Byrne, Introspection Flashcards
What is Byrne’s central question in “Introspection”?
Byrne asks: How do we know our own mental states? Specifically, how do we come to know what we believe, and what kind of process introspection really is—whether it’s like perception (inner sense) or better understood as a type of reasoning.
What is the “inner sense” theory of introspection?
The view that we have a perceptual-like faculty that detects our mental states, similar to how vision detects external states. It is sometimes called the “broad perceptual model.”
What does it mean to say we have “privileged access” to our mental states?
It means our beliefs about our own mental states are more likely to be true or knowledge-yielding than our beliefs about others’ minds or the external world.
What does “peculiar access” mean?
It means we have a special method—unavailable for others’ minds—for knowing our own mental states. This knowledge doesn’t come from observation or behavior inference.
What is Richard Moran’s “self-constitution” view of self-knowledge?
Moran argues that self-knowledge is not about discovery, but commitment—we learn what we believe by deciding what is true, treating “Do I believe P?” as the same as “Is P true?” This is based on the Transparency Condition.
What is the Transparency Condition?
When asked, “Do I believe P?” we typically answer by considering whether P is true—not by introspecting. That is, we look outward, not inward.
How does Byrne critique Moran’s view?
Byrne argues that not all belief self-ascriptions require decision-making. In many cases, we already believe P, and self-knowledge comes by remembering facts—not constituting new beliefs.
What are the main objections to the inner sense theory?
- No inner “appearance”: We don’t have sensory-like experiences of our beliefs.
- No inner organ: There’s no clear introspective “organ” like the eyes.
- Alienation worry: If introspection is like self-observation, it risks alienated knowledge (“I believe it’s raining, but it’s not”).
- Externalism clash: If content is extrinsic (e.g., Twin Earth), introspection couldn’t reveal it
How does Byrne respond to these objections?
He defends a weaker version of inner sense, where we detect our beliefs through a causal mechanism, not necessarily sensory-like. He also suggests that some objections overstate what introspection must involve.
SHOEMAKER’S SELF-BLINDNESS ARGUMENT
What is Shoemaker’s “self-blindness” argument against inner sense?
A: Shoemaker argues that if inner sense were required, it would be possible to be rational and conceptually competent but totally blind to one’s own beliefs. But this seems impossible—so introspection must come from more basic rational capacities.
What is Byrne’s reply to Shoemaker?
A: Byrne argues that self-blindness might not be impossible, and even if we never observe it, that doesn’t mean inner sense doesn’t exist. There could be backup mechanisms like reasoning or inference.
THE RULE-FOLLOWING ACCOUNT
What is Byrne’s positive account of introspection?
A: Byrne proposes that self-knowledge of belief comes from following epistemic rules, specifically transparent rules like:
BEL: If p, then believe that you believe that p.
This is not inner perception but reasoning, grounded in general rational capacity.
Q: What makes BEL a “transparent rule”?
A: Because to follow it, you look outward and consider whether P is true, and then infer you believe P. It aligns with Moran’s Transparency idea but without commitment.
SELF-VERIFICATION & PRIVILEGED ACCESS
What is Byrne’s argument for BEL being a good rule?
A: Byrne argues that BEL is self-verifying: If you follow it, you end up believing you believe P, and this is guaranteed to be true. You couldn’t follow BEL without believing P.
How does this explain “privileged access”?
A: Because BEL is more reliable than rules like DOORBELL (e.g., “If the doorbell rings, believe someone’s at the door”), it leads to safer, more likely knowledge-yielding beliefs.
EXTENDING TO DESIRE
Can this rule-following approach extend beyond belief?
A: Byrne explores the possibility using desire. He proposes rules like:
DES: If ψ-ing is better than χ-ing, believe that you prefer to ψ than to χ.
But unlike BEL, DES is not self-verifying. You can think ψ-ing is better, yet still prefer χ-ing. So desire knowledge may require introspection, or different rules.
FINAL CONCLUSIONS
What is Byrne’s final position on introspection?
A: Byrne adopts a mixed view:
For belief (and possibly perception), introspection is not like perception but more like rule-following reasoning.
This respects privileged and peculiar access.
A true “inner sense” may be unnecessary for most self-knowledge.
Q: What does Byrne say about introspection of other mental states (e.g., desires)?
A: The epistemology of non-transparent states may require different mechanisms, possibly even a true introspective faculty, but this needs further exploration.
