5MARKERS

Question 1

What is Popper’s conception of science?

Answer 1

A critical and objective methodology which consists of tentative attempts to solve our problems through a “consciously critical development of the method of ‘trial and error’” which exists independent of any value judgement.

Question 2

What’s the point of saying that the philosophy of social science is ‘empirical’?

Answer 2

It is measurable in ‘scientific’ terms which means theories in social science can be tested in a similar way to theories in the natural sciences through hypothesis, experimentation and revision (if necessary).

Question 3

What is logical positivism?

Answer 3

Logical positivism is the belief that all meaningful problems can be expressed in terms of things that can be checked, verified or falsified; thus solved by logical analysis. Valid conclusions must be based on empirical observation. Philosophical analysis can and should have a critical as well as descriptive function.

Question 4

Briefly compare Guala’s with Popper’s view of where economics sits.

Answer 4

Guala believes that economics is a science because it deals more in objective fact, which sets it aside from the social sciences. Popper on the other hand believes that economics is in fact a social science, and because it has a purely objective method it demonstrates that empiricism has a place in the social sciences.

Question 5

What’s been the main intellectual change in the philosophy of social science?

Answer 5

The move from methodology (the question of how we should study the social science) to ontology (the question of what social science is).

Question 6

Kincaid identifies four objections to the possibility of a science of society. Choose and briefly describe two.

Answer 6

One a priori objection Kincaid mentions to the possibility of a science of society is the notion of multiple realizability, which is the idea that social ideas have infinitely many plausible physical realizations and as such cannot be systematically linked to the physical, if this is the case, then social kinds cannot support genuine laws. Another a priori objection mentioned is the idea that the social realm is not “closed”, and therefore there cannot exist any universal laws as the open realm is subject to outside forces.

Question 7

What is multiple realisability? Illustrate by means of one example.

Answer 7

Multiple realizability is the idea that social ideas have infinitely many plausible physical realizations and as such cannot be systematically linked to the physical. If this is the case, then social kinds cannot support genuine laws. One example is money, which exists in the social realm and can be realized in many different forms, for example in the form of gold, paper or a digital code.

Question 8

What is a ceteris paribus clause in social science?

Answer 8

The Ceteris Paribus clause means ‘all other things equal’, and is used to qualify theories in the social sciences. It works by asserting that a causal explanation is true IFF other possible interfering factors are held at a constant. This way the causal factor discussed is isolated.

Question 9

What is the traditional account of laws according to Mitchell?

Answer 9

The traditional account of laws according to Mitchell is such that a law can be a considered a law only if it meets the following criteria: (a) logical contingency (have empirical content), (b) universality (cover all space and time), (c) truth (exceptionless); and (d) natural necessity (not accidental). It comes from formal logic, and these conditions amount essentially to a universally quantified conditional which cannot be vacuously true.

Question 10

Why does Mitchell compare social knowledge with biological knowledge?

Answer 10

Mitchell compares social knowledge to biological knowledge because “like knowledge of the social world, biological knowledge does not appear to fit the image of scientific law advocated by many philosophers”. As such, both the social sciences and biology share this doubt of whether the disciplines are capable of producing laws in their respective fields of inquiry. The underlying reason for this is both of their limitation to contingent truth, or ceteris paribus qualifications.

Question 11

What is the Chemical Method? And why does Mill argue that it is not an appropriate method of inquiry for the social sciences?

Answer 11

The chemical method is the view that properties of a social entity are associated with the component parts of that entity, yet the properties of the social entity cannot be inferred from the properties of the component parts that make up the entity. Mill argues that social entities do not act in this way – men when brought together do not form some other kind of substance. Human beings, he argued, have no properties but those which are derived from the laws of the individual man (methodological individualism).

Question 12

How does the Concrete Deductive Method work?

Answer 12

The concrete deductive method described the deduction of social scientific facts and laws from the conjunction of individual causes. Mill claims that to determine the effects produced by social phenomena one must look to the vast array of individual effectual circumstances, and from this one can deduce social laws. Final step is verification.

Question 13

What does the Inverse Deductive Method aim to provide, and how?

Answer 13

The Inverse Deductive Method aims to provide a solution to the issue that the concrete deductive method is highly complex and requires significant understanding of individual and highly complex social circumstance. The inverse deductive method therefore allows one to look at historical circumstances and the associated human laws we exhibit, and from this ascertain social laws and facts.

Question 14

What are Tendency Laws?

Answer 14

Laws have a tendency to turn out false – ceteris paribus. We must therefore treat them only as mere tendencies to exhibit this circumstance. Yet the fact they may only be tendencies, he argues, does not undermine their status as laws.

Question 15

Why does Mill talk about Empirical Social Laws?

Answer 15

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Question 16

What three criteria does Taylor give for the object of a science of interpretation?

Answer 16

The object of a science of interpretation must be describable in terms of sense and nonsense, coherence and its absence. It must also admit of a distinction between meaning and its expression.The third condition is that it must this meaning, distinguishable from its expression, is for or by a subject.

Question 17

Describe the hermeneutical circle.

