Unit 3 - Lesson 9 - Chapter 8 Flashcards

1
Q

Union-management negotiations usually proceed through specific stages:

A
  • the pre-negotiation stage
  • the stage of establishing the negotiating range
  • the stage of narrowing the bargaining range
  • the crisis stage
  • the ratification stage
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2
Q

The actual negotiations proceed through three specific stages:

A

the stage of establishing the negotiating range
the stage of narrowing the bargaining range
the crisis stage preceding the decision to settle or to invoke economic sanctions such as a strike or lockout.

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3
Q

Aborting or short-circuiting any stage in the negotiation process can cause

A

the process to end abruptly or to fail to produce an agreement.

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4
Q

Pre-negotiation Stage

A

In this stage, each side determines its priorities, goals, and proposals for the upcoming negotiations.

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5
Q

Establishing the Negotiating Range

A

This stage of bargaining typically begins at the first formal bargaining session, where all the representatives of both parties are present. In this stage, both parties introduce their bargaining team members and present their proposals. Usually, the chief negotiator for each side orally presents the rationale for each proposal to the other side.

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6
Q

These oral presentations serve several purposes.

A

One is to establish the negotiating range by identifying the issues of importance to each side and stating what each side initially intends to achieve on these issues.
Another purpose of these presentations is to demonstrate the degree of commitment each side has to its own positions.
Finally, these presentations provide an opportunity for each side to explain the reasoning behind its proposals and positions and thereby influence the perceptions and expectations of the other side.

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7
Q

Narrowing the Bargaining Range

A

The activities in the stage when the bargaining range is narrowed are perhaps best illustrated by the zone of agreement model.

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8
Q

The timing of counter-proposals and concessions is crucial during the narrowing stage of bargaining.

A

It is important for both sides to fully exhaust their arguments for their own positions. It is only when those discussions are thoroughly concluded that any movement from a position becomes timely.

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9
Q

This back-and-forth discussion, combined with the time each team spends in private meetings, means that narrowing the bargaining range is often the

A

longest of all the bargaining stages.

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10
Q

The Crisis Stage

A

During the crisis stage of negotiations, one or both sides must decide whether to settle or whether to use economic sanctions such as a strike or lockout to pressure the other side into agreeing to its demands.

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11
Q

Ratification

A

Once mutually acceptable contract terms are agreed upon, both sides must obtain ratification of the tentative agreement. During ratification, the negotiating teams return to the constituencies they represent and present the negotiated contract terms for the constituencies’ approval

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12
Q

The constituencies represented by the management negotiating team will want to be sure that the negotiated terms do not make the organization

A

less efficient or less productive.

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13
Q

The union negotiators will want to have satisfied the legitimate and specific needs of the members, and they must assure

A

members that the negotiated contract terms address these needs.

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14
Q

Generally, the union will conduct a ratification vote among its

A

membership on whether to accept the negotiated agreement

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15
Q

management will contact all relevant stakeholders to ensure that the terms of the negotiated agreement are

A

acceptable

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16
Q

Pre-negotiation Summary

A

Parties determine and prioritize bargaining issues and determine desired outcomes

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17
Q

Establishing the negotiating range Summary

A

Parties meet and exchange initial offers Parties adjust expectations based on the other side’s offers

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18
Q

Narrowing the negotiating range Summary

A

Parties discuss offers and develop and exchange counter-proposals

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19
Q

Crisis Summary

A

Parties disagree over items One side may decide to start strike or lockout to pressure the other side into agreeing to its terms One side must agree to other side’s proposal for the crisis stage to be resolved, after which parties settle a tentative agreement

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20
Q

Ratification Summary

A

Parties take the agreement to their constituencies for approval

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21
Q

subprocesses of bargaining

A

intra- organizational bargaining.
attitudinal structuring
integrative bargaining
distributive bargaining

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22
Q

Whether attitudinal structuring results in positive or negative attitudes depends on such factors as

A

each team’s knowledge of or experience with members of the other team; each team’s perception of how difficult it will be to negotiate certain issues; and any previous bargaining history shared by the two sides

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23
Q

during the integrative bargaining subprocess, the parties focus on

A

what they have in common, rather than on where they differ, and try to develop solutions that benefit both sides, rather than having one party “win” and the other party “lose.”

