Cases and Holdings Flashcards
(89 cards)
1
Q
Johnson v. M’Intosh
A
A government which discovers/conquers terra nullius (land not previously discovered by white, Christian men for a sovereign power) has a right of ownership of that land.
Title to land is held by the discovering or conquering government until it is purchased by or granted to another party, whether a state or an individual. (Indians merely have right to occupy)
2
Q
Pierson v. Post
A
Mere pursuit of an object, no matter how near attaining the object the pursuer, is not enough to constitute possession. Possession requires bodily possession (manucapture), mortal wounding, or the ability to escape being highly impaired (deprived of actual liberty).
Policy: Livingston’s dissent: No one would hunt foxes if other came in at the last second to take the animal away from the original pursuer. Custom here was ignored (sportsmen were not asked opinion).
3
Q
Ghen v. Rich
A
The whaling industry’s custom takes precedent: one who mortally wounds a whale and affixes upon it a symbol of his/her brand is the owner and possessor of that whale, no matter who should discover it.
Policy: No person would engage in the practice if the fruits of his labor could be appropriated by any chance finder.
However, this holding discourages the industry from developing a more efficient mechanism for whaling.
4
Q
Keeble v. Hickeringill
A
An owner of property has a given right to make profitable and lawful use of his own property without malicious interference of others.
5
Q
International News Service v. Associated Press
A
Quasi-property rights, “postpone participation by a news distributor’s competitor in the processes of distribution and reproduction of news that it has not gathered, and only to the extent necessary to prevent that competitor from reaping the fruits of complainant’s efforts and expenditure.”
6
Q
Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp
A
In absence of some trademark, or recognized right at common law, or under a statute, a man’s property right is limited to the actual chattels that embody his invention. Others may imitate these at their pleasure. (Copyrighted, patented, trademarked, or in physical form).
7
Q
Smith v. Chanel, Inc.
A
In absence of some trademark, or recognized right at common law, or under a statute, a man’s property right is limited to the actual chattels that embody his invention. Others may imitate these at their pleasure. So long as they do not claim that they are the same product (made by the same entity as the original).
8
Q
White v. Samsung Electronics (dissent)
A
“Under the majority’s opinion, it’s now a tort for advertisers to remind the public of a celebrity. Not to use a celebrity’s name, voice, signature or likeness; not to imply the celebrity endorses a product; but simply to evoke the celebrity’s image in the public’s mind…. It conflicts with the Copyright Act and the Copyright Clause. It raises serious First Amendment problems. It’s bad law, and it deserves a long, hard second look.”
“Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it’s supposed to nurture.”
9
Q
Moore v. Regents of the University of California
A
Body parts may not be sold for profit; the theory of conversion does not apply to cells/body parts taken from a patient.
10
Q
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.
A
Not “giving a fuck” is not a permissible excuse to invade a private land owner’s right to the land.
Society has an interest in punishing and deterring intentional trespassers beyond that of protecting the interests of the individual landowner. Society has an interest in preserving the integrity of the legal system. Private landowners should feel confident that wrongdoers who trespass upon their land will be appropriately punished. When landowners have confidence in the legal system, they are less likely to resort to ‘self-help’ remedies….”
11
Q
State v. Shack
A
“A man’s right in his real property of course is not absolute. It was a maxim of the common law that one should so use his property as not to injure the rights of others. Although hardly a precise solvent of actual controversies, the maxim does express the inevitable proposition that rights are relative and there must be an accommodation when then meet. Hence it has long been true that necessity, private or public, may justify entry upon the lands of another.
12
Q
Armory v. Delamirie
A
The title of the finder is good against the whole world but the true owner. (If the jewel was not produced, the court would assume that the jewel stolen was the most valuable jewel possible).
13
Q
Hannah v. Peel
A
Because Defendant was not physically present in the house at any time and did not know of the brooch’s existence, Plaintiff’s find was defensible against all parties except the rightful owner. Honest finders will be rewarded.