Answer 17

The Hermeneutical Circle highlights the idea that our understanding of a whole will require knowledge of the individual, and our knowledge of the individual will require knowledge of the whole. The example Taylor uses is of an interpretation of a reading. We are trying to establish an interpretation for the whole text, and for this we appeal to partial expressions, but because we are dealing with meaning where expressions only make sense with relation to others, the reading of partial expressions will depend on those of others and ultimately the whole. This circle is an issue as it undermines the notion of objective knowledge – our reasoning is always circular.

Question 18

What does Taylor mean by ‘meaning’?

Answer 18

When we speak of meaning, Taylor says, we are using a concept with the following interpretation. (a) Meaning is for a subject, it is not the meaning in a situation, but its meaning is for a subject. (b) Meaning is of something; this is to say that we can distinguish between a given element-situation action or whatever- and its meaning (but this is not to say they are physically separable). (c) Things only have meaning within a given domain or field, that is with relation to other things. Things cannot be meaningful on their own – there is no such thing as a single unrelated meaningful event.

Question 19

Why does Taylor invite us to think that “man is a self-interpreting animal”?

Answer 19

Taylor wishes to claim man is a self-interpreting animal as there is no such thing as the structure of meaning independent of man’s own interpretation of himself – one is woven into the other. What we know of object or relations is our experience of them – we describe them and form the subjective nature of these properties ourselves. Thus, that of which we are trying to find the coherence is itself partly constituted by self-interpretation.

Question 20

Taylor suggests two ways of breaking out of the hermeneutical circle. Briefly explain.

Answer 20

The first way is the “rationalist” approach, which does not involve a negation of intuition, or of our understanding of meaning, but rather aspires to attainment of an understanding of such clarity that it would carry with it the certainty of the undeniable. The aim is to bring understanding to an inner clarity which is absolute. The other way, which we can call “empiricist,” is a genuine attempt to go beyond the circle of our own interpretations, to get beyond subjectivity. The attempt is to reconstruct knowledge in such a way that there is no need to make final appeal to readings or judgments which can not be checked further. The building blocks for such an approach are brute data.

Question 21

What is social action, for Weber?

Answer 21

Social action for Weber is an action whose meaning is derived from the past, present or anticipated future behaviour of other individuals. That relation to others’ behaviour determines the way in which the action proceeds. The other people in question may be particular individuals known to the agent, or an indefinitely large group, none of whom are known to the agent.

Question 22

Briefly compare Taylor’s concept of experiential meaning with Weber’s concept of subjective meaning.

Answer 22

Taylor’s concept of experiential meaning says primarily that meaning is something – a piece of mental content - that makes sense for the subject, i.e. something is meaningful because it is meaningful to the subject. Weber’s concept of subjective meaning is more or less the same, as he suggests that meaning should be as understood as what is actually intended by the subject or the meaning we attribute to them.

Question 23

Weber identifies two types of understanding. Describe.

Answer 23

Understanding to Weber can either consist indirect understanding of the intended meaning of an action or it can mean explanatory understanding in the sense that we understand the motive of a certain action. For example, in witnessing a man cutting wood, there is the direct understanding of the action in the sense that we can understand ‘that man is cutting wood’, and there is also the explanatory understanding of the action in the sense that we can understand ‘that man is cutting wood because that is what he does for a living’.

Question 24

According to Weber, crowd behaviour is not an instance of social action. Why?

Answer 24

Crowd behaviour is not an instance of social action because social action requires that the said action find its meaning in the behaviour of others as individuals. This does not occur in crowd behaviour, because in crowds the individual is not necessarily influenced by the behaviour of others within the crowd, but rather is reactive to the crowd as an aggregate entity. The meaning of the action is therefore not derived from the behaviour of others and because of this is not social.

Question 25

Weber claims that the interpretation of action has to refer to collective concepts in three ways. What are these?

Answer 25

The interpretation of action has to refer to collective concepts in the following three ways. Firstly, the sociologist must refer to collective concepts in order to develop an intelligible terminology. Secondly, the sociologist must refer to collective concepts to be able to provide compelling causal explanations because these concepts actually represent something which in part actually exists and has a normative force in the minds of real people. Thirdly, the sociologist has to refer to collective concepts to be able to relate the ‘part’ to the ‘whole’, i.e. the individual and his behaviour must be interpreted in relation to the whole.

Question 26

Durkheim claims that social phenomena are "things", and ought to be treated as things. What does that mean?

Answer 26

In suggesting that the social phenomena are “things” and should be treated as such, Durkheim wants to suggest that social phenomena are real pieces of data, which are unique to the social sciences. Further, by calling them ‘things’, Durkheim wants to suggest that these phenomena are uninfluenced by the will. Rather, they determine the will from without.

Question 27

What is Durkheim’s argument for the claim that social facts cannot be biological phenomena? Psychological phenomena?

Answer 27

Social facts cannot be biological phenomena, because whilst social facts consist of ways of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual enforced by some form of coercion, biological phenomena consist of representations and of actions. Similarly, social phenomena are distinct to psychological phenomena, which exist only in the individual consciousness and through it, whilst social phenomena exist external to individual consciousnesses.

Question 28

What is a group mind, for Durkheim?

