Brett Mulligan Flashcards
Con law (49 cards)
“11th amendment immunity”
Protects state from suit “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”
States retain a constitutional immunity from suit in their own courts, and, States retain immunity from private suits prosecuted in their own courts.
Federal question jurisdiction gives citizens a right to sue his own state in federal court on federal question jurisdiction.
Work around 11th amendment (ex parte young): exception for injunctive relief; just don’t name state and instead name state official
3 factors to Standing
3 factors: Injury, causation, repressibility
1) Personal, actual, or imminent injury in fact. The plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” - an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, (b) actual or imminent not conjectural or hypothetical. Most injuries are economic or tangible; but aesthetic, emotional, and environmental injuries are sufficient to confer standing if the remaining elements of standing are present.
2) Caused by or fairly traceable to the defendant’s action complained of. There must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of- the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court
3) Redressable by the courts. It must be likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
For third-party standing to be present there must be…
(1) a substantial or special relationship between the claimant and the third party,
(2) proof of the impossibility or impracticability of the third party asserting his or her own interests; and
(3) a risk that the rights of the third party will be diluted or lost unless the claimant is allowed to assert the third party’s claim.
Ordinary standings rules apply to organizations asserting their own rights, but when an organization asserts the interest of people who they claim to represent, it must be established that…
(1) the members would have standing to sue independently;
(2) the interests asserted are germane to the association’s purpose; and
(3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the members’ participation in the suit
Ripeness: controversy/injury/wrong has occurred or manifested. What are the 3 requirements?
To be ripe for decision, a plaintiff must
(1) have already suffered harm;
(2) be faced with a specific present objective harm; and (3) be under a threat of specific future harm.
Mootness
A moot case need not be decided. A case rendered moot if events occur after the case has begun that eliminate the plaintiffs stake in the controversy.
The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence.
Political question: Separation of powers issues/ courts right to punt issue to legislature or executive. “Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found”…
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
(2) or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
(3) or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion;
(4) or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
(5) or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
(6) or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”
10th amendment
Powers not enumerated in constitution are left to states and citizens.
The ‘Necessary and Proper Clause’ grants Congress…
The legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute if the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power. The relevant inquiry is simply “whether the means chosen are “reasonably adapted” the attainment of the legitimate end.”
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”
Aggregate principal…
Congress may use its commerce power to regulate a class of activities without proof that the particular intrastate activity has an effect on interstate commerce. So long as the regulated activities (considered as a class and taken as a whole) has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and the affected person is “a member of the class” that is regulated, the regulation is a valid use of the intrastate commerce power.
Test of substantive immunity
(1) there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the “States as States” (2) the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably “attributes of state sovereignty” (3) it must be apparent that the States’ compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability “to structure integral operations in areas of traditional government functions.” (4) apparently successful challenges fail if “the federal interest advanced (by the challenged law) justifies state submission.”
Procedural Immunity…
The state autonomy limit upon the commerce power is “one of process rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the [commerce power] must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process/ The court might intervene to correct “possible failings in the national political process.”
Procedural immunity is that Congress can use the commerce power to regulate the states in whatever manner it pleases, so long as the regulation is
(1) A clear and unequivocal statement of congressional intent to regulate a state’s sovereign functions, and
(2) Not the product of a political process.
2 ways Congress can encourage a State to regulate in a particular way
(1) Under Congress’s spending power “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.” Such conditions must (among other requirements) bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending; otherwise, of course, the spending power could render academic the Constitution’s other grants and limits of federal authority. Where the recipient of federal funds is a State, as is not unusual today, the conditions attached to the funds by Congress may influence a State’s legislative choices.
(2) Where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’s power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation. By either of these two methods, the residents of the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply.
Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds… what are the 3 elements for a spending condition?
(1) The exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of “the general welfare.” In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgement of Congress
(2) If Congress desires to condition the States’ receipt of federal funds, it “must do so unambiguously, [enabling] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”
(3) Our cases have suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.
