Antiterrorism Flashcards
(95 cards)
1
Q
Force Protection Conditions (FPCONS)
A
The FPCON level program is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved program
standardizing the military Services’ identification of, and recommended responses to, terrorist threats and terrorist acts against United States (U.S.) personnel and facilities. It facilitates inter- service coordination and support for AT activities. The FPCON level system is a progressive system designed to shape the AT operational environment in terms of threat integration, resource allocation, and operational continuity. Designed to be proactive in application, the FPCON level process allows commanders to implement graduated measures across systems, resulting in an appropriate security posture. DODI O-2000.16, Volume 2, Department of Defense Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation: Department of Defense Force Protection Condition (FPCON) System, delineates implementation of specific DOD mandatory measures at each FPCON level for afloat and ashore commands. Geographic combatant commander (GCC) supplemental measures to be implemented at each FPCON level for afloat and ashore commands are delineated in respective GCC instructions and/or directives. When a change in FPCON is directed (increased or decreased), voice and message attainment reports will be made via tactical control (TACON) for the FP chain of command. Afloat units will make reports to their immediate superior in command (ISIC) and briefs the installation commanding officer (ICO). The ICO will typically make reports to the regional commander via the regional operations center (ROC). The designated supervisor will brief security/AT watch standers on any changes to the FPCON and include additional threat information or modifications to prescribed measures. Watch standers will report completion of directed changes to the antiterrorism tactical watch officer (ATTWO) or the designated supervisor (i.e., watch commander (WC)). The CO or designated representative is responsible for understanding the reporting requirement and informing the chain of command
2
Q
a progressive system designed to shape the AT operational environment in terms of threat integration, resource allocation, and operational continuity?
A
FPCON level
3
Q
What zone add structure to defense in depth?
A
Assessment Zone and
Threat Zone
4
Q
Terrorists gather exhaustive operational knowledge of a target through _______, but they can also exploit targets of opportunity.
A
Surveillance
5
Q
Vessels must be classified as either a threat or nonthreat before entering this zone.
A
Threat Zone
6
Q
Terrorists will often conduct detailed preoperational planning and surveillance prior to executing an act of terrorism. Which of the following represent typical steps of a terrorist attack planning cycle in order?
A
Target Selection, Surveillance, Final Selection, Tactical Level Planning, Final Surveillance, Deployment, Attack.
7
Q
All surveillance reporting should be in compliance with…
A
OPNAVINST F3100.6J and DODI 2000.26 (eGuardian reporting requirement).
8
Q
_______ have accounted for over one-half of all recorded international terrorist attacks since 1983.
A
Bombings
9
Q
An action taken against a prominent individual for a specific reason.
A
Kidnapping
10
Q
Terrorism is primarily a _________ act that communicates through violence or the threat of violence.
A
Psychological
11
Q
Terrorist strategies will be aimed at publicly causing damage to symbols or inspiring fear. Timing, __________, and method of attacks accommodate mass media dissemination and optimize current news impact.
A
Location
12
Q
On October 12, 2000, what U.S. Naval vessel, assigned to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, was the target of a small-boat attack in the Port of Aden, Yemen.
A
USS Cole
13
Q
What type of device is considered to be much more lethal than a PBIED due to the greater payload
A
VBIED
14
Q
An _______________ is defined as any inadvertent leaving of personal property in a common area during routine business where there is no evidence of any suspicious activity or observable malicious intent.
A
Unattended package
15
Q
Seeing race as the defining characteristic of a society and a basis of cohesion.
A
Ethnocentric
16
Q
Force Protection Conditions
A
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved program standardizing the identification and recommended responses to terrorist threats/acts against US personnel and facilities.
Facilitates inter-service coordination and support for AT activities.
Designed to be proactive in application, the FPCON level process allows commanders to implement graduated measures across systems, resulting in an appropriate security posture.
When a change in FPCON is directed, voice and message reports will be made via TACON for the FP CoC. Afloat units will make reports to their ISIC and briefs the installation commanding officer (ICO). The ICO will typically make reports to the regional commander via the regional operations center (ROC). The designated supervisor will brief security/AT watch standers on any changes to the FPCON and include additional threat information or modifications to prescribed measures. Watch standers will report completion of directed changes to the ATTWO or the designated supervisor (i.e., watch commander (WC)). The CO or designated representative is responsible for understanding the reporting requirement and informing the chain of command.
