Levels of Analysis

Question 1

What level is structural realism?

Answer 1

system level

Question 2

describe structural realism’s view of the international state system

Answer 2

predicts balancing to protect from threats
–major states join weaker side to balance
bandwagoning (stephen Walt)
–weak states join stronger side–now at the mercy of the major power on that side
–joining weak alliance won’t help anyone
System is anarchic and self-help
–causes security dilemma and game theory

Question 3

What type of system does Waltz believe is the most stable and why?

Answer 3

bipolarity

• because accidental war is less likely, mistakes are likely in multipolar world and can cause war
• since there are no leads, there is deterrence (equal strength)–actors are risk-averse

Question 4

What does Rosecrantz argue about bipolarity?

Answer 4

• counters Walts
• looks at historical examples of bipolarity (Western Europe in late 1800s: Triple-Entente fought Russia
• Peloponnesian war
• argues that when two states have equal power, both think they are superior and will fight war to settle

Question 5

Describe unipolarity as a type of system

Answer 5

• 1990s and early 200s, US was extremely more powerful (economically and militarily)
• even now there is still nobody to truly balance the US
• -states (Iran and North Korea) threaten nuclear attacks and asymmetric threats to deter US attacks,–trying to make conflict too costly for US
• unipolarity could mean less likely for wars because as a weaker power, it is illogical to try to fight against US
• some argue that since there is no true deterrence for US, there will be many small wars

Question 6

Describe Complex Interdependence and the International state system

Answer 6

• Keohane and Nye–critique structural realism and Walts
• believe that in reality states are dependent, not independent
• ex. IPE: states are tied together through trade
• -interdependence
• to understand different parts of the world, need to figure out where states fit into the world economy
• -Wallerstein (African States), equates them to social, hierarchic classes
• international trade is about specialization, making it interdependent
• economies are intertwined
• –suggests less war because states shouldn’t fit each other if their economies are reliant on one another
• globalization changes the system

Question 7

How generalizable, parsimonious and accurate are system-level theories

Answer 7

• generalizable, modern or ancient periods
• vague, and therefore accuracy can vary
• some theories are very parsimonious (balance of power)

Question 8

What are some examples of domestic level theories?

Answer 8

• culture
• regime-type
• ideology
• domestic stability
• economic characteristics

Question 9

Describe Choucri and North’s “Lateral Pressure”

Answer 9

• considers Population Density and Technology
• Population Density tells us about resources/resource supply
• Technology: how industrialized is it, how much input is needed
• States with high population density and high industrialization (tech) (ex Japan) may not be able to supply its own needs, and thus must trade. If states do not want to trade with them, might take by force (imperialism)
• ex. US (low population density, high tech), can largely feed itself, has its resources despite needing high input—self-sustained for a long time
• ex. Chine (low tech, high PD), becoming more industrialized, needs to trade or conquer to get materials

Question 10

describe the DPT

Answer 10

• democracies rarely fight other democracies, the fight non-democracies
• emphasis on democratic domestic political structure
• democratic leaders tolerate opposition–translates to international-level : DEMOCRATIC NORMS
• if a leader, going to war is risky–likely to lose popularity: CONSTRAINTS ON SYSTEM

Question 11

What is Krasner’s argument? (domestic level)

Answer 11

• insulation of top decision-makers
• -are they able to operate independently from domestic pressures (corporate ideals)
• -if insulate, acts in a more realist way

Question 12

Describe Peter Kazenstein’s views of state-society relations

Answer 12

considers state and society and their relative strengths

• strong state and strong society means more unitary response, coordination
• weak state means decentralized gov system
• weak society means decentralized society/ corporations don’t really communicate or work together

Question 13

Describe the characteristics of Domestic-level theories

Answer 13

• more accurate than system-level theories
• relatively generalizable, but less generalizable than system level theories
• less parsimonious than system-level theories

Question 14

describe bureaucratic politics

Answer 14

different bureaucracies with different views, diplomacy

• -narrow views, marrow responsibilities
• different parts of government are acting rationally, but have different and narrow views of what rational action looks like: leads to no UNITARY rational action

Question 15

What is the organizational process model?

