behaviourism

Question 1

what is physicalism

Answer 1

A philosophical position which claims that there is only one kind of substance, matter, and the physical phenomena which impact it, such as forces. Not everything in physicalism is material, for example gravity is not material but rather is physical. The mind is therefore either completely reducible to the physical or supervenes (depends) on it.

Question 2

what are the three physicalist positions

Answer 2

Behaviourism –> mental properties supervene on physical properties and are analytically reducible. The mind is just our behaviour
MBIT –> mental properties supervene on physical properties and are ontologically reducible. The mind is just the brain
Eliminative Materialism –> mental properties do not exist, so cannot supervene on the physical or be reduced. We should eliminate all language that refer to them and replace them with the concepts of neuroscience

Question 3

what is supervenience

Answer 3

• when properties are dependent on one another
• changes in the property of one thing will result in changes in the properties of the other, which is supervenient on it
• two things that have identical B properties cannot have different A properties
• example of a painting, aesthetic and physical properties which are dependent on one another, two physically identical paintings will have the same aesthetic properties

Question 4

what are the 4 strengths of behaviourism

Answer 4

• solves the problem of other minds
• solves the problem of interaction
• coherent with science
• avoids Ryle’s category mistake

Question 5

explain the strength of behaviourism that it solves the problem of other minds

Answer 5

• if the mind is in some way reducible to the physical
• then all we have to do to know whether a being has a mind is empirically identify the physical aspects
  –> behaviour, having a brain

Question 6

explain the strength of behaviourism that is solves the problem of interaction

Answer 6

• if the mind is reducible to the physical or supervenes on it
• then we do not have to explain how two totally different substances interact with one another
• we can explain how physical phenomena interact and the mind will be no different

Question 7

explain the strength of behaviourism that it is coherent with science

Answer 7

• science is physicalist
• it admits only things that we can empirically verify can be evidence
• physicalism claims that the mind can only be investigated empirically using science –> specifically neuroscience

Question 8

explain the strength of behaviourism that it solves Ryle’s category mistake

Answer 8

• as a physicalist theory, behaviourism claims that the mind is something physical
• it is not something that exists in a separate category to physical things and therefore behaviourism, and physicalism generally avoids making any kind of category mistake

Question 9

what does a behaviourist claim about mental states

Answer 9

• the mind can be understood in terms of behaviour
• when we refer to a mental state, what we mean is all the associated behaviour of that mental state
  —> fear = screaming, saying you are afraid, blood pressure rising
• behaviour is publicly accessible to us and empirically verifiable

Question 10

what is analytic reduction

Answer 10

• aims to demonstrate that the meaning of one term is the same as other terms
• a triangle can be analytically reduces to a shape with three sides
• purely linguistic and to do with the meaning of words

Question 11

what is hard behaviourism

Answer 11

• mental states are behavioural occurrences that can be translated completely into the language of physics
• the statement “I am afraid” therefore means I am running away, my blood pressure is rising, I am screaming

Question 12

Carl Hempel claimed that mental states can be fully translated into a definite list of the language of physics, what does this mean

Answer 12

• each distinct mental state has lists of conditions of verification
• finite lists of behavioural occurrences that correspond to a particular mental state
• the meaning of these conditions is completely translatable (they mean the same thing)

Question 13

what are the 5 objections to behaviourism

Answer 13

• problem of defining mental states
  1. due to circularity
  2. due to multiple realisability of mental states
• asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states
• dualist arguments can be applied to behaviourism
• the distinctness of mental states from behaviour

Question 14

what is Ryle’s soft behaviourism

Answer 14

• mental states are behavioural dispositions expressed in ordinary language
• rejects analytic reduction as analytic reduction involves some loss of meaning and ultimately refers to psychological states, so does not try to reduce to the language of physics
• he also rejects the possibility of there being a definite list of the conditions of verifications –> behavioural dispositions mean that there will be indefinite translations

Question 15

what is a behavioural disposition

Answer 15

• a description of how we will or might behave in certain ways, given certain factors such as the environment we are in
• this allows Ryle to refer to potential behavioural states alongside actual behavioural states

Question 16

how does soft behaviourism respond to the issue of circularity for hard behaviourism

Answer 16

• SB allows for the use of mental states (psychological statements) in its analysis
• meaning there is a degree of circularity built into it
• analytic reductions aren’t definite

Question 17

how does soft behaviourism respond to the issue of multiple realisability for hard behaviourism

Answer 17

• behavioural dispositions involve behaviour related to particular mental states being expressed differently
• multiple realisability of behaviour is also built into this understanding of the mind

Question 18

how does soft behaviourism respond to the issue of asymmetry for hard behaviourism

Answer 18

• Ryle claims that we can have knowledge of other peoples mental states
• we can ask them and they will respond and this will count
• but they could be deceiving us, but in principle this gives us access to their mind

