Cases Flashcards
(105 cards)
1
Q
Capron v. Van Noorden (1804):
A
On direct attack, plaintiff can challenge a federal court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, even though plaintiff chose to file in that court in the first place. He brought in federal court without establishing diversity jurisdiction.
o A defect in SMJ can be raised after a fully tried case, even if parties’ domeciles are unknown, and cannot be waived by parties.
o No constitutional power to hear the case (Art III Section 2) and no statutory jurisdiction. 28 USC Section 1332(a)
2
Q
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
A
Congress cannot expand original SMJ of SCOTUS.
Writ of mandamus is an appellate writ not one of original jurisdiction.
Attack on SMJ can be raised by an appellate court even if raised by no party below.
3
Q
Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857):
A
No diversity jurisdiction because Dred Scott not a U.S. citizen because he is not a citizen of any state.
4
Q
Rose v. Giamatti (1989)
A
A plaintiff cannot defeat a defendant’s right of removal by fraudulent joinder of a non-diverse defendant against whom the plaintiff has no real cause of action, aka a nominal party.
o An unincorporated association is a citizen of every state in which its constituent members is a citizen.
o A party cannot be held liable for conduct of a person over whom the party has no control. (MLB and Reds had no control over Commissioner)
o Taking defensive action in state court in preliminary proceedings short of an adjudication of merits of an action does not waive right to removal.
5
Q
Louisville & Nashville R Co v. Mottley (1908)
A
Mottleys had free pass to ride railroad but Congress disallowed these types of passes. Mottleys sued for breach of settlement agreement in federal court but it was a state claim.
Federal-question jurisdiction only applies when cause of action arises out of federal claim not anticipated defense.
“Well-pleaded complaint” rule under federal question jurisdiction under 28 USC §1331.
6
Q
United Mine Workers of Am. V. Gibbs (1966):
A
Gibbs lost his haulage contracts and claimed that he was unable to obtain other hauling contracts as a result of a UMW plan against him. Sued with state and federal claims. State claims won but federal lost.
Pendent state claims must derive from **same nucleus of operative fact as federal claim. **
Pendent jurisdiction is not a plaintiff’s right but a matter of discretion.
Whether a federal issue predominates should generally be determined on the pleadings.
7
Q
Aldinger v. Howard (1976):
A
Howard fired Aldinger for living with her boyfriend.
Aldinger alleged violations of several of her constitutional rights. Additionally, Aldinger asserted state law claims, and argued the federal court had pendent jurisdiction over those claims.
Pendent jurisdiction for state law claim against additional nondiverse defendant not allowed even if arising from common nucleus of operative fact.
8
Q
Owen Equipment v. Kroger (1978):
A
Kroger of Iowa sued in federal court against power company in another state and an Iowa equipment company. No diversity jurisdiction.
9
Q
Finley v. US (2003):
A
Joining the City of San Diego under state law to federal claim against U.S. not allowed because not complete diversity
10
Q
Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah Services Inc. (2005)
A
Class action against Exxon for overcharges on fuel.
A federal diversity action meeting amount in controversy requirement can be joined under supplemental jurisdiction with a claim that does not meet amount in controversy requirement if part of same case or controversy.
11
Q
Tickle v. Barton (1956):
A
Service of process, if procured by deceit, is not sufficient to demonstrate a court’s personal jurisdiction over the person served. The court will refuse to exercise jurisdiction even if it has it. Insufficient notice.
o Personal jurisdiction requires power, notice, and opportunity to be heard.
o Plaintiffs demurrer to defendant’s amended plea in abatement is 12(b)(6): Even if it’s true, so what?
o Standard of review is in light most favorable to the nonmoving party (here the defendant) has the nonmoving party stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.
o This was discretionary interlocutory appeal, which is a two-key system §1292 (b): Trial court certifies and appeals court accepts if controlling question of law and early appeal would materially advance the termination of the litigation.
12
Q
Republic of Austria v. Altmann (2004):
A
Sovereigns immune unless subject to exception such as expropriation of property that is in the US or property traded for that property is within the US.
13
Q
- Pennoyer v. Neff (1877):
A
No personal jurisdiction in Action 1 because court failed to consider that property in question was not in its jurisdiction and the defendant was not served personally.
