Behaviurism

Question 1

Issue one, multiple realisability.

Answer 1

The argument that many of our expression can not avoid making implicit references to some sort of mental state.

Question 2

What does ‘Rowena orders some food’ mean?

Answer 2

This statement make implicit references to the subjects intentions - wittingly making some action to achieve some end.

Question 3

Issue 2, circularity:

Answer 3

Consider you are at the bar and your friend desires to drink a beer. But in consideration of wanting to have a beer he considered that he must drive later and that he must work tomorrow. Refereeing to these beliefs, which play a role in wether or not to have a beer, seems to be referring to nothing other than some mental state.

Question 4

What does circularity mean?

Answer 4

So in order to complete reductive analysis in behavioural terms, it seems that we can not avoid reintroducing precise what the analysis is supposed to be reducing: the mind.

Question 5

What is the perfect actor?

Answer 5

This is an issue with behaviourism.
What if has a perfect criminal actor? And this person showed all outward signs of a mental disorder, even embodied the
mental disorder within his central nervous system, such that any empirical
analysis would find him diagnosed with the mental disorder - yet he does not
have a mental disorder, but purely instantiates the disorder by his own volition.

Question 6

A reply to the perfect actor:

Answer 6

Hempel argues that this is not, in fact, a coherent idea:
If literally all the possible empirically observable signs of mental illness are on
display, then we would have no basis for supposing he wasn’t really mentally ill.
The point of contention here is whether we think it is possible for someone to show all the symptoms (including neurological symptoms) of mental illness but not actually have the condition, as it were - this will be picked up on Putnam’s
super-spartan example.

Question 7

What is another problem that Hempel considers?

Answer 7

Hempel considers the objection that our ability to either feign some mental state, like an intention, using behavioural pretences, or even being able to hide some mental states, by not performing some accompanying behaviour- like some kind of pain.