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24
Q

The Intra-organizational Bargaining Subprocess

A

The intra-organizational bargaining subprocess involves the internal relationships that exist within each organization and bargaining team. It is thus distinct from the other three subprocesses, which involve external relationships between the union and management during negotiations.

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25
Q

During the intra-organizational bargaining subprocess, two main types of internal conflict appear

A

role conflict and factional conflict.

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26
Q

Role conflict occurs because

A

there are conflicting expectations for each side’s chief negotiator

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27
Q

factional conflict, develops within an organization when

A

different groups have conflicting demands

28
Q

The Attitudinal Structuring Subprocess

A

The attitudinal structuring subprocess is one part of the larger process establishing the relationship patterns that define and shape each side’s negotiation behaviour.
The attitudinal structuring subprocess can assist in creating this atmosphere by confirming, or, if necessary, changing each side’s beliefs and perceptions of the other side.

29
Q

The Integrative Bargaining Subprocess

A

In integrative bargaining, a gain for one side is also a gain for the other side, and the reso- lution of goals, priorities, and demands results in a joint advantage for both sides. The integrative bargaining subprocess is different from the distributive bargaining subprocess in that the former deals with mutual problems, while the latter deals with more conten- tious issues.

30
Q

The Distributive Bargaining Subprocess

A

The most highly visible negotiation subprocess and the one most often associated with union-management negotiations is the distributive bargaining subprocess. In distribu- tive bargaining, both sides are involved in a fundamental conflict over the allocation of a fixed and limited amount of resources.

31
Q

The amount of bargaining power that each side holds in negotiations cannot be precisely measured. The amount will vary depending on a number of factors

A

Environmental, socio-demographic, and organizational factors, for example, can affect the amount of bargaining power held by both sides.

32
Q

Environmental factors affect- ing the amount of power held by each side include

A

public opinion, legislation, and the economy.

33
Q

if the public perceives that a union is being greedy in its bargaining demands

A

this perception reduces the union’s bargaining power, because it gives the employer a reason to disagree with the union’s proposals

34
Q

The socio-demographic factors affecting bargaining power include

A

the diversity of bargaining priorities among negotiators and their constituencies.

35
Q

When negotiators and their constituencies have the same bargaining priorities, their unity can increase the

A

negotiators’ bargaining power, particularly if the other side is aware of this unity and feels there is less unity on its own side.

36
Q

The orga- nizational factors affecting bargaining power include

A

The intra-organizational dynamics of both the union and management.

37
Q

Factors affecting the employer’s bargaining power may include

A

the size of its inventory, the structure of its operations, its competi- tiveness, whether the business is seasonal, whether the business can operate during a strike, and the business’s labour costs.

38
Q

having a large amount of pro- duction inventory on hand would increase the employer’s bargaining power.

A

Having a reliable supply of raw materi- als would allow a company to continue production dur- ing a strike or lockout, even if suppliers are not able to deliver goods to the workplace.

39
Q

Factors affecting the union’s bargaining power may include

A

the strength of the union’s commitment to spe- cific issues, the union’s access to funds for supporting strike activity, and the timing and effectiveness of a possible strike.

40
Q

The “cost of disputes” model of union-management negotiations

A

focuses on the inter- actions among the bargaining power, the interests, and the rights of each side, and how these interactions affect the costs associated with negotiating disputes.

41
Q

The “cost of disputes” model outlines how

A

interests, rights, and power interrelate during the bargaining process. The parties’ differing interests are reconciled within the context of each side’s rights and bargaining power; for example, the party with more rights may be able to dominate decisions on processes and outcomes, even within a supposedly collaborative framework.

42
Q

The “cost of disputes” model proposes that in order to assess how the interrelationship among rights, interests, and power has influenced the outcome of a bargaining dispute, we should assess the costs incurred by the parties involved in the bargaining process. There are four criteria to consider in evaluating the amount of these costs

A

transaction costs
satisfaction with the outcome
the effect on relationships
and whether there has been a recurrence of a problem.

43
Q

Transaction costs associated with negotiations include

A

expenditures of time, money, resources, and emotional energy; they also include the value of opportunities lost because of disagreement.