In action 1 service by publication was inadequate and post-judgment attachment of property found in litigation did not establish personal jurisdiction.
o Action 1 Mitchell v. Neff was void, not final, not valid, and not deserving collateral estoppel
o Field theory of PJ (territorial presence) = in personam: present within state or citizen there, in rem: determine status of property within territory, quasi in rem: recovery limited to value of property within jurisdiction. Formalistic with loopholes for corporations who never want to be anywhere.
o Full Faith and Credit only when court rendering judgment has SMJ and PJ.
o Constitutionalizes personal jurisdiction by finding Action 1 denied due process of 14th Amt.
o Failed attempt by defendant Pennoyer to invoke defensive nonmutual use of collateral estoppel.
14
Q
Hess v. Pawloski (1927):
A
MA statute that implies appointment of registrar as attorney who can be served in claims arising out of driving of vehicle if sends plaintiff notice and copy of process by mail with receipt is constitutional.
Nonresident drivers must answer equally for actions as resident drivers.
Laws can establish specific jurisdiction of people transiently present. Single Act Long-Arm. Specific Enumerated Jurisdiction.
15
Q
- International Shoe v. Washington (1945):
A
International Shoe moved to set aside the notice on the grounds that it was not a corporation doing business in Washington, had no registered agent within the state, and was not an employer and did not furnish employment within the state as defined under state law.
Minimum contacts required to give general personal jurisdiction and due process. Continuous and systematic activities. Must be both a fair exercise of state power and rights AND fair exercise of defendant’s rights.
o Only applies to in personam service.
o Fair play and substantial justice.
16
Q
- McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. (1957):
A
Int. Life, which had only 1 client in CA could be sued in CA to ensure due process for residents. Broad scope for PJ with focus on individual rights and nationalization of commerce.
17
Q
A
17
Q
- Hanson v. Denckla (1958):
A
FL court took jurisdiction of DE trust and trustee Hanson.
Hanson has less than minimal contacts in FL so there was no jurisdiction and trustee was indispensable to the case that proceeded without him.
Therefore, no full faith and credit due by DE court. Violation of 14th Amt due process rights. Overturns FL case.
Narrow scope of PJ with focus on sovereignty. Personal jurisdiction depends on both state power and defendant’s rights.
18
Q
- Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980):
A
Oklahoma does not have PJ over a car sold in NY to NY residents involved in a car accident in OK. WWVW does business only in CT, NY, and NJ.
Foreseeability has no impact on PJ. Plaintiff must show defendant’s volition.
19
Q
- Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985):
A
Specifying choice of law in contracts as FL is intentionally making use of FL laws. Litigation in FL consistent with fair play and substantial justice. No due process violation. Rule 12(b)(3).
Contract-plus is purposeful availment. Contractual consent = volitionality.
20
Q
- Grace v. MacArthur:
A
Flying over territory sufficient for PJ according to Arkansas Supreme Court.
21
Q
Asahi Metal Industry v Superior Court (SCOTUS 1971):
A
- Asahi is a Japanese subcomponent manufacturer. Its product ended up in tires that were in an accident in CA.
- Defendant must purposely direct action to forum state or purposely avail itself of CA market. CA had a general unenumerated long-arm statute.
- Awareness that a product would reach a state does not constitute minimum contacts such that jurisdiction would be fair and just.
- unreasonable and unfair if the burden on the alien defendant outweighs the plaintiff’s and forum’s interests in the forum state’s assertion of jurisdiction.
- “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
22
Q
McIntyre Machinery LID v. Nicastro (SCOTUS 2011):
A
- Nicastro injured by machine manufactured in England and only channeled generally to the US.
- Defendant must intentionally invoke benefits and protections of that jurisdiction’s laws. McIntyre did not direct conduct toward NJ and therefore there is no specific PJ. Stream of commerce not enough.
23
Q
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown (SCOTUS 2011
A
- NC children injured in a bus accident. Foreign subsidiaries of Goodyear operated exclusively abroad.
- No personal general jurisdiction if they do not have a continuous and systematic affiliation such to render it “at home” in a state. It would violate due process to exercise jurisdiction.
- CURRENT GENERAL JURISDICTION TEST
24
Daimler v. Bauman (2014):
A court cannot assert general jurisdiction over a corporation if the corporation’s affiliations with the forum state are not so continuous and systematic as to render the corporation at home in the state.
Residents of Argentina sued Daimler based on the US court having jurisdiction over its subsidiary. Daimler is incorporated and has its principal places of business outside CA, so it is not at home in CA.
25
BNSF Rwy v. Tyrell (2017):
Tyrell sued for injuries while employed at BNSF. BNSF was a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Texas.