17
Q
Antiterrorism Plan
A
Baseline plans provide the guidance, policy, and detailed execution required for sustained AT operations. These plans incorporate operational consistencies relative to the physical protection of afloat and ashore critical infrastructure, personnel, operational capabilities, restricted areas, ship systems/tenant activities, and security force training.
Each installation and unit shall develop standing plans to provide a baseline level of security and procedures to increase security postures.
18
Q
Random Antiterrorism Measures
A
present a robust security posture from which a terrorist cannot easily discern patterns and routines that are vulnerable to attack.
The goal of a RAM program is to deter, detect, and disrupt terrorist attacks. The effectiveness of a RAM program, to instill uncertainty of success in the minds of would-be terrorists, is measured by how formidable, unpredictable, and ambiguous the installation or ship appears.
19
Q
Defense in Depth
A
Assessment Zone
Warning Zone
Threat Zone
20
Q
Assessment Zone
A
The outermost defense zone, which typically does not have boundaries. Security forces detect and identify contacts as they approach or pass near the protected asset or area.
21
Q
Warning Zone
A
Security forces must classify contacts as either threats or nonthreats. In this zone, security forces initially interact with contacts to determine hostile intent and provide a physical presence to control access to a restricted area. Standard operating procedures must clearly define methods and steps that can be used to determine hostile intent so watch standers can avoid ambiguity and hesitation.
22
Q
Threat Zone
A
innermost layer of defense in depth. All personnel, vehicles, and vessels must be classified as either a threat or nonthreat before entering this zone. To neutralize threats, the threat zone must be organized to bring maximum destructive fire, via CSWs or other weapons, to bear on targets while minimizing the risk of fratricide and damage to assets.
23
Q
Surveillance
A
Before initiating an attack, terrorists conduct months or years of meticulous planning to maximize the likelihood of success.
Terrorists gather exhaustive operational knowledge of a target through surveillance. Terrorists use surveillance to assess capabilities of security systems, judge effectiveness of security measures, and identify security weaknesses. They closely examine all details of a target, including watch schedules, entry control procedures, periodicity of roving patrols, volume of traffic, citizenship of security guards, and the presence of defensive weapons.
24
Q
Terrorist Surveillance Techniques
A
Terrorists will often conduct detailed preoperational planning and surveillance prior to executing an act of terrorism. The following represent typical steps of a terrorist attack planning cycle:
Target Selection
Surveillance
Final Selection
Tactical Level Planning
Final Surveillance
Deployment
Attack
25
Target Selection
Initiates the operational cycle timeline. A target or groups of targets are selected
26
Surveillance
Potential targets are placed under surveillance to assess risk, vulnerability, and probability of success.
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Final Selection
Surveillance assessment data is evaluated and analyzed to further refine the target selection and method of attack.
28
Tactical Level Planning
Specific TTP for the attack are determined including logistics, materials, and methods. The target is clearly defined and vulnerabilities are identified.
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Final Surveillance
Additional surveillance is conducted to validate previously collected data and to familiarize the terrorists with the attack plan.
30
Deployment
When personnel and resources are in place, the terrorist element will deploy to the selected site for tactical execution of the plan.
31
Attack
The type of attack (close in or standoff) as well as the specific timing is predicated on a number of variables including the specific TTP being employed by the terrorist cell.
32
Detecting surveillance
Personnel, especially sentries and watch standers, must become familiar with their surroundings and normal unit operating procedures. Armed with heightened awareness, personnel must be able to detect the slightest changes which may be indicators of surveillance activity.
33
Terrorist surveillance-detection activities include the following
-Multiple sightings of the same suspicious person, vehicle, or activity, separated by time, distance, or direction.
-Individuals staying at bus/train stops for extended periods while buses/trains arrive and depart.
-Individuals engaging in long conversations on pay or cellular telephones.
-Individuals ordering food at a restaurant and leaving before the food arrives or ordering without eating.
-Joggers standing and stretching for an inordinate amount of time.
-Individuals sitting in a parked car for an extended period of time.
-Individuals wearing improper attire for the location (or season) and not fitting into the
surrounding environment.
-Individuals drawing pictures/taking notes or photographs in an area not normally of interest to a standard tourist; showing interest in security cameras and guard locations; or noticeably watching security reaction drills and procedures.
-Individuals exhibiting unusual behavior (e.g., staring at or quickly looking away from individuals or vehicles as they enter or leave designated facilities or parking areas).
-False phone threats.
-Individuals approaching security checkpoints to ask for directions or innocently attempting to smuggle nonlethal contraband through checkpoints in order to determine the effectiveness of search procedures and to gauge the alertness and reaction of security personnel.