Answer 28

Currents of opinion impel certain groups to act a certain way (more marriages, more suicides, higher/lower birthrate etc.). These currents of opinion are purely social facts, but it might be hard at first to disentangle them from the forms they take in individual cases. But statistics furnish us with the means of isolating them - we look at birth rates, suicide rates, marriage rates etc. – the individual circumstances are neutralized out. The average then expresses a certain state of the group mind (l’âme collective).

Question 29

Lukes identifies several versions of individualism. Choose three and describe them comparatively.

Answer 29

Social Atomism says that society whilst it might be made up of groups of individuals, it nevertheless solely consists of individuals. By comparison, the ontological approach goes further and suggests not only that society consists only of individuals, but that in the social world, only individuals are real. Social Individualism differs from both again by asserting that society has as its end the good of individuals, so it focuses on the purpose of social organization.

Question 30

Lukes gives four examples of what 'facts about individuals' can mean. What are these, and how does he distinguish between them?

Answer 30

Lukes gives four examples of what facts about individuals can mean and calls these individual predicates. He distinguishes between these predicates by suggesting that they move along a continuum from the non-social to the most social. The first category of predicates, which are non-social in nature, are predicates which describe human beings by their physical properties. The second category includes predicates which presuppose consciousness but do not presuppose anything about the social. The third includes predicates which have minimal social reference and the fourth includes those which are maximally social.

Question 31

What is "intentionality"? Describe in the context of Searle's discussion of social ontology.

Answer 31

Searle suggests that intentionality is the capacity of the mind to represent objects and states of affairs in the world other than itself. Not all consciousness is intentional, and not all intentionality is conscious. Intentionality is important in understanding Searle’s discussion of social ontology, because he states that some features of the world, namely those of a social kind, exist only relative to the intentionality of the subject.

Question 32

"That object is a paperweight". What sort of fact does this statement describe, for Searle?

Answer 32

Calling an object a “paperweight” involves appealing to an observer-relative, as opposed to intrinsic, feature of that object. This is because the feature’s existence is dependent on there existing an observer. The fact is thus said to be ontologically subjective, but so long as it actually is a paperweight, the fact is epistemically objective. It is also an instance of humans applying an agentive function to a preexisting object, i.e. a stone.

Question 33

Drawing on Guala's characterization (from Week 1), briefly present the Standard Model of Social Ontology.

Answer 33

SMOSO is constituted by three elements: reflexivity, performativity and collective intentionality. Reflexivity refers to the idea that social entities are constituted by beliefs about beliefs. Performativity refers to the idea that if social entities are somehow made of beliefs, they must be constantly ‘performed’ by the individuals who belong to a given social group. Collective intentionality refers to the idea that individuals are capable of thinking not only in terms of “I intend” but also in terms of “we intend”.

Question 34

What are institutional facts, for Searle, and how do they contrast with brute facts?

Answer 34

Institutional facts are facts which exist only because of human institutions, whereas brute facts exist independently from any human institutions. For example, the fact that “this piece of paper is a five-dollar bill” exists only because of the human institution of money and thus it is an institutional fact. In contrast, “there is snow on the top of Mt. Everest” is a fact which is true regardless of any human institution (aside from language, but Searle accounts for this by differentiating between the fact itself and the statement of that fact).

Question 35

Articulate the difference between constitutive and regulative rules.

Answer 35

Regulative rules are rules which regulate certain pre-existing activities. For example, the rule of driving on the left, which regulates how people should drive but driving can still exist as an activity without it. Constitutive rules, in contrast, are rules which create the very possibility of certain activities. For example, the rules of chess creates the game of chess; if you do not follow at least a large subset of rules, you are not playing chess.

Question 36

Illustrate Searle’s view of collective intentionality by way of the Business School example.

Answer 36

Students at a business school are all indoctrinated to come to believe that they can best help humanity by pursuing their own self-interest. Each student thus has the individual intention of “I intend to do my part toward helping humanity by pursuing my own self-interest. Let us also suppose that each student believes the others will share this intention and will most likely be successful in carrying it out. This is not a case of collective intentionality because there is no sense of a “we intention”. This shows that the notion of “we-intentions” is central to collective intentionality and that it cannot be understood merely in terms of “I intentions” and mutual beliefs, because cases like this would slip through the cracks and mistakenly be identified as cases of collective intentionality.

Question 37

What are we ‘we-intentions’, for Searle? Why are they irreducible to ‘I-intentions’?

Answer 37

‘We-intentions’ cannot be reduced to ‘I-intentions’ because the notion of a we-intention, of collective intentionality, implies the notion of cooperation. The mere presence of I-intentions to achieve a goal that is believed to be shared with others does not entail the presence of an intention to cooperate to achieve that goal. In other words, ‘I-intentions plus mutual beliefs’ do not provide sufficient conditions for cooperation.

Question 38

Explain why the irreducibility claim and the individual ownership claim are in tension.

Answer 38

The irreducibility claim is that collective intentionality is not merely an aggregation of individual intentions; in other words, collective intentionality is irreducible to individual intentionality. The individual ownership claim is that each individual has a mind of his or her own and has a sort of intentional autonomy; there is no ‘group mind’. The tension that arises between the two claims therefore is that collective intentionality is not merely reducible to individual intentionality, but at the same time only exists in the minds of individuals.