Dormant commerce clause or the negative commerce clause
Modern dormant clause doctrine proceeds along two tracks. If a state regulation openly discriminates against interstate commerce, the regulation is presumed to be invalid. The regulation is valid only if the state can prove that it furthers a legitimate state interest that cannot be accomplished by any less discriminatory means. But if a state regulation is nondiscriminatory and has only incidental effects on interstate commerce, it is presumed valid. The regulation is void only if the challenger can prove that the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the punitive local benefits of the regulation.
Balancing test: “Does this state regulation so interfere with the national interest in maintaining a free flow of interstate commerce that the local benefits of the regulation are comparatively slight?”
Pike balancing test
“Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.” The crucial inquiry, therefore, must be directed to determining whether the law is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.
SC has identified three elements that a state must prove to establish that a facially discriminatory tax is a valid compensatory tax
(1) The state must identify the specific intrastate tax burden for which the discriminatory tax compensates, and show that the intrastate tax serves a purpose for which the state may legitimately burden interstate commerce
(2) The discriminatory tax must approximate but not exceed the tax imposed on intrastate commerce
(3) The discriminatory tax and the intrastate tax must fall on substantially equivalent events.
3 principles of Commerce Clause Challenges to state regulations
(1) The courts are not empowered to second-guess the empirical judgements of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation
(2) The burdens imposed on commerce must be balanced against the local benefits actually sought to be achieved by the State’s lawmakers, and not against those suggested after the fact by counsel
(3) Protectionist legislation is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, even if the burdens and benefits are related to safety rather than economics
“Market Participant” Doctrine
When a state acts like an ordinary businessperson (as a participant in a market, rather than as a regulator of market activity) it is exempt from scrutiny under the dormant commerce clause
5 major differences between Privileges and Immunities Clause and dormant commerce clause doctrine
(1) Corporations may bring commerce clause challenges but are not “citizens: for purposes of the privileges and immunities clause and thus are not protected by it
(2) The privileges and immunities clause protects only certain rights that are “fundamental to the promotion of interstate harmony.” By contract, the dormant commerce clause applies to all interstate commercial activity
(3) There is no market participant exception to Article IV privileges and immunities clause
(4) Congress cannot consent to state acts that violate the privileges and immunities clause, but it can consent to state regulation of interstate commerce that would otherwise violate the dormant commerce clause. Congress can no more waive the privileges and immunities clause than it can waive a state’s violation of free speech or equal protection. However, because Congress has plenary power to regulate interstate commerce, it can permit states to regulate interstate commerce in way they could not in the absence of congressional exercise of its commerce power.
(5) The standard of review used in privileges and immunities cases is “intermediate”- more exacting than Pike balancing but not as stern as strict scrutiny.
The fundamental rights protected as privileges and immunities by Article 4, section 2, consist of interest that are fundamental to the promotion of interstate harmony or to the maintenance and well being of the nation
In practice, this boils down to the right to prevent a state from imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens of other states in (1) seeking a job, or, all the privileges of trade and commerce, (2) the ownership and disposition of privately held property within the states, and (3) access to a state’s courts
Standard of review: States may discriminate against outsiders if they can prove that there is a “substantial reason” for differential treatment. To do so, a state must prove (1) a substantial relationship between the discriminatory practice and the problem the law addresses, and (2) a lack of workable less discriminatory alternatives to achieve the state’s goal. The court has described the first element as a requirement that non-residents must be shown to “constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed.”
Field preemption…
Occurs when federal law leaves no doubt that Congress has intended by its legislation to occupy an entire field, such that even without a federal rule on some particular activity within the field, state regulation of that activity is preempted, leaving the activity unregulated by either state or federal law. This implied intent of Congress can be detected in several ways: (1) when federal regulation of a field is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress intended to displace state regulatory authority; (2) when the federal law touches a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system is assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject (e.g. immigration and nationality; or (3) when the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it reveal a congressional intent fully to occupy the field. Courts are apt to construe the field that is occupied fairly narrowly to avoid the possibility of a regulatory vacuum: preclusion of state regulation but the absence of federal regulation
Conflict preemption…
Occurs in one of two ways. (1) when compliance with both state and federal law is literally impossible. (2) when a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objections of Congress.”
“obstacle” conflict…
State law discourages behavior that federal law specifically encourages
But “obstacle” conflict preemption will not be found simply because state law is in “general tension with broad or abstract goals that may be attributed to various federal laws or programs.”