“Appointed officials are better than elected ones”. Discuss.

Question 1

Fundamental Tension - PAWPE

Answer 1

Canes-Wrone et al (2001) - conflict between an elected official’s duty to act in the PUBLIC interest and electoral incentives
Information ASSYMETRY: officials have access to private information, and public cannot immediately verify that decisions are WELFARE-maximizing
Can lead to a PANDERING EQUILIBRIUM that does not occur if the electoral incentives are removed via appointment

Question 2

Tradeoff of appointment - MAPPT

Answer 2

Maskin and Tirole (2004) - Elections allow for MORAL-hazard correction, incentivizing politicans to align with public interest, and ADVERSE-selection correcion, the ability to remove non-congruent officials
Congruency of appointed officials is a matter of PROBABILITY, which is problematic when they are of poor quality…can just make bad decisions
Trades off against PANDERING and Majority TYRANNY

Question 3

Office-holding motive - OLTIS

Answer 3

Maskin and Tirole (2004) - When officials highly value staying in OFFICE, they are likely to engage in full pandering. When the prioritize their LEGACY, they are more likely to act on their own private information, anticipating that this is welfare-maximizing.
In cases like this, the TRADEOFF does not seem worth it, as it is valuable to screen for non-congruence.
However, Dewan and Vallve (2016) show that electoral incentives cause officials to make INEFFICIENT policy choices, straying from the optimal ratio of risky/safe choices. SCREENING can lead to adverse effects, as well.

Question 4

Benefits of appointment - COCF

Answer 4

Maskin and Tirole (2004) - COSTS to acquire information are less likely to be paid by elected officials bc their incentives are influenced by popularity. Appointed officials care only about OPTIMALITY, and are thus better suited for positions that require technical knowledge.
Wrone et al (2001) points out that when voters have a low probability of discovering the CONSEQUENCES of an official’s action (‘uncertainty resoltion’), pandering increases. So, when officials make FEWER, more technical decisions, they are more incentivized to pander. Appointed officials don’t face those incentives.

Question 5

Empirical evidence - JPAT

Answer 5

Lim (2007) - analyze the differences between appointed and elected JUDGES in Kansas, showing that elected judges are vulnerable to PARTISANSHIP and pandering, leading to heterogenous outcomes depending on the politics of the electorate, whereas APPOINTED judges have more standard decision making.
Can be extended to other TECHNICAL positions where the public lacks knowledge.

Question 6

Conclusion - BSOMB

Answer 6

Elected officials are best for positions with BROAD power, as demonstrated by e.g. information sharing in Maskin and Tirole (2004), where the benefits of SELECTION are most prominent and officials have the most OPPORTUNITIES to demostrate competence, i.e. higher probability of uncertainty resolution. MOST government positions are not like this: the consequences of decisions are not available within the timeframe of an election cycle, and understanding decisions is often locked behind technical knowledge unavailable to the public.
So, for most positions, APPOINTED officials are better.