervenience can be defined simply as “non-causal dependence”, or as Chalmers describes it “B-properties supervene on A-properties if no two possible situations are identical with respect to their A-properties while different in their B-properties”. To illustrate this otherwise, we could take the relationship between (a) the state of all pixels on the screen and (b) the picture on the screen, in this case, the picture supervenes on the pixels since every facts (properties) about the picture entirely depends on facts (properties) about the pixels. Property dualists deny this - they claim that even if we knew all of the physical facts (properties), there would still be an “explanatory gap”, that prevented us from discovering all mental facts (properties). So mental properties do not supervene on physical properties.
Explain how natural selection/evolution poses as a challenge for epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is the theory that mental states exist, they are caused by physical events, and they are causally inert (i.e. they have no effect on anything else). If epiphenomenalism is true, then there is no reason for why we have mental states. However, according to the theory of natural selection, biological organisms only have traits that increase their ability to survive or reproduce, so, if organisms have the traits they do because they were selected for, then surely there would be a reason for why we have mental states.
Explain the “problem of other minds” facing dualism.
Cartesian dualism holds that minds exist, and that they are not identical to bodies. This means that minds do not depend on bodies to exist.
This “problem of other minds” can be put formally as such:
P1: If dualism is correct then I have direct access to my own mental states but not to those of
others.
P2: All I can know of others is their behaviour (and even this is not known directly, but via my
mental representations of the external world).
P3: However, I am not in a position to know that any behaviours I observe are caused by mental states in others because (a) the relationship between a mental state and a behaviour is contingent; and (b) there is no epistemological route for me to the non-physical states of others.
C1: Therefore, I am unable to know that there are other minds than my own.
Explain how he argument from analogy can be used as a response to the problem of other minds
The argument from analogy claims that we can use the behaviour of other people to infer that they have minds too.
P1. I have a mind.
P2. I know from experience that my mental states cause my behaviour.
P3. Other people have bodies similar to mine and behave similarly to me in similar situations.
C1. Therefore, by analogy, their behaviour has the same type of cause as my behaviour, namely mental states.
C2. Therefore, other people have minds.
Explain Ryle’s claim that substance dualism makes a “category mistake”
A category mistake is where we assign a concept in the wrong logical category because we were misled by the grammar of language.
Ryle thinks that substance dualist makes a category mistake— he argues that substance dualists assigns the mind in the wrong logical category as “parts of the human organism” rather than “ways that the human organism is behaving.” As Oxford university is a way of describing how all buildings in Oxford function together (rather than an additional building in Oxford), so too the mind is a way of describing how our bodies act (rather than an additional part of us).