-Vehicle breakdowns on or near base or gates.
-Vehicles with an excessive number of antennas (possibly indicating two-way radios).
-Personnel or vehicles performing evasive movements.
-A dirty vehicle with a clean license plate or vice versa, indicating a recent change.
34
Reporting surveillance
Personnel detecting or suspecting surveillance of assets or areas should immediately report it to the chain of command so that civilian or military LE authorities can take appropriate actions. Sentries or watch standers should have the ability to note descriptions and details of any suspected surveillance activity.
Observers must note the following information:
1. Detailed descriptions of suspicious personnel to include:
a. Gender, height, weight, hair color, build, race, and identifying marks b. Clothing
c. Equipment carried by suspicious personnel (e.g., a phone, camera, or
notebook).
2. Time of day
3. Exact location of suspicious activity
4. Detailed description of vehicle.
35
Surveillance-detection Countermeasures
Preplanned surveillance-detection countermeasures to deter terrorist activities include installing mechanical devices, varying modes of watch-stander behavior, and employing physical barriers. Effective countermeasures specifically include the following:
1. Installing and displaying visible security cameras and motion sensors 2. Employing RAMs to include:
a. Roving security patrols with varying size, timing, and routes b. Sentry watch rotations.
c. Active searches (including X-ray machines and explosive detection
devices) of vehicles and personnel at ECPs.
d. MWD/EDD teams at ECPs.
3. Emplacing barriers, roadblocks, and entry mazes.
4. Visibly displaying CSW and sentries
5. Properly equipping sentries with NVDs, binoculars, thermal imagers, and other gear to enhance surveillance detection.
6. Ensuring sentries receive training in detecting surveillance activities.
7. Establishing sentry posts to ensure all potential surveillance locations can be observed.
8. Ensuring a camera is readily available for surveillance detection.
Surveillance-detection measures assist personnel with consistently maintaining a vigilant stance. By proactively watching for suspicious activity, observers have the highest chance of deterring terrorist attacks before they become a reality.
36
TERRORIST TACTICS
Terrorist tactics vary in sophistication according to the level of training the individual or group has received. The objectives and sophistication of the terrorist group will dictate, to some degree, the tactics used. Terrorist objectives may include attracting publicity for a group’s cause, demonstrating the group’s power or the existing government’s lack of power, exacting revenge, or causing government overreaction. Regardless of the tactics or objectives, terrorists seek to identify and exploit vulnerabilities or seams in security. A critical factor in understanding terrorism is the emotional impact of the terrorist act on an audience other than the victim. The terrorist of today will exploit information operations (IO) against the United States as much as the media will allow. News media coverage is important to terrorists who are attempting to incite public fear or gain attention for their cause. Another determinant of tactics and target selection is the role the terrorist group perceives itself as playing. Terrorism can be used as either an overt or a covert aspect of a political movement engaged in a power struggle within an existing political system. Terrorists frequently claim affiliation with causes or political organizations to give their actions a claim to respectability. Terrorist tactics are criminal violations that require expert criminal investigation with a goal toward prosecution.
37
Common terrorist tactics include:
1. Assassination.
2. Arson.
3. Bombing.
4. Hostage Taking.
5. Kidnapping.
6. Hijacking or Skyjacking.
7. Seizure.
8. Raids or Attacks on Facilities.
9. Sabotage.
10. Weapons of Mass Destruction.
11. Information Warfare (IW).
38
Assassination
A term generally applied to the killing of prominent persons and symbolic enemies as well as traitors who defect from the group.
39
Arson
Arson is the crime of maliciously setting fire to a building or the property of another person. Less dramatic than most tactics, arson has the advantage of low risk to the perpetrator and requires only a low level of technical knowledge.
40
Bombing
Bombing, or improvised explosive device (IED), is the terrorist’s weapon of choice.
A devoted terrorist willing to sacrifice his/her life can cause tremendous damage.
41
Hostage taking
This usually is an overt seizure of one or more individuals with the intent
of gaining publicity or other concessions in return for release of the hostages. While dramatic, hostage and hostage barricade situations are risky for the perpetrator.
42
Kidnapping
While similar to hostage taking, kidnapping has significant differences. Kidnapping is usually a covert seizure of one or more specific persons in order to exact specific demands. The perpetrators of the action may not be known for a long time. News media attention is initially intense but decreases over time. Because of the time involved, successful kidnapping requires elaborate planning and logistics. The risk to the terrorist is less than in the hostage situation.