14
Q
Andersen v. Goldberg
A
One who has acquired the possession of property, whether by finding, bailment, or mere tort has a right to retain the possession as against a mere wrongdoer who is a stranger to that property.
15
Q
Bridges v. Hawkesworth (Part of Hannah v. Peel)
A
Held that the banknotes belonged to the finder, as the shopkeeper never truly held ownership of the banknotes (the notes were in a public area of the shop, and were left on the floor and the true owner couldn’t be found) [mislaid, lost, or abandoned]
16
Q
South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman
A
Land owner carries with it possession of everything which is attached or under that land even without knowledge of its being there.
17
Q
Elwes v. Brigg Gaw Co.
A
Owner had no knowledge of the boat being under the ground, and such, the finder is entitled to the boat.
18
Q
McAvoy v. Medina
A
When an item is found on a table or “misplaced,” in a shop, the shop owner is entitled to keep it over the finder. This is to provide the best possible means of returning the item to its rightful owner. Shop owner has a duty to attempt to return the property to its rightful owner.
19
Q
Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz
A
Adverse possession requires an entry that is open and notorious, continuous for the statutory period, adverse, and under a claim of right (hostile). Proof of claim of right can be substantial improvements to the land, and enclosures.
20
Q
Howard v. Kunto
A
Tacking of adverse possession is permitted if the successive occupants are in “privity” – privity of estate which connects the possession of the successive occupants.
It has become firmly established that the requisite possession requires such possession and dominion as ordinarily marks the conduct of owners in general in holding, managing, and caring for property of like nature and condition.
21
Q
Buchanan v. Cassell
A
if the evidence shows that the deed to X was intended by the parties to convey not only the described land but also the adversely possessed strip, X is allowed to “tack” that strip onto the land described in the deed.
22
Q
O’Keefe v. Snyder
A
Discovery Rule: “In an appropriate case, a cause of action will not accrue until the injured party discovers, or by exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered, facts which form the basis of a cause of action.” Putting in reasonable diligence to recover the stolen or misplaced goods tolls the statutory period (makes it stop).
Under the doctrine of adverse possession, the burden is on the possessor to prove the elements of adverse possession. Under the discovery rule, the burden is on the owner as the one seeking the benefit of the rule to establish facts that would justify deferring the beginning of the period of limitations.
23
Q
Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.
A
Good title cannot be passed on in a sale by a thief. The court noted that the due diligence determination is “highly fact-sensitive and must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”
24
Q
Pile v. Pedrick
A
Even if the construction intrudes one and one half inches into the neighboring property, and built in good faith, the encroached upon may compel the builder to knock down the offending structure.
25
Raab v. Casper
Once a person acting in good faith is put on notice of his/her possible trespass, it is negligent for that person to continue to build in ignorance of the actual boundaries.
26
Newman v. Bost
- To constitute a donatio causa mortis, two things are indispensably necessary: an intention to make a gift, and a delivery of the thing given.
- Actual manual delivery must occur when articles are present and capable of manual delivery. Constructive delivery may occur when the things intended to be given are not present, or when present are incapable of manual delivery because of their weight or size.
- “But “the bureau and any other article of furniture, locked and unlocked by any of the keys given to the plaintiff, did pass and she became the owner thereof.” This is because these items were too big to be manually delivered manually, “and the delivery of the keys was a constructive delivery of these articles, equivalent to an actual delivery if the articles had been capable of manual delivery.” “We are of the opinion that other articles of household furniture (except those in the plaintiff’s private bed chamber) did not pass to the plaintiff, but remained the property of the defendant’s intestate.”
27
Gruen v. Gruen
In order for an inter vivos gift to be valid, there must be intent on the part of the donor to make a gift, delivery by the donor to the donee and acceptance of the gift by the donee. An inter vivos gift requires that the donor intend to make an irrevocable present transfer of ownership. Delivery of the gift can be by physical, constructive, or symbolic delivery, sufficient to divest the donor of dominion of the property. Acceptance by the donee will be presumed when the gift is of value to the donee.