44
Q

The second criterion in evaluating the cost of bargaining—the level of satisfaction with the result of bargaining—addresses how

A

well the ultimate resolution fulfills each side’s underlying interests. An unsatisfactory resolution will incur costs later on because it will be an inefficient resolution to disputed issues and will also cause frustration for the parties.

45
Q

The third criterion for evaluating bargaining costs—the long-term effect of bargaining on the union-management relationship—examines outcomes similar to those that the attitudinal structuring subprocess has on the union-management relationship—in other words

A

how the relationship between the parties has changed as a result of their interactions with and perceptions of each other

46
Q

The last criterion for determining costs—recurrence—examines whether the negotia- tions produced

A

an agreement that resolved the issues between the parties, or whether the problems recurred after ratification and during the administration of the new collective agreement.

47
Q

The “cost of disputes” model suggests that, in general, the cost of disputing will be less when

A

interests are reconciled within the context of rights and bargaining power

48
Q

the overall financial impact of disputes can be reduced if the parties focus on

A

shared interests in bargaining, rather than on issues that can only be resolved if they exercise their rights or bargaining power. Because interests involve common problems and mutually acceptable solutions, it will be ultimately less costly to deal with interest-based issues, since better-quality solutions will be produced.

49
Q

The mutual gains model of bargaining is founded on four principles that define a straightforward method of negotiations. These principles, with their corresponding actions, are as follows:

A
  1. People: Separate the people from the problem.
  2. Interests: Focus on interests, not positions.
  3. Options: Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do.
  4. Criteria: Insist that the result of negotiations be based or evaluated on some objective standard.
50
Q

the results of various studies have indicated that there is, at best, an imper- fect fit between mutual gains bargaining tech- niques in general and the specific demands of union-management negotiations

A

Often there is an inherent power imbalance between unions and management, as well as different perspectives on what constitutes an accept- able solution to an issue. These conditions can make it difficult to use the mutual gains model of bargaining, since the model emphasizes equality and commonality between the parties.

51
Q

Mutual gains bargaining in union-management negotiations is more feasible when there is

A

increased trust between the union and manage- ment sides, reshaping of the roles and responsibilities of individuals on both negotiation teams, and reductions in the amount of power imbalance between the sides.

52
Q

Three different approaches have been proposed to resolve the adversarial conflicts caused by the differences between the distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining sub- processes.

A

First, each side should strive to establish a minimum degree of trust in and level of communication with the other side. Second, each side should determine a minimum level of acceptance of the other side. Third, both sides should recognize the common dependency they share.

53
Q

arbitral jurisprudence

A

Decisions in previous cases that deal with interpretation and/or applications of collective agreement language.

54
Q

attitudinal structuring

A

A subprocess in bargaining that affects the parties’ attitudes toward each other and toward their mutual relationship.

55
Q

bargaining power

A

The ability of one side in bargaining to secure the other side’s agreement to its terms

56
Q

bottom line

A

The absolute minimum that a negotiating team is prepared to accept as a settlement for a bargaining item.

57
Q

concessions

A

A party’s willingness to agree to the other side’s proposal in negotiations or to adjust their own bargaining position.

58
Q

crisis

A

A bargaining stage in which parties decide whether to settle or to use economic sanctions to pressure for an agreement.

59
Q

distributive bargaining

A

A subprocess in bargaining that consists of competitive behaviours intended to influence the distribution of limited resources

60
Q

integrative bargaining

A

A subprocess in bargaining that consists of problem-solving behaviour focusing on common interests and joint gains.

61
Q

interests

A

The needs, wants, fears, concerns, desires, or other motivators of the parties in bargaining.

62
Q

intra-organizational bargaining

A

A subprocess in bargaining during which negotiators for each side attempt to achieve consensus within the bargaining team on goals and objectives

63
Q

position

A

The preferred outcome of one side in negotiations

64
Q

ratification

A

The bargaining stage in which the parties present the negotiated agreement to the constituencies they represent for approval.

65
Q

rights

A

The formalized powers of the parties in a negotiation.

66
Q

zone of agreement

A

A range of solutions to bargaining issues that are potentially acceptable to both parties.