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SAMS Comps > TOA Authors > Flashcards

TOA Authors Flashcards

1
Q

James N Rosenau

A
  • 1924-2011
  • Thinking Theory Thoroughly
  • Emperical - what something “is” – descriptive
  • Value - what something “ought” to be – prescriptive
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2
Q

Peter L. Berger

A
  • 1929 -
  • Individuals are “not born a member of society. He is born with a predisposition toward sociality, and becomes a member of society
  • Higher vs lower self
    • Higher: courage, social norms of eating
    • Lower: fear of death, hunger
  • Institutionalization is the foundation for the social construction of reality.
  • To be in society is to participate in its dialectic.
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3
Q

Kenneth N. Waltz

A
  • 1924 - 2013
  • American Poly Sci; taught at UC Berkeley & Columbia
  • Founder of neo-realism or structural realism
  • Neo-realism = power is the most important thing in international politics
  • Three images
    • 1st: Human nature drive society; logic does not necessarily contribute
    • 2nd: Internal affiars affect external affairs
    • 3rd: States must rely on itself to govern, exercise and prevent war. States that have similar views will not go to war. State policies depend on each other’s policies
  • Passion is more important than reason in going to war
  • Other factors that promote war besides government (economy, etc)
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4
Q

Thomas S. Kuhn

A
  • 1922-1996
  • Rules vs paradigms vs normal science
  • Things that create paradigm changes
    • Discoveries (constructive-destructive)
    • Invention of new theories
    • Crisis state (failure)
  • To accept a new paradim, you must reject another
  • Reasons to not accept
    • No reason to attempt to disprove
    • event could be an anomaly or counter-instance
  • Three types of phenomena that cause development of new theories
    • Existing paradigms with divergence from
    • Paradigms whose details can only be understood by further theory articulation
    • Anomalies that continuously fail to assimilate into existing paradigms
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5
Q

John Lewis Gaddis

A
  • 1941 -
  • Historians don’t want to predict the future like scientists, economists, sociologists, etc. (but he does talk about forecasting)
  • Thesis:
    • We should learn from the past since it is our only database
    • We should do so systematically
  • Doesn’t like time travel (e.g. Bill & Ted)
    • Selectivity - pick exactly when, where, and the scope
    • Simultaneity - analyzing multiple points in time at once
    • Scale - shift form macro to micro and back
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6
Q

Charles Tilly

A
  • 1929 - 2008
  • US Navy, PhD in Sociology (BA from Havard)
  • Capital locations create cities; coercion creates states
  • For military eras
    • Patrimonialism (<1500) - militias
    • Brokerage (14-1700) - mercenaries
    • Nationalization: (17-1850) - mass armies & navies from indigenous people
    • Specialization (>1850) - Militaries became specialized branches of the federal government
  • Coercion vs. capital is a continuum. More successful states in Europe formed by using both pathways
  • Why does war happen? = coercion works
  • Essential trio: statemaking, warmaking, protection
    • states then needed to extract the three from the population to survive
      *
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7
Q

John A. Lynn

A
  • 1943 -
  • PhD from UCLA; historian; lectured many times at US military PMEs (including SAMS & CGSS)
  • During the enlightenment-ish, argues that war became more about asthetics
    • Uniforms - find deserters; fashion statements
    • Fortification - ascetically pleasing geometry rather than functional
  • French kept smooth-bore fusils into the 19th century b/c there was greater ability to place a lot more rounds down range suffering only minor losses to accuracy
  • Officer prejudice - enlisted were not to be trusted
  • Enlightenment - became our quest to reduce war/warfare to scientific principles
  • Semi-entrepreneurial system
    • in 1780s, 85% of commissioned officers were noble who bought their ranks
    • officiers financially liable for their units
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8
Q

Robert Axelrod & Michael Cohen

A
  • Axelrod: 1943-
  • Cohen: 1945-2013
  • Complexity: talks about a co-evolutionary process; emergence; more than many moving parts
  • complex adaptive systems: co-evolutionary process where individual parts adapt to each other
  • “Designing new strategies and organizations will frequently imply altering–or even creating–the variation, interaction, and selection that are hallmarks of a Complex Adaptive System.”
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9
Q

Lawrence Freedman

A
  • 1948-
  • Kings College (UK) professor
  • After ODS, we believe ‘shock & awe’ is the way to go
  • Five Core themes
    • Dicotomy: wars are won or lost
    • Humans are important (instead of just tech)
    • War was protracted in nature
    • Enemies not easy to find or pin down
    • Military action is a form of communication
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10
Q

BG (Ret) Dr. Shimon Naveh

A
  • King’s College (London); part-time consultant to SAMS
  • Founder of Operational Theory Researc Institute (OTRI)
  • Associated with transformation of IDF
  • Advocates that operational art is the linkage between strategy and tactics
  • Discusses operational shock
  • Discusses Center of gravity
  • Controlled disequilibrium
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11
Q

