beyond the nation state (part of reading 1) Flashcards
written by Claire Vergerio
Westphalian order (the story)
conception of global politics as a system of independent sovereign states, all of which are equal to each other under law
along this political structure came other features, e.g. non-intervention, territorial integrity, religious tolerance, balance of power, rise of multilateral European diplomacy
= Europe broke into political modernity + provided a model for the rest of the world
post-Westpalian order
common story says that sovereign states / the Westphalian system have been in decline since the end of the 20th century : power of states redistributed to non-state institutions and organizations (UN, ISIS, Google)
claim = this will result in a post-westphalian order that resembles medieval Europe
!some speculate the hour of the Westphalian order is not over: resurgence nationalism (e.g. Trump, Brexit, Bolsonaro)
problems story of the Westphalian order
it is spectacularly wrong: diametrically opposed to historical reality
*the Myth of Westphalia
- mismatch story of Westphalia and historical evidence
- nation-state is not as old as was told + didn’t come as naturally
- Europe wasn’t the first historical instance of a system of sovereign states: Latin America moved in that direction at the same time (19th century Atlantic revolutions + civil wars in sovereign federative structures that had emerged)
- the Myth of Westphalia: treaties of the peace of Westphalia didn’t mention non-intervention, religious tolerance (contradicted Augsburg 1555), balance of power + no desire to reorganize the European political syste, no mention of sovereign states, but a reassertion of the Holy Roman Empire: autonomous political units could form a broader conglomerate without a central government
causes false story of the peace of Westphalia
confusion because: major peace treaties (Munster/France and Osnabruk/Sweden) under one name
popularity :
- historical narrative late 18th + early 19th century = make rise states-system and global European power seem like a linear, inevitable, laudable process (historians craft stories that serve own worldview: make Europe look modern + with states to highlight Napoleon’s expansionist imperialist threat)
- 20th century = Leo Gross essay compared UN Charter and Peace on Westphalia as treaties with same virtues (although he said they were not seen in the Westphalian treaties, he said they must have been general principles that had underpinned these ideas)
cherry-picking clauses about internal affairs Holy Roman Empires + brandishing them as foundations for a new pan-European order
how has the Westphalian myth endured?
debunking efforts have failed to offer a clear and compelling alternative
alternative to the Westphalian story + consequences of this different story
- Claire Vergerio
- international order patchwork of polities until the 19th century (Europe, just like non-Europe was heterogeneous)
- sovereign statehood became the default within Europe only in the 19th century (Belgium, Greece appeared + Italian and German unification were completed e.g.) + Latin America also transitioned into a system of sovereign states (anti-colonial revolutions)
- state-system became the default through decolonization 1950s-1970s (empires were replaced)
- alternatives were considered in this transition (e.g. federations and confederations), have since been long forgotten
- state has triumphed as the only legitimate unit of the international system + has rewired our collective imagination into the belief that this has been the normal way of doing things since 1648
- empires continued to thrive despite growing popularity of nation-states (until WW2 empires dominated)
- decolonization after 1945 nation-state wasn’t only option discussed: they also considered/planned: Union of African States and a West Indian Federation (US example), chose states as there was disagreement among leaders independence movements
consequences different story =
- forces us to rethink the sources for international stability: relative stability post-1648 period may have more to do with continued diversity of polities than the emergence of a system of nation states (e.g. stability through diversity also seen in other regions, e.g. Indian Ocean)
- forces us to rethink how we talk about the influence of non-state actors in the present: non-state actors now are relatively weak to those in the past (e.g.: big companies now are less powerful than mercantile companies that were central actors until mid-19th century (British and Dutch East India Companies were the primary engines of European imperial expansion + now sometimes called company-states)) -> non-state power is not necessarily caused by declining state power + solution is not necessarily to expand the state
- myth of Westphalia tends to obliterate any historical evidence that does not make the state-system sound like 400-years old historical inevitability (states important post-1648, but so were other actors -> Westphalian order begins to look more like an anomoly than status quo)
(example) antinationalist anticolonialism
decolonization process francophone African colonies = radical departure from the nation-state model
ended up with nation-states due to disagreements French gov. and African leaders and thinkers
original conversations were about federations and confederations OF nations = form of antinationalist anticolonialism
- not as US: federation OF nations (not federation AS nation): each polity own gov. and identity, but would act together + provide shared form of citizenship within a multinational state (citizenship as bundle of rights that didn’t have to overlap with nationhood)
consequences alternative story of how the modern international order came to be (Claire Vergerio)
- forces us to rethink the sources for international stability: relative stability post-1648 period may have more to do with continued diversity of polities than the emergence of a system of nation states (e.g. stability through diversity also seen in other regions, e.g. Indian Ocean)
- forces us to rethink how we talk about the influence of non-state actors in the present: non-state actors now are relatively weak to those in the past (e.g.: big companies now are less powerful than mercantile companies that were central actors until mid-19th century (British and Dutch East India Companies were the primary engines of European imperial expansion + now sometimes called company-states)) -> non-state power is not necessarily caused by declining state power + solution is not necessarily to expand the state
- myth of Westphalia tends to obliterate any historical evidence that does not make the state-system sound like 400-years old historical inevitability (states important post-1648, but so were other actors -> Westphalian order begins to look more like an anomoly than status quo)
example why decentering the state might matter
challenges colonized people faced in struggle for freedom were exacerbated by the fact they were not states themselves, meaning that they had almost no international legal rights against the states they sought to defy
- weren’t allowed to use force, if they did they were considered criminals rather than combatants, regardless of the legitimacy of their cause
!they did manage to form independent states, but if they had a baseline of rights in their capacity as collective actors, their path to freedom would have been less obstructed
myth of Westphalia and creativity
The myth of Westphalia has ultimately inflicted serious damage to our ability to think creatively about how to tackle the pressing global challenges that transcend both borders and levels of governmental organization
!layering of sovereignty within polities like the EU + rising power of corporations + prominence of violent groups not considered ‘‘states’’ = not at odds with how international relations operated since 1648
!truly new = triumph of the state worldwide + inability to think of ways of organizing the world that do not involve nation-states or organizations of nation-states
