Case Pithies Flashcards
(28 cards)
Bailey v. West, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 249 A.2d 414 (1969).
“Man feeds lame horse for free.”
Contract “implied in fact”: requires mutual intent.
Quasi-Contract: needs a benefit conferred upon D by P, and acceptance and appreciation by D, such that it would not be right for D to avoid payment.
In this case, there was neither, as D did not accept the service and did not intend to do so. P acted as a volunteer.
Sullivan v. O’Connor
“Actress sues for a terrible nose job.”
If a given result is clearly promised, a doctor’s promise can create a binding contract.
Restitution: Refund of benefit from breacher to non-breacher (least common).
Reliance: Put non-breacher in position as if contract had never been entered.
Expectation: Put non-breacher in position as if contract had been fulfilled (most common).
Kirksey v. Kirksey, 1845.
“Come live with me so I can buy cheap land and kick you out.”
A gratuitous promise lacks consideration, as there is no bargained-for exchange.
Hamer v. Sidway, 1891.
“Don’t drink and I’ll give you money.”
It doesn’t matter if either end of the bargain benefits promisor or promisee as long as their is a bargained for exchange.
In re Edwin Greene
“Bankrupt signs contract with Mistress with $1 consideration.”
Intent to contract doesn’t create a legally enforceable contract if there is no exchange, and nominal exchanges such as $1, while having the trappings of consideration, are not real consideration.
Dan Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
“Don’t reveal my name and I’ll give you documents.”
The law doesn’t create a contract where none was intended, nor is the exchanging of promises binding, even if there is offer, acceptance, and consideration. D expressly said that they couldn’t make a binding promise.
Daniel Mills v. Seth Wyman
“Doctor treats son and is promised money after the fact by father.”
An offer to pay for a past unrequested service “past consideration” lacks consideration, though it may create a moral obligation to pay. (traditional rule).
Joe Webb v. N. Floyd and Joseph F. McGowin
“I crippled myself for life to save you”
Factors that can make a promise for “past consideration” valid. Material benefit + moral obligation + subsequent promise = sufficient consideration.
Restatement 86: A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice. A promise is not binding if the benefit was conferred as a gift or to the extent that the value is disproportionate to the benefit.
William Levine v. Anne Blumenthal, S/C of New Jersey.
“Tenant underpays on rent, is oral modification without benefit to landlord valid?”
For a subsequent agreement to have consideration, it must rest upon a new and independent consideration, however small.
Alaskan Packers’ Association v. Domenico, 9th circuit A/C.
“Sailors coerce for more pay to do what they already agreed to do.”
A modification made by demand for the benefit of one party, with the demanding party providing nothing more than the services already agreed to, is without consideration. Also, a modification made by coercion lacks consideration.
Angel v Murray, S/C Rhode Island.
“Garbageman asks for more money from city for more houses.”
A modification of a contract not fully performed on either side is binding if the modification is fair and equitable in view of new circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made.
Restatement 73: Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration; but a similar performance is consideration if it differs from what was required by the duty in a way which reflects more than a pretense of bargain.
Restatement 89: A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding
if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made; or
to the extent provided by statute; or
to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material change of position in reliance on the promise.
Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. F.G. Walker Co.
“Whisky distillery fails to provide agreed amount, buyer has no obligation to purchase. Mutuality?”
Free Way Out: If one of the parties can arbitrarily back out of the contract for any reason it wishes, a contract lacks mutuality.
W. M. McMichael v. Harley T. Price
“Man won’t buy sand from sand salesman he agreed to purchase from.”
In construing a contract where the agreement is a sale, the obligation to sell and buy must be mutual to render the contract binding. If one of the parties can escape future liability without some previous detriment, this is a “free way out” and lacks mutuality.
Otis F. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon
“Exclusive rights to fashion model endorsement is breached.”
Rule: An explicit promise may be lacking, and yet an “imperfectly expressed” implied promise may still be present. An implied promise is valid for mutuality.
Omni Group, Inc. v. Seattle First-National Bank
“Real estate company agreed to buy property after “satisfactory” feasibility report.”
A promise dependent on a condition isn’t by default rendered illusory. As long as the limitation isn’t so great as to make a promise illusory, a contractor can make his duty expressly conditional upon satisfaction with the quality of the bargained-for performance.
Promissory Estoppel - Elements
1. A promise which
2. The promisor must reasonably expect to induce reliance
3. Promisee did actually rely on
4. Such that injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of the promise
a. Manner of enforcement limited by justice
[Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. Robert A. DeLeo] “Dying Jew promises synagogue money.”
Restatement 90 merely removes the absolute requirement for reliance regarding charity, but not the other requirements. Promissory estoppel also doesn’t apply because PLNTF didn’t act sufficiently in reliance. No injustice in refusing to enforce.
[W.O. Lucy v. A.H Zehmer] “Drunk farmer sells farm ‘as a joke.’”
Objective Standard of Assent:
If his words and acts manifest an intent to agree
As judged by a reasonable standard
THEN subjective unexpressed intent is irrelevant
[Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co.] “Employer tells employee to work without hiring him.”
Inner Intent can neither make a contract where there was none, nor invalidate one that was otherwise valid. If one party, as a reasonable person, acts on reliance that it is a valid contract, it can be enforced.
[Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store “Fur coats are for the BOYS.”]
Rule: An advertisement constitutes an offer when it is:
A. Clear
B. Definite
C. Explicit
D. And leaves nothing open for negotiation.
[Joseph Lonergan v. Albert Scolnick “New Yorker tries to buy Californian land after it has already been sold.”]
Restatement 25 offer:
A. If from a promise, manifestation of intent, or from circumstances,
B. the person to whom the promise is addressed
C. knows or has reason to know that
D. the person making it doesn’t intend it as an expression of a fixed purpose until he has given a further expression of assent,
E. he has not made an offer.
Leonard v. Pepsico
“Teen tries to buy harrier jet with Pepsi points”
Reasonable Person with Offers
An advertisement does not constitute an offer, unless it is clear, direct, explicit, and leaves no room for negotiation.
TAKEAWAY: If a reasonable person would believe the commercial to be an offer, it may be one regardless of the intentions of either party.
Leonard v. Pepsico
“Teen tries to buy harrier jet with Pepsi points”
Rewards as Offers
Offers for specific actions in exchange for specific rewards, “Radio host says ‘If someone can do X I will give $10k dollars,” can be enforced. In this case, was not specific enough.
[Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.] “Use this smoke ball and we will give a reward.”
Advertisements offering rewards are offers to anybody who performs the conditions named in the advertisement, and performance of those conditions is acceptance of the offer.
Acceptance of a reward = Performance of the task assigned
The offer must not be too vague