Question 39

Some authors claim mental states are collective if they have a collective content; others claim that they must be entertained in an irreducible mode to count as collective; still others claim that collective intentionality presupposes the existence of a plural subject. Choose one view and explain accordingly.

Answer 39

The ‘content’ view can be explained as saying that mental states are collective if the intention is expressed in the form ‘I intend that we J’, where J refers to a joint activity in which the intending agent participates. For instance, if Alex and Ben go for a walk together, their respective intentions refer not to their own individual walks, but to their joint walk. It is thus in the content of the intention that collectivity is found; i.e. in the ‘jointness’ of the walk

Question 40

In what sense is collective intentionality a building block of the social reality?

Answer 40

Collective intentionality is considered a building block of social reality because it is required to create and maintain social institutions. For instance, the existence of money, a social phenomenon, depends at least partly on collective intentional attitudes, or on a shared practice of treating certain pieces of paper, and not others, as money.

Question 41

What is a 'plural subject', for Gilbert?

Answer 41

A plural subject is a body of two or more people who are jointly committed to some endeavour or some belief with which they share an intention to perform or believe. For instance, a group would constitute a plural subject if they shared an intention and a commitment to play a basketball game later. The plural subject emulates, as far as possible, a single agent intending to do something, in that they act or intend to act on shared information and have a shared commitment to the activity.

Question 42

Why does Searle claim that Bratman's view of shared intentionality is circular?

Answer 42

Searle claims that Bratman defines we intentions in terms of we intentions because and thus that his argument is circular. ???

Question 43

In what sense is Bratman a ‘constructivist’? Explain by way of an example from his account of sociality.

Answer 43

While Bratman is not a social constructionist, he does believe that by adding or building up from several I-intentions (or individual intention), you can ‘construct’ a shared intention. He uses the example of painting a house in which one or more individuals will come together and intend to paint the house in concord with the others and in common knowledge of the agreement. For instance each individual would say ‘I intend that we paint the house’. As such they have a shared intention made of, and reducible to, individual intentions.

Question 44

What are Gilbert's three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared agency?

Answer 44

disjunction criteria: it is not the case that shared intentions need match the personal intentions of the individuals involved, one might have an individual intention that goes against the shared intention. concurrence criteria: in order for a shared intention to be changed or rescinded (for example if one person were to not participate) all parties must agree prior to the change. obligation criteria: each party in a shared intention is obligated to act in accordance with that intention and in conjunction with the other members of the intention.

Question 45

How does Gilbert believe a joint commitment is created?

Answer 45

A joint commitment is created when two or more people openly express their actual personal readiness to commit to do or believe something in concord with the others. This happens under conditions of common knowledge in terms of what they are agreeing to do and who with and is not rescindable by one party unilaterally, all parties must agree to changes to the commitment.

Question 46

Reconstruct Hacking's definition of human kinds by using one of his examples.

Answer 46

Human kinds are socially situated categories of people, their behaviour, their actions, experience (etc.) with certain features. Hacking uses the example of child abuse as a human kind because: (i) it is highly relevant to some people in society, (ii) it is peculiar and abnormal to society, (iii) it is the subject of study in the human and social sciences because it is something we would like to have more knowledge of in order to prevent and (iv) we project the kind onto a type of person e.g. child abusers or abusive parents. These are features that all human kinds share according to Hacking.

Question 47

What view of 'causal understanding' does Hacking's account of human kinds underlie?

Answer 47

Human Kinds underlie Hacking’s practical causal understanding that maintains that if we change the background conditions in which someone operates, we can improve the person, provided we understand the kind of person we are talking about. This view of causal understanding is intervontist, it asserts that through correct classification, we will able to prevent and confront certain social behaviours such as teen pregnancy and suicide.

Question 48

Human kinds are social constructions, but Hacking is no social constructionist. Explain.

Answer 48

While Hacking believes that social facts and human kinds are socially constructed, unlike a social constructionist he still believes that they are real because they stem from ‘real’ things. Hacking also acknowledges a difference between human kinds, which are constructed yet real and natural kinds (e.g. quarks) which are not constructed and real. Social constructionists would argue that natural kinds, like social kinds, are just social constructions.

Question 49

Illustrate the 'looping' of human kinds with an example.

Answer 49

Hacking uses the example of individuals classified as ‘juvenile delinquents’ to illustrate how the classification of human kinds has a looping effect. Typically individuals labeled ‘juvenile delinquents’ conform more and more to the stereotypical ‘juvenile delinquent’. This in itself is interesting to the human kind (and study) of juvenile delinquency and thus becomes part of its description which again affects the individuals being classified, who then change again (etc.). Human Kinds thus create a loop of definition and identification. Looping is a feature of the social and contextual nature of human kinds.

Question 50

What does it mean to say that human kinds have intrinsic moral value, for Hacking?

Answer 50

It means that human kinds are fundamentally value-laden because such classifications arise out of judgements of good or bad. For instance, the human kind of teen-pregnancy would not exist unless there was a distinct group of unmarried, young girls who are ‘not supposed to be’ pregnant. Human kinds are deviations from social norms provided those deviations are value-laden and thus worthy of investigation. This is partly because the greater the moral value attached to a classification, the greater the level of looping and the more significant the relevant human kind.

