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EU Law > Competition Law - Art 101 & 102 > Flashcards

Competition Law - Art 101 & 102 Flashcards

1
Q

TEPEA

A

Agreements between undertakings can be oral or written

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2
Q

Transocean Marine Paint

A
  • non-binding decisions by associations of undertakings can be a breach of 101
  • here justified because breaking into new markets
  • use of rule of reason
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3
Q

ICI

A

example of concerted practices

  • parallel behaviour; when ICI raised their prices so did their competitors
  • horizontal; between competitors of same size
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4
Q

Brasserie de Haecht

A
  • all beer outlets in Belgium tied to certain breweries
  • created a barrier so no one else could break in
  • did not have the object of affecting competition but did have the effect.
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5
Q

test for affecting interstate trade?

A
  • mere potential to prevent/restrict/distort trade it is caught by Art 101(1)
  • Maschinenbau
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6
Q

Pronuptia de Paris

A
  • exclusion clause for franchising

- distorts normal trade pattern so affects interstate trade

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7
Q

Volk v Vervaecke

A
  • sold practically nothing so anti-competitive agreement was de minimis
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8
Q

NAOMI

A

Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance

  • less than 10% market share horizontally
  • less than 15% market share vertically
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9
Q

Art 101(1)(a-e)

A

hard-core anticompetitive practices

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10
Q

Art 101(3)

A
  • positive obligations to fulfil

- negative obligations to obey

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11
Q

R330/10

A
  • block exemptions
  • only apply to vertical agreements
  • in combination can have no more than 30% market share
  • no hardcore practices
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12
Q

United Brands

A
  • can determine RPM by looking to demand substitutability
  • bananas are separate from other fruit
  • brand name can help determine RPM
  • vertical agreement because UB dominated supply chain
  • excessively high pricing where there was no competition
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13
Q

Hilti

A
  • nailguns not interchangeable with hammer and nails so separate RPM
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14
Q

SSNIP

A

Small but Significant (5-10%) Non-transitory Increase in Price

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15
Q

Continental Cans

A
  • producing cans is easy so easy supply substitutability so market dominance will not last
  • part of 1 MS can be a satisfactory RGM
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16
Q

Michelin

A
  • look to intended use to determine RPM
  • court held their tryres were for a particular use and had a particular RPM
  • RGM can be only 1 MS
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17
Q

Boosey & Hawkes

A

look to marketing strategies to determine RPM

- targeted Northern brass bands

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18
Q

BPB Industries

A

look to market power to decide RPM

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19
Q

define RGM

A

Art 102 - common market or a substantial part

United Brands:

  • where objective conditions of competition
  • applying to the product in question
  • are the same for all traders
20
Q

RTE

A

Radio Television Eire

  • look to volume of trade in an area for RGM
  • forced to give up monopoly of TV broadcast guides in Ireland
21
Q

Define dominance in the RM

A

United Brands

  • position of economic strength
  • which enables it to prevent effective competition
  • the power to behave independently
22
Q

Tetrapak

A

market share can demonstrate dominance in RM - 90%

- Predatory pricing can be abusive behaviour

23
Q

Hoffman-La-Roche

A

controlling distribution systems can demonstrate dominance in RM

24
Q

Intel

A

anticompetitive or exploitative actions constitutes abusive behaviour
- loyalty bonuses

25
Q

Commercial Solvents Corp

A

Refusing to supply competitors constitutes abusive behaviour

- refused to supply them then bought them out when they went bust

26
Q

Microsoft

A
  • supplementary obligations can be abusive behaviour

- here, bundling all Microsoft products together (tie ins)

27
Q

British Leyland

A

simply having the potential to affect interstate trade is enough to engage Art 102

28
Q

Art 102

A

Abuse of a dominant position

29
Q

Art 101

A

bans agreements between undertakings which may affect interstate trade and aim to affect competition

30
Q

What is the enforcement method for anti-competition rules

A

R1/2003

31
Q

how does the rule of reason relate to Art 101 and 102?

A
  • it is not what companies say or intend in terms of planning concerted practices
  • but what they actually do and what the actual effects of their practices are.
32
Q

what does art 101 (3) mean?

A

101 restrictions do not apply if the agreements do not apply if they enhance competition

33
Q

Hofner

A

any economic activity = an undertaking

34
Q

World Cup 1990 Package Tours

A

Italian FIFA is an undertaking because had economic activity

35
Q

Motosykletistiki

A

not a commercial company but engaged in economic activity so an undertaking

36
Q

Comm v ANIC

A
  • court views agreements, undertakings, concerted practices very widely.
  • includes contracts and oral agreements
37
Q

Treuhand v Commission

A
  • a “gentleman’s agreement” engages Article 101

- hiding info for a cartel is contributing to anti-competitive practices

38
Q

Tepea

A

oral agreements can engage 101

39
Q

Bayer

A
  • one company genuinely acting on its own cannot be an anti-competitive practice
  • but if the other company is allowing or acquiescing to another company there can be anti-competitive practices
40
Q

Maschinenbau

A

even mere potential to affect MS trade engages Art 101

41
Q

Consten v Grundig

A
  • distortion of normal trade pattern from electronic goods sales
  • exclusive distribution agreements can be a breach if they lead to artificially high prices
42
Q

R1/2003

A
  • enforcement mechanism
  • removed individual exemptions
  • allowed block exemptions
43
Q

Courage v Crehan

A
  • UK competition law gives way to EU competition law

- tied pub arrangements are anti-competitive

44
Q

B&I v Sealink

A
  • RGM can be tiny
  • here port of Holyhead was enough
  • what is relevant is the volume of trade within the area
45
Q

Akzo Chemie

A
  • example of predatory pricing

EU Law (15 decks)

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