Montana court lacks personal jurisdiction over BNSF.
At home means either a corporation’s principle place of business or place of incorporation. Formalistic and manipulable.
26
Bristol Myers Squibb Co v. Superior Ct CA (SCOTUS 2017):
BMS did not design, develop, or manufacture the drug at issue in California. Further, the plaintiffs residing outside of California did not buy or take it in California.
Specific jurisdiction arises from connection between forum and claims at issue not defendant’s contact generally with the state.
No personal jurisdiction because activities in forum state not connected to plaintiff’s claims.
27
Ford Motor Co. v Montana 8th Judicial District Ct (SCOTUS 2021):
* Specific jurisdiction requires purposeful availment of MT and MN markets, which Ford did. Activities in state must be a but-for cause or related to the claim. Rejects strict causal link standard.
* The fact that a specific car was not originally sold in these states does not revoke specific jurisdiction.
* It is fair to have the defendant defend here because they intentionally use these markets and no other states have a stronger interest in litigating this case.
28
Insurance Corp of Ireland v. Compagne des Bauxites de Guinee (SCOTUS 1982):
* Insurers refused to pay a business-interruption claim by CBG, which was incorporated in DE but operated only in Republic of Guinea
* Insurers failed to comply with court orders for production, so the court imposed a sanction under 37(b)(2)(A)(i) with presumptive finding that insurers were subject to jurisdiction because of business contacts. A refusal to produce evidence can be viewed as an admission of PJ.
29
Shaffer v. Heitner (SCOTUS 1977):
* Stock holdings in a company do not satisfy minimum contacts for jurisdiction for absent defendants.
* The officers and directors of a DE corporation have nothing to do with DE and PJ in DE would be inconsistent with constitutional limits on state power.
30
Burnham v Superior Court (SCOTUS 1990):
* PJ due to transient presence in state consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice as evidenced by historical acceptance and federal and state statutes allowing it. Also called tag jurisdiction.
* Husband visiting his kids in CA served with divorce papers under CA court, although he lives in NJ and was married in WV.
31
Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. (SCOTUS 2023):
* Registration is consent to general jurisdiction. 14th Amt due process allows a corporation to be sued in any state where it appointed an agent to receive suits. The PA law requiring registration to do local business in a state is constitutional. PA has power to hear case.
* Mechanic who previously worked for Norfolk Southern handled asbestos and chemicals and allegedly carcinogens sued in PA under Fed Employers’ Liability Act, a workers’ comp scheme for negligence
* Mechanic had worked for Norfolk in Ohio and VA
32
* Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank (1950):
Central Hanover petitioned the court for settlement of its first common trust account as trustee.
Notice (and due process) requires use of the method someone actually desirous of informing/giving notice would use.
Publication in local newspaper insufficient given addresses of many trust beneficiaries are known.
Notice reasonably certain to reach most is sufficient to protect interests of all.
Thick theory.
33
* Sniadach v. Family Finance (1969):
Prejudgment wage garnishment unconstitutional because it created tremendous hardship on wage earners.
34
* Fuentes v. Shevin (1972):
State statutes authorizing replevin of consumer goods without a pre-seizure hearing are unconstitutional because state acts without info. No opportunity to be heard and no due process.
Unless directly necessary to secure an important government or public interest, urgent, or person initiating seizure was a government official. Thick theory.
o Fuentes first learns of the lawsuit when they are taking her property. She has to post a bond 2x the value of her property to keep it.
35
* Goldberg v. Kelly (1970):
Recipient of government-funded public assistance entitled to opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of benefits. (Thick due process: in the eye of the receiver) Entitlements are property.
36
o Matthews v. Eldridge (1976):
Recipient of Social Security disability benefits not entitled to hearing before termination. (Thin due process: in the eye of the administrator)
Factors include risk of erroneous deprivation, government interest, and interest of party seeking judgment.
Government interests given paramount consideration here according to Koh.
37
* MacDermeid v. Deiter (2012):
Defendant purposely availed herself of CT law when she accessed CT servers. PJ was reasonable because both CT and P have a significant interest in resolving the matter in CT and reasonable for the Canadian to travel to CT.
38
* Greene v. Lindsey:
Posting notice on door not the method someone actually desirous of giving notice would have used given that they slip eviction notices under the door.
39
* Connecticut v. Doehr (1991):
Prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing without showing of extraordinary circumstances and without posting a bond does not satisfy the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. No opportunity to be heard.