43
Hijacking or skyjacking
Sometimes employed as a means for escape, hijacking is normally carried out to produce a spectacular hostage situation. Although trains, buses, and ships have been hijacked, aircraft are the preferred target because of their greater mobility and vulnerability.
44
Seizure
Seizure usually involves a building or object that has value in the eyes of the audience. There is some risk to the terrorist because security forces have time to react and may opt to use force to resolve the incident, especially if few or no innocent lives are involved.
45
Raids or Attacks on Facilities
Armed attacks on facilities are usually undertaken for one of three purposes: to gain access to radio or television broadcast capabilities in order to make a statement; to demonstrate the government’s inability to secure critical facilities or national symbols; or to acquire resources (e.g., robbery of a bank or armory).
46
Sabotage
Sabotage is the destruction of property or obstruction of normal operations, or treacherous action to defeat or hinder a cause or endeavor. The objective in most sabotage incidents is to demonstrate how vulnerable society is to terrorist actions.
47
WMD
There is an increasing threat of terrorist use of high explosives, chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons.
48
Information warfare
Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while leveraging and defending one’s own information, information systems, and computer-based networks. The maturation of global connectivity via the Internet allows computer hackers anywhere in the world to attack computer systems with viruses.
49
State Supported terrorist group
These are groups that generally operate independently but receive support from one or more governments.
50
State Directed terrorist group
These groups operate as an agent of a government and receive substantial intelligence, logistic, and operational support from the sponsoring government.
51
Non-state Supported terrorist groups
These are terrorist groups that operate autonomously, receiving no significant support from any government.
52
Forms of Terrorism
Threat or Hoax
Arson
Sabotage
Bombing
Kidnapping
Hostage Taking
Hijack-Seizure
Raid or Ambush
Assassination
WMD
53
Threat or Hoax
A terrorist cell can use threats to coerce or preclude actions by
a targeted individual or population. Threats and hoaxes can dull the effectiveness of preventive or countermeasures when a targeted individual or population loses situational awareness of an actual terrorist target or disperses finite assets against many possible threats. At the less lethal end of the spectrum, hoaxes can simply be methods to annoy and wear down security forces and keep the population constantly agitated. Bomb threats, leaving suspicious items in public places, and ploys consume time and effort from other security operations and contribute to uncertainty and anxiety.
54
Hijack-seizure
Hijacking involves the forceful commandeering of a conveyance. Although normally associated with planes, it can also include naval vessels or other craft. There are many purposes to hijacking, such as hostage taking activities, obtaining a means of escape, or as a means of suicide. While hijacking of aircraft for hostage taking has declined in frequency since the implementation of improved security measures, the use of hijacked aircraft for escape or as a weapon continues. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001 are vivid reminders of the hijacking abilities of terrorist groups and the destructive power of hijacked airliners.
55
Raid or ambush
A terrorist raid is similar in concept to a conventional operation but is usually conducted with smaller forces against targets marked for destruction, hijacking, or hostage operations. A raid permits control of the target for the execution of some other action. The kidnapping or assassination of a target that has a security force can often require a raid to overcome the defenses. Successful conduct of these type attacks requires extensive preoperational surveillance and detailed planning. Examples of this type tactic are the raids conducted by terrorists on three Riyadh western housing compounds in Saudi Arabia on 11 May 2003. Attackers penetrated each compound and then detonated vehicle borne IEDs. The attack at the al-Hamra compound demonstrates the tactics used in a raid such as this.
56
Assassination
An assassination is a deliberate action to kill specific individuals, usually VIPs such as political leaders, notable citizens, collaborators, particularly effective officials. The terrorist group assassinates people it cannot intimidate, people who support their enemy, or people who have some symbolic significance for the enemy or world community. Terrorist groups often refer to these killings as punishment or justice as an attempt to legitimize their actions. In 1981, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was assassinated by fundamentalist Islamics for his support of the peace process in the Middle East and his relationship with Western nations.
57
Terrorism
The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.
58
Counter Terrorism
Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to
terrorism.
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Hostile Act
An attack or other use of force against the United States or U.S. forces,
which includes force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. forces and the recovery of U.S. personnel and vital U.S. government property. In certain circumstances, the use of force against U.S. nationals, their property, U.S. commercial assets, and/or other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals, and their property is also a hostile act.
60
Hostile Intent
The threat of imminent use of force against the United States or U.S.
forces, which includes the threat of imminent use of force that would preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. forces, including the recovery of U.S. personnel or vital U.S. government property. In certain circumstances, hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force against U.S. nationals, their property, U.S. commercial assets, and/or designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals, and their property.