Dr. Antoine Bousquet

A
  • Younger; specializes in war & society, political violence, the history and philosophy of science and technology, and social international political and theor
  • Four regimes of the scientifc way of warfare
    • Mechanism
    • Thermodynamics
    • Cybernetics
    • Chaoplexity
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12
Q

Frans P. B. Osinga

A
  • Former Netherland F-16 Pilot; current professor at the Netherlands Defense Academy
  • systems thinking; adaptation (plays into anti-fragile)
  • Analysis means taking something apart to understand it; systems thinking means putting it into context of the larger whole
  • Generative learning: concrete experience -> observation & reflection -> forming mental models -> applying & testing conclusions -> repeat
  • Uses Heisenberg uncertainty principle
  • Likes Boyd, Jervis, and Clausewitz
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13
Q

Antulio Echevarria

A
  • At the Army War College; focuses on History and Theory of Warfare; Nature of War; Future Warfare; American Way of War
  • Operational level = echelon
  • OPART = “the ‘way’ that is used to move military means in the direction of strategic aims”
  • Doctrine is lacking: OPART, as described in doctrine is best suited for 1st grammar, but to a point, ignores 2nd grammar
  • 5 phases of oeprations
    • mobilization, conentration, advance, occupation of positions, combat
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14
Q

Brian McAllister Linn

A
  • Director of Military Studies Institute at Texas A&M since 1989
  • Three types of intellectual traditions
    • Guardians - war is an engineering project
    • Heroes - personal intangibles such as military genius, experience, courage, morale, and discipline
    • Managers - war is a logial outgrowth of political problems
  • Peacetime developments is as important as wartime service
  • The army misses its weaknesses by seletive use of history
  • The army should work with other agencies rather than hand off a problem (stability, reconstruction) to other agencies
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15
Q

MacIssac

A
  • Airpower guy
  • Planes originally observers for arty; then people mounted weapons on planes
  • Key development was during Interwar period
  • Douhet: warfare is now 3-D
  • Air power theorist all had different ideas, so it was hard to understand air power potential (e.g. fighter vs. bomber vs. offense vs. defense…orginially aircraft carriers were more for defensive purposes than offensive)
  • Air power development was a reflection of national opinions
  • US hierarchy: air superiority, interdiction, CAS
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16
Q

Sir Hew Francis Anthony Strachan

A
  • 1949 - Scottish military historian;
  • Prof of IR at St. Andrews
  • US criticism: Bush: inherently astrategic, but knew what he wanted; Obama: chronically incapable of mil strat (doesn’t know what he wants to do)
  • Modern strategists (politicians) do not understand the nature of war, and therefore have bad strategies
  • OPART & maneuver warfare are self-fulfilling prophecies
  • Argues against shielding the military from politics
  • Asymettric is not new
  • Neither mil or political leaders understand strategy (how it is an extension of policy rather than being one and the same)
17
Q

Dr. Stathis Kalyvas

A
  • Greek-American; Univ of Athens & Chicago
  • Civil War Definition: “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized soverign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities.”
  • Selective vs indiscriminate violence (civil war must have selective violence)
  • 5 zones of defection (1 - incumbent; 5 - insurgent)
  • Civil war is at its worst in zones 2 & 4; control shifts frequently and indiscriminate violence is high
18
Q

Emile Simpson

A
  • Young Gurkha guy (knows J.J.)
  • Kaleidoscopic political environment
  • “If force is a ‘language’, war is the interpreter who acts as a medium between the speaker and the listener.”
  • Expands on Clausewitz’s themes…war achieves the political goal rather than the military goal; implies that Clausewitz falls short in contemporary conflict
  • Referst to tensions as magnets that both repel and attracts others.
19
Q

Carl Schmitt

A
  • 1888 - 1985; German jurist and political theorist
  • Napoleon’s Spain is the first insurgency
  • Theory of the partisan: the partisan is very political in nature. Partisans are ‘all-in’
    • Must be political in nature
    • constraint is the means
    • fighting an absolute war (trying to move towards)
    • Has absolute enmity - ideological shift
    • Aren’t going to go around the world
  • Criteria: irregularity, increased mobility, intensity of political engagement, telluric character
20
Q

Roger T. Ames

A
  • Chinese philosophy academic; educated in London, works in Hawaii
  • World views: west: dualism (knowledge vs perception); China: harmony
  • China’s view…it’s all about the ‘W’, not about courage, etc
  • Shih - strategic advantage
  • Shen - human spirituality and divinity
  • Hsing - strategic positioning
21
Q

Dr. Misagh Parsa

A
  • Iranian, Univ of Michigan, immigrated in 1970 to US; minority in Iran; served in Iranian army
  • Very much interested in poverty
  • Thesis: conditions are right for a social revolution with a centralized power loses its social support
  • Mono-crop or other single-source nations are susceptible to revolution
  • Key similarity between Herbst & Paras is the exclusion of lower class from government
  • Migration of countryside to city limits food production and causes rents to skyrocket…exacerbates the problem
22
Q