Question 19

explain the objection to hard behaviourism that it is circular

Answer 19

• if mental states cannot be fully translated into a finite list of conditions of verification then we cannot clearly set the boundaries of one mental state from another
• if we cannot do this, then there is no way of telling where one mental state ends and another begins
• this means that there cannot be a finite list of conditions of verification and they are possibly infinite
• at the very least they are indeterminate, meaning that we cannot adequately define any given mental state so the analytic reduction fails

Question 20

what is multiple realisability and how might mental states be multiply realisable

Answer 20

1. the same behaviour can be used to express different mental states
2. the same mental states can be expressed in different behaviour
   - so happiness could be expressed as both laughing and crying
   - so no specific behaviours can be associated with any given mental state

Question 21

what is the implication of the problem of defining mental states satisfactorily due to multiple realisability of mental states

Answer 21

• we cannot provide a definite list of the conditions of verification for any given mental state, the list will be indefinite
• so we cannot complete an analytic reduction; all mental states would have the same analysis meaning we could not really tell the difference between them

Question 22

what does asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s metal states mean

Answer 22

• we have unique access to our own minds but not to the minds of others
• asymmetry means that these two things aren’t the same
• sceptical view

Question 23

if behaviourism is true, why would there no be asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states

Answer 23

• behaviourism claims mental states can be understood in terms of behavioural states, therefore the behaviour that someone expresses should indicate their mental state
• if behaviourism were true then there would be no asymmetry between the knowledge we have of our own minds and the minds of others because by observing behaviour we would be gaining direct and immediate access to their metal state
• there is nothing going on inside, just observable behaviour

Question 24

what are 5 features of self-knowledge

Answer 24

1. direct and non-inferential –> acquired via introspection
2. certain –> impossible to doubt claims about ones own mind
3. infallible –> one cannot be wrong about claims about ones own mind
4. incorrigible –> no one can correct you on your claims about your own mind
5. transparent –> there is nothing about ones own mind that one does not know
6. possible to know –> possible to have knowledge about our mental states

Question 25

what are 5 features of knowledge of other people's mind

Answer 25

1. indirect and inferred --> behavioural observations from perception 2. uncertain --> possible to doubt claims about another's mind 3. fallible --> one can be wrong about claims about another's mind 4. corrigible --> another person can correct you on your claims about their mind 5. non-transparent --> there are things about another's mind that one does not know 6. impossible to know --> impossible to have knowledge about our mental states

Question 26

what is the implication for behaviourism regarding the asymmetry between self knowledge and knowledge of other people's mental states

Answer 26

- if behaviourism were correct then there would not be such an asymmetry - we'd have knowledge of other peoples minds in the same way we have knowledge of our mind - however, this asymmetry does exist, therefore behaviourism cannot be true

Question 27

explain how the indivisibility argument for substance dualism poses as an issue for physicalism

Answer 27

- descartes claimed that the mind and body must be distinct substances, since the mind is indivisible and the body is divisible - the behaviourist cannot be right that mental states can be understood in terms of behavioural states because the mind is something totally distinct from the body

Question 28

explain how the conceivability argument for substance dualism poses as an issue for physicalism

Answer 28

- Descartes claimed the mind and body must be distinct substances since we can conceive of them being distinct - when we conceive of a mental state, we conceive of something beyond simply the behavioural expression of that mental state - if we think about this in terms of cause and effect, there must be a cause (mental state) distinct from the effect (behavioural expression)

Question 29

how would behaviourism respond to the dualists arguments presented against physicalism

Answer 29

- Ryle category mistake argument - Descartes is misunderstanding how we use language relating to mental states, when we talk about mental states, we refer to our physical situation, not some unobservable mind, the only way we can talk about the mind meaningfully is to refer to verifiable states, which are behavioural states

Question 30

what is a perfect actor and how does the conceivability of a perfect actor show that behaviour is not sufficient for mental states

Answer 30

- perfect actor is a being that can express behaviour that is fully distinct from their mental states --> someone who is crying has the mental state of happiness - this suggests we can conceive of a being whose behaviour does not capture their actual mental states without loss of meaning, deception in general fits in this category - so behaviour is not sufficient condition for mental states

Question 31

how could behaviourism respond to the objection about this distinctness of mental states from behaviour

Answer 31

- Ryle claims that mental states are behavioural dispositions rather than actual occurrences of behaviour - perfect actors might have a unique disposition to display behaviour distinct from their mental state

Question 32

what is a super spartan and how does the conceivability of one demonstrate that behaviour is not necessary for mental states and how could behaviourism respond

Answer 32

- super spartans are beings that have the mental state of pain but are conditioned to express absolutely no pain related behaviour even down to the physiological level - this suggests we can conceive of a being who can be absent of behaviour but still have a mental state - so behaviour is not a necessary condition for mental states - Hempel could argue that there will have to be at least some physiological or neurological states relating to pain behaviour for their to be the mental state of pain - However this is explicitly ruled out: we can conceive of a being who lacks these states and still feels the mental state of pain