Question 51

Explain Fodor’s distinction between token physicalism and reductivism.

Answer 51

Token physicalism is the view that all events in the social sciences are actually physical events. Reductivism is the stronger view that all the special sciences reduce to physics. Reductivism, which Fodor rejects, is incompatible with the claim that there are some events which fall in domain of the social sciences but not in the domain of physics, whereas token physicalism is compatible with this claim.

Question 52

Briefly describe the ‘generality of physics’ view.

Answer 52

The generality of physics view is that all events which fall under the laws of any science are physical events and hence fall under the laws of physics. For example, you could start with a law of a special science like psychology and note that this law reduces down to a law of neurology (since psychology concerns the brain), which you could then say reduces down to a law of physics (since the brain functions by electric impulses).

Question 53

Why does Fodor argue that “the truth of reductivism cannot be inferred from the assumption that token physicalism is true” (page 100)?

Answer 53

Token physicalism, or the belief that any event under any scientific law also falls under a law of physics, does not imply the truth of reductivism because it is possible to believe in token physicalism and yet reject strict bridge laws (e.g. S1x ⇆ P1x) that create coextensive correlate relations between events in the social sciences and events in physics (reductivism). Fodor’s alternative conception of disjunctive ‘bridge statements’ (e.g. Sx ⇆ P1x v P2x v … Pnx) for instance demonstrates how token physicalism can be true without inferring the truth of reductivism.

Question 54

What is the point of scientific reduction, for Fodor?

Answer 54

The goal of scientific reduction for Fodor, is to explain the physical states and mechanisms that underlie events in the social sciences. This is distinct from the discovery of co-extensive correlates in social science events and physical events, which Fodor calls the ‘misconstrued’ goal of scientific reduction.

Question 55

What is the implication of saying that the unity of science does not imply a strong form of reductivism for the special sciences (i.e. psychology)?

Answer 55

Rejecting a strong form of reductivism means the study of social science cannot be reduced to the study of physics, as such it can be informative, interesting and worth studying as more than a mere pathway to physical understanding. A conception of science without strong reductivism also allows us to account for the differences that exist between social science and natural science for instance the existence of exceptions in social science ‘laws’ where there are none in the natural sciences.

Question 56

Why psychology 'as' philosophy?

Answer 56

Psychology as philosophy refers to Davidsons outline of holism of the mental. Davidson argues that when we attribute psychological concepts (beliefs, desires intentions) to agents we necessarily operate within a system of concepts part determined by the agents themselves. The means such psychological concepts elude the law like generalisations of physical concepts – psychology should be understood as philosophy rather than physics.

Question 57

Reconstruct Davidson’s argument for Anomalous Monism

Answer 57

1. All psychological events are caused by physical events 2. Any physical event caused by another must exist within a closed and deterministic set of laws for which both appropriately fit 3. Analysis of psychological events is not deterministic in this way – you can’t infer from an action what a belief or desire 4. Psychological laws cannot be described in this way so cannot be caused by physical events

Question 58

What is a 'serious' statistical law, for Davidson, and why does he think we cannot find them in the social sciences?

Answer 58

A serious statistical law is ‘ more than just a statistical generalization’ but a law that gives a sharply fixed probability. In spite of many provisos its application will allow for determination in advance of whether its conditions are satisfied or not, and thus whether something will take place. These are not possible in social science as it is not possible to tell in advance what beliefs and desires will determine a course of action for an individual.

Question 59

Why does Davidson think that we cannot discover deterministic psycho-physical laws?

Answer 59

Davidson argues that when we attribute a belief, a desire, a goal, an intention or a meaning to an agent, we necessarily operate within a system of concepts in part determined by the structure of beliefs and desires of the agent himself. We cannot escape this feature of the psychological; but this feature has no counterpart in the world of physics. This leads to an inability to determine psycho-physical laws.

Question 60

Define the concept of Holism of the Mental.

Answer 60

Holism of the mental refers to the closed system of explanations we can give for human behaviour. When we attribute a belief, a desire, a goal, an intention or a meaning to an agent we necessarily operate within a system of concepts that is in part determined by the structure of beliefs and desires of the agents themselves. Therefore, if we are given a belief, we can only make sense of it through further enquiry of these beliefs and desires – the system is closed so a certain holism of the mental pervades explanations of human behaviour.

Question 61

Why does Davidson believe that the idea of incommensurable conceptual schemes is implausible? Explain briefly.

Answer 61

If the idea of different conceptual schemes is intelligible, then we can make sense of a difference in conceptual schemes consisting in complete or partial failure of language translation between schemes. So, if complete or partial failure is unintelligible then incommensurable conceptual schemes is unintelligible – i.e. if Davidson shows the former then the latter also holds. The basic idea is that if languages are translatable, even to some extent then incommensurability of conceptual schemes must be rejected.

Question 62

How does Davidson propose we define, or characterise, conceptual schemes?

Answer 62

Davidson argues a conceptual scheme is way of organizing empirical content; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene. Reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one system may not in another.