Matter of Szabo – what is sufficient to constitute delivery must be tailored to suit the circumstances of the case; the delivery necessary to consummate a gift must be as perfect as the nature of the property and the circumstances and surroundings of the parties will reasonably permit
28
Spiller v. Mackereth
Unless there has been an ouster, the co-tenant in possession does not have to pay a proportionate share of the rental value to the cotenants not in possession. In order to prove ouster, a cotenant not in possession must show that EITHER she demanded and was denied entry, OR the co-tenant in possession actively prevented the non-possessory cotenant from entering (adding new locks is simply an action of a normal owner).
29
Varnum v. Brien
Property rights apply equally to all citizens. To hold otherwise would violate the Equal Protection Clause (according to Iowa). You cannot grant privileges to one class over another.
30
United States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue
Wife allowed to retain interest in property despite husband’s illegal activities. Tenancy in the entirety.
31
Mahoney v. Mahoney
Ct declined to recognize a professional degree as marital property. Such an item was too speculative in value. There will be circumstances where a supporting spouse should be reimbursed for the financial contributions he or she made to the spouse’s successful professional training.
32
Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co.
- An owner of a property who intentionally creates and maintains a nuisance is liable for the injuries caused regardless of the degree of care or skill taken to avoid such injury. (This is an example of a rule 1 - the resident held the initial right to the activity and set the price of stopping the nuisance.)
- “Any substantial nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by any type of liability forming conduct is a private nuisance; that the invasion which subjects a person to liability for private nuisance may be either intentional or unintentional; that a person is subject to liability for an unintentional invasion when his conduct is negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous.”
33
Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop.
(Goes against the Restatement’s take on nuisance)
When the damage suffered by residents (threshold is “substantial interference”), the polluter strictly liable for the damages caused. Damages are calculated according to the degree of danger and injury created by Defendant’s conduct, regardless of Defendant’s degree of care.
34
Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.
The court held that, “in the atomic age” to define a trespass as, “any intrusion which invades the possessor’s protected interest in exclusive possession, whether that intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can be measured only by the mathematical language of the physicist.” (referring to fumes from an aluminum plant)
35
Wilson v. Interlake
Excessive noise alone would not support trespass action absent some kind of physical invasion or physical damage to the property. Intangible intrusions must be approached on a nuisance theory.
36
Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz
When the jury finds there is a nuisance, the court should balance the equities to determine if an injunction should be granted. The nuisance in this case will not be permitted to exist “based on the stern rule of necessity rather than on the right of the author of the nuisance to work a hurt, or injury to his neighbor.”
37
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.
When the value of a nuisance outweighs the harm to the plaintiff’s, the injunction will be vacated upon the payment of permanent damages to Plaintiffs, which would compensate them for present and future economic loss to their property.
-Dissent - this doesn’t promote innovation, or the purchasing of a “land mote.” “by overruling the long established rule of granting injunctions, the court is allowing ongoing wrongs to be continued via payment of a fee.” In the future, rich companies could simply invest a lot of money to ensure their nuisance would not be enjoined.
38
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.
(Example of Rule 4 - polluter holds initial entitlement, but court sets the price i.e. P pays D not to pollute) If a residential owner knowingly comes into an area reserved for industrial or agricultural endeavors, he may not be entitled to relief until he pays polluter not to pollute.
39
Garner v. Gerrish
Despite violations of Numerus Clausus, a lessor can create a life tenancy in a lessee in which the lessee has the sole power to terminate the lease.
Because livery of seisin, like the ancient requirement for a seal, has been abandoned here is no longer any reason why a lease granting the tenant alone the right to terminate at will, should be converted into a tenancy at will terminable by either party
40
Hannah v. Dusch
The American Rule: “Recognizes the lessee’s legal right to possession, but implies no such duty upon the lessor as against wrongdoers…. The landlord is not bound to put the tenant into actual possession, but is bound only to put him in legal possession, so that no obstacle in the form of superior right of possession will be interposed to prevent the tenant from obtaining actual possession of the demised premises.”