Factors include the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation and value of other safeguards, interest of party seeking prejudgment remedy and government interest. (Thin theory provided by CT law insufficient, but holding is also thin theory).
o DiGiovanni attached Doehrs property after being injured in an incident with Mr. Doehr for tort claim. Never brought suit, but Doehrs had trouble selling house later because of DiGiovanni’s attachment. Attachment was based on a conclusory affidavit with few facts alleged.
40
* Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert (1947):
A VA resident sued a PA corporation in NY for negligence based on a fire that occurred in VA. The PA corporation argued that VA—which is where the VA resident lived and did business, where all the events in the litigation took place, and where most of the witnesses resided—was the better place for the trial. SCOTUS agreed.
The factors for forum non conveniens are ease of access to source of proof, compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, cost of obtaining willing witnesses, view of premises, enforceability of judgment.
Plaintiff’s choice of forum rarely disturbed, but local interest in solving affairs that originate there and lack of duty to solve others.
41
* Piper Aircraft v. Reyno (1981):
Plaintiffs may not defeat motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens merely by showing that change of law would be less favorable. Courts should not consider different bodies of law when deciding convenience.
o Plaintiffs lay venue in CA state court. Defendants remove to CA federal court §1441, transfer to PA §1404, move to dismiss to Scotland—winning at SCOTUS on forum non conveniens.
o Test: Is there a jurisdictionally adequate alternative forum? Presumption against disturbing American plaintiffs forum choice. Balance private and public interest factors (Gulf Oil). Subject to review under abuse of discretion standard.
42
* Sinochem Int. v. Malaysia Int. Shipping (2007):
A DCt may dimiss on forum non conveniens without even inquiring on PJ and SMJ. Case dismissed due to alternative forum in China.
43
* Atlantic Marine Const. v. US Dist. Ct for W Dist of TX (2013):
Contract called for suit in VA. Plaintiff filed in TX.
When there is a valid forum selection clause, it should be transferred unless there are extraordinary circumstances.
44
* Case v. State Farm Mutual (1961):
The plaintiff, who alleges State Farm wrongfully breached his contract, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. His contract could be terminated with or without cause.
o Defendant demurs 12(b)(6)
o It is not the duty of the court to formulate a claim which the plaintiff has not spelled out in the pleading, even if the complaint charges facts for which the law could provide relief.
45
* Temple v. Synthes (1990):
A plaintiff is not required to join all tortfeasors as defendants in a single suit. A tortfeasor with joint and several liability is a permissive not required party to an action against another tortfeasor. Rule 20. (This was a major shift because courts had been regularly defeating cases this way.)
o SCOTUS finds it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to order joinder.
o This was per curiam on shadow docket. No oral argument.
46
* Philippines v. Pimentel (2008):
After class action by human rights survivors won default judgment, they try to enforce by attaching assets owed to Merrill which the Philippines claims to own because of Marcos’ misuse of office. Merrill Lynch files statutory interpleader naming Philippines.
o Philippines is an indispensable party and case should not proceed due to comity interest, no alternative remedy, inability to bind absentees, and inability to help Merrill Lynch.
Parties are indispensable if their interests in the subject matter are not protected when they are absent.
47
* Conley v. Gibson (1957):
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim. Viability standard. (old std)
48
* Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (2007):
To state a claim, the complaint must contain enough factual material to suggest that an agreement existed between defendants.
To prove an illegal conspiracy under Sherman Act, plaintiff must introduce evidence tending to exclude possibility that defendants acted independently. Conscious parallelism not illegal.
Subscribers to local telephone services file antitrust class action.
Overturns Conley. Plausible is more than conceivable but less than probable.
49
* Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009):
Since Iqbal did not show plausibility, the complaint does not state a claim. A complaint will only survive a motion to dismiss if it alleges nonconclusory facts that taken as true state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
SCOTUS concluded complaint must allege that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of classifying detainees as of high interest because of race, religion, or national origin.
Must be plausible legal and factual claim. Changed pleading standard without modifying Rule 8.
“Obvious alternative explanation” that link to attacks would create disparate impact on Arab Muslims. Courts should use “judicial experience and common sense.”
50
* Erickson v. Pardus (2007):
Generous pleading standard for pro se cases.
51
* Tellabs v. Makor (2007):
Private Securities Lit. Reform Act of 1995 imposes super-heightened pleading standard on complaints under 1934 Sec Exchange Act; facts must be states with particularity
52
* Alderman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. (1953):
Plaintiff, who sues for personal injuries from train derailment although her free ticket said she assumes all risk of personal injury, fails to state sufficient facts to substantiate a charge of willfullness. Dismissed on summary judgment.
