AAPL Landmark - Prisoners' Rights Flashcards
(12 cards)
Do prisoners have a constitutional right to treatment?
Yes.
Estelle v. Gamble (1976). USSC
Gamble was a prisoner at the TX DOC, and a bale of hay fell on him.
The USSC ruled that the 8th Amendment, as defined by “contemporary standards of decency,” supports a right to adequate medical care for prisoners whose loss of liberty prevents them from seeking medical care independently.
However, the court defined the standard of constitutional violation as “deliberate indifference” to a prisoner’s serious medical care, not mere negligence.
Is a prisoner constitutionally entitled to procedural protections before involuntary transfer to a psychiatric hospital for treatment?
Yes.
Vitek v. Jones (1980). USSC.
Nebraska Prison transferred Jones to a psychiatric facility for setting his mattress on fire in solitary confinement.
The USSC affirmed the lower courts’ requirement that states abide by the following procedure to transfer a patient to a mental hospital: written notice to the prisoner, a hearing allowing for the presentation of evidence and testimony, an independent decision maker, a written statement by the fact finder, and legal counsel for the prisoner.
14th Amendment violation of Due Process
Is a judicial hearing about medication required to satisfy due process for a dangerous, convicted prisoner refusing psychiatric medication?
No.
Washington v. Harper (1990).
The USSC ruled that Harper had a protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medication. However, the Court held that this liberty interest must be balanced against the state interest in “prison safety and security.” It held that 1) there is a legitimate state interest in combating danger posed by a violent mentally ill inmate, and 2) there is little dispute that proper use of medications is an effective means of treating mental illness.
The state must prove its compelling interest in administering the medication.
The state must prove that the medication is necessary and effective.
The state must provide certain procedural protections.
An impartial professional must make the decision to medicate.
Can a person standing trial be forced to take antipsychotic medication without a determination that it is both medically appropriate and the least intrusive option?
No.
Riggins v. Nevada (1992). Riggins argued that the forced administration of Thorizine violated his right to assist in his defense and that the state should have demonstrated treatment with antipsychotics over objection was medically necessary and least restrictive. The USSC found that forcing antipsychotic medications on a convicted prisoner is impermissible without overriding compelling state interest and a determination of medical appropriateness. The 14th Amendment affords at least as much protection to persons standing trial as to those convicted and sentenced.
The Supreme Court ruled that the forced administration of antipsychotic medication violated Riggins’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court held that the state must establish a pressing need to administer antipsychotic medication against a patient’s wishes.
Does the “deliberate indifference” standard outlined in Estelle v. Gamble require actual knowledge of risk by prison officials?
Yes.
Farmer v. Brennan (1994). USSC.
Transexual inmate raped by another inmate.
The USSC decided that prison officials may be held liable for deliberate indifference only if they’re aware of a “substantial risk of serious harm” and “disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Deliberate indifference is somewhere above negligence but below purposeful or knowledgeable harm, and the appropriate test of this case was determined to be that of subjective recklessness: “The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
This was an 8th Amendment Case
Can antipsychotic drugs be forced on a defendant facing serious criminal charges to restore competence to stand trial?
Yes.
Sell v. U.S. (2003). USSC.
An Incompetent Dentist in Missouri refused forced medication.
.
The USSC found that the Constitution permits the government to administer antipsychotic medications involuntarily to mentally ill defendants to restore competence to stand trial if (1) “important government interests are at stake (serious crime),” (2) the treatment is medically appropriate, (3) the treatment is, in fact, likely to “render the defendant competent,” (4) the treatment is “substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel,” and (5) taking account of less intrusive alternatives, the treatment is necessary to further governmental trial-related interests.
Was a special district court ruling to drastically reduce the inmate population in California’s prison system necessary and authorized by Congress?
Yes.
Brown v. Plata (2011). USSC.
Consolidation of two class action cases toward California Prisons. A court-mandated population limit was necessary to remedy a violation of prisoners’ Eighth Amendment constitutional rights, affirming the US District Court’s decision. California had to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity within two years.
It did not violate the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Framed under an 8th Amendment violation.
Does the lack of adequate suicide prevention protocols violate a prisoner’s 8th Amendment constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment?
No.
Taylor v. Barkes (2015).
USSC said there was no clearly established law that gave prisoners the right to adequate suicide prevention protocols under the 8th Amendment.
What case looked at the commitment procedures required for a prisoner to be kept in a maximum-security psychiatric hospital at the expiration of his criminal sentence?
Baxtrom v Herold, (1960), USSC.
Baxtrom was transferred to the New York psychiatric hospital, Dannemora, after the conclusion of his prison sentence.
USSC reversed and remanded, stating he was denied due process under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.
Does mandatory participation in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP) violate an offender’s Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination?
No
McKune v. Lile, (2002), USSC.
Lile refused to participate in SATP and disclose all instances of perpetrating sexual abuse. Consequently, he lost privileges and was transferred to another facility.
The Court said that SATP had a vital penological purpose and that requiring participation did not violate the 5th Amendment prohibition of self-incrimination.
Can a disabled inmate in a state prison sue the State for money damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?
Yes.
United States v. Georgia, (2006), USSC.
Tony Goodman was forced to sit in a cell that did not allow him to turn his wheelchair around, which limited self-care. He was also denied physical therapy, medical treatment, and access to prison programs due to his disability. He sued for monetary damages.
The USSC said Title II created a private cause of action for damages against States if their conduct violated the 14th Amendment. Title II abrogates state immunity.
Does the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution allow Congress to create legislation permitting the civil commitment of sex offenders after their incarceration?
Yes.
U.S. v. Comstock, USSC, 2010
Comstock was in a federal prison and classified as a sexually dangerous person under 18. U.S.C. 4248.
The USSC said the federal government had the constitutional power to protect its citizens from dangerous people.
