Cases Flashcards
(77 cards)
blind trip foreseeable
Haley v London Electricity Board
inspection relational proximity
Harrison v Technical Sign Co Ltd: D did NOT owe C a DoC because his inspection lacked the relational proximity to C’s injury
spoons banister idiot
Geary v JD Wetherspoon plc: no causal proximity, she was a willing participant and D was not there to protect her from her own foolish endeavours
failed to be brought as an OLA case because there was nothing defective about the premises
court held that if they were wrong in their analysis that it was not an OLA case, C would have been subject to a finding of volenti
caparo tripartite test
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman (Lord Bridge):
(1) harm to C was foreseen or reasonably foreseeable
(2) requisite degree of legal proximity existed between C and D
(3) it is fair, just, and reasonable to impose a DoC (no legal or public reason preclude DoC)
incremental test: novel scenarios should develop incrementally, by close analogy to established categories- courts should ‘hug the coastline’ of established DoCs
police old-lady fall
Robinson v CC of West Yorkshire Police: DoC WAS owed- positive act
boy lorry death
Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis: DoC was owed; liability of D to detain TPs
There was sufficient control over the 3 year old boy; the road was right outside the kindergarten; the kindergarten must have been aware of the propensities of a child to get up to mischief; death happened very shortly after TP wondered off
rippah police
Hill v CC of West Yorkshire Police: core principle that as a matter of public policy the police are precluded from owing a duty of care
Proximity factors precluded DoC: there was no control over TP as he was never in custody; the activity was spread over three major cities
ex stab 999
Michael v CC of South Wales Police: she made 999 calls, operator logged it wrong, she died- no duty despite being a pre-identified victim
shop police fire
Rigby v CC of Northamptonshire: police used gas cannisters and fired them into C’s shop, explosions, shop was ruined, DoC WAS owed- positive act was committed
doc, well, monoxide
Baker v TE Hopkins & Sons Ltd: C was a Good Samaritan who went to the mens’ assistance, but harness got stuck he died in the well- DoC WAS owed to him as it was reasonably foreseeable
there was no finding of CN against the doctor, as the standard was much lower (although there was a finding of CN against the workmen)
no volenti either- it would be repugnant to public policy for the defence to be asserted against a rescuer
voluntary assumption responsibility
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd: D, possessed of special skill, undertook to apply that skill for the assistance of C, who relied upon that skill and requires - an assumption of responsibility by D towards C to conduct himself with reasonable care and/or skill AND a consequential and reciprocal reliance by C upon D in so conducting himself
ambulance late uh-oh
Kent v Griffiths: was told ambulance was on its way, finally arrived 40 minutes late, C suffered heart attack, lost baby, brain damage, was held to owe a DoC; C had relied to her detriment because the alternative was that her husband would have driven her immediately
back surgery paralyzed
Chester v Afshar: C didn’t ask whether she would be paralysed but did ask what could go wrong- he simply replied he hadn’t crippled anyone yet; C was left paralysed
Any risk within single digits should be disclosed, anything below 0.5% probably not
Causation: C said she would’ve done more research, possibly have had the operation at a different time with a different surgeon had she been warned, and causation was found even though she probably would’ve had the operation anyway
Remoteness: principle that for failure to warn cases the risk that manifested must be what was warned about, otherwise it’s too remote
eye surgery blind
Rogers v Whitaker: (Australian case) C was suggested to have surgery to attempt and heal her good eye, she asked to make sure they cover up her good eye so the scalpel doesn’t slip, demonstrating anxiety at not being able to see, her good eye started going blind
It was an objective risk because the reasonable person would want to be warned of the risk of blindness but also subjective because the questions and anxiety expressed by her showed this was the worst outcome for her
horse road danger
Haynes v Harwood: D left his horse untethered, children came along and frightened the horse, which bolted, C launched himself into the path of the horse to save the kids; D was held to have created the source of danger and so owed a DoC despite the pure omission
boys yacht damage
Dorset Yacht Co v Home Office: program to rehabilitate young offenders, involving excursion but they were not supervised well enough one night and tried to escape, causing damage to a yacht
DoC owed by D: the boys were prisoners so in D’s control; the yacht was reasonably physically proximate; officers knew of the propensities of the boys because of the custodial relationship; damage to the silver mist happened very shortly after the escape of the boys
little girl dead
Palmer v Tees HA: no DoC owed to the girl even though TP had disclosed his propensities about sexual feelings towards young children; he was living in the house for 1 year and 1 week (long time, no temporal proximity); once a patient is in an outpatient setting the degree of control reduces immediately; and the hospital was not proximate to the outpatient house
neighbour angry council
Mitchell v Glasgow CC: C’s neighbour didn’t like him, C complained to the council who talked to him, TP appeared calm in the meeting but went back and killed C, no DoC to warn C held to be owed for a number of public policy reasons
e.g. division of resources for all social housing landlords, more warnings you give less people take notice, would effect the wider community
baby super-saturation blind
Wilsher v Essex AHA: (causation went to HL, DoC and breach stopped at CA)
C born prematurely, due to a mistake he was administered more oxygen than required, junior doctor also misread the x-ray that the catheter was misplaced, he was rendered blind
There was no breach in misplacing the catheter (even experienced doctors might do that) but there was a breach in misreading the x-rays and not noting the misplacement- there is no team or average standard of care
Causation failed, as there was more than one possible agent that caused the blindness (and it could not be said, on the balance of probabilities, which one it was)
driving lesson incompetent
Nettleship v Weston: friend taught D to drive, D hit a lamppost and C suffered knee injury- C was still expected to achieve the standard of a reasonable competent driver
eye mechanic blind
Paris v Stepney BC: one-eyed mechanic, chip of metal flew up and entered his good eye, blinding him
probability was low but harm of the injury very high, would have been very cheap to implement some supply goggles- breach
tunnel collision police
Knightley v Johns: inevitable accident (for the driver- D3), there was nothing a reasonable driver could have done differently- no breach
For D1 (who caused the initial accident): no causation because D2’s failure to follow standing orders and shut the gate was so unlikely that it was almost unforeseeable
cricket ball quadrant
Bolton v Stone: cricket ball hit Miss Stone, had happened 6 times in the last 30 years that it was hit over the fence, source of the quadrant;
probability of the injury occurring was very low, harm was medium to high, cost of building a fence very expensive, and social utility of the club would be highly compromised- no breach
brigade, brake, injury
Watt v Hertfordshire CC: fire brigade had a lifting jack in the vehicle which shifted when braking and hit one of the firemen
probability medium to high because it was foreseeable they would need to brake often while driving
injury also medium to high
cheap to the fire brigade to wait for the suitable vehicle to come back for it to be secured properly BUT
social utility would have been very highly compromised- no breach
‘If this accident had occurred in a commercial enterprise without any emergency, there could be no doubt that [C] would succeed. But the commercial end to make profit is very different from the human end to save life or limb. The saving of life or limb justified taking considerable risk’
employer’s liability: sub-duties to provide safe working equipment and a safe system of work were engaged but not breached