6 - The Firm: Owners, Managers, and Employees Flashcards

(40 cards)

1
Q

How does coordination differ between firms and markets?

A

Firms:
* Centralised economic power
* Managers issue commands to employees
* Employees expected to comply

Markets:
* Decentralised power
* Buyers and sellers act independently
* Buyers and sellers are not expected to comply

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2
Q

How do owners differ from managers and employees?

A

Owners - Decide long-term strategy of company, directing managers to implement these decisions
Managers - Assign tasks to employees to meet ownership directives
Employees - Carry out tasks from managers

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3
Q

Why is there asymmetric information between the three layers in a company?

A

Owners and managers do not necessarily know if their commands are carried out.

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4
Q

How did Coase describe the firm?

A

A miniature, privately-owned, and centrally planned economy.

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5
Q

What is the difference between a sale and wage labour contract?

A

Sale contract - Transfers ownership
Wage labour contract - Transfer authority of labour while at work (i.e. rent the employee’s labour)

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6
Q

Why are all three layers of the firm united in their common interest for firm success?

A

All suffer if the firm fails.

Skills, networks and friendships are firm-specific assets which you lose if it goes out of business.

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7
Q

Why do the three layers of the firm disagree?

A

Disagreement as to how to distribute profits from firm success amongst themselves.

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8
Q

How can the owners benefit from the managers and employees?

A

If revenues increase and all else remains the same.

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9
Q

How do small enterprises differ from larger enterprises?

A

Small enterprises often:
* are owned by the managers
* cannot outsource to a low-wage location

Larger enterprises often:
* are owned by many (shareholders)
* use capital to finance growth via managerial decision-making

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10
Q

How can the separation of ownership and control lead to conflicts of interest?

A

Decisions taken by managers may not be in the interests of the owners.
They may try to minimise work hours, increase personal power etc.

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11
Q

How can the separation of ownership and control be solved?

A

Either by:
* offering managers ownership (i.e. shares)
* shareholder revolt by forcing management out

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12
Q

What are the assumptions we make about the firm?

A
  • Owners have strong interest in profit maximisation
  • Market competition penalises those that cannot make substantial profits for owners
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13
Q

What do firm profits depend on?

A
  • Costs of acquiring inputs for production
  • Output
  • Sales revenues from selling goods or services
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14
Q

What is contractual incompleteness?

A

The fact that:
* the firm cannot know exactly what an employee needs to do
* it is impractical for a firm to observe exactly how much effort each employee makes in doing the job

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15
Q

Why are piece rate contracts almost impossible?

A
  • Difficult to measure output that a person is producing in modern, knowledge based companies.
  • Employees rarely work alone
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16
Q

How can employment rents benefits owners and managers?

A
  • Employee is more likely to stay with the firm
  • They can threaten to fire the worker
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17
Q

What are the costs of working?

A
  • Disutility of work
  • Cost of travelling to work everyday
18
Q

What are the benefits of working?

A
  • Wage income
  • Firm-specific assets
  • Social status of being unemployed
19
Q

What are the main determinants of economic rent?

A
  • The pay an individual gets
  • How hard they work
20
Q

What is the net utility per hour?

A

Wage - disutility of working per hour

21
Q

Where is Maria’s employment rent on this graph?

22
Q

What happens to employment rent if an individual receives unemployment benefits?

A

Economic rent falls by the amount of unemployment benefits per hour.

23
Q

What will workers do when the employment rent is large?

A

Work harder to reduce risk of losing job.

24
Q

How can a firm increase the employment rent?

A

Raising wages.

Assuming all else is constant.

25
What kind of game is employment?
Sequential. Employer chooses wage => Worker chooses a level of work effort
26
How can a work game be made to a Nash equilibrium?
Worker puts in best level of effort for wage offered Employer offering best wage to get the most profit
27
Draw a worker's best response curve, with a reservation wage of £6.
28
What happens to a worker's best response curve if wages increase?
You shift along the curve, causing effort per hour to increase, with the employer's MRT decreasing as wages increase.
29
What is the main bargaining power that a worker has?
A worker can leave.
30
What does the bargaining power of workers do to the BRC?
Causes it to be concave and slope upwards. The only way to increase effort per hour is to pay a higher wage.
31
What is the cost of a unit of effort for employers?
w/e ## Footnote w = wage, e = effort per hour
32
Draw an iso-cost line for an employer trying to maximise effort per wage.
33
How do employers attempt to minimise cost per effort on an isocost curve?
Choose the steepest curve to minimise cost per effort.
34
Draw a graph showing an employer's IC and worker's BRC.
35
Why must there be some involuntary unemployment in the economy?
If worker's could find a job at the same wage level instantly, the best response of the worker would be 0 effort.
36
What does the position of the BRC depend on?
* Utility of salary * Disutility of effort * Reservation wage * Probability of getting fired at each effort level
37
If the time it takes to find a new job increases, what happens to employment rent?
* Reduces reservation wage - employment rent per hour increase * Total employment rents increase
38
Draw two different BRCs for higher unemployment, and higher unemployment benefits.
39
Why are there principal-agent problems in the economy?
There is a conflict of interest between employees and managers. The information is unverifiable as actions taken by the agent is 'hidden' from the principal.
40