Question 63

What is the difference between total and partial failures of translatability, for Davidson?

Answer 63

Total failure refers to total failures of translation – the inability to equate one-person statement L1 ­with another’s L2. There is thus total failure if no significant range of sentence in one language could be translated into another. Partial failure, to continue, refers to if only some parts of L1 can be translated into L2; there would be partial failure if some range could be translated and some range could not.

Question 64

Has Davidson shown that there is only one conceptual scheme? Motivate your answer.

Answer 64

What Davidson has looked to show is that there is no intelligible basis for on which it can be said that schemes are different through the implausibility of incommensurable conceptual schemes. He concedes however that it would be wrong to use this conclusion to argue that there is just a single conceptual scheme for although we cannot intelligibly say that schemes are different, we cannot intelligibly say that they are one.

Question 65

What is the analytic-synthetic distinction?

Answer 65

The analytic-synthetic distinction is the idea that, with respect to all meaningful statements, one can distinguish between statements that are true in virtue of their meaning (analytic) and those that are true in virtue of both their meanings and some fact or facts about the world (synthetic). An example of an analytic sentence would be all bachelors are unmarried men. A synthetic sentence would be snow is white.

Question 66

Briefly explain Solomon's distinction between 'internalism' and 'externalism' in social epistemology.

Answer 66

Internalism in social epistemology refers to the view that justifications for belief are internal to each knower and, typically, not only internal but also available to reflection. The externalist view on the other hand posits that justifications for knowledge are not (or not readily) available to individual knowers, either because the reasons do not enter conscious awareness or because the reasons themselves are external to individual minds.

Question 67

Illustrate the 'wisdom of crowd' phenomenon by way of one example.

Answer 67

The idea of the wisdom of the crowd is most famously explained through Galton’s experiment of finding an estimation for the weight of a fat Ox. He asked a large group of people at a fair to guess the weight of the Ox, and then calculated the mean of the estimates. The mean of the estimates ended up being extremely accurate, being only 1 pound off of the actual weight. The average estimate of a group of people can be more accurate.

Question 68

Define the relationship between groupthink and collective intelligence.

Answer 68

Groupthink occurs when a group of individuals aims to reach consensus on a controversial topic. Peer pressure, as well as pressure from authority (if present) leads dissenting individuals to drop their concerns and change their minds. The dynamics of groupthink frequently lead the group to a polarized position, not to an average or neutral aggregate of individual opinions. As a consequence, collective intelligence is compromised by groupthink. Groupthink is negative, collective intelligence is positive.

Question 69

Solomon discusses Surowiecki's three conditions for a group to make good aggregate judgements. What are they?

Answer 69

The three conditions Surowiecki provides to make good aggregate judgements are independence, diversity, and decentralization. Independence refers to the ability of each individual to make a judgment on his or her own. Diversity refers to there being a range of individuals who are sufficiently different with respect to the knowledge and perspectives they have. Decentralization refers to the process of aggregation which treats each person’s decision similarly: every vote counts for the same and there are no experts or authorities whose votes are weighted more heavily than others.

Question 70

Why does Solomon think that "consensus is usually epistemically undesirable"?

Answer 70

Solomon maintains that consensus is usually epistemically undesirable because it involves choosing the option which has the most evidence for it rather than incorporating all the evidence. This is in comparison to a view that preserves dissenting opinions, which is epistemically superior on the grounds that it takes advantage of a larger quantity of knowledge or evidence.

Question 71

What is cognitive universalism, for Zerubavel?

Answer 71

Zerubavel portrays cognitive universalism as an approach to the study of the mind whereby we think as human beings rather than as individuals. That is to say that there are cognitive commonalities between us which are universal. Further, thinking appeals to the objective, there is a natural or logical inevitability to the way in which we (are hard wired to) think.

Question 72

What does Zerubavel mean by intersubjectivity?

Answer 72

The term intersubjectivity is used to describe the middle point between subjectivity and objectivity. Moreover, the way we think is not influenced by our own purely individual and subjective experiences, but rather it is influenced by the impersonal social mindscapes we share in common with others. These social mindscapes can be large, but they are by no means fully universal.

Question 73

Reconstruct Zerubavel's conception of language, and how it relates to our cognitive processes.

Answer 73

Zerubavel suggests that language is why we think intersubjectively. Language allows one to transcend a purely sensory experience of the world. This is because language allows one to process reality conceptually, which also entails that one’s thinking is determined by social and impersonal factors.

Question 74

Explain the process of cognitive socialization

Answer 74

The process of cognitive socialization is the process of learning ‘cognitive norms’, i.e. the rules of thinking dictated by society. Zerubavel suggests that this process can happen as a result of formal education (schooling), and tacit learning, in which we just ‘pick up’ cognitive norms by observing and interacting with others. He suggests cognitive socialization also takes place merely through learning a language, as languages have many cognitive norms engrained.

Question 75

What is the difference between cognitive sociology and cognitive universalism?