```
This Court (VA) goes with the American rule, which grants the lessee has a right to possession, but absent an explicit covenant, the lessor has no duty to deliver possession.
The English rule on one hand, implies a covenant requiring the lessor to put the lessee in possession. The American rule, on the other hand, recognizes the lessee’s right to possession, but imposes no duty on the lessor to deliver possession.
```
41
Ernst v. Conditt
While the lease called the interest a sublease, an assignment was actually created because the tenant (T1) conveyed all of his remaining interest to the new tenant (T2). However, because T1 already agreed to be liable for damages during that period, T1 could still be held liable for non-payment of rent by T2.
42
Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc.
“Where a commercial lease provides for assignment only with the prior consent of the lessor, such consent may be withheld only where the lessor has a commercially reasonable objection to the assignee or the proposed use.”
Both the policy against restraints on alienation and the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing militate in favor of adoption of the rule that where a commercial lease provides for assignment only with the prior consent of the lessor, such consent may be withheld only where the lessor has a commercially reasonable objection to the assignee or the proposed use. Under this rule, appellants have stated a cause of action against respondent Ernest Pestana, Inc.
43
Berg v. Wiley
The only lawful means to dispossess a tenant who has not abandoned nor voluntarily surrendered, but who claims possession and rights adverse to those claimed by landlord, is by resort to judicial process.
Self-help is allowed in situations of abandonment.
However, Minnesota has historically followed the common law rule that a landlord may rightfully use self-help to retake leased premises from a tenant provided that the (1) landlord is legally entitled to possession (the tenant has abandoned the property) and (2) landlord’s means of reentry are peaceable.
44
Summer v. Kridel
Application of the contract rule requiring mitigation of damages to a residential lease may be justified as a matter of basic fairness.
A LL has an affirmative duty to mitigate damages in questions of contract for any a tenant’s payment when there is a possibility of default.
In a residential lease, a landlord has a duty to mitigate damages when he seeks to recover past due rent from a defaulting tenant.
45
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper
Constructive eviction is found where the landlord promised to find the leaks in the property which caused it to flood but never did fix it, despite repeated requests.
Requirements of constructive eviction: (1) Covenant of quiet enjoyment (could be implicit) (2) Breach of covenant (3) Breach is substantial (not leaving immediately = not substantial)
46
Hilder v. St. Peter
All residential rentals have a warranty of habitability which cannot be contracted away. The warranty of habitability is a non-waivable covenant between landlord and tenant. The warranty of habitability requires that the premises by delivered over and maintained in a condition that is fit for human habitation.
Tenant must show: (1) LL had notice of the defect, within a reasonable amount of time, to repair it and (2) the defect, affecting habitability, existed during the time for which rent was withheld
A tenant’s right to claim a constructive eviction will be lost if he does not vacate the premises w/in a reasonable time after the right comes into existence
Policy behind change to implied warrant of habitability: (1) Tenants today contract for a package of goods and services that are increasingly necessary because the tenants are urban apartment-dwellers which do not have the skills or resources to fix essential fixtures on their own. The Tenant is also in an inferior bargaining position and cannot “vote with their feet.” (2) imposes a cost on poor by decreasing supply.
47
Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp.
```
The implied warranty comes from D.C.: Judge Skelly Wright. Because of the holding establishing a warranty of habitability, the landlord couldn’t afford the building (b/c the poor tenants didn’t pay rent). The building was bought by a Community Development Center and they too went bankrupt. Another CDC bought it, and cheap apartments became market-priced apartments. [Housing vouchers work well. Housing projects do not.]
[The federal government is supporting the trickle-down model of housing the poor by providing subsidies (the mortgage deduction) which are generally taken advantage of by upper or upper-middle-class people.]
```
48
Chicago Board of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago (housing for the poor)
Judges Easterbrook and Posner suggested that empirical data suggested that when the price of rental housing is artificially depressed and the cost to the landlords artificially increased, supply falls and many tenants, usually the poorer and newer tenants are hurt.