61
Hostile Force
Any civilian, paramilitary, or military force or terrorist(s), with or without
national designation, that has committed a hostile act, exhibited hostile intent, or has been declared hostile by appropriate U.S. authority.
62
Discuss how terrorists choose the target
This phase is the collection of information on a number of potential targets. Collection is gathered from diverse sources. Collectors may be core members of the terrorist cell, sympathizers, or people providing information without knowledge of the intended purpose. This phase also includes open source and general information collection. Some features of this type of collection are:
-Stories from newspapers and other media provide background information.
-Internet research provides data such as texts, pictures, blue prints, and video information.
-Potential targets are screened based on the intended objective and assesses areas such as symbolic value, critical infrastructure points of failure, expected number of mass casualties, and potential to generate high profile media attention.
The number of preliminary targets that can be screened is limited only by the capabilities of the group to collect information. Targets that are considered vulnerable and which would further terrorist goals are selected for the next phase of intelligence collection.
63
Describe the Operational Intent of terrorism
Terrorism is primarily a psychological act that communicates through violence or the threat of violence. Terrorist strategies will be aimed at publicly causing damage to symbols or inspiring fear. Timing, location, and method of attacks accommodate mass media dissemination and optimize current news impact.
A terrorist operation will often have the goal of manipulating popular perceptions, and will achieve this by controlling or dictating media coverage. This control need not be overt, as terrorists analyze and exploit the dynamics of major media outlets and the pressure of the news cycle. A terrorist attack that appears to follow this concept was the bombing of commuter trains in Madrid, Spain in March 2004. There has been much speculation as to the true objective behind these bombings. One view is that Islamic terrorists who conducted the attacks specifically planned to influence the political process in Spain. They believed that a large percentage of the Spanish population opposed the war in Iraq and would feel that the current government was responsible for the bombings, and would vote for the opposition. The attacks occurred during morning rush hour just three days prior to national elections. The timing facilitated maximum casualties on the trains that killed 191 people and injured more than 1800. News coverage was immediate throughout the world and amplified the carnage of the terrorist attack. An antiwar Socialist prime minister was elected and quickly withdrew Spain’s military forces from Iraq.
64
Describe terrorism motivational categories
Separatist.
Ethnocentric.
Nationalistic.
Revolutionary.
65
Separatist
Separatist groups reach for a goal of separation from existing entities through independence, political autonomy, or religious freedom or domination. The ideologies that separatists promote include social justice or equity, anti-imperialism, as well as the resistance to conquest or occupation by a foreign power. Categories of ethnicity and nationalism can crossover in support rationale.
66
Ethnocentric
Ethnocentric groups see race as the defining characteristic of a society and a basis of cohesion. Group members promote the attitude that a particular group is superior because of its ethnic or racial characteristics.
67
Nationalistic
The loyalty and devotion to a nation and the national consciousness place one nation’s culture and interests above those of other nations or groups is the motivating factor behind these groups. This can aim to create a new nation or to split away part of an existing state in order to join with another nation that shares the perceived national identity.
68
Revolutionary
These groups are dedicated to the overthrow of an established order and replacing governance with a new political or social structure. Often associated with communist political ideologies, other political movements can advocate revolutionary methods to achieve their goals.
69
State the FPCONs and their definition:
Condition NORMAL — Applies when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only a routine security posture.
Condition ALPHA — Declared when a general threat of possible terrorist activity is directed toward installations, vessels, or personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable and where circumstances do not justify full implementation of FP condition.
BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain selected measures from FP condition BRAVO as a result of intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this threat condition must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.
FP Condition BRAVO—Declared when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures of this FP condition must be capable of being sustained for weeks without causing undue hardships, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.
FP Condition CHARLIE—Declared when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against installations, vessels, or personnel is imminent. Implementation of this FP condition for more than a short period will probably create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.
FP Condition DELTA—Declared when a terrorist attack has occurred in the immediate area or intelligence indicates a terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this FP condition is declared only as a localized warning.
70
FCPON Normal
Applies when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only a routine security posture.
71
FPCON Alpha
Declared when a general threat of possible terrorist activity is directed toward installations, vessels, or personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable and where circumstances do not justify full implementation of FP condition BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain selected measures from FP condition BRAVO as a result of intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this threat condition must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.
72
FPCON Bravo
Declared when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures of this FP condition must be capable of being sustained for weeks without causing undue hardships, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.
