Asymmetric Information Flashcards

(37 cards)

1
Q

Why can information be a potential source of market failure?

A

consumers and firms may not know or be fully informed of the opportunities or costs associated with their decision-making.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

What is asymmetric information?

A

Where some agents hold more/better information than others. It doesn’t always cause market failure without government action but can complicate the operation of real-world markets - firms/consumers will have to take action to prevent complication

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

How is information asymmetry within a market important?

A
  1. One side of a transaction knows more about themselves, but the other side does not - this can lead to the problem of adverse selection, choice made may be poor.
  2. One side can take actions that the other side cannot observe - this can lead to the problem of moral hazard.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

What happens if it is costly to gain accurate information?

A

If important information is costly to obtain then it is no longer possible to that buyer and seller to have the same info.
The cost of information provides an important source of market friction and therefore something we need to consider when analysing any market.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

What is a classic example for looking at the illustration of hidden/private information?

A

the used car markets is important - this was developed by Akerloff (1970).
A typical car buyer will not be able to tell the difference between:
- lemons - low quality used cars
- peaches - high quality used cars

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

What is the problem of hidden/private information?

A

It is advantageous for the seller of a lemon to pretend it is a peach (as they are worth more) - seller knows the true quality.
Since the buyer cannot tell the difference between a lemon and a peach they will not be willing to pay more then what the average quality car is worth.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

What happens in the market for lemons when buyers make a offer?

A

if we assume there is a equal number of lemons and peaches - a peach is worth £10,000 a lemon is worth £5000.
E(V) = 1/2 (10,000) + 1/2 (5000) = £7500. Buyer will offer £7500 and no more, since the buyer cannot tell the difference between a lemon and a peach they will not be willing to pay more than the expected value of the average quality car is worth.
Since the buyer is only paying their expected value, it is below that for peaches, so the seller of peaches leaves the market.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

What happens when the highest quality car (peaches) exits the market?

A

The average quality of car fall - buyers respond by lowering the price they are willing to pay - so the best cars currently available again to leave the market. But same problem just happens again and again.
At the end of the ‘death spiral’ the market collapses and buyers either buy a lemon or concluded that they don’t want to buy any used car that is offered for sale.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

What is Gresham’s law and how is it linked to the lemons problem?

A

Because the bad car have drive the good cars out of the market -named after Sir Thomas Gresham, bad coins would drive out those that were goods.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

What is adverse selection?

A

This is the idea that ex-ante i.e. before purchase the buyer cannot distinguish between the quality of competing goods.
The notion of adverse selection is simple and yet there are many applications in the real world.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

What are examples of adverse selection in the real world?

A
  • consumer durables (high quality/low quality)
  • service providers (who provides good/bad service) - domestic services e.g. gas installers, plumbers. personal services e.g. medical or legal services
  • financial markets - insurance (who is safe risk/bad risk), bank lending (who will default)
  • employment - hiring workers (who’s most productive)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Why can adverse selection be addressed?

A

sectors like the used car market is thriving which tells us that there are effective ways of addressing the problem of adverse selection - inspection, vehicle history, report, warranties, certified, pre-owned programmes

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

What are the solutions that can better support the markets of adverse selection?

A
  • actions taken by the seller - signalling the best informed party to take actions to reveal their unobservable true characteristics
  • actions taken by a third party - appraisal
  • action taken by the buyer - screening = the less informed party takes actions to learn about the true characteristics of the other side of the market.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

What should higher quality sellers do?

A

may need to signal their true worth signals are observable actions taken by economic agents to convince others as to their true characteristics and hence value/quality.
Signals are everywhere and in many ways a key part of like

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

What are the different types of signals?

A

Guarantees/warranties reduce the risk of purchase, signalling that this is a high quality product as this is unlikely to happen as this is expensive for the company to do if the product were low quality.
Brand names relate to reputation of quality e.g. Coco Cola, a certain brand name have a high reputation and so consumers will always go back to them.
Licensing e.g. gas safe installers (ensure engineers have the right qualifications to carry out the work correctly), kite marks

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Are all signals clear and how can they be important?

A

There is not always a clear distinction between a pure signal and firm looking to differentiate its products.
Signalling can solve the lemons problem but only if the cost of attaining the signal significantly differs between sellers.
Michael Spence (2011 Noble Peace Prize in economics) suggested that education could act as a signal in the job market.
With asymmetric info, employees cannot tell the difference between high productivity and low productivity workers,, they wont know how smart or skilled an applicant is.

17
Q

How does a lemon problem occur in the job market?

A

average wage offered will be the low for high productivity workers and to high for lower productivity workers.
Higher productivity workers will be driven out the market - firm cannot get the best possible employees.
In the extreme only low productivity workers are hired

18
Q

What 2 roles does education have?

A
  1. Improves human capital (knowledge enhancing)
  2. Acts as a signal of higher productivity (spence)
    Firms can’t observe productivity levels of a worker before hiring them, but they can observe educational attainment which is regarded as a signal of higher productivity. Firms offer higher wages to workers with a given level of educational attainment and a lower wage to those who have not.
    A degree provides a credible signal of useful skills and abilities and hence gives employers more info they can use in the hiring
19
Q

What is in the interest of all workers?

A

To attain higher level of education to secure the higher wage. But education is costly, time, effort, stress etc, if education is to operate as an effective signal then the cost to attain the signal mist be sufficient to differentiate between different groups of workers

20
Q

What should workers choose?

A

workers should choose the level of education at which the difference between their returns from education (wages) and their total educational cost is maximised (MB=MC).
Getting a degree is harder i.e. more costly for someone with lower ability and is less determined.

21
Q

What is a pooling equilibrium in a educational context?