Answer 75

Cognitive sociology posits that we think as social beings whereas cognitive universalism posits that we think as human beings. The difference between the two is that cognitive sociology, unlike cognitive universalism, denies that cognitive commonalities are universal, and suggests instead that they are common only insofar as they are common to a particular thought community. Cognitive sociology therefore also differs in the sense that it allows for cultural, historical and subcultural cognitive differences between humans, whereas the cognitive universalist would deny these exist.

Question 76

What is ‘reverse design’?

Answer 76

Reverse design is used in natural experiments to turn the intervention by Nature or Society into a suitable site for study which can produce natural experimental results. The process is done post hoc using three main principles. Firstly, using randomisation to see how phenomena of interest act on a varied population. Secondly, identifying at least one suitably comparable control group to depict the emphasis on the treatment site, and finally statistical analysis to substitute controls.

Question 77

What is the difference between a Nature’s experiment and a natural experiment?

Answer 77

Nature’s experiments are instances where natural situations happen to have the characteristics of an experiment. This means Nature provides both intervention and the controls, most commonly in cases of unusual events occurring in stable situations. Natural experiments occur in unstable environments, meaning scientists must reconstruct the experimental conditions by reverse design. This means testing a hypothesis in nature by isolating variables of interest.

Question 78

In what sense is a field experiment not a natural experiment?

Answer 78

In a field experiment the intervention is made by the scientist as opposed to Nature. Field experiments aim to replicate laboratory conditions in the real world, whereas natural experiments are events which already exist in nature and are then used to fit into an experimental model designed post hoc.

Question 79

Describe Merton's Investigation of Mass Propaganda and explain three of the virtues that this experiment had.

Answer 79

Merton’s experiment was an investigation into why war bond sales rose so significantly in such a short time in response to specific radio broadcasts compared with previous attempts. The Stimulus Pattern was objective, where the stimulus (the content of the propaganda) could be easily identified and the response to it (bond sales) quantified. Retrospective field studies may not be able to reconstruct the stimulus accurately and in a lab setting subjects may display bias in response to the environment. Finally, the short time period was 18 hours, indicating that the context was otherwise stable and the cause and effect relationship a priori demonstrable.

Question 80

What does statistical analysis substitute for in natural experiments, according to Morgan?

Answer 80

Statistical analysis in natural experiments substitutes for controls. This means using passive observations, collected data taken from nature, and identifying causal relationships to support or disprove an experimental framework. For instance, by keeping other causal variables at average values to analyse their impact and be able to rule out other variables with little to no influence on dependent variable a priori.

Question 81

What is the main claim of the Santa Barbara School?

Answer 81

Their main claim shares a lot with cognitive universalism in that human nature is made up of an innate set of adaptations which have been formed by natural selection. On this view, the mind is a collection of specialised modules which have evolved in response to the environment humans spent most of their evolutionary history. Therefore, cultural change arises from the interaction between altering cultural environment and a set of unchanging conditions.

Question 82

Describe what 'memes' are, using an example.

Answer 82

Memes are ideas which spread from a subset of the population and increase their representation via replication. The rate at which they do this depends on their “adaptive fit” with local environments which themselves are constituted by the impact left by preceding memes. An example of a meme might be a technique for making baskets which has spread and found wide usage in a population.

Question 83

How does Sperber define cognitive processes?

Answer 83

Cognitive processes are causal links which secure content relationships between representations in the mind and the reality they represent. Cognitive process secure the relationship between input stimuli and outputs, for example during perception. They form chains where one output can become the input for a new cognitive process.

Question 84

Briefly explain the process of evolution by natural selection.

Answer 84

According to natural selection, characteristics which benefit individuals will survive in a gene pool to be passed to future generations. DNA is the replicator which facilitates this as each strand is causally responsible for the resemblance of the daughter strands. Surviving traits are considered fitter than others in helping individuals cope with their environment.

Question 85

Describe Sperber’s proposal for a naturalisation of the socio-mental on the model of epidemiology.

Answer 85

Epidemiology studies social phenomena as individual pathologies, such as psychological patterns, expressed at a population scale. Epidemiology proposes to naturalise the socio-mental through cognitive science and the understanding that social processes are cognitive processes expressed at a higher level given that they still secure content relationships among mental states and actions of people involved. In the same manner as cognitive processes, socio-mental phenomena spread through populations via causal processes of cognition.

Question 86

What, for Taylor, is the 'big disanalogy' between social theory and natural science?

Answer 86

Although both social theory and natural science aim to convey what is really going on, the development of social theory actually changes the practices it describes. This is because, unlike natural science, social theory brings about self-understanding which can affect social practices. Natural science on the other hand concerns independent physical objects.

Question 87

Explain the difference between a shared good and a convergent good.

Answer 87

A shared good is a good precisely in virtue of being valued in common. A convergent good on the other hand is a case where individuals have independent interests which happen to coincide with their own projects. In the case of the latter, common appreciation of the good is not constitutive of it.

Question 88

What is the relation of theory to practice, for Taylor?

Answer 88

Theory makes explicit what is implicitly occurring in a social setting at a pre-theoretical level. This causes self-understanding which itself can alter the practices the theory concerns itself with originally. Theory achieves this by bring to light an interpretation of the constitutive norms of a practice. However, theory itself is not the determinant of practice as certain practices may be operating already at a pre-theoretical level as mentioned.