73
FPCON Charlie
Declared when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against installations, vessels, or personnel is imminent. Implementation of this FP condition for more than a short period will probably create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.
74
FPCON Delta
Declared when a terrorist attack has occurred in the immediate area or intelligence indicates a terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this FP condition is declared only as a localized warning.
75
State the purpose of Pre-Planned Responses
Preplanned responses are developed, exercised, and evaluated actions and measures implemented to identify, track, assess, and neutralize terrorist attacks. This chapter sets forth specific guidance for commanders and planners to develop effective PPRs to counter terrorist threats.
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Active Threat
An active shooter incident is when one or more subjects participate in a shooting spree, random or systematic, with intent to continuously harm others. Active shooter scenarios are extremely dangerous and difficult because there is no criminal objective (e.g., robbery, hostage taking) involved other than mass murder. Often the shooter has no regard for his/her life and may be planning to die. The FBI and DHS defines an active shooter as an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined, populated space. In most cases, active shooters employ weapons that are concealable and fire on persons that they may or may not know.
77
Aircraft Threat
The detect-to-engage sequence is compressed even further when dealing with aircraft threats. Certain security aspects (e.g., determining temper, intent, and weapons release authority) become more difficult. Security forces may lack the proper anti-air weapons for target engagement. If aircraft are deemed to be hostile and security forces open fire with weapons, collateral damage from expended rounds is an added concern. While this risk also exists when firing on waterborne and land threats, the potential for collateral damage is greater when firing against an air threat.
78
Armed/Barricaded/Hostage Incidents
When responding to a crisis involving a hostage taker or barricaded subject, negotiators normally experience one of two categories of behavior; instrumental or expressive. Although these two distinctly different categories of behavior represent opposite ends of a continuum, subjects may often exhibit elements of both types during an incident.
1. Instrumental Behavior. Instrumental behavior is characterized by substantive demands and clearly recognizable objectives that, if attained, will benefit the subject.
2. Expressive Behavior. Expressive behavior is designed to communicate the subject’s frustration, outrage, passion, despair, anger, or other feelings.
3. Hostage takers usually fall into one of four major types; mentally disturbed persons, criminals trapped during the commission of a crime, prisoners who are revolting, or political terrorists attempting to produce social change through threat of or use of violence.
4. Hostage taking, by the very nature of the act, forces the hostage taker into stereotyped responses. The hostage becomes a pawn, caught between the hostage taker and authorities. The hostage takers become violent, strive to control the situation and move the event toward completion of their objective.
The hostage, by conduct, can enhance or diminish their chance of survival. The more the hostage understands about their hostage taker, the better they will be able to predict the hostage takers behavior and feel some degree of control. This can assist by diminishing the hostages fear.
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Chemical, Biological, Radiological, And Nuclear Environments
Armed forces require protection from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
threats that include the intent and capability to employ weapons, improvised devices, as well as hazards from industrial facilities in their respective AO. The threatened or actual employment of CBRN material, including toxic industrial materials (TIMs), can seriously challenge U.S. military operations. The deadly, destructive, and disruptive effects of these weapons and materials merit continuous consideration by the joint force commanders and supporting commanders. Failure to properly plan and execute CBRN defenses may result in significant casualties, disruption of operations, and even mission degradation. Protecting the force is of equal or greater concern during all entry operations as well as offensive or defensive operations.
80
Deep-Draft Vessel Threat
Deep-draft ships have the potential to inflict devastating damage due to their large capacity to hold explosives and to the difficulty friendly forces face trying to stop an underway vessel. Security forces and boats can stop hostile small vessels by shouldering, ramming, or shooting them. Although the same measures could be employed against an approaching hostile ship, the likelihood of stopping it is minimal.
81
Entry Control Point Threat
The primary focus is the ability to detect and defend against attack by a terrorist/vehicle with an IED/VBIED. The approach is proactive in nature and emphasizes standardized procedures across all ashore and afloat operating environments.
Navy installation ECPs should have clearly posted Federal/U.S. government property demarcation lines, vehicle speed limits, traffic regulatory, and directional signs, and these directives should be strictly enforced. Examples of signs at an ECP approach zone include REDUCE SPEED, STOP, and TRUCKS USE RIGHT LANE. These signs must not impede the sentry’s line of sight of oncoming traffic. Any person or vehicle that needs to reach a critical asset or area should be required to pass through an ECP. At naval installations and commands, ECPs are typically base gates, pier accesses, and ships’ quarterdecks. Such defense in depth is designed to keep PBIEDs and VBIEDs far enough from critical assets and areas (blast mitigation) to avoid serious damage.