No way to prove wanton and willful misconduct because legal bar is so high. Would’ve had to prove they knew the rail was broken, the defect was likely to cause derailment, and intentionally drove on it anyway.
Took case from jury, giving judge power to say what the law is in his eyes, even though it was disputable.
53
* Tolan v. Cotton (2014):
Police shot Tolan in front of home he shared with parents after he was mistakenly suspected of driving a stolen car. Disputed facts include the lighting, Tolan’s mother’s dimeanor, whether Tolan threatened officer, and his position during the shooting. At summary judgment, the trial court dismissed case against defendant.
o At summary judgment, facts must be viewed in most favorable light to non-moving party. SCOTUS rules lower court improperly weighed evidence and disputed issues according to the non-moving party. SCOTUS overturns dismissal.
o On remand, DCt judge says she still believes she is right, which drives Tolan to settle for pennies.
54
* Scott v. Harris (2007):
SCOTUS can look at videotape footage of event rather than take facts as most favorable to the non-moving party.
Dismissed case on summary judgment against police officer who rammed into vehicle from behind to prevent plaintiff from fleeing. The collision caused the driver to lose control and become quadriplegic due to the crash.
Not unreasonable use of deadly force in violation of 4th Amt.
Interlocutory appeal.
o Qualified immunity protects government officers from suit except when violating civil rights that a reasonable person would have known about.
o Must be viewed in light most favorable to nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.
o Says no reasonable jury could believe plaintiff’s version of facts.
o Appears to erase presumption in favor of the non-moving party entirely.
55
* Adickes v. Kress (1970):
Adickes white teacher takes 6 students to public library. Adickes arrested for vagrancy after leaving library and restaurant because they refused to serve her. Sues for conspiracy. DCt granted SJ for defendant.
Defendant Kress did not carry its burden of showing absence of material fact.
o Although plaintiff has burdens of proving the case, defendant has burdens of production and proof on dispositive motions to dismiss.
56
* Celotex v. Catrett (1986):
BURDEN. Widow sues for her husband’s death from asbestos. Defendant granted SJ because only evidence plaintiff produced was inadmissible hearsay. SCOTUS overturns because party moving for SJ has burden of persuasion that no genuine issue of fact exists.
Need not produce evidence. BUT, once movant makes a prima facie showing burden shifts to plaintiff.
57
* Anderson v. Liberty Lobby:
MATERIAL. DCt gives SJ to Anderson because Liberty did not prove with “convincing clarity” or produce “considerable” evidence that Anderson acted with actual malice.
Plaintiff must meet elevated standard of production for state of mind cases or personal knowledge cases. Nonmovant must respond with affirmative evidence. If a reasonable jury could not find for one side, then it doesn’t go to a jury.
58
* Matsushita v. Zenith (1986):
PLAUSIBILITY. Defendants entitled to SJ because plaintiffs did not offer enough evidence that tended to exclude an innocent interpretation for parallel business activity.
Plaintiff’s claims make no economic sense. Inference of conspiracy unreasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action.
59
* DiMichel v. South Buffalo Ry Co. (1992):
Surveillance films should be treated as material prepared in anticipation of litigation and subject to qualified privilege overcome only by a factual showing of substantial need and undue hardship to obtain. Rule 26: work product
o Surveillance films should be turned over only after a plaintiff has been deposed so they cannot change their story to adapt to footage.
60
* Hickman v. Taylor (1947):
Discovery of lawyer’s notes on witness interviews not allowed.
Work-product immunity protects competency of legal work. Making discoverable would discourage lawyers from writing things down.
o Product that contains thoughts, mental impressions, and theories of attorneys absolutely protected. Qualified immunity for material prepared if substantial need and undue hardship.
61
* Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993):
Expert testimony must be based on sufficient facts or data, be the product of reliable methods and principles, and must be applied reliably.
62
* Alexander v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, Inc (1959):
Defendant objected once, judge acknowledged, judge later gave incorrect jury instructions.
To preserve an objection to a jury instruction on appeal, parties must take exception to the instruction and provide support for that exception when it is made to the jury.
63
* Texas Employers Ins Assn v. Price (1960):
It is misconduct for jurors to relate their own personal experience as original evidence of material facts to be considered in their deliberation.