Answer 15

• policy decisions vs. policy implementation
• problems executing rational policy
• bureaucracies might skew things, different from what is chosen at top

Question 16

What is the importance of Standard operating procedures (SOPs)?

Answer 16

• people are trained fro specific things, not a wide variety of things
• shaped by training and preparation
• policy options reduced to repertoires or menus: can’t easily create another choice
• gap between what policy makers think they’re doing and what they actually can do

Question 17

What is the impact of bureaucratic politics?

Answer 17

• manipulation by bureaucratic actors possible
  (ex. Pentagon didn’t think they would be able to do anything about Rwandan genocide, Clinton wanted to)
• bureaucratic politics entails competition between bureaucratic actors: competition for responsibility because that’s how you get resources (Halperin and Kanter)
• “where you stand depends on where you sit” (Allison)
• -individual matters less, it’s about the role

Question 18

What are the characteristics of Bureaucratic politics?

Answer 18

• generalizability depends on person (Nossal argues not generalizable, Van Evera argues generalizable)
• not very parsimonious, many details needed
• great for descriptions of events, not great for predictions (accuracy)

Question 19

Masculine overcompensation

Answer 19

• behaves in a way that overcompensates for physical difficulties (Kaiser Wilhelm II)
• aggressive, especially to subordinates, “bully”
• this will affect how other countries perceive Germany

Question 20

Role of bias

Answer 20

• influence how information is received and interpreted
• -confirmation bias: what should I pay attention to? (we have preconceived notions)
• belief-systems serve as shortcuts, therefore can’t assume rational behaviour due to systemic belief shortcuts

Question 21

What are some challenges for decision making at the individual level

Answer 21

value complexity: different values (not equivalent) to compare, how do you decide which is more important, different people may have different combinations

stress: affects ability to gather information, prompts people to behave in unexpected ways
- -situational factors: crisis–in specific conditions, there are great difficulties with doing rational calculation

Question 22

What are some responses to challenges for decision-making at the individual level

Answer 22

“Bolstering”: choose/push to what you prefer even if not rational

• -happens when information is imperfect/ can’t do rational action calculation
• -don’t spend the time to obtain extra info and weigh it
• -actors try to prove what they believe
• -ex. US invasion of Iraq

Defensive procrastination: instead of calculating a response, tries to wait it out to see if new info or problem solves itself
–usually not a good choice

Question 23

What are the four elements of a crisis

Answer 23

1. High level threat
2. Surprise (did not have time to prepare/plan for rational action)
3. Short-time limit
4. Fatigue (related to stress, no mental break, mentally and physically fatigued)
   - –impedes rational action, particularly in longer crises

Question 24

What are the common consequences of crises/ crisis decsion-making?

Answer 24

• options are limited unneccessarily–ex. don’t go back to looking at cuban air strike as an option
• cognitive rigidity: don’t really use new info, focus on what you think
• short-run thinking takes over: long-term impacts aren’t considered, what’s done after first action?, emphasis on specific goals
• denial of control over events: leaders feel it’s other side that needs decisions, feel trapped
• tendency to make issues personal: individual vs. individual (individual assessments of individuals0 (ex. JFK and Krushchev in CMC–Krushchev thinks JK can be played)

Question 25

What are the origins of focus on individuals?

Answer 25

• strategic analyses in WW2 and early Cold War
• danger of creating tautological (circular) arguments
• Personality causes behaviour and vice versa
• *need different basis of personality to predict
• if using outcomes to prove you’re right, you cannot be proven wrong

Question 26

Potential sources of personality

Answer 26

• childhood
• genetics
• individual experience
• generational experience (Gorbachev)

Question 27

Conclusions on idiosyncratic approaches

Answer 27

-accurate? –usually descriptive
–predictive–depending on components and available info
–Prescription is clear: change individuals
how generalizable are such theories:
-depends on how specific
-usually not very parsimonious