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Man-Portable Air Defense System Threat
Potential damage and loss of life resulting from the employment of MANPADS is greater than from a sniper or mortar threat. The November 2002 terrorist attack on an Israeli airliner in Kenya highlights the potential anti-air MANPADS threat to U.S. aviation assets. Since MANPADS threats typically launch a single missile (fire and flee) as opposed to a recurring sniper or mortar threat, the key to countering the threat is to prevent its recurrence.
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Maritime Improvised Explosive Devices, Mines, And Floating Mine Threats
Waterborne threats may include floating mines and IEDs. Floating mines can be released to allow current, tides, or wind to push the device towards intended targets where upon they detonate on contact or by influence, such as a magnetic firing device. Refer to NTTP 3-15.23, Expeditionary Mine Counter Measures, Appendix F, for additional guidance when planning defense actions against these threats. Ensure to use knowledge of local environmental conditions when planning defensive actions for floating mine threats.
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Media Requests
Representatives of the media are not allowed access to the protected area without proper authorization. Watch standers should proceed as follows:
1. Notify supervisor when media representatives do not identify themselves, attempt to gain
access to the protected area, or are visibly present near the ECP displaying cameras, lighting, sound equipment, or marked vehicles
2. Refer all media queries to the proper military authority (e.g., the public affairs officer/command spokesperson, CDO, XO, or CO).
85
Personnel-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
When a PBIED is discovered or recognized, it should be treated as an attack with a deadly weapon, and deadly force is immediately authorized. While a weapon may be useful for an IED situation, the best survival tools are cover, distance from the IED, and time to achieve both. Unfortunately, the ECP is the first line of defense against an enemy attack and the most likely to take casualties. It is the duty of the watch personnel to ensure they stop the aggressors at the ECP and debar access to U.S. Navy facilities or assets.
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Protests, Demonstration, And Rallies
If protestors approach an ECP, watch standers should perform the following procedures:
1. Upon initial gathering or massing of personnel, notify patrol supervisor or ECP supervisor.
2. Prepare to secure ECP by closing gates or activating barrier systems.
3. Maintain the flow of friendly personnel through the ECP.
4. Do not take actions that would escalate the situation.
5. Request reinforcements as required.
6. Verbally warn protestors to remain away from the post as directed by supervisors.
7. If protestors physically attack watch standers or attempt to forcefully gain access to the protected area, perform the following procedures:
a. Prevent access by using authorized force.
b. Apprehend aggressors and remove from immediate area.
c. Secure ECP as directed to prevent unauthorized access.
d. Assist civilian authorities as required.
e. Maintain positive access control at all times.
8. Photograph participants (which can be an effective deterrent and removes anonymity from the process).
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Rail-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Threat
Rail-borne IEDs have not been used to inflict terrorist damage, although the potential exists.
The train’s size permits loading very large IEDs with less likelihood of early discovery. The following are reasons a rail-borne IED is an attractive form of attack for terrorists:
1. The IED is easily transportable.
2. The size of the IED can be large and is not limited to what a person can carry.
3. A rail car is an inconspicuous delivery vehicle.
4. An IED can be easily hidden within a rail car.
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Bomb threats
A bomb threat is generally defined as a threat, usually verbal or written, to detonate an explosive or incendiary device to cause property damage, death, or injuries, whether or not such a device actually exists. Bombs come in all shapes and sizes and can be detonated remotely from significant distances with little or no warning. Security personnel should take any bomb threat seriously and assume the worst case until determined otherwise. Use of EDD team if available, to assist in the search, should occur prior to any personnel entering into the area. The EDD team should be accompanied by a qualified spotter and, if available, an individual familiar with the area.
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Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack
Acts of terrorism that involve synchronized and independent team(s) at multiple locations, sequentially or in close succession, initiated with little or no warning, and employing one or more weapon system (i.e., firearms, explosives, fire, and other nontraditional attack methodologies) that are intended to result in large numbers of casualties.
Various violent extremist organizations have the proven ability to launch simultaneous, coordinated attacks against multiple targets. Complex coordinated terrorist attacks are an evolving and dynamic terrorist threat, shifting from symbolic, high levels of sophistication, planning, surveillance, target selection, and mission execution to attacks that could occur anywhere, at any time, with the potential for mass casualties and infrastructure damage. Commanders and ATOs must be cognizant of this type of attack profile.