Jury man told jury that the plaintiff’s injury would likely make him unable to get a job. New trial under Rule 59,
64
* Pena Rodriquez v. Colorado (2017):
The 6th Amt requires a racial bias exception to the no impeachment of jury verdict rule.
65
* Batson v. Kentucky (1986):
Race-based peremptory challenges unconstitutional.
66
* Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete (1991):
extends Batson to civil trials
67
* JEB v. Alabama:
peremptory challenges based solely on sex violates Eq Pr Cl
68
* Beacon Theaters v. Westover (1959):
****Fox filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief that Fox’s clearance contracts were not in violation of antitrust laws and requesting a preliminary injunction to prevent Beacon from filing suit. Beacon filed a counterclaim alleging that Fox was violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, and demanded a jury trial. The district court judge, Judge Westover (defendant), found that the issues in the case were basically equitable, and directed that the issues be tried in front of the district court before being submitted to a jury.
Court abandons **equity cleanup doctrine** in which it decided subordinate issues before handing over to jury and held **all factual issues must first be tried by jury.**
69
* Dairy Queen v. Wood (1962):
When DQ defaulted on its payments, McCullough sent DQ a notice of termination letter cancelling DQ's right to use the trademark. McCullough brought suit for breach of contract. McCullough sought "an accounting to determine the exact amount of money owing by [DQ] and a judgment for that amount." Judge found no right to jury trial because it was a "purely equitable" matter.
**Right to jury trial on all legal issues common to legal and equitable claims.** Plaintiff called legal issue accounting rather than action for damages to try to pass it off as equity claim. **7th Amt applies to issues not cases.**
70
* Curtis v. Loether:
Julia Curtis (plaintiff), an African American woman, brought suit against the Loethers (defendants), alleging that they had refused to rent her an apartment because of her race.
7th Amt right to jury trial required under fair housing provisions of Civil Rights Act because **analogous to tort actions recognized at common law.**
71
* Tull v. United States (1987):
Tull (defendant) was charged with violating the Clean Water Act, which authorized an injunction and/or a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per day during the violation. The government sought both penalties.
To determine right to jury trial, compare action to premerger of equity and law actions and examine whether remedy is legal or equitable in nature.
Tull had right to jury trial.
72
* Diniero v. US Lines Co. (1961):
Injury claim against employer. Confusing interrogatory.
Withdrawing an interrogatory question not an abuse of discretion unless it would be prejudicial. There was an inherent ambiguity in the question and it clearly needed addressing.
73
* Lavender v. Kurn (1946):
Can only overturn jury verdict when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached.
SCOTUS reverses Supreme Court of Missouri, which found the jury verdict unreasonable and abandoned it. SCOTUS says a reasonable jury could find the plaintiff was harmed by a mail hook due to defendant’s negligence.
o Standard of review for jury verdict is complete absence of probative fact.
74
* Hicks v. U.S. (1966):
Patient died after US Naval Base exam 9 hours after misdiagnosis. Where trial courts’ conclusions are based on undisputed facts, they are not entitled to finality customarily accorded under 52(a) because the case becomes a question of law. The 4th Circuit finds the District Court improperly weighed testimony when it ruled evidence insufficient, overturns trial court decison, and found doctor failed to meet legal standard of care.
75
* Des Moines Navigation & RR Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co. (1887):
Iowa Homestead Co. (Homestead) (plaintiff) brought suit against the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Co. (Railroad) (defendant) to recover taxes. Homestead had previously sued the Railroad to recover the same taxes.
No collateral attack on SMJ unless: plain abuse of authority, allowing it to stand would substantially infringe on authority of other tribunal/government, or court was unable to determine its own jurisdiction. (intersystem preclusion). Therefore, Iowa state court should have given FF&C.
Action 1 was voidable not void.
o Action 1 was final because all avenues for appeal were exhausted.
o Not a manifest abuse of authority even though it was an error for the federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction in action 1. Complete diversity rule not clarified until after Action 1.
o Full Faith and Credit due to first case. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and US Const. Art. IV, § 1
76
* Harris v. Balk (1905):
A judgment of garnishment or attachment against a debt handed down in another state is entitled to full faith and credit if it was valid.
o While Harris was travelling to Baltimore, Maryland, he was served with a writ of attachment from Epstein for the debt that he owed to Balk ($180). Shortly after, Balk sued Harris in North Carolina state court for the $180. Harris argued that he had already paid the debt and that the Maryland judgment was entitled to full faith and credit by the North Carolina court.