Dr. Jeffrey Herbst

A
  • Pres & CEO of Newseum; fmr Pres of Colgate Univ; taught at Princeton; PhD from Yale
  • Problem is African states is the inability to consolidate power
  • Colonization race between European states
  • Govern where the government could control (near ports, along major roads)
  • Established the boundary problem that exists today.
23
Q

Jeter A. Isely & Philip A. Crowl

A
  • Evoluation of USMC Amphib doctrine (published 1951)
  • Starts with the tragedy of the Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign; USMC established ambib ops in 1934 (10 years before Normandy), but didn’t get to practice it until WWII
  • Claims the USN was mostly responsible for the development of amphib ops (b/c many believed the USMC was like the Army at the time)
  • USMC avation became more integrated with ground troops (Interwar period)
  • 6 componets of amphib: command relations; naval gunfire; aerial support; ship-to-shore mvmt; securing the beach head; logistics
24
Q

Alex Ryan

A
  • Young guy, former instructor at SAMS
  • Systems approach / general systems theory
  • “a system is a set of entities with relations between them”
  • systems are bounded
  • Brings in the 2nd law of thermodynamics
  • “The utility of a systems approach derives from the critical examination of simplifying assumptions.”
  • Types of systems
    • I. Organized Simplicity (machines)
    • II. Unorganized Complexity (aggregates)
    • III. Organized Complexity (systems)
25
Q

James J. Schneider

A
  • Former SAMS Prof; published Vulcan’s Anvil in 1992
  • As weapons became more precise, accurate, and lethal, casulties decreased
  • Napoleon, Alex the Great, etc used concentrated battle; modern OPARTists use distributed operations
  • “Operational art is defined by extended maneuver and deep battle”…talks about positional advantage
  • Claims that the birth of OPART was April 4, 1864; Grant gave guidance to subordinate generals that would achieve Lincoln’s goals
26
Q

Richard M. Swain

A
  • Recent author (dates unknown)
  • Discusses the Army’s identity crisis in the early 1980s with the establishment of the operational level and how we wrestled with this concept
  • Wass de Czege and SAMS struggled to figure out what OPART was.
27
Q

Justin Kelly and Michael J. Brennan

A
  • Both Austrailian; Kelly is a retired BG, and Brennan is a PhD.
  • Rely heavily on Isserson and Tukhachevsky
  • Argues that strategy needs tactical considerations so all levels of war informs each other
  • The continuum of war
    • Strategic = ends
    • Operational = ways
    • Tactical = means
  • “an operational level of war charged with campaign planning and working in conjunction with the post–Goldwater-Nichols hierarchy threatens effective campaign planning.”
  • “The term operational art can, in the end, mean anything we want it to mean, but it cannot usefully mean everything we presently think it does.”
    *
28
Q

G. S. Isserson

A
  • Old Russian theorist
  • Depth is a big deal, however, the Russians can afford to use depth; talks about the transition from linear to deep strategy (seems to coincide with Schneider).
  • “The basic principales of our military preparation, of our operational art, are the principles of the offensive.”
  • Contradiction: “we have always fought and will always fight against war with all our strength.”
  • “The basis for our theory of operational art is the concept of the most decisive offensive operations.”
  • “Modern deep operational deployments require a series of uninterrupted operational efforts that merge into a single whole.”
29
Q

Huba Wass de Czege

A
  • OPART is “thinking and acting like an exploer before the days of Google Earth, The Weather Channel, and Global Positioning Systems. While tactical and strategic thinking are fundamentally different, both kinds of thinking must take place in the explorer’s brain, but in separate compartments”
  • “A strategic end is conceptual and general; it cannot be specific or concrete.”
    *
30
Q

Aleksandr A. Svechin

A
  • 1878-1938, Ukrainian; Russo-Japanese War, WWI; purged by Stalin
  • “The art of conducting military operations cannot be divided by any clear boundaries into completely independent and delineated sections.”
  • Politics -> strategy -> OPART -> tactics
  • Tatical art = battle requirements; urgent
  • Operational art = tactical creativity; combining multiple tactics together
  • Strategy as art = the ultimate goal; long term
  • War games on a map important at all levels
31
Q

Sumanta Banerjee

A
  • Talks about the Naxalites (Maoists)
  • Argues the two basic problems between the Naxalites and the government is land reforms and social justice
32
Q

Pratul Ahuja & Rajat Ganguly

A
  • India’s long history of peasant revolt can be attributed to the intolerable economic oppression and social humilitation that India’s ppor peasants, tribals and dalits faced for centuries.
  • Naxalite insurgency attacks rural land owning elite
  • Naxalite aggressions is the manifestation of peasant struggles
  • Elites view the Naxalite aggression as manageable
  • Cycle where poor farmers borrowed money, couldn’t pay it back, lost farms to rich, became essentially slave labor to pay back rich
  • 2nd Cycle where gov’t reforms aimed at increasing production and cash flow actually benefited only the rich; poor farmers migrated to cities increasing the poverty in citieis
  • Tilly written all over this
  • Naxalites play Robin Hood; they govern places ungoverned rather than just using terrorism

SAMS Comps (5 decks)

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