Question 89

Why does Taylor think that economics can't be a model for political science?

Answer 89

Economics makes its predictions in a defined domain based on instrumental rationality. What makes economics effective in this regard is that these norms have become deeply rooted in our culture. Theorising political science along the same framework is not possible because it would mean reconstructing political behaviour according to such a narrow definition of ‘rationality’. This would be a partial account and not necessarily a theory of what is actually occurring.

Question 90

How are we to validate social scientific theories, according to Taylor?

Answer 90

Practice tests theory because theory supposedly is understood to alter practices. A validated theory is one which makes a practice more effective when it is adopted, whereas a practice is self-defeating when it fails to achieve the point of a practice as it purports it to be more efficiently.

Question 91

What does Haslanger say the goal of her project is?

Answer 91

Haslanger states that the goal of her project is to consider what work the concepts of gender and race might do for us in a critical social theory. Largely through offering accounts of gender and race informed by feminist epistemology.

Question 92

What makes Haslanger’s approach to race and gender a case of Critical Social Science? Briefly discuss.

Answer 92

Good critical theories are those systematic bodies of knowledge that select from the mass of truth those that address our broader cognitive and practical demands. This is what Haslanger strives to achieve in her project to race and gender thus highlighting her approach as one in fitting with a case of critical social science.

Question 93

Briefly describe the three projects that articulate Haslanger’s framework for understanding race and gender.

Answer 93

The three projects which articulate her framework are conceptual, descriptive and analytical. The conceptual project seeks to articulate our concepts of gender and race. The descriptive project focuses on developping more accurate concepts through consideration of phenomena and usually with the aid of empirical methods. The analytic project requires us to consider what we want these concepts to do for us.

Question 94

Describe the two problems that have generated pessimism about proving a unified account of women.

Answer 94

The two key problems faced by feminist theories are the commonality problem and the normativity problem. The commonality problem questions whether there is anything social that all females have in common that could count as gender. The normativity problem instead is concerned with any definition of ‘what woman is’ as it seems always value laden and leads to marginalization and reinforcement of norms.

Question 95

How do materialist feminist accounts define gender?

Answer 95

The main strategy of materialist feminist accounts of gender has been to define gender in terms of women’s subordinate positions in systems of male dominance. In doing so there is a concerted effort to show how gender oppression is jointly sustained by both cultural and material forces.

Question 96

In what sense is early Critical Theory “nothing but the critique of capitalism”, for Jaeggi?

Answer 96

She sees critical theory as nothing but a critique of capitalism insofar as everything it deals with—including the most elaborate thoughts on aesthetic phenomena—is addressed in terms of the effects and character of capitalist socialization. This is a wide view of the economy – pervading all areas of a social existence and acting beyond that of other social institutions.

Question 97

Briefly sketch Jaeggi’s wide concept of the economy.

Answer 97

In order to understand the economy in a wider sense, we should conceive of it as a set of social practices—of economic social practices , to be precise. This is to view economic practises as a subset of social practises in general and share the features of practises. (allows for a critique of the layout of economic contexts of practice, a critique immanent to their normative content, that is, to the normative conditions of fulfilment underlying these practices.) Don’t just look at the practises of exchange within a market but a set of social practises that result from the basic assumption of utility maximising individuals

Question 98

Explain why Jaeggi claims that “critical theory as a critique of capitalism finds itself in a slightly paradoxical situation”.

Answer 98

Early critical theory came with an approach to capitalism that saw it to encompass and corrupt all spheres of life. Much of the criticism focused on the influence of commodities in other non-economic sphere of public life – this led to a slightly paradoxical situation. On the one hand, early critical theory, as a whole, is the critique of capitalism. It is thus, in a certain sense, nothing but the critique of capitalism, insofar as everything it deals with—including the most elaborate thoughts on aesthetic phenomena—is addressed in terms of the effects and character of capitalist socialization. On the other hand, however, the question arises as to what extent such a theory is actually a critique of capitalism at all, since, in fact, it deals very little with the analysis and critique of actual economic practices specific to capitalist societies (effects and implications rather than economic practises).

Question 99

Summarise Jaeggi's thesis that capitalism can be understood as a form of life.

Answer 99

practices because they encompass a diversity of practices that, while dependent on one another, do not exist as an impenetrable and closed totality. Capitalism is constituted by different social practises – property, market and exchange, labour and production – which when bundled can be considered a form of life.

Question 100

What are the main features of a social practice, for Jaeggi?

Answer 100

The term “social practice” refers to practices concerning oneself, others, and the material world. E.g. to attend a dinner party. First, practices are not just intentional actions. They might be based on implicit rather than explicit knowledge; they are patterns in which we act, and which allow us to act. Second, practices are not “brute facts.” They have to be interpreted and understood as something. They are constituted as practices only through interpretations and understanding with interlinked practises. Third, practices are regulated by norms. They are organized around an essential idea of what it means to “fulfil” this practice at all, that is, to act according to the normative expectations involved in a certain practice Fourth, practices have an inherent telos. They are directed at some aim that might be realized through engaging in them, even if we might find a multiplicity of aims coming together in a single practice.