77
* Fetter v. Beal (1697):
Beal struck Fetter and cracked Fetter’s skull. Fetter brought suit against Beal and recovered monetary damages for his injuries. Since the conclusion of that suit, a piece of Fetter’s skull came out of his head. Fetter brought suit again to recover for the additional injury he suffered.
Action 1 plaintiff wins for injuries. Action 2 plaintiff brings claim for more injuries and loses because claim is merged.
A plaintiff may not sue a defendant again for an injury that has already been completely litigated if the plaintiff suffers further injury after the litigation.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL/issue preclusion occurs when same issue of fact or law, same or different parties, and actually litigated or necessarily determined
78
* HCC v. Sale (SCOTUS 1993):
Duty of nonreturn does not apply extraterritorally.
79
* Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss (1998):
The MDL claimants accused consulting company Lexecon of providing inaccurate information about the financial condition of Lincoln Savings and Loan, American Continental’s subsidiary.
Section 1407 imposes a duty on JPML to remand transferred action to original court for trial and DCt conducting pretrial proceedings lack authority to assign a transferred case to itself for trial
80
* Swift v. Tyson (1842):
Rules of Decision Act foes not requires federal courts to follow state judicial decisions, because laws do not include court decisions. Goal of horizontal uniformity pursued through applying federal common law.
81
* Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1938):
Overturns Swift. Swift allowed skirting the law. Refusing to use state law is an unconstitutional invasion of autonomy (10th Amt).
There is no general federal common law.
Federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law, including common law, absent a contrary federal command.
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state.
Judge-made law is law.
82
* Guaranty Trust Co. v. NY (1945):
Federal courts must apply state legal rules that would be outcome determinative if held in state court.
State statute of limitations would be outcome determinative so must be applied.
Should not allow choice of law between federal and state courts in the same state.
83
* Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop (1958):
The issue of whether Byrd qualified as a “statutory employee” needed to be decided by the trier of fact. The state practice would have had the factual question decided by the judge. However, the federal practice was to leave such a question up to the jury.
Federal rules prevail over state rules that would interrupt judge-jury relationship in federal court.
The federal system has an interest in maintaining the traditional allocation of functions between judge and jury.
o Balancing test between policies behind state law, policies behind federal rule, and whether choice is outcome determinative.
84
* Hanna v. Plumer (1965):
A federal rule should apply if it is arguably procedural. FRCP do not affect everyday decisions of residents. There is no federal substantive common law.
o Test: Is there a direct conflict? If no, apply both. (Try to read fed law narrowly to avoid conflict)
o If yes, is FRCP constitutional and within power delegated by Congress?
o If yes, apply FRCP.
o BUT if important state policies at issue apply modified OD test below, which probably leads to use of state rule: If there is a relatively unguided Erie choice (no governing federal rule), a federal court required to follow state rule only where the differences are likely to affect the outcome of the case in a way that would cause forum-shopping OR result in inequitable administration of the laws.
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* Klaxon v. Stentor (1941):
Stentor won award for breach of contract and moved to have interest added to the award, from the date that the action was commenced through the date of the judgment, pursuant to New York Civil Practice Act § 480. The district court granted Stentor’s motion on the grounds that the law of New York, as the place of performance, applied.
Where its jurisdiction is founded on diversity, a federal court must apply the conflict-of-laws rules of the state in which it sits.
In this case, the district court applied NY law where the contract was made but should have applied Delaware’s conflict of laws rules. Delaware has the right to dictate the choice of laws rules to be applied within the forum.
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* Dart Cherokee Basin v. Owen:
Brandon Owens (plaintiff) filed a putative class action against Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company, LLC (Dart) and Cherokee Basin Pipeline, LLC (CBP) (defendants) in Kansas state court for underpayment on oil and gas leases.
In CAFA, **amount in controversy** need not be proven by detailed pleading standard.
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* Walker v. Armco Steel Corp (1980):
Products liability suit. Walker admitted that his claim would be dismissed under the state law, but argued that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governed when an action is commenced and thus preempted the Oklahoma state law.
Hanna analysis only applied if federal rule is sufficiently broad to control the issue. Here, no federal rule covers the dispute, so Erie commands enforcement of state law. Nothing in FCRP 3 indicates it should displace state tolling rules for statute of limitations.
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* Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Woods (1987):
Applies FCRP 38 instead of state law which assessed penalties for unsuccessful appeal because both laws are procedural and conflict. FCRP 38 says no penalty for unsuccessful appeal while AL law says 10% of damages penalty for unsuccessful appeal. SCOTUS applies FCRP since they conflict.