This statute rests the initial costs of the new standards on landlords. This could have the effect of depleting their resources, thus leaving them with little capital to use to the quality of the housing.
49
Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist
A grantor may reserve interest in the land to be granted for use by 3d party (common law says must reserve in self, but this ct decided that may go to 3d party = against common law). An appurtenant easement attaches to the property to allow a neighbor to cross in order to get to the property. The deed for the property being crossed would need to list the easement. A gross easement would specify a person to benefit. The easement (rights) attach to the dominant tenant (exerciser). Common law property rule prohibiting the transfer of easements to third parties was abandoned entirely in favor of the common law contractual doctrine favoring giving effect to contractual purposes.
50
Holbrook v. Taylor
The revocation of the license to use the land is disallowed by estoppel because they justifiably relied on the license to use the road (building a house, improving it, etc.). This is the same type of idea as the good faith improver rule and certain adverse possession claims.
“But the law recognizes that one may acquire a license to use a passway or roadway where, with the knowledge of the licensor, he has in the exercise of the privilege, spent money in improving the way or for other purposes connected with its use on the faith that of the license. Under such conditions the license becomes irrevocable and continues for so long a time as nature calls for it.”
51
Van Sandt v. Royster
The Plaintiff purchased the property upon careful inspection and knowledge that the property had modern plumbing. Plaintiff was thus charged with notice of the sewer and an easement by implication was created. The easement was necessary for the comfortable enjoyment of the grantor’s property. An easement is implied to protect the probable expectations of the grantor and grantee that a prior existing use will continue after the transfer. Thus, where the grantee is aware of a reasonably necessary use of the grantee’s property for the comfortable enjoyment of the grantor’s property an easement by implication is created
52
Othen v. Rosier
An easement that is merely convenient is not sufficient to establish an easement by necessity. Not prescriptive when the easement was permissive and the owner knew about the use. A prescriptive easement is akin to adverse possession, and when it is not done hostile or adverse to the true claim of right, there is no easement by prescription.
In order to find an implied easement, you must look back to the time of the common owner and determine whether the easement was a necessity and not a mere convenience at the time of the severance of the dominant and servient estate. The court here presumed that the use of the road was permissive, rather than adverse because it was not exclusive.
53
Raleigh Avenue Beach Assn. v. Atlantis Beach Club
The public trust doctrine requires the Atlantis property be open to the general public at a reasonable fee (including incurred expenses for management services) for services provided by the owner and approved by the Department of Environmental Protection. All people must have access to the beach. The public msut be granted reasonable access to the sea for recreational purposes.
54
Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass.
The right to bathe was prescriptively granted (it would be unjust to hold otherwise). Additionally, “we may assume that these privileges are easements in gross, and we see no reason to consider them otherwise. It has uniformly been held that profit in gross may be assignable.” However, an assignment is valid, but it cannot be aligned in such a way that it may be utilized by grantor and grantee, or by several grantees, separately; there must be a joint user, nor can one of the tenants alone convey a share in the common right. There must be a “combined exploitation of privileges” and the easement must be used as “one stock.”
Easements in gross are divisible and assignable when the creating instrument so indicates or when the easement is exclusive (the sole right to engage in the activity on the premises). However, when the easement is divided, there must be “one stock;” one cannot be commercially used and grant licenses without the common consent and joinder of the present owners.
NOTE on Prescription: The Othen v. Rosier case, the court presumed that the use of the road was permissive, rather than adverse because it was not exclusive.
55
Brown v. Voss
Normally, appurtenant easements allow access only to the particular parcel of land to which it was granted. However, equity may estop the servient estate from enforcing rules against access to further parcels when the servient estate would experience no increased burden.
56
Preseault v. United States
In order to establish an abandonment there must be in addition to nonuse, acts by owner of the dominant tenement conclusively manifesting either a present intent to relinquish the easement or a purpose inconsistent w/ its future exercise.