A

If the cost of attaining a given level of educational qualification is too high (relative to rewards) then no one will undertake education.
If the cost of attaining a given level of education qualification are too low then all workers will undertake education.
If education doesn’t actually improve productivity levels sufficiently then the education process would be socially inefficient (wasteful).
If either of the above situations occur then a pooling equilibrium exists and all workers will be paid the same wage - lemons problem.

22
Q

What is the separating equilibrium in a educational context?

A

Spence suggested that high productivity individuals might find it less costly to undertake education.
If the cost of attaining the level of education is too high for low productive workers then they will refrain from undertaking education and if the cost of attaining the level of education is low enough to induce high productivity workers to undertake education, then a separating equilibrium exists (which solves the lemons problem)
High productivity workers will be paid high wages
Low productivity workers will be paid low wages

23
Q

Are signals good?

A

They can solve the lemons problem created by asymmetric information, but signals are costly. It might be wasteful (relative to opportunity cost) to spend 4 years at university.
While many will learn useful skills/knowledge, some may prefer to simply learn more while working as opposed to spending time jumping through assessment hoops.
While signals do create inefficiently, they all generate benefits by creating more information - the individuals in market realise gains from transactions by overcoming problems of asymmetric information.
Effective signals don’t have to be complicated or involved - advertising and price can both be signals in certain cases. Good types are based on the ease with which consumers can evaluate quality.

24
Q

What are the different types of goods?

A
  • search goods = can be evaluated prior to purchase or consumption e.g. clothing, furnishings
  • experience goods = can be accurately evaluated only after the product has been purchased and experienced e.g. restaurants, hairdressers, movies, holidays
  • credence goods = difficult or impossible to evaluate even after consumption has occurred e.g. accounting, legal services, medical diagnosis
25
Why is advertised important to use as a signal?
If there are high (Qh) and low (Ql) experience goods. Ex-ante consumers can't distinguish between Qh and Ql and all firms will get the same market prices and in the extreme only low quality goods will be on the market (classis lemon problem). To avoid this problem, firm selling Qh goods will spend more on advertising (especially when it involves repeat purchasing). In the context high spending on advertising, even if uninformative is a signal of quality (Nelson 1974)
26
How is priced used as a signal?
Products that are generally one shot purchases - high price signal high quality. 'You get what you pay for' Only at a high price, high quality producers are willing to supply the goods (as low quality producers are worried about contracting demand and on cost of warranty claims). Repeat purchases at an introductory stage, a low price signals a high quality product as a low quality producer cannot generate repeat purchases. Later high prices signal high quality as a high quality producer is not afraid of contracting demand.
27
What is appraisal?
resolves asymmetric information by using a suitable third party to examine a characteristic that's objectively verifiable Examples - car mechanics can assess car conditions, building surveyor identifies defects when buying a house, an appraiser evaluates a piece of art, credit rating agencies assess the financial strength of business/country's. Appraisal resolves the issue by identifying missing information in a way that trustworthy.
28
What is screening?
a uniformed party's effort to learn the information that the more informed party has. It can be successful when it is unprofitable for bad types to mimic the behaviour of goods types. The company can look to employ screening ties to structure things in a way that induces the other side of the market to reveal their hidden information.
29
What does screening involve deploying/offering?
- offers a range of products/services that allow the firm to distinguish between high and low quality because of self-selection e.g. comprehensive v third party insurance. - deploy knowledge of learning measures such as assessment centres when recruiting to identify those with the right skills.
30
How did Zappos.com use screening?
Zappos.com is a shoe retailer that depends heavily on customer service as a key differentiator - but training alone was not sufficient to ensure high quality service. Specifically, Zappos had trouble measuring relevant intangible qualities behind good customer service. They gave employees 4 weeks of training, then offered $2000 bonds to any person who will quit on the spot. About 3% of employees take the offer, remaining group generally delivers the quality of service Zappos desires.
31
What is a moral hazard?
problems created by asymmetric information can also occur after a transaction has taken place. Ex-post agents have less incentive to deliver on a contract and develop a tendency to take risks because the costs that could incur will not be felt by the party taking the risk.
32
What are examples and solutions to moral hazards?
- a fully insured driver starts to drive recklessly because they know accidents are now covered by insurance -> exclusion clauses, no claim bonus on renewals, so incentive to comply) - someone with a dental insurance plan becomes lax at brushing their teeth/flossing and or eating lots of sugar -> excess/deductible, so policy holder still faces a cost
33
Why is the principal agent problem a example of a moral hazard?
agents act on behalf of another party, the principal e.g. the CEO works for a company owner. Agent usually has more information about their actions or intentions that the principal does, because the principal usually cannnot completely monitor the agent. Agent may have a incentive to act inappropriately (from the view point of the principal). If the interests of the principal are not aligned - opportunism/opportunistic behaviour e.g. workers may shift or take excessive risks, slack off
34
What are solutions for the principal agent problems?
- piece rate - only payed for each unit produced - performance related bonus - pay rise - monitoring/appraisal system - future promotions - threat of losing one's job - raising cost of losing one's job, efficiency wages, paying too high so if they lose their job it would not be beneficial. - all about aligning the interests of the agent with the interests of the principal - but not always easy to get right e.g. 2008 financial crash - taking risks were incentivised.
35
How can information be produced?
It can be but at an increasing opportunitty cost - firms are not limited to just solutions to address information challenges, but: - the marginal cost of information increases - while decreasing marginal benefit also applies to information Therefore this is an efficient amount of information, competitive markets in information vs monopoly
36
How would you consider information in the 5 forces framework?
Does information asymmetry feature in any/all forces? Does information asymmetry have implications for generic strategy choices?
37
What must you consider when information is/could be an issue?
- If firms have an asset they can exploit - what firms can do about addressing information they lack - government actions - cost/impact of any actions needed to address issues around information provision.