Cases Flashcards
(106 cards)
Jonh Labatt Ltd. v. Carling Breweries Ltd. (1974) FC
It is not a proper approach to the determination of whether a mark is descriptive to carefully and critically analyse the words to ascertain if they have alternate implications when used in association with certain goods but rather to look at the words as they are used in association with certain goods and to ascertain what those words in the context in which they are used would represent to the public at large who will see those words and who will form an opinion as to what those words connote.
Miss Universe, Inc. v. Bohna (1994) FCA
To decide whether the use of a mark or of a trade name causes confusion with another mark or another trade name, one must ask whether, as a matter of first impression on the minds of an ordinary person having a vague recollection of that other mark or name, the use of both marks or names in the same area in the same manner is likely to lead to the inference that the services associated with those marks or names are performed by the same person, whether or not the services are of the same general class.
Molnlycke Aktiebolag v. Kimberly-Clark of Canada Ltd. (1982) FC
The onus is always upon an applicant for the registration of a mark to establish that , on the balance of probabilities, there is no likelihood of confusion with a previously used and registered trademark.
United Artists Pictures Inc. v. Pink Panther
Beauty Corp. (1998) FCA
In determining whether there is a likelihood of
confusion between similar trademarks, the
Registrar or the Court must assess the likely
impression made by the marks on the public.
Mihaljevic v. British Columbia (1991) BCCA
A trademark registered to Her Majesty, her
agent or the government is not one whose adoption
is prohibited by Section 9, under which it might be
an identical official mark
Home Juice Company, Home Juice
Company Limited and Jay-Zee Food Products
Limited v. Orange Maison Limitée (1970) SCC
Under s. 12(1)(b), the meaning of words
in the French or English language, within a
trademark, is not limited to how the words are
currently used in Canada.
Dubiner and National Yo-Yo and Bo-Lo
Ltd. v. Heede Int’l Ltd. (1975) TMOB
An applicant in its trademark application must
clearly set forth goods or services as they are
customarily referred to in the trade.
Standard Oil Co. v.. Registrar of Trade
Marks (1968) (Ex Ct)
(1) For trademark purposes, there are at least
three classes of “words”, viz., dictionary words,
names, and invented words. They are all words, at
least for the purposes of the Act.
(2) The response of the general public to a surname needs to be considered.
Maple Leaf Foods Inc v. Consorzio del
Prosciutto di Parma (2012) TMOB
The test of confusion set out in Section 6 of the
Trade-marks Act applies to certification marks.
Metro Goldwyn Mayer Inc. v. Stargate
Connections Inc., (2004) FC
The date of filing of a statement of opposition
is the material date to assess an allegation on nondistinctiveness.
Canadian Jewish Congress v. Chosen
People Ministries, Inc. (2003) FCA
The fact that a body was incorporated as a
non-profit corporation with charitable
objects, has obtained tax exempt status,
has the ability to issue charitable receipts
to donors, and could be asked to provide
its accounts, financial and corporate
information to the Public Guardian and
Trustee of Ontario is not sufficient to
determine whether it is a public authority
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques
Cliquot Ltée, [2006] SCC
Goodwill is not defined in the Act. In ordinary commercial use, goodwill connotes the positive association that attracts customers towards the goods
or services of a trademark owner, rather than the G/S of its competitors.
The test to be applied is a matter of first impression in the mind of a casual consumer somewhat in a hurry who sees the applicant’s mark at a time when he or she has no more than an imperfect recollection of the opponent’s trade-mark, and does not pause to give the matter any detailed consideration or scrutiny, nor to examine closely the similarities and differences between the marks.
Canada Post Corp. v. United States
Postal Service, [2006] FC
S. 9(1)(n)(iii) of the Act requires that, in order to
be entitled to an official mark, the
institution claiming the mark must be a
public authority in Canada.
See You In – Canadian Athletes Fund
Corporation v. Canadian Olympic
Committee, 2007 FC 406
While an official mark is not used for commercial purpose or in the course of trade, ss. 3 and 4 assist in the interpretation of those words. A common feature of both “use” and “adoption” is that there is an element of public display […] If internal discussion, memoranda, etc. which preceded a request for publication constituted adoption and use, the phrase would be meaningless because, in that instance, no request could be sent in without the mark being deemed to be previously adopted and used; the very act of requesting or the internal correspondence on whether to request publication would, theoretically, constitute “adoption and use”.
Stadium Corporation of Ontario Ltd. v.
Wagon-Wheel Concessions Ltd. (1989) FC
Although Parliament could have included
a definition of “public authority” in the
Act, it chose not to. As a result, when an application under s. 9(1) is brought forward the Registrar has to take responsibility for satisfying himself that
the applicant is indeed a public authority.
Canada (Registrar of TMs) v. Harris Knitting Mills (1985) FCA
Evidence filed in response to a s. 45 proceeding does not have to be in the form of an affidavit signed by the RO (but must be filed by the RO)
The Bruce Trail Association v Andrew Camp (2001) TMOB
The Registrar will not accept for recordal on the register an assignment o fan Official Mark
Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc. 2007 SCC
An exclusive licensee cannot assert a claim of secondary infringement of a work reproduced on product packaging, to prevent the importation of grey goods into Canada featuring the same copyrighted
work, if those goods were manufactured by the copyright owner. To be successful, the copyright work should not be “merely incidental” to the product being sold, and there should be a “legitimate economic interest” in the copyright apart from the product itself.
Burke-Robertson and Carhartt Canada Ltd. v. RTM (1994)
Cross-examination is not permitted for s. 45 proceedings
Argenti Inc v. Exode Importations Inc (1984), 8 C.P.R (3d) 174 (FC);
Windmere Corp v. Charlescraft Corp Ltd (1988), 23 C.P.R (3d) 60 (FC)
The transfer of free samples may constitute “use” for the purpose of s. 45, if it is part of the normal course of trade and to solicit future orders of the same product.
Aerosol Fillers Inc v. Plough (Canada) Ltd (1979), 45 C.P.R. (2d) 194 (FC); aff’d (1980), 53 C.P.R. (2d) 62 (FCA)
If an affidavit in a s. 45 proceeding is susceptible of >1 interpretation, the interpretation adverse to the interest of the party in whose favour the affidavit was made should be adopted.
Lewis Thomson & Sons Ltd v. Rogers, Bereskin & Parr (1988), 21 C.P.R. (3d) 483 (FC)
In a s. 45 proceeding, an affidavit which fails to attach an invoice is not presumptively useless.
Philip Morris Inc. v. Imperial tobacco Ltd (No 2) (1987), 17 C.P.R. (3d) 237 (FCA)
Sale to anyone in Canada along the chain of distribution constitutes “use” for the purpose of s. 45.
The purpose and scope of s. 45 is to provide a simple, summary and expeditious procedure for removing “deadwood” from the register. Evidence of a single sale, whether wholesale or retail, in the normal course of trade may well suffice so long as it follows the pattern of a genuine commercial transaction and is not seen as being deliberately manufactured or contrived
to protect the registration of the trademark. There is no need or justification for evidentiary overkill.
Brouillette Kosie Prince v. Great Harvest Franchising Inc (2009), 77 C.P.R. (4th) 247 (FC)
Advertising a service and being ready, willing and able to provide the service constitutes “use” for the purpose of s. 45.