Using a right of way, previously used for a railway, as a walking path was not within the scope of the previously granted easemen
57
Tulk v. Moxhay
An equitable servitude (running with the land) is enforceable by injunction with no regard to privity, so long as the promise is intended to run and the subsequent purchaser has actual or constructive knowledge of the covenant. (privity of estate, not of contract).
58
Sanborn v. McLean
A reciprocal negative easement is attached to all lands sold in a common development scheme, and even though a restriction is outside of the direct chain of title, subsequent buyers will be deemed to have constructive notice when “one [can] not avoid noticing the strictly uniform residential character given the lot by the expensive dwellings thereon.”
59
Neponsit Property Owners’ Association, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank
Age-old essentials of real covenant, aside from the form of the covenant, may be summarily formulated as follows: (1) it must appear the grantor and grantee intended that the covenant should run with the land; (2) it must appear that the covenant is one “touching” or “concerning” the land with which it runs; (3) it must appear that there is “privity of estate” between that promisee or party claiming the benefit of the covenant and the right to enforce it, and the promisor or party who rest under the burden of the covenant. (4) This is subject to the Statute of Frauds, and therefore must be included in a written instrument.
Here, paying dues to the homeowners’ association does “touch and concern the land” because it literally does concern the property rights and value attached thereto.
The new test from this court about whether a covenant touches and concerns the land is whether it alters the legal relation of the parties as owners of interest in the land. This is highly expansive.
60
Shelley v. Kraemer
The 14th Amendment prohibits state cts from enforcing the race-based restrictive covenants of private individuals.
The holding stands, but the reasoning does not. Now, the Court looks to the Fair Housing Act, not the 14th Amendment.
61
Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski
Restrictive covenant restricting the use of the entire 40 acres of the subdivision to single-family dwellings and prohibiting any stores or other business of any kind is enforced to enjoin Western Land from building a shopping mall on a 3.5 acre parcel of the land. Circumstances had not changed enough (neither the residential and single family character of the neighborhood nor the achievability of the purpose of the restrictive covenant) and the restrictive covenant had not been abandoned.
62
Rick v. West
A landowner who purchased land w/ knowledge of a restrictive covenant governing his land and the surrounding land is entitled to enforce that covenant against other parties.
Should inability of market to make this residential count as changing circumstances? According to court, no.
-How to protect both developer and buyer? Restrict only for time period, if doesn’t work out change it; or make only a portion of the land restricted; or make a price floor - restriction only if at least 20% of lots sold.
-Tells you the limits of nuisance. Nuisance wouldn’t necessarily take care of things like helicopter or ambulance noises. That’s why you would need restrictive covenants.
63
Citibrook v. Morgan’s Food
Court held that a covenant restricting forever the use of land for the exclusive purpose of building and operating a KFC was invalid b/c it was unreasonable in duration. (Unreasonable restriction on the land)
64
Pocono Springs Civil Association, Inc. v. MacKenzie
“No authority exists in PA that allows for the abandonment of real property when owned in fee simple with perfect title.” To abandon you must relinquish all rights to the title and claim to possession with intention to terminate ownership. Other actions to disassociate from the land will not be enough.
Restatement
The distinctive feature of a common-interest community is the obligation that binds the owners of individual lots or units to contribute to the support of common property, or other facilities, or to support the activities of an association, whether or not the owner uses the common property or facilities or agrees to join the association.
65
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass. Inc.
Agreed-to use restrictions, even if the resident did not known of the restriction, is presumed valid and will be enforced unless it is shown that they are unreasonable, arbitrary, or against the Constitution/fundamental right. In determining whether a restriction is “unreasonable,” and thus not enforceable, the focus is on the restriction’s effect on the project as a whole, not on the individual homeowner. For all agreements, there is the rebuttable presumption of validity.