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Small boat threat
On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole, assigned to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, was the target of a small-boat attack in the Port of Aden, Yemen. Approximately two hours after the ship moored in the harbor for refueling, a two-manned fifteen-foot skiff packed with several hundred pounds of C-4 military explosives circled her bow before closing amidships and detonating the charge. The resulting blast blew a 35 by 36-foot hole in the hull, killing 17 American Sailors and wounding 39 others. The terrorist organization al-Qaeda later claimed responsibility and a number of conspirators were captured and subsequently indicted.
Organizations deploy extremely fast, highly maneuverable, and highly versatile small boats (either independently or in swarms) to achieve conventional naval goals by asymmetric means. Small-boat asymmetric-warfare methods include directly attacking enemy ships, harassing and interdicting commercial shipping, engaging in international piracy (as exemplified by the seizure of the merchant vessel Maersk Alabama in April 2009), smuggling operations, and conducting surveillance. This threat to HVAs must be considered, especially during choke point transits. Small boats armed with machine guns and RPGs may carry out mining operations.
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Small Unmanned Aircraft System
The SUAS represent a rapidly changing and growing sector of the aviation environment. Constantly evolving technology and easy access to sophisticated systems has regulatory, LE, and security communities struggling to keep pace. With the proliferation of SUAS usage, SUAS overflights of Navy installations and assets are occurring more frequently. Unlike manned aircraft violations, for SUAS intrusions, an observer may be unable to identify type, payload, and registration markings. These factors make determining the nature and intent of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operations problematic.
The SUAS may be configured for non-lethal or lethal missions. The small size, and flight characteristics, make detection by Navy personnel challenging, but not impossible. Reliance on human optics alone is not sufficient to effectively detect SUAS. In lieu of an integrated Counter- small Unmanned Aerial System (C-sUAS), vigilance, awareness, and training are essential to mitigate the SUAS threat. The desire end state is to integrate an array of organic and non- organic sensors as well as an operator understanding and exploitation of the operational patterns of the SUAS.
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Standoff Attack Threat
As demonstrated by the attack on the amphibious assault ship (dock) USS Ashland (LSD 48) and the landing ship dock USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) while pier side in Aqaba, Jordan, one of the most difficult threats to detect, deter, and defend against is a standoff attack, because close contact is never made between the attacker and security forces. Distance and the likelihood that the threat is in a civilian or concealed area make eliminating the threat more hazardous. The most likely standoff threats are snipers, mortars, RPGs, and MANPADS (e.g., Stinger missile). Snipers use rifles as antipersonnel weapons, while mortars and RPGs are primarily anti-equipment weapons.
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Swimmer Threat
The threat occurs at the subsurface level, carried out by swimmers/divers utilizing limpet mines (both conventional and improvised) against afloat units and underwater infrastructure. Subsurface threats are an attractive option for terrorists because of their relatively low cost of the device when compared to the value of the target. That said, conducting an underwater attack is extremely complicated when compared to a land-based IED attack. Construction of an underwater attack charge must take into account all of the environmental factors that are involved from fresh or salt water corrosion, resulting internal air void pressure seals due to water depth, current, visibility, and tides just to name a few. Additionally, required training to successfully conduct a subsurface attack is very difficult to complete covertly without attracting undue attention by security forces.
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Unattended Package And Suspicious Package
An unattended package is defined as any inadvertent leaving of personal property in a common area during routine business where there is no evidence of any suspicious activity or observable malicious intent. For any unattended package to be considered a suspicious item (e.g., package, luggage, backpack, letter, parcel, and vehicle) one or more contributing factors which lead you to identify the item as suspicious must be present.
Some contributing factors to look for may be unusual smells, oily stains, protruding wires, excessive postage, no return address, a package out of place with the surrounding area, or strange noises emanating from the package.
The best defense against suspicious packages is awareness of your surroundings; it is possible to come in contact with a suspicious package at home, in your workplace, or in public. Report suspicious packages immediately; and be prepared to act in a manner that enhances your safety as well as others.
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Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
A VBIED can be much more lethal than a PBIED due to the greater payload a vehicle is capable of delivering. A VBIED must be dealt with decisively to prevent it from accessing greater numbers of personnel and assets inside the perimeter being guarded. A VBIED could be targeting the ECP or attempting to access a protected asset, or it could also be the precursor to a follow-on attack. ECP personnel must carefully consider and rehearse PPRs to ensure effective and decisive action in stopping the threat outside the protected perimeter.