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* Stewart Org. Inc. v. Ricoh Group (1988):
If a statute is sufficiently broad to control issue and valid under Constitution, apply federal law. Federal law requires consideration of forum-selection clause but AL law forbids it. Even though these rules are not perfectly coextensive, the federal law covers the point in dispute so should be applied.
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* Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc (1996):
A federal trial court sitting in diversity jurisdiction may apply state-law standards for reviewing a jury verdict, subject to review for abuse of discretion by a federal appellate court. Does not conflict with 7th Amt, so both are applied. Read federal laws narrowly to avoid conflict.
91
* Shady Grove Orthopedic v. Allstate (2010):
Shady Grove filed a diversity class-action suit in the Eastern District of New York to recover the statutory interest owed to it and similarly situated parties.
Rule 23 and NY law conflict because Rule 23 allows every class action within 3 categories and NY law bars penalty class actions. Rule 23 is valid. Therefore, apply Rule 23.
92
* Clearfield Trust v. US (1943):
US sues Clearfield Trust for endorsing a check with a forged signature. The court then held for Clearfield, finding that under Pennsylvania law the government had unreasonably delayed in informing Clearfield Trust that the check was a forgery.
Need for a uniform rule because US needs certainty and consistency. **Rights and duties of US governed by federal common law.**
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Hinterlider v. La Plata :
Apply specialized federal common law if specialized source, interstitial, trumps inconsistent state law, or promotes national uniformity.
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* Boyle v. United Tech (1988):
State laws that hold government contractors liable for design defects in military equipment displaced with federal common law if US government approved reasonably precise specifications, equipment conformed, supplier warned US about dangers in use of equipment.
95
* US v. Kimbell Foods (1979):
Kimbell brought suit, claiming that its interest in bankruptcy proceeds was superior to the SBA’s interest. The SBA argued that federal law should apply to prioritize its interest because applying state law to the SBA’s loan program would harm its ability to collect on the loans.
Applied federal law for questions involving rights of the US arising under federal programs. Choice of federal or state law based on balance of 1) need for uniformity, 2) frustration of specific objectives of federal programs, and 3) extent to which federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships.
96
* Hansberry v. Lee (1940):
Restrictive racial covenant not binding on defendant because the representation in the original action was inadequate and the class lacked commonality.
Adequacy requires same interests and experienced counsel.
The class did not purport to protect the interests of black residents only the white attempting to exclude them.
Adequacy is a due process requirement.
97
* Wal-Mart v. Dukes (2011):
No commonality among class of 1.5M women working at Walmart who allege discrimination. Franchise model means that any discrimination is due to regional hiring managers not company-wide policy.
o Prior to Walmart, the commonality threshold was low. Heightened standard applies to all class actions.
o Subclasses may be established with independent counsel for different interests.
o Cannot hybridize if monetary relief not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief. Requires that there are no new legal or factual issues.
98
* Teamsters v. US:
40 accounts of racial discrimination certified to represent 8 members of class each spread throughout company. More representative than in Wal-Mart.
99
* Harrington v. Purdue Pharma:
Bankruptcy code did not permit nonconsensual third-party releases; SCOTUS overturns bankruptcy settlement. Bankruptcy case cannot release third-party liability.
100
* Phillips Petrol. v. Shutts:
Shutts (plaintiff), a royalty owner, brought a class-action suit in a Kansas state court, alleging that the plaintiff class members were owed interest on royalty payments that Phillips had delayed.
Kansas state court can exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state class members because adequacy of representative protects their interests and provides due process.
But, application of Kansas law is sufficiently **arbitrary and unfair as to be unconstitutional**. Choice of law inquiry usually provides defendant’s state law.
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* Amchem v. Windsor (1997):
Asbestos class action settlement invalidated because named plaintiffs inadequate to represent class members, because class members had different interests depending on whether they were presently injured or exposure only.
102
* Ortiz v. Fibreboard (1999):
Prejudice class action certification overturned because there was no evidence “limited fund” was actually limited.
Must be limited by more than just agreement of parties to protect absent class members.
Exclusions from class and allocations of assets are at odds with the concept of limited fund treatment and structural protections of Rule 23(a). SCOTUS calls it “constructive bankruptcy.”
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AT&T v. Concepcion:
Uphold no class-action arbitration contract under Federal Arbitration Act because FAA preempts state law which would have found clause unconscionable.
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