66
40 West 67th Street Corp. v. Pullman
Review of a cooperative residential association’s decision is subject to the business judgment rule, rather than to statutory landlord-tenant law
To trigger further judicial scrutiny, shareholder-tenant must show that the Board acted:
o (1) Outside the scope of its authority
o (2) In a way that did not legitimately further the corporate purpose
o (3) In bad faith
67
Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners Assn.
“We recognize, of course, that tier 3 registrants (and indeed convicted criminals) are not a protected group within the terms of New Jersey’s Law against discrimination. It does not necessarily follow, however, that large segments of the State could entirely close their doors to such individuals, confining them to a narrow corridor and thus perhaps exposing those within that remaining corridor to a greater risk of harm then they might have otherwise had to confront.”
68
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
Zoning is ok. The state uses its police power to enforce zoning (health and safety). Courts use nuisance as a way to determine whether the zoning exclusions were proper
69
PA Northwestern Distributors, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board
A lawful nonconforming use establishes in the property owner a vested property right that cannot be abrogated or destroyed, unless it is a (1) nuisance, (2) it is abandoned, or it is (3) extinguished by eminent domain
-24 States allow amortization if during a reasonable period.
Not necessarily protecting expectation of future development, even though it’s reasonable and justifiable. Not going to protect it unless property is developed. Which means as landowner, incentivize to develop as quickly as possible (before the zoning ordinance is changed).
70
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
Board may in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards make special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance in harmony w/ its general purpose and intent, and may authorize in specific cases such variance form the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest.
71
Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment
A variance should be granted if (1) the party seeking the variance can establish undue hardship should the variance not be granted, and (2) that the granting of the variance would not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zoning plan.
72
Cope v. Inhabitants of the Town of Brunswick
The board is behaving in a way that acts legislatively when it makes such unrestrained decisions. There must be standards for determining why an exception should not issue, not just an application of a vague standard such as prongs 2 (health and safety) or 4 (characteristic of the surrounding area) (which make no reference to the application of standards set by the legislature). Exceptions should be explicitly specified, and cannot be overly vague.
Exceptions should be granted or denied according to a set standard to prevent unrestrained, legislature-esque decision-making.
73
State v. City of Rochester
“[W]hen a municipality adopts or amends a zoning ordinance, it acts in a legislative capacity under its delegated police powers. As a legislative act, a zoning or rezoning classification must be upheld unless opponents prove that the classification is unsupported y any rational basis related to promoting the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, or that the classification amounts to a taking without compensation. . . . ”
Factors suggesting invalidity of spot zoning:
o (1) Small parcel singled out a privileged
o (2) Singling out is for private, not public benefit
o (3) Not accord w/ comprehensive plan
If it looks like a spot-rezoning, it’s going to be treated as such and subject to analogous review. It’s a very fine line between spot re-zoning and taking (which requires just compensation).
74
State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley (LADUE)
City of Ladue, by way of its Architectural Board, could prohibit a “hideous monstrosity . . . of ultramodern design” which is out of conformity with houses in the area from being built among its high-value homes because the city had the authority to regulate pursuant to protection of the police powers. This included of the general welfare of the residents (which included happiness, property value and resultant ability to maximize the value of taxes collected therefrom, and the essential character of the area).
75
Anderson v. City of Issaquah
When enforcement standards are not based on monetary value but instead on vague standards such as harmony, interest, and depth, deprive an applicant of due process in the land certification process.
76
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas
A zoning ordinances that excludes more than two unrelated people from living together does not violate the Constitution.
The dissent more accurately reflects the Court’s position today. Marshall, J., focuses on the right to choose household composition, basing it on family rights, sanctity of the home, privacy (generally), freedom of association, prohibition against discrimination between married and unmarried persons, and right of intimate association.
77
Moore v. City of East Cleveland
“When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation on the family, neither Belle Terre nor Euclid governs.” This case concerns the composition of a family, not a household.
78
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.
The Exception to the Fair Housing Acts occupancy requirement must be based in health and safety and applied uniformly. These standards are meant to prevent overcrowding, not to give preferential treatment to certain kinds of families. This case did not rule on whether alcoholics qualified as "disabled" under the FHA.
79
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel
Zoning Boards may not zone as to exclude low income residents. The Board must act for the general welfare of the state as a whole, not simply a particular municipality. Euclid showed a preference for upholding the general welfare for the municipality while this case showed a preference for the general welfare of the state as a whole. Here, the need to serve the general welfare of the state outweighed the need to serve the general welfare of the particular municipality.
(Incentives of excluding the poor) Tax base improvements:
o Single-family homes, on large tracts of land, with few children
§ Don’t have to provide as many services
Downside of including the poor:
Smaller tax revenue, more services required (more students in school).
80
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
The court held that a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent if they challenge that environmental regulations impact minorities adversely and violate the Equal Protection Clause.
81
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel properly known as Mount Laurel II
Mount Laurel applies to all municipalities, not just developing ones. There is an affirmative duty of a municipality to offer housing for low and moderate income families.
82
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
The court held that a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent if they challenge that environmental regulations impact minorities adversely and violate the Equal Protection Clause.
83
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel properly known as Mount Laurel II.
Mount Laurel applies to all municipalities, not just developing ones. There is an affirmative duty of a municipality to offer housing for low and moderate income families.
84
Kelo v. New London
Taking for the “public purpose” (the “end”) of economic development is an acceptable “public use,” even if part of land is transferred to private parties. This dispute is just about taking of property to build the Pfizer plant and the retail stores, because there’s no question that taking to build a public park is a public use. When a taking from a private party goes to another private party, it is a valid taking when the taking is part of a broad “economic development scheme.”
Public use - so long as a taking is rationally related to an conceivable public purpose, requirement for public use is satisfied.
If a taking is effected as part of a larger project that is for the public purpose, the individual use of that parcel is not considered “in isolation.” The purpose of the project is considered in the aggregate. Cannot conceptually sever the land.
1. Berman, cited herein: Court said that a residential area could be condemned and part of it utilized for the construction of streets, schools, and other public facilities.
2. Midkiff: The government of Hawaii accused Native Hawaiians of being an oligarchy by holding so much land and took their land to redistribute it to tenants on that land. The taking was constitutional.
85
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
Any permanent physical occupation, no matter how small, is a taking and must be compensated. This is a per se bright line rule.
86
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
The Kohler Act forbids mining under people’s homes in most situations. The act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power in this way (without it being a taking). The opinion holds that the act is invalid. People can contract for whatever they want and are empowered to make terrible decisions regarding their property rights. The state can’t abrogate property rights to protect such people. The property owners should have acquired the subsurface rather than just the surface.
The diminution in value test: When state regulation goes too far and substantial diminution in value of the property results, there has been a taking.
This was a conceptual severance.
87
Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York
Several factors must be weighed to determine whether a taking occurred: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment backed expectations, and (2) the character of the government action, a taking is more readily found when the government has physically invaded the property than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
Here, the property interests in the parcel at issue are aggregated rather than regarding them as separate interests which could be taken individually.
Cannot designate Landmarks as taking: scatteredness of designations (across Manhattan) view, district as a whole rather than Grand Central as isolated incident; because they are scattered, each of the the landmarks does benefit
This was not a conceptual severance.
In deciding whether a particular government action has effected a taking, this Court focuses both on the character of the action and the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole - here, the city tax block designated as the “landmark site.”
88
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
If a regulation denies a property of all of its economic value through a regulation, that is a taking (unless the prohibited use is a nuisance).
89
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
In determining whether a temporary taking has occurred, “requires careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.”
You cannot conceptually server time.
“The categorical rule that we applied in Lucas states that compensation is required when a regulation deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial uses” of his land. But our holding was limited to “the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.” The emphasis on the word “no” in the text of the opinion was, in effect, reiterated in a footnote explaining that the categorical rule would not apply if the diminution in value were 95% instead of 100%. Anything less than a “complete elimination of value,” or a “total loss,” the Court acknowledged would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central.”
